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Foreword
Hatem A. El-Karanshawy
Founding Dean, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Hamad bin Khalifa University, Qatar Foundation, Doha
The International Conference on Islamic Economics and 
Finance (ICIEF) is the leading academic conference in the 
discipline organized by the International Association for 
Islamic Economics (IAIE) in collaboration with other key 
stakeholders, including the Islamic Research and Training 
Institute, Islamic Development Bank. It is the pioneering 
international conference on Islamic economics organized 
first in Makkah Al Mukaramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
in 1976 under the auspices of King Abdulaziz University 
and has since been held in numerous locations around the 
world. The conference as such has contributed immensely 
to the promotion of Islamic economics and finance. Since 
2011, the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies (QFIS), of 
Hamad bin Khalifa University, Qatar Foundation, has also 
become a key partner in organizing the conference.
The global economy continues to face the perennial 
problems of poverty, persistent youth unemployment, 
excessive inequalities of income and wealth, high levels of 
inflation, large macroeconomic and budgetary imbalances, 
exorbitant debt-servicing burdens, inadequate and aging 
public utilities and infrastructure, skyrocketing energy 
prices, and growing food insecurity. The reoccurring 
regional and global financial crises further intensify 
and magnify these problems, particularly for the 
underprivileged segments of the world population. As a 
result, many countries are at the risk of failing to achieve 
by 2015 the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
set by the United Nations. Hence the achievement of an 
inclusive and sustainable economic and financial system 
has remained highly illusive.
The ICIEF presents an excellent opportunity for those 
interested in Islamic economics and finance to present their 
research and contribute to the development of an inclusive 
and sustainable global economic and financial system. It is 
through such a setting that thoughts can be debated with 
the objective of advancing knowledge creation, facilitating 
policymaking and promoting genuine innovation for 
the industry and the markets. Disseminating research 
presented at ICIEF to the greatest number of researchers 
interested in the topic is important. It not only advances 
the discourse, but also grants those who did not have the 
privilege of attending the conference to partake in the 
discussion.
To this end, this series of five volumes (two in Arabic to 
follow) presents the proceedings of 8th and 9th conferences, 
which were held in Doha and Istanbul respectively in 2011 
and 2013. Each volume focuses on a particular sub-theme 
within the broader theme of Developing Inclusive and 
Sustainable Economic and Financial Systems.
The volumes are as follows:
Volume 1:  Access to Finance – Essays on Zakah, Awqaf and 
Microfinance
Volume 2:  Islamic Economics and Social Justice – Essays 
on Theory and Policy
Volume 3:  Islamic Banking and Finance – Essays on 
Corporate Finance, Efficiency, and Product 
Development
Volume 4:  Ethics, Governance, and Regulation in Islamic 
Finance
Volume 5:  Financial Stability and Risk Management in 
Islamic Financial Institutions
We hope that this academic endeavor in partnership with 
the Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation Publishing will benefit 
the Islamic economics and finance community and policy 
makers and that it will promote further academic study of 
the discipline.
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frontiers of knowledge in the area of Islamic economics 
and finance. Without the hard work and creativity of the 
researchers who shared their work with us, the pool of 
knowledge generated in the form of the conference papers 
and presentations would not have been possible. We thank 
all the authors who submitted their abstracts and papers 
to the two conferences.
The IAIE has always endeavored to publish most of the 
significant research papers contributed to its conferences. 
Currently the selected papers of the 8th and 9th conference 
are being published in five volumes under the common 
theme of Developing Inclusive and Sustainable Economic 
and Financial Systems. On behalf of the Editorial Board we 
acknowledge that the partnership with the Bloomsbury 
Qatar Foundation Publishing in this regard will be 
highly beneficial in disseminating research output and in 
promoting the academic cause.
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Dr. Moh’d Azmi Omar
Director General, Islamic Research & Training Institute (IRTI)
Over the past two decades the Islamic finance industry 
has grown at an increasing rate. During this time, issues 
of ethics, governance, and regulation have defied the 
sector, and they continue until this day to challenge many 
jurisdictions across the globe. Weakness observed in these 
important domains has direct implications on overall 
financial stability, development of the Islamic financial 
industry, and the perception of current and prospective 
consumers. For example, the moral grounding of Islamic 
finance is one of the strongest value additions that it 
presents to world markets. It is, therefore, essential for 
the industry to maintain its ethical nature and not sever 
this bond for the sake of a quick profit that is devoid of 
value. On the same note, Shariah compliance of banking 
activities differentiates this industry from its counterpart. 
It should, therefore, be perceived by consumers and other 
stakeholders as a strategic advantage and not a burden on 
market players. However, due to human capital challenges 
as well as gaps and inefficiencies in practices, Shariah 
compliance is sometimes perceived to be an impediment 
rather than a value addition. Researching Shariah issues 
and devising solutions to solve these problems is thus 
critical. Closely related to this are matters of governance 
that have been brought to prominence as a result of 
scandals that have resulted in the failure of international 
financial institutions and other corporations. The Islamic 
financial industry can afford to shun these experiences, 
learn from them, and work toward strengthening their 
governance practices. Finally, regulation is vital for 
healthy growth of the industry. Without the involvement 
of regulatory authorities, much of the efforts expounded 
at the institutional level are contained within limited 
organizational boundaries and yet the risks emerge on the 
macro level.
This volume titled Ethics, Governance, and Regulation in 
Islamic Finance is an attempt to highlight these important 
inter-related topics. It consists of 14 papers that focus on 
their numerous dimensions. The papers were selected from 
the 8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and 
Finance held in Doha, 19–21 December 2011, and from 
the 9th International Conference on Islamic Economics 
and Finance held in Istanbul, 9–11 September 2013. They 
are presented here in their original form, with changes 
limited to copyediting and correcting typographical errors. 
The conferences were organized by the Center for Islamic 
Economics and Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies 
(QFIS), Hamad bin Khalifa University; Islamic Research 
and Training Institute (IRTI), Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB); International Association for Islamic Economics 
and Finance (IAIE); and Statistical, Economic, and Social 
Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries 
(SESRIC).
I hope that the papers selected in this volume not only 
reflect the diverse academic research conducted on ethics, 
governance, and regulation, but also motivate researchers 
to dedicate extra time and effort to studying these 
fundamental topics that influence the present and future 
direction of the Islamic financial industry.
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Senior Researcher, Center for Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies,  
Hamad bin Khalifa University
For over twenty years, Islamic financial markets have 
demonstrated strong growth in both the Eastern and 
Western hemispheres, thereby signaling continued interest 
by consumers and investors in this niche financial sector. 
Such growth, however, should not be taken for granted as it 
comes with its own set of challenges that need to be studied 
and aptly addressed. The recent financial crisis, which shook 
markets and economies around the globe, is great evidence 
that market corrections eventually occur irrespective of 
astounding growth rates that may be experienced at times. 
Years have passed since the onset of the recent financial 
crisis, the worst since the Great Depression of 1929, yet 
we continue to witness some of its aftershocks on a daily 
basis. Researchers and policy makers in Islamic finance 
should take heed of the crisis, lest it spread to the young 
and vibrant Islamic financial sector. Early prevention and 
weakness correction is important because by the time a 
crisis hits, the powerful waves of market correction will be 
too strong to withstand, potentially devastating the Islamic 
financial industry.
To this end, Volume IV: Ethics, Governance and Regulation 
in Islamic Finance, addresses some of the most challenging 
contemporary issues that the industry faces. Although 
there is plenty of common ground between these themes, 
the volume has been divided into three sections to allow 
for better comprehension of each of the topics discussed. 
The first part, Shariah Issues and Business Ethics in Islamic 
Finance, blurs the boundaries of ethics and Shariah as 
disciplines, since Islamic jurisprudential teachings within 
a transactional context endorse ethical business practices. 
Shariah compliance is a primary concern for stakeholders 
of the industry. Nonetheless, jurists and consumers alike 
have voiced pleas for endorsing more genuine Islamic 
legal rulings. Some have argued that the current process 
of ijtihad, as practiced in the industry, needs to be revisited 
to address shortcomings, which have led to jurists issuing 
rulings with negative implications on a macro scale. In the 
broader scheme of things, focusing on issues of business 
ethics is vital, since it is this premise of moral grounding 
that is often invoked when attempting to characterize the 
Islamic financial industry. Moreover, such ethics are critical 
to sound development of the sector in the long run.
The second part, Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Islamic Finance, contributes to calls for 
Islamic banking institutions to adopt a more maqasidic 
orientation in conducting business that transcends 
profitability goals. This is in line with the stakeholder 
theory that R. Edward Freeman and others have long 
promoted. In this vein, one may ask whether Islamic banks 
are too preoccupied with satisfying the financial ambitions 
of shareholders at the expense of other foundational 
goals. Is it time for these institutions to reconsider their 
objectives in light of proactive attempts by corporations to 
more positively contribute to their communities? Isn’t such 
a purposeful contribution a key objective of the Islamic 
economic system? While corporate governance research 
has increased considerably in the wake of corporate 
scandals that continue to rock the business world, these 
studies have rarely examined the practices of Islamic 
financial intuitions.
The third part, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Islamic 
Finance, is an attempt to fill an institutional void in legal 
and regulatory matters that has certainly limited the growth 
of the industry. Disputes occur in the Islamic financial 
world among transacting parties, just like they occur in 
the conventional financial sphere between participants. 
Robust legal and regulatory frameworks enable parties 
to resolve their disputes in an efficient manner. The lack of 
standardization that the Islamic financial industry suffers 
from, however, makes it much harder for authorities to 
introduce legal and regulatory measures. Moving forward, 
this lack of consensus amongst participants has to be 
overcome. In fact, some jurisdictions have successfully 
introduced such measures after engaging stakeholders 
in the discussion. What follows is a short summary of 
the papers listed under each of the three themes of the 
volume.
Part I: Shariah issues and business ethics 
in Islamic finance
In the first paper on Shariah issues and business 
ethics, Islamic Finance Ijtihad in the Information Age: 
quo vadis?, Ahmed highlights the current information 
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overload  problem, links it to the gap that has emerged 
between the theoretical ideals and practical realities of 
Islamic finance, and highlights the consequent trust deficit 
that this rift has caused. He raises questions about the 
ijtihad of contemporary Shariah supervisory boards of 
Islamic banking institutions, the resulting resolutions that 
preserve the letter of the law at the cost of its spirit, and 
the practices of Shariah arbitrage and fatwa shopping. 
He proposes overcoming doubts that have crept up on 
the industry using a framework grounded in authenticity, 
curiosity and evolution (ACE).
In the second paper, Determinants of Ethical Identity 
Disclosure Among Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic Banks, 
Abdul Rahman and Saimi study ethical identity disclosure 
of 16 Malaysian and 5 Bahraini Islamic banks by examining 
their annual reports from 2007 to 2011. The authors find 
a low level of ethical disclosure in both countries, with 
Bahrain having an edge over Malaysia. With respect to the 
determinants of ethical identity disclosure at the banks 
studied, a positive significant relationship is established 
between board size, Shariah Supervisory Board, investment 
account holders and significant ethical identity disclosure. 
In contrast, the relationship between independent directors 
of Islamic banks and ethical identity disclosure was found 
to be insignificant. The author recommends that banks 
improve their disclosure on the following dimensions: 
vision and mission statements; product; Zakaˉt, charity and 
benevolent loans; community; environment, and Shariah 
supervisory boards.
In the third paper, Islamic Business Ethics and Finance: 
An Exploratory Study of Islamic Banks in Malaysia, Musa 
examines the practices of Islamic financial institutions in 
Malaysia to determine the extent to which they align with 
Islamic ethical norms of business. Using a 45-item survey, 
the author assesses the perception of 105 executives of 
Islamic banks using five dimensions: the general ethics of 
the banks, attitudes and behavior of employees, treatment 
of employees, code of ethics, management and social 
responsibilities. The author concludes that the studied 
Islamic banks generally conform to Islamic ethical norms; 
nevertheless, there are areas for improvement.
In the fourth paper, Articulation of Spirituality in the 
Workplace: The Case of Malaysia, Kamil, Al-Kahtani and 
Sulaiman enrich the discourse on spirituality in the workplace 
by studying the determinants of Islamic spirituality in an 
organizational setting. Data for the study was captured using 
a 17-item questionnaire. 405 Malaysian Muslim respondents 
were randomly selected from 50 companies to participate in 
the study. The authors found four determinants of Islamic 
spiritualty: rituals (ibadat), forgivingness/repentance (al 
a’fw), belief (iman) and remembrance of Allah (dhikrullah). 
The authors recommended that the study be replicated in 
other contexts and that the impact of several contextual 
variables be assessed.
Part II: Governance and corporate social 
responsibility in Islamic finance
In the first paper on governance and corporate social 
responsibility Corporate Governance of Islamic Financial 
Institutions in Malaysia, Sulaiman, Majid, and Ariffin 
examine the quality of corporate governance disclosure 
of Islamic financial institutions operating in Malaysia. 
Using a corporate governance index developed in an earlier 
study on the basis of guidelines issued by the Central Bank 
of Malaysia as well as corporate governance guidelines 
promulgated by the Accounting and Auditing Organization 
of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), the authors examine 
the annual reports of 16 Islamic financial institutions 
in Malaysia. The index used contains 14 dimensions 
under which there is a total of 123 different items. The 
dimensions are categorized into general-governance 
related information (GCGi), which focuses on operational 
efficiency and economic achievement, and specific-
governance related information (SCGi), which focus on 
achieving ethical and socially corporate values. Islamic 
financial institutions were generally found to have “good” 
disclosure with more attention being paid to GCGi than 
SCGi. Nevertheless, the authors remark that there is plenty 
of room for improvement.
In the second paper, The Effect of the Board of Directors’ 
Characteristics on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
by Islamic Banks: Evidence from Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) Countries, Bukair and Abdul Rahman study the 
effect of the board of directors’ characteristics, such as 
board size, composition, and the separation roles of CEO 
and chairman, on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure using the annual reports of 53 Islamic banks 
in the GCC, while controlling for bank size, financial 
performance and relevant public (percentage of Muslim 
population to the total population in the country). A 
positive and significant relationship is found between bank 
size and CSR disclosure as well as financial performance 
and CSR disclosure. The authors, thus, recommend that 
policy makers impose additional constraints on the board 
of directors’ characteristics.
In the third paper, Islamic Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) in Islamic Banking: Towards Poverty Alleviation, Yusuf 
and Bahari attempt to identify criteria which are essential 
for Islamic CSR to have meaningful impacts on society. The 
authors derive six such criteria from Qur’an and hadith as 
well as the literature: (1) Shariah compliance; (2) equality; 
(3) responsibility in work; (4) guarantee of welfare; (5) 
guarantee of environmental sustainability and (6) charity 
for preservation of virtue. The authors then develop an 
instrument to measure Islamic CSR at Islamic banking 
institutions through the identification of 34 items under 
the criteria. Five individuals with expertise in academia, 
Shariah supervisory boards, directing and regulating 
Islamic banks were asked to opine on the 34 items proposed 
for the instrument. The experts generally agreed that the 
34 items identified by the authors were suitable. The paper 
ends by recommending that maslaha (public interest) and 
social capital guide the application of Islamic CSR.
In the fourth paper, Social Responsibility Dimension in 
Islamic Investment: A Survey of Investors’ Perspective in 
Malaysia, Barom studies the perception of investors of 
the social responsibility dimension of Islamic investments 
and the factors that influence such perception. The study 
involves 415  investors of Islamic funds from 3 fund 
management companies in Malaysia (Public Mutual 
Berhad, CIMB-Principal Asset Management Berhad, 
and Prudential Fund Management Berhad). The author 
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identifies three main concerns (fiqh injunctions, economic, 
and social responsibility) for a holistic approach to Islamic 
investment. Underneath these concerns, the author lists 10 
criteria that he derives from the literature. The study finds 
that investors consider fiqh injunctions the most important 
consideration. Furthermore, social responsibility concerns 
are perceived by the majority of respondents to be as or more 
important than economic concerns. Ethnicity, religion, 
level of commitment to Shariah principles in investment, 
income, age, level of SRI awareness, as well as gender, 
marital status and participation in pro-social activities 
are all variables that are found to affect the importance 
attached by respondents to social responsibility.
In the fifth paper, The Corporate Social Performance 
Indicators for Islamic Banks – The Manager’s Perception, 
Bani, Ariffin, and Abdul Rahman investigate Corporate 
Social Performance (CSP) indicators for Islamic banks 
through conducting a survey of 152 Islamic bank 
managers in Malaysia. The study reports 47 important 
CSP indicators, with Shariah compliance being among the 
most important indicators. Additionally, the authors find 
that the majority of respondents are in favor of a model of 
social responsibility that considers explicit responsibility 
to multiple stakeholders as part of the CSP of Islamic 
banks. Respondents also identify the interests of employee, 
customers, zakat recipients, regulators and community as 
factors that contribute toward Islamic banks fulfilling their 
social duty.
Part III: Legal and regulatory issues 
in Islamic finance
In the first paper about legal and regulatory issues titled 
The  Continuing Influence of Common Law Judges and 
Advocates in the Adjudication of Islamic Finance Disputes in 
Nigeria, Sambo and Abdulkadir assess the effect of common 
law judges on the resolution of Islamic finance disputes 
in Nigeria. The authors find that the current institutional 
arrangements result in a misplacement or miscarriage of 
justice due to the influence that these judges and advocates 
have on the adjudication of cases without possessing 
sufficient Islamic jurisprudential knowledge or background. 
Because the Islamic finance industry is in its early stages 
in Nigeria, the authors emphasize the importance of 
developing institutional frameworks to enable it to operate 
and grow in the right direction. They recommend that 
additional judges who have a strong background in Islamic 
transactional jurisprudence be appointed to the appellate 
courts to decide on Islamic finance cases. Alternatively, they 
suggest the inception of a Shariah Supreme Court separate 
from the regular Supreme Court through a constitutional 
amendment.
In the second paper, Dispute Resolution in Islamic Finance: 
A Case Analysis of Malaysia, Oseni and Ahmad employ direct 
observation and case analysis to examine the potential for 
resolving Islamic finance disagreements between parties 
using alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. 
The authors examine the ADR mechanisms currently 
employed in the industry and investigate the legal and 
institutional ADR framework in Malaysia. The importance 
of addressing this topic arises from the need to establish an 
efficient ADR framework that would swiftly deliver justice 
in Islamic finance disputes in an amicable manner, given 
the need to maintain long-term business relationships. 
Additionally, having such a framework in place saves 
time and costs associated with litigation. The authors 
recommend that the civil court scheme be complemented 
with expert determination via mediation and arbitration, 
such that issues relating to Islamic jurisprudence are 
referred to experts in the field who would issue binding 
decisions enforceable in court.
In the third paper, Regulatory and Financial Implications 
of Sukuk’s Legal Challenges for Sustainable Sukuk 
Development in Islamic Capital Market, Nazar scrutinizes 
legal impediments to sukuk structures that are inherent 
in current day contracts. In doing so, the author attempts 
to harmonize Shariah with the western legal framework 
in order to better govern sukuk transactions. The author 
concludes that legal infrastructures in several jurisdictions 
have not been “supportive enough” for true sukuk 
transactions, and that each jurisdiction has its challenges. 
Thus, the legal rights of sukuk holders to securitized assets 
remain unprotected. The author recommends that key 
players of the industry engage in serious discussions to 
resolve the outstanding issues.
In the fourth paper, Overcoming the Divergence Gap Between 
Applicable State Law and Shariah Principles: Enhancing 
Clarity, Predictability and Enforceability in Islamic Finance 
Transactions within Secular Jurisdictions, Sacarcelik 
examines contractual dimensions of sukuk transactions 
within the German legal setting and the rift that emerges 
between the legal structures of these transactions and 
Shariah guidelines that govern their implementation. The 
author points to the problematic ownership status of sukuk 
holders and highlights the complications that could arise 
in case of obligor bankruptcy. To protect the rights of sukuk 
holders, the paper suggests that a true sale be effectuated 
under German law, or that the concept of Treuhand be 
utilized. In spite of the concerns raised, the author contends 
that German law is capable of providing the necessary 
environment required for sukuk transactions.
In conclusion, the research presented in this volume 
advances our knowledge on matters of ethics, governance, 
and regulation, as related to the Islamic financial realm. 
It is an attempt to fill gaps that have challenged our 
progress, and to advance our knowledge of these domains. 
Nevertheless, a wealth of issues within each of these streams 
awaits exploration, and I hope that future researchers will 
continue to dedicate attention to these important topics.
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Abstract - Islamic finance faces an unprecedented existentialist threat from the exponential 
explosion of knowledge in the current Information Age. Excessively legalistic current practices such 
as Shariah arbitrage, fatwa shopping, and the use of legal ruses have collectively exacerbated a 
pre-existing deficit of trust with ordinary Muslims. The pervasive spread of information overload 
today highlights this present trust deficit and compounds it with additional unique complications 
for the future development of Islamic finance. The independent reasoning (ijtihad) exercised 
by Islamic scholars to these present and potential problems may well determine the extent to 
which such present and potential problems are successfully overcome. Yet contemporary Islamic 
finance ijtihad is both a victim and perpetrator: scarred by its own loss of both contextual focus 
and practical finesse, Islamic finance ijtihad is also actively hastening Islamic finance’s possible 
demise by creating conditions for wider disillusionment with the industry amongst lay Muslims. 
Even though some of these conceptual concerns are already known to industry practitioners at the 
operational level, this article argues that a meaningful exploration of the relationship between the 
changing nature of information and the role of ijtihad is still lacking at the strategic level. Hence, 
this paper constructively sets forth some possible embryonic macrocosmic solutions to help reduce 
the debilitating effects of information overload upon Islamic finance’s overall feasibility.
Keywords: Ijtihad, Information Age, Islamic law, Islamic finance
1. Introduction
At the dawn of the third millennium (C.E.), we face an 
unprecedented threat from information overload. More than 
ever, we are bombarded with practically infinite volumes 
of instantly accessible information and intellectual stimuli 
which challenge our cognitive capacities beyond their 
natural abilities and limits. As a result, human beings suffer 
increasingly from an “attention deficit,” made constantly 
worse by the snowballing changes in information technology 
and the impact such technological challenges are having on 
both the intensity of our work lives and our employment 
patterns (Klingberg, 2009, pp. 4–5). Even in a fairly young 
industry such as Islamic finance, the repercussions of these sea 
changes and their collective onslaught on our organizational 
and cognitive abilities are inescapable. Although theoretically 
such unprecedented access to information holds out positive 
possibilities for the advancement of humankind, the actual 
reality is that there is a general struggle for meaning and 
useful knowledge in the current Information Age. Herein lays 
the paradox: the more information overload we experience, 
the less efficient our knowledge distillation processes become.
It is not just that information is increasing: there is cause 
for concern about the calculus by which this transformation 
in information is taking place. Access to a virtually infinite 
amount of documents, presentations and databases online 
does not equate to meaningful knowledge, which is far more 
than the simple agglomeration of disparate information 
sources and raw, unprocessed data. Knowledge creation 
is more a process whereby form is imposed upon chaos 
to create something previously unknown or unnoticed, 
which becomes a useful epistemological commodity worth 
sharing. This is the second paradox: the infinite savings in 
time created by information dissemination platforms such 
as the World Wide Web and popular search engines such 
as Google, however worthwhile, is counteracted by the vast 
increase in our tasks, thus creating backlogs of knowledge for 
us all. Consequently, the tempestuous flood of information 
overload threatens to render obsolete the current structures 
and frameworks of references with which we have previously 
made sense of the fast-paced developments in the burgeoning 
field of Islamic finance. With these circumstances in mind, 
this article proffers some modest thoughts and solutions 
regarding this existential threat of information overload to 
the Islamic finance industry.
Knowledge creation backlogs are occurring precisely 
because humanity has yet to devise accessible, affordable 
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and intelligent systems to organise or contain the flood 
of information. But just as we can tap into the ocean’s 
resources and make sensible use of these natural resources, 
then it stands to reason that similar techniques can be 
applied to information as well. Such techniques are already 
being developed in efforts such as the Semantic Web, 
but are not yet accessible to those with little knowledge 
of computer programming techniques. Governments 
and large corporations may have access to more reliably 
intelligent next-generation systems, but these are obviously 
beyond the financial reach of most ordinary academic 
institutions, let  alone individual researchers or workers. 
At present therefore, in the absence of such tools and their 
effective utilisation, ijtihad remains our best hope for the 
contemporary renewal of Islamic finance.
Ijtihad is the application of independent reasoning by 
Islamic scholars to interpret the revealed sources of 
Islamic law in light of the problems faced by Muslims 
of their age. Giving a succinct and singular definition 
of what ijtihad entails is almost impossible, as classical 
scholars such as Ibn Ashur and Al-Shatibi demonstrate. 
Ibn Ashur (2006 pp. 5–6) provides a definition of ijtihad 
which has five distinct aspects, whilst Al-Shatibi provides 
a two-stage definition of ijtihad which inextricably 
links the practice of ijtihad to the higher objectives of 
Islamic law, the Maqasid al-Shariah (al-Raysuni:331). 
For convenience’s sake therefore, these definitional 
intricacies are left aside and focus is rather on the 
issues arising from the application of contemporary 
Islamic finance ijtihad. In this paper, ijtihad is denoted 
interchangeably as either “legal interpretation” or 
“independent reasoning.”
2. Current Issues Affecting Islamic Finance
The trust deficit of Islamic finance
The primary contention of this paper is that Shariah today 
suffers from a credibility gap between theoretical ideals 
and practical realities stemming from two main factors: a 
significant over-reliance on debt-based Shariah-compliant 
instruments; and the virtual unenforceability of Shariah 
in a modern cross-border transactional context. Along 
with unfortunate and excessively legalistic practices such 
as Shariah arbitrage, fatwa shopping and legal ruses, 
these two main factors continue to fuel a deficit in trust 
which harms the Islamic finance industry’s reputation 
amongst lay Muslims, who constitute the lifeblood of 
Islamic finance as depositors and shareholders in Islamic 
financial institutions. For instance, according to El-Gamal 
(2006:20, 177), Shariah arbitrage is a “peculiar form of 
regulatory arbitrage,” which merely mimics “Western 
regulatory arbitrage methods aiming to reduce tax 
burdens on high-net-worth individuals.” The pervasive 
spread of information overload today highlights this 
present trust deficit and compounds it with additional 
complications for the future development of Islamic 
finance. First, there is a significant over-reliance on debt-
based Shariah-compliant instruments and structures as 
opposed to equity-centred Shariah-based products. This 
preference for debt over equity damages the credibility of 
Islamic finance, and thus harms the industry’s long-term 
viability and sustainability. On the one hand, the present 
legalistic approach to Islamic finance helps legitimize a 
distressingly myopic preoccupation with the practice of 
Islamic finance with a Shariah-compliance certificatory 
system for predominantly debt-based modes of finance, 
which is criticised to be grounded more in the letter than the 
spirit of Islamic jurisprudence. On the other hand, however, 
the normative evolution of Islamic finance towards more 
equity-based modes of finance, e.g., “profit-loss sharing” 
partnerships, holds out rich possibilities for Shariah-based 
product development, which is firmly rooted in the spirit 
of Islamic commercial jurisprudence (Lewis, 2007). Quite 
understandably, the current status quo in the practice of 
Islamic finance is in many respects not viable, as Islamic 
financial institutions have to continuously strive to seek 
a balance between the provision of authentic Shariah 
compliant financial products and financially viable 
products – the two basic requirements for depositors and 
shareholders in their endorsement of Islamic financial 
products (Rehman, 2010, pp. 115–121).
Second, Shariah today is virtually unenforceable in a cross-
border transactional context (DeLorenzo & McMillen, 
2007, p. 136). Recent cases which have come before the 
courts of secular jurisdictions, such as England, as well 
as commentaries on them, proffer ample evidence of the 
problems in enforcing a non-national legal system open 
to equally authoritative interpretations (Bälz, 2005; 
“Beximco,” 2004; Godden & Miller, 2010; “Symphony 
Gems,” 2002; “Jivraj,” 2009; “Musawi,” 2007). Moreover, 
such problems with respect to enforceability are further 
compounded by the problematic nature of relying on religious 
texts as authoritative legal sources in private international 
law (Warde, 2000, p. 234). This unenforceability of 
Islamic law creates uncertainty in the Islamic banking and 
finance industry, which works against the general public 
interest (“Maslaha”) of Muslims. Perhaps now is the time 
to gradually move away from the piecemeal mimicry of 
common law and reliance on Western legal traditions and 
shift towards more novel fusions of the Islamic and Western 
legal traditions, such as incorporating elements of Islamic 
arbitration within the global framework of international 
commercial arbitration (Nadar, 2009, p. 189).
Finally, there is also ample criticisms from academic 
quarters that an Islamic finance built upon compliance 
foundations and the certificatory functions of Shariah 
scholars, whilst technically abiding by the letter of the 
Shariah, fails to implement the wider spirit of the Shariah 
and its original intended sentiments (Abdul-Rahman, 
2010, p. 237). This preference for form over intent has led, 
perhaps inevitably, to the emergence of several interrelated 
criticisms of Islamic banking practices (Ayub, 2007, pp. 
445–456). Regardless of the merits of such criticisms, they 
still represent symptomatic discontentment by ordinary 
Muslims, who have misgivings over whether Islamic 
finance in practice is sufficiently distinct from conventional 
operational practices in areas such as murabahah finance, 
bay al inah practices and tawarruq financing (Iqbal & 
Molyneux, 2005, p. 126). So until and unless the Shariah 
becomes legally enforceable in transactional contexts; 
improves its value proposition to stakeholders; and derives 
an adequate mechanism for dispute resolution, the trust 
deficit will remain. In this context, the pervasive spread 
of information overload will only serve to starkly highlight 
such shortcomings in industry practice to the industry’s 
own detriment.
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Sub-optimal Ijtihad through excessive legalism
Ijtihad in contemporary Islamic finance is essentially 
the product of Shariah scholars’ intellectual efforts to 
legally realise Islamic economic principles in light of 
the contemporary global financial and banking system. 
These efforts at juristic interpretation are central to the 
development of Islamic finance, as Shariah supervisory 
boards provide the certificatory services for Islamic 
financial products which financiers, as non-experts in 
Islamic commercial jurisprudence, cannot by themselves 
provide (Jobst, 2007, p. 27). Logically therefore, the 
presence of sub-optimality in ijtihadic processes would 
not augur well for Islamic finance. Such sub-optimality 
does exist, and is perpetuated in large part through 
excessively legalistic practices such as Shariah arbitrage; 
fatwa shopping; and the use of legal artifices (hiyal). All of 
these three practices harm the industry and stunt its future 
development, whilst also reflecting a broader tension 
in Islamic finance between legal forms and economic 
substance. As Dusuki and Abozaid (2007:164) note, in 
certain contexts it may be best to ignore the legal form 
of a transaction where the net effect is merely to replicate 
the economic substance of a prohibited conventional 
transaction.
First, as Islamic financial institutions require external 
certification and are commercially-driven to enhance their 
products with the best brand endorsement possible, there 
is a tremendously strong demand for Shariah experts. 
Whilst obtaining input from Shariah scholars is innocuous 
on the surface, on another level, actual practice gives rise 
to serious concerns: these highly-prized scholars can and 
do leverage their “celebrity status” in this captive market 
to excessively influence the development of Islamic 
finance industry. This phenomenon is commonly known 
as “Shariah arbitrage.” El-Gamal, a firm critic of such 
practices, avers that such practices are inherently futile, 
as they result in declining Shariah arbitrage profit margins 
and an inevitable dilution of the “Islamic” brand name and 
value: (El-Gamal, 2006). Moreover, the negative impact of 
such dilution of the “Islamicity” of products is increased 
by the use of legal artifices in Islamic finance, which help 
subvert the original aims and objectives of the “maqasid al-
Shariah.”
Second, there is a distinct lack of unique value propositions, 
which not only draw upon the rich heritage of classical 
Islamic jurisprudence, but also noticeably build upon the 
legacies of the past to create products with both strong 
Shariah authenticity and strong financial demand. Scholars 
such as Hegazy (2005:141–149) have pointed out at length 
the dangers that can arise from the abuse of fatwas as 
instruments for change in Islamic finance. In particular, 
such procedural abuses further harm the authenticity of 
the Islamic finance industry by undermining the authority 
of fatwas as religio-legal opinions of persuasive authority, 
and support the view that present-day Islamic finance will 
continue to operate at a trust deficit with both depositors 
and shareholders alike. In this regard, the unfortunate abuse 
of fatwas in Islamic finance ijtihad today through practices such 
as fatwa shopping has led us to a point where Islamic finance 
ijtihad is severed from both its religious underpinnings and, 
more importantly, the well-meaning foundational aspirations 
of Islamic economics (Hegazy, 2005, p. 149). Again, without 
the genuine reassertion of Shariah’s authenticity through 
fields such as “Islamic Finance Law,” Islamic finance will 
continue to harm itself as an emerging industry.
Third, legal artifices –“hiyal” (sing. “hila”) – were a feature of 
Islamic jurisprudence even in the classical period of Islamic 
law: (Habil, 2007). In fact, some scholars such as Rosly (2010: 
134) even employ legalistic approaches to the issue of legal 
artifices, arguing that they serve a useful ancillary function 
to the achievement of internal consistency with respect to 
the fundamental legal building blocks of Islamic commercial 
law and finance: (1) ’aqd; (2) maqasid al-Shariah; (3) 
financial reporting; and (4) legal documentation. Be that as 
it may, legal artifices still pay only lip service to the economic 
substance of Islamic finance transactions, and thus lead to 
absurd results and effects such as, for example, the giving 
and receiving of interest by another name via structures 
and mechanisms such as tawarruq. Finally, as Habil pointed 
out in his discussion on legal artifices, “aside from its ethical 
vagueness and irrationality, hila is casuistic and its applica-
bility is limited by its very nature ... sooner or later, hila leads 
to a dead end.” (Habil, 2007).
Sub-optimal Ijtihad and Islamic finance
Yet contemporary Islamic finance ijtihad is both a victim 
and perpetrator: scarred by its own loss of both contextual 
focus and practical finesse, Islamic finance ijtihad is also 
actively hastening Islamic finance’s possible demise by 
creating wider disillusionment with the industry amongst 
lay Muslims. These losses of focus and finesse give rise to 
serious doubts over the feasibility of Islamic finance as a 
whole, and are inherently linked to the sub-optimality of 
contemporary Islamic finance ijtihad.
3. Future Issues Affecting Islamic Finance
Quantitative quagmires: The loss of focus in Ijtihad
With the increasing complexity in Islamic finance and the 
application of Islamic commercial law, and the resulting 
human capital trend towards increased specialisation, 
there is a clear and present danger that this phenomenon 
of specialisation may well interact with the wider 
fragmentation of knowledge currently being experienced 
in the Information Age by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
The emphasis on micro over macro; rules over principles; 
and form over substance; are all symptoms of a dominant 
‘compliance is king’ mentality that predominates in Islamic 
finance today. Such a mentality at the organisational level 
has inevitably led to wider confusion at the regulatory level 
of what the actual focus of Islamic finance should be: it is, 
in short, precisely these quantitatively induced quagmires 
which leave Islamic finance open to accusations of a 
perceived lack of authenticity. For Hamoudi (2008:463), 
this clash between theoretical macro-ideals and practical 
micro-realities signifies “nothing more than careful 
mediation, between the necessity of adopting conventional 
finance models and a desire to retain the appearance of a 
populist fundamentalist vision of economic justice in finance” 
(Hamoudi, 2008, p. 463). Whatever one’s views on the 
potency of such a statement, it is fairly indisputable that 
somewhere along the way towards making the dreams of 
Islamic economics come true, Islamic finance ijtihad has 
strayed considerably.
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Qualitative quagmires: The loss of finesse in Ijtihad
The quantitative quagmires and loss of focus in Islamic 
finance are grimly complemented by the existence of 
qualitative quagmires and a resultant loss of finesse in 
Islamic finance ijtihad. Much has already been written 
about the numerous corporate governance issues 
surrounding both the practices of Shariah Supervisory 
Boards in deriving their rulings and the various conflicts 
of interest which bring into question their ability to 
remain truly independent of their client Islamic financial 
institutions (Archer & Karim, 2007; Grais & Pellegrini, 
2006; Nakajima & Rider, 2007; Warde, 2005; Yunis, 2007). 
Suffice to say, such conditions are far from conducive to 
the reputation of Islamic law in general, and its application 
to Islamic finance in particular through the use of ijtihad. 
One may at this point call to mind Gresham’s Law, i.e., “bad 
money drives out good,” and readily muse whether sub-
standard or inadequately prepared fatwas will drive out 
potentially better fatwas simply because the latter emanate 
from lesser well-known younger scholars, who are likely to 
be passed up by Islamic financial institutions in favour of 
more well-known older scholars. This type of pecking order 
seems perversely removed from the meritocratic nature of 
Islam, and seems increasingly anachronistic in this day and 
age. Hopefully, this situation will be suitably remedied by 
the widely-reported efforts and plans of AAOIFI to address 
this crisis in scholars by 2013, although according to recent 
media reports, even that is an optimistic timeframe.
Ijtihad as victim and perpetrator: The loss of 
feasibility in Islamic finance
Until 2013 though, the loss of both focus and finesse in 
Islamic finance will continue to worsen as demand for 
Islamic financial services increases amidst a background 
of insufficient human capital supply (Volker Nienhaus, 
2007, p. 381). More importantly, the loss of focus and 
finesse in Islamic finance, taken together, support and fuel 
a wider malaise of confidence in Islamic finance’s overall 
feasibility as an industry with aims to make a difference 
to the world of finance and well-being of humanity. In this 
day and age of innovation par excellence, only countries 
and industries which take the initiative to adapt boldly to 
novel technologies and paradigms will prosper – countries 
such as Germany, the “land of ideas”, and industries such 
as life sciences, where high trial failure rates are offset 
and made profitable by the minority of game-changing 
success stories. It is ironic and somewhat puzzling that for 
an industry founded upon legal maxims such as “no risk, 
no profit”, Islamic finance remains heavily imitative of 
conventional interest-based structures and mechanisms. 
Hence, contemporary Islamic finance ijtihad is both a 
victim and perpetrator: scarred by its own loss of both 
contextual focus and practical finesse, Islamic finance 
ijtihad is also actively hastening Islamic finance’s possible 
demise by creating conditions for wider disillusionment 
with the industry amongst lay Muslims.
4. Islamic Finance: Quo Vadis?
Islamic finance as an industry has a myriad of potential 
destinies awaiting it. The focus of this paper is, however, 
on two particular issues. The first scenario assumes Islamic 
finance will meander along with little change to the issues 
raised above, and this promotes an inherently bleak 
outlook for the industry. The second scenario however, 
no less possible but infinitely more promising, assumes 
that Islamic finance will realign its strategic development 
in favour of authenticity, curiosity and evolution. In 
particular, ‘the development of “Islamic Finance Law” is 
central to achieving such aspirations and answering the 
question “Islamic finance: Quo vadis?” (“Islamic finance: 
Where are you going?”).
Scenario 1: Wider disillusionment
On a wider level, practices such as “Shariah arbitrage” 
are dangerous for the cohesiveness and unity of 
contemporary Muslim society. It is ironic indeed, that for 
an economic system which prides itself on the ability to 
offer more inclusivity than incumbent economic systems 
such as Western capitalism, there is a risk of increasing 
marginalisation of future generations of Muslims in Islamic 
finance. “Shariah arbitrage” supports the monopolisation 
of Islamic finance ijtihad by concentrating key decision-
making within the hands of a select few Shariah scholars. 
The rest of the Muslim society, rather than feeling 
comforted, feels marginalised as such a clerical clique 
fights to maintain its purported indispensability in an age 
of increasing competition. This marginalization of wider 
Muslim society by the scholarly community in Islamic 
finance today is similar in many respects to the abject and 
continuing failure of the doctrine of “guardianship of the 
jurist” (wilayat-i faqih) as practised in the state of Iran, 
where the safeguarding of parochial privileges through 
doctrinal rigidity has led to resentment among the younger 
generation of Iranians (Amanat, 2007, p. 134).
Also, it has been noted in previous literature on Islamic 
political economy that ethical values are indispensible 
to the establishment of an Islamic economic system 
(Asutay, 2007, p. 4), which would by definition include 
the operation of an Islamic financial system. However, in 
practice, Islamic finance has come up short on the ethical 
front in many respects. Looking ahead, one way forward 
for the development of earnest ethical credentials for 
Islamic finance in practice may be to operationally focus 
on “glocalization” – that is, to “think globally and act 
locally”, by emphasising local-scale action and initiatives 
over global cross-border transactions. Otherwise, 
continuing the present industry practices may simply 
compound the disenfranchisement of ordinary Muslims 
and their considerable disillusionment with Islamic finance 
(Balala, 2011, p. 8).
Scenario 2: “Islamic finance law” and the golden 
opportunity for Ijtihad
The hypothesis of this paper is that the credibility gap 
in Islamic finance discussed in Section II above can be 
significantly reduced by re-establishing the authenticity 
of the Shariah through the systematic development and 
evolution of “Islamic Finance Law” as a separate discipline 
and emergent legal system, and this hypothesis is strongly 
supported at the outset by the need for the solutions 
discussed and outlined below. Even though some of 
these conceptual concerns are already known to industry 
practitioners at the operational level, a meaningful 
exploration of the relationship between the changing 
nature of information and the role of ijtihad is still lacking 
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at the strategic level. “Islamic finance law”, whilst by no 
means a panacea, nonetheless offers a viable ijtihad-centric 
alternative to the current malaise in confidence over 
Shariah authenticity in Islamic finance today. Hence, this 
paper constructively sets forth some possible embryonic 
macrocosmic solutions to the debilitating effects of 
information overload on Islamic finance’s feasibility in the 
following section.
5. Playing the “Ace” Card: An Embryonic 
Solution
Of course, uncomfortable truths are hard to swallow, 
as to some extent they entail the tacit acceptance of 
prior error in judgment. But the benefits of embracing 
knowledge creation techniques far outweigh the costs of 
stubbornly adhering to obsolete methods of learning and 
knowledge assimilation on flimsy and irrelevant grounds 
of culture, heritage or tradition. Islamic finance itself is 
an interdisciplinary field born out of the union between 
Islamic law and Islamic economics: its very birthright 
consists of both thoughtful industry-driven solutions by 
practitioners and industry-aware thoughtfulness from 
academicians. As such, this paper proposes a composite 
“ACE” card paradigm, whereby the Islamic finance industry 
can effectively counter the growing doubts over both its 
conceptual validity and practical feasibility. This prototype 
of a solution is but a mere sketch, and it is important to 
emphasise that the further illustration of such a paradigm 
is less important than understanding the centrality of the 
three key pillars: authenticity, curiosity and evolution.
Authenticity
One possible way forward for Muslims today to achieve 
authenticity in Islamic finance ijtihad would be to reassess 
the classical scholarship with an emphasis on purpose-
based reinterpretations. By distilling the wisdom from 
classical texts and reviewing their application to the needs 
of our current era, we may perhaps get closer towards more 
meaningful ijtihad which takes account of the spirit as well 
as the letter of the law. Questions relating to authenticity 
in contemporary ijtihad in Islamic finance will, like other 
areas of Islamic law, inevitably overlap with questions 
relating to the general public interest (“maslahah”) of 
Muslims today. In order to move beyond previous models 
which apply maslahah, or at least reframe them in light of 
present-day concerns in Islamic finance, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the relevance of changes in Muslim societies at 
large. Tomorrow’s Shariah scholars who will exercise their 
ijtihad in Islamic finance will bring with them the benefits 
of higher standards of formal education in Islamic law and 
finance specifically; more diverse previous work experience 
in an age of ever-changing employment patterns; and will 
live in an age where the provision of information becomes 
ever-more ubiquitous and instantaneous. The influence of 
these educational, occupational and historical realities will 
determine their approaches to important concepts such as 
maslahah: (Opwis, 2007, p. 82). As such, we would do well 
as a community of Muslims to better make sense of and 
prepare for these sea changes in Islamic human capital.
Also, the tension between the need for certainty in an 
emerging field like Islamic finance and the inherent 
flexibility in Islamic law’s application and interpretation 
makes the discussion of ijtihad’s authenticity especially 
relevant today at the operational level as well. In many 
respects, allowing events to simply play out for themselves 
between the institutional and organic levels of the Islamic 
finance industry may be the most feasible avenue towards 
an increased yet moderate degree of certainty and 
uniformity in Islamic ijtihad (Foster, 2007, p. 178). Of 
course, standardisation per se is not a bad thing, provided it 
does not stifle the diversity of opinions inherent in Islamic 
finance ijtihad, and this flexible form of standardisation 
has been achieved in several instances of Islamic insurance 
law (Bakar, 2002, p. 88). As such, endeavours such as a 
flexible system of codification in Islamic finance law would 
form a substantial and much-needed part of solutions to 
this question of balance in future ijtihad relating to Islamic 
finance (McMillen, 2011, p. 38).
Curiosity
“Islamic Finance Law” is very much an emergent legal 
system (Foster, 2007, p. 187). In other words, there is still 
much conceptual work yet to be done, which is urgently 
needed to cement the legal aspects of contemporary Islamic 
transactional jurisprudence into a coherent system of 
laws. With the increasing spread of globalization to Muslim 
lands, the need to seek out innovative and yet fundamentally 
authentic solutions to the problems of ijtihad in contemporary 
Islamic finance will become ever more pressing (Krämer, 
2007, p. 37). It goes without saying therefore, that in such a 
scenario “Curiosity is key”.
Furthermore, the systematic development of “Islamic 
Finance Law” as a separate discipline is one of the best 
methods available to re-establish Sharia’s authenticity in 
the modern age. Effective Islamic finance, based around a 
sound application of the Shariah to Muslim societies’ socio-
economic problems, would greatly help underdeveloped 
Muslim economies. Moreover, with rapidly changing 
political landscapes in the Middle Eastern nation states, 
the onus is on the Muslim communities of the world to 
build upon such developments in the socio-economic fields 
through more extensive use of Islamic finance techniques 
which genuinely benefit the masses. If Ijtihad is ignored 
or dismissed as unimportant in the field of Islamic finance’s 
normative development and evolution, there is a clear danger 
that instead of being a transformative tool for widening 
the constituency of Islamic finance, ijtihad will be used in 
Islamic finance discourse to justify the desperate existing 
state of Islamic finance. Such a legitimising effect would be 
undesirable at best, and at worst, destructive of the very ethos 
of reform which ijtihadic processes seek by their very nature 
to uphold (Codd, 1999, p. 131).
Historically, the decline of innovation and creativity 
in knowledge discovery stems from the abdication of 
responsibility by scholars. This abdication of responsibility 
threatens once more to derail Islamic jurisprudence in the 
field of Islamic finance, as the current information overload 
dictates that independent thought be eschewed in favour 
of mere knowledge management and the dissemination of 
existing knowledge sources. It is not hard to see, then, how a 
culture of rote-dominant rather than innovation-dominant 
learning springs from the proliferation and engendering 
of such a stifling mindset. Ironically, such a mindset stands 
distinctly in opposition to the flourishing of pluralistic 
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thought in the Golden Age of Islamic legal scholarship and 
should be sensibly resisted. In sum, the times we now live in 
called for curiosity, not conformity, in thought.
Evolution
The needs of today call for an evolution in “Islamic Finance 
Law”. It is not simply, and cannot be, a mere accumulation 
of various fragmented laws or regulations relating to 
transactions in Islamic finance: “Islamic Finance Law” must 
offer a unique value proposition of its own as an emergent 
legal system in this post-financial crisis era. Otherwise, 
the credibility of Islamic finance, which crucially derives 
its legitimacy from the Shariah, will suffer irreparably. 
Practices such as “Shariah arbitrage” have already had 
undesirable effects on the industry’s reputation (El-
Gamal, 2005), as have conflicts of interest and concerns 
over independence which plague the operation of Shariah 
Supervisory Boards (V Nienhaus, 2007, pp. 136–137).
Also, the majority of contemporary Muslim countries 
are demographically made up of young people. These 
digital natives need to be actively encouraged to think 
independently, innovatively and insightfully in order 
to chart a bright new path for “Islamic Finance Law”. 
At present, despite the increasing growth of the Islamic 
capital markets and refinement of products such as sukuk 
(Islamic investment certificates) and overall brusque pace 
of Islamic finance’s development (Archer & Karim, 2007, 
p. 400), the actual level of sophistication in Islamic finance 
remains limited (Mirakhor & Smolo, 2010, p. 377) and 
clearly requires substantial further improvements (Al-
Salem, 2009, p. 194).
As Vogel (2000) obliquely points out in his extended study 
of Islamic law as applied to the Saudi Arabian legal system, 
innovation and originality by legal scholars of Islam 
was sacrificed at the altar of expediency. Applying this 
historical lesson to our present times, we may well find that 
in today’s age of hyper specialization and the increasing 
fragmentation of knowledge, such recourse to expediency 
is becoming increasingly threatening to the role of ijtihad 
in Islamic finance today. Doctrines once alien to Islamic 
jurisprudence, such as the doctrine of binding precedent 
(stare decisis), are now wholeheartedly embraced by the 
Islamic scholarly community in the name of practicality 
and ummatic “maslahah”.
This rich plurality may well be the underestimated and 
ignored antidote to the suffocating monoculture that is 
affecting Muslim scholarship today under the guise of 
“consensus” and “public policy”. As several commentators 
on Islamic legal history point out, this rich plurality of 
opinions has been conveniently forgotten and emphatically 
airbrushed out of the historical accounts of Muslim 
scholarship. Hallaq (2004: 61), for instance, cites the 
examples of independent mujtahids such as Abu Thaw, 
Muzani and the “Four Muhammads” to illustrate how a 
tradition of plurality is intricately and unmistakeably woven 
into the history of Islamic law and ijtihad, noting with interest 
that these and other scholars more or less forged their own 
legal philosophies. From this perspective, the “closing of the 
gates of ijtihad” is still very much debatable (Hallaq, 1984, 
p. 33), and it is a healthy debate which should be aired more 
often in Islamic banking and finance discourse.
Recently, there have been calls for standardisation of 
Islamic legal principles and structures in controversial 
products such as Shariah-compliant derivative products, in 
order to help open up new markets and opportunities for 
the nascent industry (Fagerer, Pikiel, & McMillen, 2010, 
p. 16). However, building a doctrine of binding precedent 
indistinguishable from the common law system may not 
be in the best interests of the Islamic legal framework at 
large. On the contrary, as Hallaq (2004: 62) avers, “the 
doctrine of the closure of the gate can now be seen as an 
attempt to enhance and augment the constructed authority 
of the founding imams, and had little to do with the realities 
of legal reasoning, the jurists’ competence, or the modes of 
reproducing legal doctrine.” What is particularly interesting 
here is that such an analysis may well apply to the doctrine 
of standardisation, as it is not dissimilar to the attempts to 
close the gates of ijtihad several hundred years ago.
Standardisation is not about the triumph of the most sensible 
methods of legal reasoning or the prevalence of the most 
competent jurists’ opinions; it is about the mere templating 
and reproduction of old doctrines through a process of 
doctrinal crystallization which is counterproductive for 
two reasons. Firstly, it harms Islamic finance’s flexibility 
and fluidity as an emergent legal system; and secondly, it 
goes against the very grain of the historical reality of Islamic 
law, i.e. its inherent respect for reasonable differences 
amongst reasonable people. As Imam Shaf’i stated in his 
Risala when discussing the matter of Ijtihad, Allah in His 
infinite wisdom has ‘endowed men with reason by which they 
can distinguish between differing viewpoints, and He guides 
them to the truth either by [explicit] texts or indications [on 
the strength of which they exercise ijtihad].’ (al-Shaf’i & 
Khadduri, 1997, p. 302)
Inherent in Shafi’s quoted statement is an overt ack-
nowledgment that reason and intellect are key tools in the 
formation of ijtihad, and that since men’s intellects differ in 
stature and their powers of cognizance, the resultant ijtihad 
they perceive and construe will similarly differ. As a result, 
in today’s age of hyper specialization, a range of ijtihad is 
required, not a monoculture of a purportedly omniscient 
“grand ijtihad”. Such a monolithic construction of legal 
interpretation is, it is submitted, anathema to the true 
tenets of Islam, and calling it standardisation or associating 
such views with the wider ummatic maslahah are mere 
window-dressing and obfuscating ruses. If ijtihad were to 
be a tree, it would better be a palm tree rather than an oak 
tree – flexible and responsive as opposed to inflexible and 
unbending – so as to better weather the epistemological 
tempests in which we find ourselves today. In this regard, 
Vogel’s remarks on the “rule against ijtihad reversal” are 
also particularly insightful. Vogel (2000; 86) surmises that 
the rationale for this rule is that, in the absence of primary 
source certainty amidst a need for ijtihad to be exercised, “all 
mujtahids are equal and no one has priority, whether caliph 
or scholar, and that any other rule would defeat the autonomy 
of the qadi’s conscience.”
6. Conclusion
The short-term and long-term difficulties posed by an 
inability to adequately respond to the flood of information 
do not augur well for the industry. In fact, the existence of a 
medium term event horizon in the development of Islamic 
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finance would effectively render the industry irrelevant in a 
post-industrial global economy, as previously envisaged (El-
Gamal, 2006, p. 25). Nonetheless, there is ample hope for 
the industry’s salvation and cause for optimism, provided 
it adopts collective corrective measures over the medium-
term horizon. This paper’s suggestions for the centrality 
and primacy of “Islamic Finance Law” are a tentative start 
towards such corrective measures, but of course, will need to 
be further researched and augmented by other like-minded 
researchers and regulators. Courage, not complacency, is 
the order of the day: tomorrow is simply a day away.
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Abstract  - In Islam, the practice of transparent and adequate disclosure is stressed and 
recommended, especially with regard to the ethical identity of Islamic institutions. This is to ensure 
that the business activities are in line with Shariah principles since Shariah is the main component 
and the foremost salient feature in Islamic banks, which differentiate them from conventional 
banks. Thus, this study examines the ethical identity disclosure of sixteen (16) Malaysian and five 
(5) Bahrain Islamic banks for five consecutive years, 2007 to 2011. The study further identifies 
the determinants affecting the ethical identity disclosure in both countries. The ethical identity 
disclosure index developed for measuring the level of ethical identity disclosure comprises nine 
dimensions consisting of 81 constructs. The results indicate that the overall disclosure level in both 
countries is 51.6%, which suggests a low level of ethical identity disclosure. Room for improvement 
includes information on vision and mission statement product; Zakat, charity and benevolent loans; 
community; environment, and Shariah Supervisory Board. In examining the determinants affecting 
the ethical identity disclosure, the results show that independent directors do not affect the level of 
ethical disclosure. However, board size, Shariah supervisory board and investment account holders 
significantly influence the disclosure level by both banking industries. Hence, contrary to the agency 
theory, the results indicate that independent directors in both Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks 
are not effective or competent in performing their role in monitoring the performance and activities 
of the management of Islamic banks. However, in line with the institutional theory, having greater 
monitoring by the board of directors, Shariah supervisory Board and investment account holders 
could enhance the disclosure compliance by Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks, and, thus, could 
attract more Muslim investors to participate in the Islamic banking industry.
Keywords: ethical identity disclosure, Islamic banks, Malaysia, Bahrain
1. Introduction
Islamic Banks, similar to conventional banks, are profitable 
organizations that aim to gain profit. However, in doing 
so, Islamic banks avoid interest and other aspects that 
are prohibited by Islam, which therefore characterizes 
Islamic banks as having an ethical identity (Gray and 
Balmer, 2001; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Islamic banks 
need to disclose ethical information (both qualitative 
and quantitative) based on the Islamic ethical business 
and Shariah framework, which is vital in assisting the 
stakeholder in making economic religious decisions as well 
as assisting the management, Shariah Supervisory Board 
and external auditor in demonstrating the accountability to 
society. Since one of the aims of Islamic Banks is to promote 
and develop the application of Islamic principles, laws and 
traditions concerning transactions of financial, banking 
and related business affairs, they should exhibit their own 
ethical identity in setting them apart from other types of 
organization.
In Islam, the practice of transparency and adequate 
disclosure is highly recommended, especially in business 
dealings. This is to ensure that the business transaction is 
free from any form of exploitation. In Al Quran, numerous 
verses have emphasized the demand for fair, transparent and 
ethical behavior in all business transactions. For example, 
in Chapter  2 Surah Al Baqarah, Verse 282, Muslims are 
required to have contracts written by a scribe as well as to 
have witnesses comprising at least two men or one man and 
two women in the business transaction. This is to ensure 
that the obligation and transactions are executed clearly 
without any doubt from any party. From this verse, it is 
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clear that transparency should be the hallmark of Islamic 
institutions, as it will ensure justice to all parties involved 
in the transaction.
Kayed and Hassan (2011) further implied that having 
adequate and consistent disclosure is necessary for the 
Islamic banking industry to remain relatively positive and 
resilient. To ensure the financial stability of the Islamic 
financial system, Islamic banks need to ensure that their 
transparency is proper and consistent, especially with 
regard to their ethical identity as an Islamic institution. 
They have to ensure that their activities are in line with 
Shariah principles since Shariah is the main component 
and the foremost salient feature in Islamic banks that 
differentiates them from conventional banks. Such 
features include the prohibition of interest and the use of 
profit sharing investment. Failure to comply with Shariah 
may lead to losses by the Islamic banks since they might 
not able to recognize the income (IFSB, 2005). The 
greatest loss that they need to consider is the possibility 
of losing their investors and investment account holders, 
who are mostly Muslims, who are really particular about 
Shariah compliance issues and the ethical identity in their 
dealings.
In addition, a bank’s ability to maintain its capital at a 
sufficient level, as well as its ability to realize rates of 
return equal to the assumed investment risk is a means 
of measurement to both shareholders and investment 
account holders (Mohd Ariffin, Archer and Abdel Karim, 
2009). These criteria are important for their evaluation 
and confidence in making decisions. The lack of such 
confidence may stop any Muslim from having a business 
deal with the Islamic banks. In order to prevent the 
possibility of such incidence, proper disclosure is needed in 
the financial reports of Islamic banks, which are prepared 
according to the standards applicable to Islamic banks. As 
such, studies assessing the strength of the communicated 
ethical identity of Islamic banks are important since Islamic 
banks are accountable not only to society but also to God. 
In addition, transparency in the ethical identity of Islamic 
banks is essential to society, as it is one of the approaches 
to ensure the ethical and social activities of Islamic banks. 
For example, matters pertaining to Islamic bank products, 
financing activities and community activities.
Due to the extensive and progressive approach to Islamic 
banking and finance, the Kingdom of Bahrain is chosen for 
this study as it is acknowledged to be the hub of Islamic 
banking worldwide and represents the best practice 
of Islamic banks (Hidayat and Abduh, 2012). Bahrain 
established its first Islamic bank, Bahrain Islamic Bank, in 
1979, and, currently, has 26 Islamic banks, which comprise 
6 retail Islamic banks and 20 (twenty) wholesale Islamic 
banks registered under the Central Bank of Bahrain 
(Central Bank of Bahrain, 2012). Similarly, Malaysia has 
also observed progressive and robust development of 
Islamic banking since 1986 in order to serve the needs of 
the Malaysian economy as well as enhance the sustainable 
and economic growth of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2012). Therefore, by comparing the ethical identity 
disclosure of Malaysian Islamic banks with Bahrain Islamic 
banks, the position of Malaysian Islamic banks could 
be identified when compared to the pioneer of Islamic 
banking. Examining the level of ethical disclosure among 
Islamic Banks in Malaysia and Bahrain can fill the gap from 
previous studies where the focus was more on corporate 
social responsibility disclosure.
Besides determining the level of communicated ethical 
identity disclosure among Islamic Banks in Malaysia and 
Islamic banks in Bahrain, this study also examines the 
determinants of the level of ethical identity disclosure 
(board size, board independence, Shariah Supervisory 
Board and Investment Account Holders). Therefore, by 
exploring the ethical identity in Islamic banks, this study 
would be of interest to the stakeholders since they would 
perceive banks with higher ethical indent disclosure as 
being more favorable, especially for Muslim stakeholders 
as they are very particular about the source of investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
next section reviews the relevant literature, which discusses 
corporate ethical identity. The third section discusses 
hypothesis development, sampling methodology, data 
collection and data analysis followed by discussion on the 
research findings in the fourth section. Finally, the paper 
ends with a summary and conclusion of the research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development
Berrone et al. (2005) argued that ethical identity is a 
good investment in business as it can produce a positive 
environment and have a good impact on the organization, 
for instance, by exercizing and implementing an ethical 
code of conduct in the organization, the head of the 
organization can instill and influence the ethical behavior of 
the employees. Hosmer (1994) and Jones (1995) claimed 
that ethical identity could generate a positive atmosphere 
in the organization like the sense of trust and commitment, 
and, thus, it can attract more investors as they believe 
that the ethical identity of the organization is one of the 
important pillars in order to have successful performance. 
Further, an organization with a strong ethical identity can 
maximize the satisfaction of the stakeholder, which would 
lead to greater achievement by the organization.
Accordingly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) argued that 
Islamic banks have ethical identity, and, therefore, such an 
institution needs to attain not only its financial goal, but 
also its social goal since the foundation of Islamic banks 
is based on religious and Shariah principles, the ultimate 
goal of which is for the betterment of society. In addressing 
the practice of social reporting, the ethical identity 
disclosure in Islamic banks should be different from that of 
conventional banks since the emphasis and the underlying 
principles in these two banks are different (Haniffa, 2002). 
In conventional banks, the disclosure of their identity only 
considers the material and moral aspects, while, in contrast, 
the Islamic banks need to include the material and moral 
aspects together with the Shariah framework and ensure 
their alignment with Islamic principles.
By referring to the previous studies, empirically, this 
study used corporate governance characteristics as a 
determinant in assessing the factors affecting the ethical 
disclosure of the Islamic banks. Specifically, the board 
composition, which comprises three perspectives, namely, 
board size (Said et al., 2009), board independence (Khan, 
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2010; Bhasin, Makarov and Orazalin, 2012) and Shariah 
Supervisory Board, as well as Investment Account Holders 
(Farook, Hassan and Lanis, 2011) are used to assess the 
ethical identity disclosure of Islamic banks, thus relating 
each variable to the theoretical assumption.
3. Board size
The board of directors is one of the important elements in 
corporate governance and is responsible for supervising 
and overseeing the organization to ensure it is being 
properly managed. According to Jensen (1993), the larger 
the number of board members, the more ineffective the 
communication and coordination of the board and the 
more likely it is controlled by the CEO. This argument is 
supported by the agency theory, which proposes that large 
boards can be costly to the organization due to the increase 
in the potential conflict and operational complexity among 
board members, which lead to poor decision making 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Ning, Davidson 
and Wang (2010) suggested that an increase in board size 
would likely cause an increase in agency problems, which 
would contribute to internal conflict as well as the free-
riding problem among the directors. Said et al. (2009) 
also acknowledged that ineffective communication and 
inefficiency in decision-making would lead to the low 
quality of disclosure in financial reporting since the board 
is not able to perform their role efficiently.
However, Clemente and Labat (2009) claimed that large 
board size would increase the monitoring capabilities. Due 
to a significant relationship between the organization and 
their stakeholder, they tend to increase their disclosure 
level and release more information, as suggested by the 
stakeholder theory. In a study by Akhtaruddin, Hossain, 
Hossain, and Yao (2009), they found that board size 
is a significant predictor of the voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysian listed firms, as they found that large board size 
produced a greater level of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, 
in Rouf (2011), who studied how corporate characteristics 
and governance attributes would affect the voluntary 
disclosure in Bangladeshi firms, the study found there is 
a significantly positive connection between board size and 
voluntarily disclosure.In a study concerning the impact 
of corporate governance on social and environmental 
information disclosure in Malaysian banks by Htay, Ab. 
Rashid, Adnan and Mydin Meera (2012), it was found that 
board size has a positive significant impact on the social 
and environmental information disclosure as large board 
size seems to produce a better effect on disclosure in the 
banking sector. Thus, based on the stakeholder theory, 
this study expects that there is a positive relationship 
between board size and disclosure level, which leads to the 
hypothesis which states:
H1 (a): There is a positive significant relationship between 
board size and ethical identity disclosure.
4. Board independence
In Jensen and Meckling (1976), according to the agency 
theory, boards need to be observed and supervized by 
another party because of the nature of their opportunistic 
behavior. As the decision experts, independent directors are 
the ones who suit the role of monitoring and controlling the 
management performance since they have to be professional 
and have a positive influence over the director’s decision 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). Lim, Matolcsy 
and Chow (2007) found that independent directors would 
influence the disclosure level of firms concerning corporate 
information, as they are a part of the decision making by 
the board. On the other hand, Ho and Wong (2001) found 
no significant association between board independence 
and disclosure due to the low level of compliance in Chinese 
firms even with the presence of independent directors. In 
addition, it also supported the findings by Mohd Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006) who found that board independence 
has no significant relationship with voluntary disclosure as 
they discovered that the existence of independent directors 
on the board of directors could not influence the voluntary 
disclosure of Malaysian listed companies.
The findings from Mohd Ghazali (2007) and Hossain 
(2008) showed that board independence is significantly 
positive towards the disclosure level of the organization, 
which is consistent with the suggestion by the agency theory 
that claims that involvement from the board of directors is 
necessary in order to monitor any self-interest activities 
by managers. In addition, this theory suggests that a high 
proportion of independent directors will be able to monitor 
any self-interest action by the management, and, thus, may 
encourage the management to disclose more information 
(Williams, Duncan, Ginter and Shewchuk, 2006). This 
is consistent with the study by Bhasin et al. (2012) who 
examined the voluntary disclosure determinants in the 
banking sector of Kazakhstan, and found that board 
composition has a positive significant impact on the 
voluntary disclosure by Kazakhstan banks. This is supported 
by the findings by Htay, Ab. Rashid, Adnan and Mydin Meera 
(2011) who found that independent directors are one of 
the significant factors affecting the voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysian listed banks as they can provide more sources 
of information to the dependent directors. Consequently, 
based on the stakeholder and agency theory, this study 
expects that Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks tend 
to disclose more information on ethical identity with the 
presence of independent directors as board members:
H1 (b): There is a positive significant relationship between 
board independence and ethical identity disclosure
5. Shariah supervisory board
In this study, the Shariah Supervisory Board is included, 
as the board is one of the corporate elements in Islamic 
banks and is considered as crucial concerning the level 
of disclosure in Islamic banks. The Shariah Supervisory 
Board is a unique element in the governance of Islamic 
banks. In Scott (2004), he explained that the institutional 
theory is a kind of social structure that has been set up 
as an authoritative guideline, which consists of schemes, 
norms and routines to structure the social behavior. Based 
on this theory, in his paper, Hasan (2009) mentions that 
the Shariah Supervisory Board institution plays a vital role 
in ensuring that the activities of Islamic banks harmonize 
with Shariah ethics and principles. As the institution that 
governs the Islamic banks, the Shariah board is responsible 
for guiding and controlling the behavior of organizations so 
that the interests of society can be protected. Karim (1995) 
stressed in his paper that the authority of the Shariah 
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Supervisory Board is equal to other conventional auditors 
since they need to “investigate” whether the Islamic banks 
adhere to Islamic ethics and Shariah principles. According 
to Farook et al. (2011), the nature of Shariah compliance 
is not only based on the assurance of compliance through 
the Shariah Supervisory Board report but also on the 
greater involvement in social activities as well as the social 
disclosure. Thus, it is expected that the existence of the 
Shariah Supervisory Board in the governance of Islamic 
banks would lead to the greater disclosure level of Islamic 
banks itself.
Farook et al. (2011) also stated that the higher the number of 
the members of the Shariah Supervisory Board, the greater 
the disclosure level of Islamic banks since the ability of the 
Shariah Supervisory Board to monitor the Islamic banks 
governance also increases. Their study, which examines the 
Shariah Supervisory Board as one of the factors that may 
influence the corporate social responsibility disclosures in 
Islamic banks, found that the Shariah Supervisory Board is 
the most significant factor that affects the level of corporate 
social disclosure. As suggested by the institutional theory, 
the Shariah Supervisory institution plays an important role 
in influencing the level of disclosure of Islamic banks, as 
they are a part of the Shariah governance, which governs 
the Shariah matters in Islamic banks. Hence, applying the 
institutional theory, this study proposes that disclosure 
is positively related to the Shariah Supervisory Board of 
Islamic banks, which can be formulated in the following 
hypothesis:
H1(c): There is a positive significant relationship between the 
Shariah Supervisory Board and ethical identity disclosure.
6. Investment account holders
Farook et al. (2011) argued that Muslim investors would 
prefer to make an investment as investment account 
holders rather than invest their funds as shareholders. This 
is because they are usually interested in the services offered 
by Islamic banks compared to the share ownership of that 
particular bank. However, Archer and Karim (1997) argued 
with regard to the agency theory that the form of profit 
sharing loss contract used by Islamic banks in managing 
and mobilizing the investment account holder’s fund might 
lead to agency problems. Since Islamic banks act as the 
agent of the shareholders as well as for the Investment 
Account Holders, this relationship would increase the 
possibility of having a conflict of interest in dealing with the 
investment account holders’ funds (Archer et al., 1998). 
Pertaining to the Islamic banks risk, Shariah compliance 
is one the important elements in Islamic banks. Therefore, 
the investment account holders might face the risk of non-
compliance with Shariah, which may contribute to the 
agency problem in Islamic banks when the banks fail to 
meet the obligation of Shariah principles (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2010). Therefore, in order to solve these agency 
problems, adequate disclosure of reporting information, 
especially information with regard to the Shariah 
compliance, might reduce the occurrence of the agency 
problem among the investment account holders, since they 
have enough information to assess the risk (Karim 2001).
Karim (1990) also stated that in the context of the Shariah 
Supervisory Board report, if Islamic banks are going 
to publish a negative report, the group of investment 
account holders would begin to doubt the management’s 
commitment towards Shariah and they may start to avoid 
dealing with that particular Islamic bank. As the investment 
account holders are more interested in the Shariah 
compliance issues in the Islamic banks, the presence of 
investment account holders could have greater influence 
concerning the extent of disclosure. Further, in a study by 
Farook et al. (2011), which examines investment account 
holders as one of the factors that may influence corporate 
social responsibility disclosure in Islamic banks, it was 
found that investment account holders are among the 
significant factors that affect the level of corporate social 
disclosure. This is consistent with the stakeholder theory 
that claims the responsibility of Islamic banks towards 
the investment account holders. As investment account 
holders are the backbone in the operation of Islamic 
banks, the banks should strive to meet and maintain the 
expectation of the investment account holders through 
ethical identity disclosure. Thus, the final proposition on 
the relationship between the investment account holder 
and ethical identity disclosure level could be hypothesized 
as below:
H2: There is a positive significant relationship between 
investment account holders and ethical identity disclosure.
7. Research methodology
The sample size of this study consists of 16 Malaysian 
Islamic banks, which are registered under the Central Bank 
of Malaysia, and 5 Bahrain retail Islamic banks, which are 
licensed under the Central Bank of Bahrain (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2011). Currently, the Kingdom of Bahrain has 
26 Islamic banks, which comprise 6 retail Islamic banks 
and 20 wholesale Islamic banks, in which the operation 
of the retail banks is more towards commercial banks and 
the wholesale Islamic banks is similar to that of investment 
banks, merchant banks and other financial institutions that 
deal with larger institutions. Since Bahrain only has six 
retail banks, this study only considered five banks because 
one bank just started their Islamic bank operation in 2010 
(Central Bank of Bahrain, 2012).
The main source of this study is based on secondary data 
that were obtained from the annual reports of Islamic banks 
from 2007 to 2011, as annual reports are significant and 
relevant sources, which may communicate the information 
to all types of stakeholders and enable them to understand 
the information easily. The list of licensed Islamic banks in 
Malaysia was obtained from the website of the Central Bank 
of Malaysia, which lists sixteen Islamic banks comprising 
ten Islamic local banks and six Islamic foreign banks (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2011). Whereas for the Islamic banks in 
Bahrain, the list of registered Islamic Banks was obtained 
from the website of the Central Bank of Bahrain (Central 
Bank of Bahrain, 2012).
The study used content analysis to identify the items for 
measuring the ethical identity disclosure practices of 
Islamic banks. Content analysis is a method of compressing 
and codifying the text and putting it into various categories 
based on the criteria for coding (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Weber, 1990; Krippendoff, 2004; Stemler, 2001). 
The items and categories for the research instrument 
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chosen takes into account the disclosure requirement by 
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institution (AAOIFI, 1997) and is similar to that 
developed by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), and Zubairu, 
Sakariyau, and Dauda (2011). The Ethical Identity Index 
developed comprises nine dimensions that consist of 80 
constructs, which are Vision and Mission Statement, Board 
of Directors and Top Management, Product, Zakat, Charity 
and Benevolent Loan, Employees, Debtors, Community, 
Environment and Shariah Supervisory Board. The possible 
total score obtained by each of the banks amounts to 80 
points.
As for the independent variables, board size is measured 
according to the number of directors on the board 
(Said et al., 2009; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009), board 
independence is measured by looking at the percentage 
of independent directors to the total number of directors 
(Chau and Gray, 2010; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). 
While the Shariah Supervisory Board is measured by 
looking at the number of members on the Shariah 
Supervisory Board (Farook et al., 2011) and investment 
account holders (IAH) is measured by dividing the IAH 
funds to the paid up capital in shareholders’ equity 
(Farook et al., 2011).
The current study also used a control variable, in which 
the bank’s size is measured based on the logarithm of the 
total assets of the banks at the end of the reporting year 
(Fungacova and Weill, 2009). According to Heflin and 
Shaw (2000), in minimizing and reducing the impact of 
heteroscedasticity and extreme values when analysing the 
data, the total assets of the banks need to be in the form of 
natural logarithm (ln). For the second controlled variable, 
banks’ profitability is measured through the return on 
equity (ROE) of the Islamic banks (Berger and Black, 2011). 
Finally, the third control variable, country, is measured 
using a dummy variable where 0 represents Malaysian 
Islamic banks while 1 represents Bahrain Islamic banks. 
The usage of country as a control variable was employed in 
the study of Bashir (2001).
Since content analysis will be used as the method for 
determining the disclosure level of ethical identity in 
Islamic banks, the total score for Islamic bank disclosure is 
computed and expressed in the form of an ethical identity 
index, as follows (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Zubairu, 
Sakariyau, and Dauda, 2011):
Model 1:
EIIj
Xij
nj
=
∑
where EIIj = Ethical Identity Index
Xij =  1 if ith construct is disclosed, 0 if ith construct is not 
disclosed
nj = Number of constructs to be disclosed by banks
Multiple Linear Regression equation analysis is also 
developed in this study to test whether the four variables 
chosen could influence the disclosure level of ethical identity 
disclosure. The relationship between the independent and 
dependant variables is determined by using this model 
(Khan, 2010; Farook et al., 2011)
Model 2:
EID = β 0 + β 1BSIZE + β 2BINDE + + β 3SSB + β 4IAH  
   + β 5SIZE + β 6PROFIT + β 7COUN + e 
where
EID = Ethical Identity Disclosure
BSIZE = Board’s size
BINDE = Board’s independence
SSB = Shariah Supervisory Board
IAH = Investment Account Holder
SIZE = Banks’ size
PROFIT = Banks’ profit
COUN = Country
Bi = Parameter to be estimated
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
e = Error term
8. Results and discussion
Ethical identity disclosure analysis
Table  1 presents the ethical identity disclosure index 
for nine dimensions for both the Malaysian and Bahrain 
Islamic banks. It shows that the overall disclosure for ethical 
identity for both countries is only 51.7%, which suggests 
that there is low level of disclosure for both countries. 
Table 1. Ethical identity disclosure index.
Ethical identity index Malaysia Bahrain Total mean Sig.
Vision and Mission statement 47.1% 56% 51.6% 0.001
BOD and top management 62% 76.6% 69.3% 0.000
Product 36.8% 53.6% 45.2% 0.000
Zakaˉt, charity and benevolent loans 30.1% 49.8% 39.9% 0.000
Employees 62.5% 75% 68.8% 0.000
Debtors 84.4% 71% 77.7% 0.000
Community 38.3% 76.7% 57.5% 0.000
Environment 13.2% 0% 6.6% 0.005
Shariah Supervisory Board 49% 48.7% 48.8% 0.914
Total 47% 56.4% 51.7% 0.000
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Further, it can be seen that the disclosure of Bahrain 
Islamic banks is significantly higher (56.4%) than that of 
the Malaysian Islamic banks (47%). However, even though 
the level of disclosure of the Bahrain banks is greater than 
that of the Malaysian banks it is still low as both countries 
only disclosed about 50% of the disclosure requirements.
Table  1 also illustrates that the most communicated 
dimension by both banks is the debtors’ dimension (77.7%) 
followed by board of directors and top management 
dimension (69.3%). While the least communicated 
dimension is the environmental dimension with 6.6% of 
disclosure. This implies that neither country prioritizes 
environmental issues, which, perhaps, is because they 
considered that environmental issues are not influenced by 
their operation.
The results further indicated that the Malaysian and 
Bahrain Islamic banks need to improve their disclosure on 
vision and mission statement, product, Zaka¯t, charity and 
benevolent loans, community, environment and Shariah 
Supervisory Board dimension, since the level of disclosure 
for these dimensions is either below or around 50%.
9. Descriptive statistical analysis
Table 2  shows that, on average, most of the Islamic 
banks in Malaysia and Bahrain employed about seven to 
eight members as the members of the board of directors, 
which is an optimal number for the board size, as having 
more than that would interfere with the group dynamics 
(Jensen, 1993). As for the board’s independence (BINDE), 
the mean is 50.14%, which means that half of the board of 
directors in Islamic banks consists of independent directors. 
This indicates that the banks have met the corporate 
governance requirements for Islamic banks. For Shariah 
Supervisory Board (SSB), the results indicate that most of 
Shariah Supervisory Boards in Islamic banks consist of four 
members. This shows that both countries have complied 
with the regulators requirement. Finally, the mean for 
investment account holders of 1626.69% implies that most 
of the investment account holders in Islamic banks are 
about sixteen times more than the paid up capital of the 
Islamic banks.
10. Correlation analysis
Table  3 presents that there is a negative significant 
correlation between the board size and investment account 
holders where r is –0.377 at a 1% significance level. This 
medium relationship indicates that a larger board size 
would reduce the investment account holders. Table 3 also 
illustrates that there is a positive significant correlation 
between board independence and investment account 
holders, which has a medium strength of relationship, 
as r is 0.304 at 1% significance. This shows that a large 
proportion of independent directors would increase the 
number of investment account holders.
11. Multivariate analysis
In this section, the analysis on the normality test and 
multicollinearity test will be presented. In order to establish 
a connection between the independent variables and how 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of ethical identity disclosure determinants.
Malaysian Islamic Banks Bahrain Islamic Banks Total
Determinants Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Sig
BSIZE (No of member) 7.53 1.646 8.68 1.773 7.8 0.003
BINDE (%) 50.63% 0.133788 48.56% 0.223694 50.14% 0.571
SSB (No of member) 4.20 1.152 4.04 0.935 4.16 0.529
IAH (%) 2001.67% 31.838083 426.73% 3.635097 1626.69% 0.016
Note: EID is Ethical Identity Disclosure. BSIZE is Board Size BINDE is Board Independence. SSB is Shariah Supervisory 
Board. IAH is Investment Account Holder.
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficient.
BSIZE BINDE SSB IAH SIZE PROFIT COUN
BSIZE 1
BINDE –0.023 1
SSB 0.002 0.031 1
IAH –0.377** 0.304** –0.033 1
SIZE –0.275** 0.240* 0.336** 0.439** 1
PROFIT 0.126 0.096 0.019 0.007 –0.137 1
COUN 0.284** –0.056 –0.062 –0.236* –0.809** 0.171 1
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
Note: EID is Ethical Identity Disclosure. BSIZE is Board Size BINDE is Board Independence. SSB is Shariah Supervisory 
Board. IAH is Investment Account Holder.
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they would affect the dependent variable, the multiple 
linear regression analysis model has been applied in this 
study as well as the discussion between the independent 
and dependant variables. Below is the model that has been 
used in this study together with the regression result.
12. Test of normality
Before running the multiple linear regression analysis, 
the data was tested for normality and multicollinearity. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the data 
are not normally distributed. However, according to 
Pallant (2010), it is common for a large sample size to be 
abnormally distributed, through which the data violates 
the assumption of normality, however, it will not cause 
any serious problem. In addition, according to the Central 
Limit Theorem, when the sample size is large, more than 
30 per group, the sampling distribution will take a normal 
distribution shape, regardless of the population shape from 
which the sample is drawn (Field, 2009). Therefore, what 
can be justified here is that distribution can be converged to 
the normal distribution for sample study when it involves a 
large sample size in the study. The data also indicates that 
there is no collinearity problem as the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) is not more than ten (Alauddin and Nghiemb, 
2010). 
Table 4 tabulates the results for Multiple Linear Regression 
analysis that examines the determinants for ethical identity 
disclosure. The Durbin-Watson value shows 1.710, which 
implies that there is no presence of auto-correlation, 
thereby indicating the data independence between the 
independent variable and ethical identity disclosure.
Table  4 also highlights that there is a positive significant 
relationship between the board size (BSIZE) and ethical 
identity disclosure (EID) of Islamic banks for which the 
t-value is 2.509 at the 5% significance level, thus accepting 
hypothesis H1 (a). The finding of this study is supported 
by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Rouf (2011) and Htay et al. 
(2012) who found a positive relationship between board 
size and voluntary disclosure, which suggests that a large 
board will provide more voluntary disclosure compared to 
a smaller board.
The findings of this present study are consistent with the 
stakeholder theory, which claims that the Islamic banks 
tend to increase their disclosure level and release more 
information concerning their operations and activities 
due to the significant relationship between Islamic banks 
and their stakeholder. Therefore, having a large number of 
board members would increase the level of disclosure in 
Islamic banks, which helps the board to satisfy the needs of 
the stakeholders (Clemente and Labat, 2009). This study 
implies that board size is one of the important factors in 
Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks as it plays a significant 
role in influencing the disclosure of the ethical identity by 
the banks. It can be seen that most of the Malaysian and 
Bahrain Islamic banks have seven to nine members on the 
board, which is considered as large enough to have dynamic 
decision making. Further observation indicates that most 
of the Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain that have a 
high-level of disclosure are those banks that have a large 
board size.
As tabulated in Table 4, the results show that hypothesis H1 
(b) is rejected as this study found no significant relationship 
between the proportion of independent members on the 
board of directors and ethical identity disclosure. This 
finding is in contrast with the agency theory that suggests 
that to influence the decision making as well as monitor 
and control the opportunistic behavior of management 
Table 4. Multiple linear regression analysis: Determinants of ethical identity.
Model Coefficients t-value p-value
(Constant) −2.855*** 0.005
BSIZE 0.196 2.509** 0.014
BINDE 0.025 0.333 0.740
SSB 0.284 3.320*** 0.001
IAH 0.235 2.397*** 0.008
SIZE 0.609 3.667*** 0.000
PROFIT −0.054 −0.748 0.456
COUN 0.897 6.326*** 0.000
R2 0.529
Adjusted R2 0.495
F-value 15.541
p-value 0.000
Durbin-Watson 1.710
N 105
*** P-value is significant at the 0.01 level 
** P-value is significant at the 0.05 level 
Note: Dependent variable - EID is Ethical Identity Disclosure. Independent 
variables – BSIZE is Board Size BINDE is Board Independence. SSB is Shariah 
Supervisory Board. IAH is Investment Account Holder. Control variables - 
SIZE is Banks’ Size. PROFIT is Banks’ Profit. COUN is Country.
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and other board members, independent directors need 
to be among the board members. This is because, besides 
incentives, effective monitoring is one of the safeguards 
that have been proposed to minimize the agency problem 
that occurs in organizations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, the results corroborate Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), and Khodadadi, Khazami and Aflatooni 
(2010), as the authors found no significant relationship 
between board independence and voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia and Iranian listed firms. In addition, this study 
is supported by other findings from Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), as they found that the proportion of independent 
directors could not influence the level of disclosure due to 
the ineffective monitoring role by the directors.
Hence, the issue that needs to be addressed in the findings of 
the current study concerns the independence of independent 
directors as well as their monitoring effectiveness, as most 
of them are appointed by the Chairman or CEO. This result 
suggests that most independent directors in Malaysian and 
Bahrain Islamic banks are not really performing their role 
effectively and competently in monitoring the performance 
of Islamic banks. The data collected also show that the 
proportion of independent directors is similar for most of 
the banks, and that even banks with the highest and lowest 
disclosure level are similar in terms of their proportion of 
independent directors.
Similar to the studies by Hassn (2011), and Farook et al. 
(2011), the regression results in Table  4 further indicate 
that there is a significant positive relationship between 
the Shariah Supervisory Board and ethical identity 
disclosure in Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks and the 
relationship, thus accepting hypothesis H1 (c). This finding 
is consistent with the institutional theory that suggests 
that to ensure the organization is successful in achieving 
its goals and objectives, the organizations’ corporate 
governance mechanism must be effective. The institution 
of the Shariah Supervisory Board is responsible for guiding 
and controlling the conduct and performance of the 
Islamic banks to ensure that the interests of society are 
protected. Thus, the existence of the Shariah Supervisory 
Board members may result in greater governance and 
monitoring, and, consequently, greater compliance with 
Shariah principles by the Islamic banks. Increasing the level 
of integrity of the Shariah Supervisory Board may increase 
the level of confidence of Muslim society, especially Muslim 
investors towards the Islamic financial institution.
Similar to the study by Farook et al. (2011), further analysis 
in this study shows that investment account holders (IAH) 
have a significant positive relationship with ethical identity 
disclosure in Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks; thus, 
hypothesis H2 is accepted. This finding is consistent with 
the stakeholder theory, where having greater monitoring by 
the investment account holders as one of the stakeholders 
is needed in the Islamic banks to ensure that the investment 
account holders are managed and mobilized appropriately 
by the banks. As the Islamic banks need to act as the agent to 
the investment account holders as well as to the shareholder, 
the conflict of interest or agency problem would arise. 
Therefore, the presence of monitoring from investment 
account holders may reduce the agency problem, and, thus, 
influence the management of Islamic banks pertaining to 
the compliance and disclosure issues (Archer et al., 1998). 
The investment account holders’ influence may apply more 
pressure on the management of Islamic banks to disclose 
more information as required by the regulators. Thus, by 
disclosing the ethical identity information, it may establish 
a connection with the Muslim investor.
13. Summary and conclusion
This study explores the area of ethical identity disclosure, in 
which emphasis was given to Islamic banks in Malaysia and 
Bahrain since both countries have a considerably developed 
Islamic banking industry.Hence, the main objective of this 
study is to compare the level of ethical identity disclosure 
of Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain, and also examine 
the determinants affecting the ethical identity disclosure in 
these banks.
From the ethical identity index model, it could be seen 
that the overall disclosure level in both countries is 
51.6%, which suggests a low level of disclosure by both 
countries, since they only disclose 50% of their total 
disclosure. Further, the overall disclosure shows that the 
disclosure level of Bahrain Islamic banks is significantly 
higher (56.4%) than Malaysian Islamic banks (47.1%). 
The results further indicate that the information in the 
vision and mission statement; product; Zakat, charity and 
benevolent loans; community; environment; and Shariah 
Supervisory Board dimension need to be emphasized by the 
regulators as well as the Islamic banks as they are among 
the least communicated activities by both banks. Since all 
the dimensions involved in this study portray the identity 
of Islamic banks as Islamic financial institutions, it needs 
to be emphasized and highlighted by the management and 
regulator of Islamic banks. When these dimensions are not 
appropriately disclosed, it could have a severe impact on 
the image of Islamic banks as Islamic financial institutions.
Further analysis suggests that independent directors in both 
Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks are not really effective 
and competent in performing their role in monitoring the 
performance and activities of the management of Islamic 
banks, which means the presence of independent directors 
in Islamic banks does not influence the level of ethical 
identity disclosure of Islamic banks. While the Shariah 
Supervisory Board is found to be the most significant factor 
that would influence the level of ethical identity disclosure 
in Islamic banks. This is consistent with the idea suggested 
by the institutional theory in which the Shariah Supervisory 
Board is one of the significant means of governance in 
Islamic banks that needs to supervize and control the 
Islamic banks activities and performance and ensure that 
they conform to Shariah principles (Hasan, 2009). Thus, 
the current findings show that the Shariah Supervisory 
Board plays a critical role in influencing the level of ethical 
identity disclosure in Islamic banks as they could govern 
the Islamic banks effectively with their expertise.
Further, this study implies that investment account 
holders are among the monitoring mechanisms that 
could be applied by the Islamic banks to enhance the 
disclosure activity of important and relevant information 
appropriately. As suggested by the stakeholder theory, 
investment account holders could be a good monitoring 
tool in observing the activities of Islamic banks. 
As Muslim investors are particularly interested in the 
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compliance with Shariah principles and Islamic law, 
the management of Islamic banks need to pay extra 
attention towards this matter, especially when the 
Muslim investors possess little knowledge about the 
application of Islamic law in relation to the operation 
of Islamic banks. Therefore, Islamic banks need to be 
transparent about this information and let the Islamic 
investors monitor the banks operation externally. By 
having this kind of monitoring, greater compliance 
would be fulfilled by the banks, and, as suggested by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the ownership structure 
can determine the level of monitoring and thus enhance 
the level of disclosure. Since Muslim investors are more 
likely to invest their funds in the Shariah investments, the 
Islamic banks need to carefully manage their operation 
and ensure that everything is based on Shariah law.
Further, board size is found to have a significant influence 
on the level of ethical identity disclosure in Islamic banks, 
which is consistent with the stakeholder theory, which 
claims that the larger the board size, the greater the level of 
disclosure in Islamic banks; thus the more the stakeholders’ 
needs as well as expectations could be fulfilled by the 
Islamic banks (Clemente and Labat, 2009).
There are many aspects that could still be explored in future 
research. As this study used secondary data in examining 
the level of disclosure in Islamic banks, future research 
may consider using other methodological approaches, 
other forms of media as well as improving the research 
instruments by adding any other aspects that could be 
used in examining the ethical identity disclosure in Islamic 
banks. Future studies could also consider comparing the 
determinants for both countries and identifying which 
determinants would be more important under different 
Islamic governance settings.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank the Accounting Research Institute 
for the research grant in conducting this research
References
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions. (1997) Financial Accounting Standard No. 
1 (FAS 1): General presentation and disclosure in the 
financial Statements of Islamic banks and financial 
institutions. Accounting and Auditing Standards for 
Islamic Financial Institutions. Manama, Bahrain: 
(AAOIFI).
Akhtaruddin M, Hossain MA, Hossain M, Yao L. (2009) 
Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure 
in Corporate Annual Reports of Malaysian Listed 
Firms. Journal of Applied Management Accounting 
Research. 7(1):1–19.
Alauddin M, Nghiemb HS. (2010) Do Instructional 
Attributes Pose Multicollinearity Problems? An 
Empirical Exploration. Economic Analysis and Policy. 40 
(3):351.
Archer S, Karim RAA. (1997) Agency Theory, Corporate 
Governance and the Accounting Regulation of Islamic 
Banks. Research in Accounting Regulation. 1:97–114.
Archer S, Karim AAA. (2009) Profit Sharing Investment 
Accounts in Islamic Banks: Regulatory Problems and 
Possible Solutions. Journal of Banking Regulation. 
10:300–306.
Archer S, Karim AAA, Al-Deehani T. (1998) Financial 
Contracting, Governance Structures and the Accounting 
Regulation of Islamic banks: An Analysis of Agency 
Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. Journal of 
Management and Governance. 2:149–170.
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2010) Shariah Governance 
Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions. Bank 
Negara Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2011) List of Licensed Banking 
Institutions in Malaysia. Bank Negara Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2012) Building a Progressive 
Islamic Banking Sector: Charting the Way Forward. 
Governor’s Speech at the Seminar on 10-Year Master 
Plan for Building a Progressive Islamic Banking Sector.
Berrone P, Surroca J, Tribo JA. (2005) Corporate Ethical 
Identity as Determinant of Firm Performance: A Test of 
the Mediating Role of Stakeholder Satisfaction. Journal 
of Business Ethics. 76:35–53.
Bhasin ML, Makarov RR, Orazalin NS. (2012) Determinants 
of Voluntary Disclosure in the Banking Sector: An 
Empirical Study. Contemporary Business Studies. 60.
Central Bank of Bahrain. (2012) Central Bank of Bahrain 
(CBB) Register: Islamic Banks Licensees. Kingdom of 
Bahrain.
Central Bank of Bahrain. (2011) Corporate Governance 
Code. Kingdom of Bahrain.
Chau G, Gray SJ. (2010) Family Ownership, Board 
Independence and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence 
from Hong Kong. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation. 19(2): 93–109.
Clemente AG, Labat BN. (2009) Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Voluntary Disclosure – The Role of 
Independent Directors in the Boards of Listed Spanish 
Firms. Madrid Autonomus University through the 
NIEFAC and VolGoFin Research Projects. The Spanish 
Association of Accounting and Management (AECA) 
and the Ministry of Education INNCENOR.
Fama EF, Jensen MC. (1983) Separation of Ownership and 
Control. Journal of Law and Economics. 26:301–325.
Farook S, Hassan MK, Lanis R. (2011) Determinants of 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: The Case of 
Islamic Banks. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business 
Research. 2(2):114–141.
Field A. (2009) Discovering Statistics SPSS for Windows (3rd 
Ed) London: SAGE Publication.
MohdGhazali, N. A. (2007) Ownership structure and 
corporate social responsibility disclosure: Some Malaysian 
evidence. Corporate Governance Journal. 7 (3) 251–266.
Gray E, Balmer JMT. (2001) Ethical Identity: What Is It? 
What Of It? Working Paper No. 01/15, April. Bradford 
University School of Management, Bradford, West 
Yorkshire, United Kingdom.
Rahman and Saimi
18 Ethics, Governance and Regulation in Islamic Finance
Haniffa R, Hudaib M. (2007) Exploring the Ethical Identity 
of Islamic Financial Institutions via Communication in 
the Annual Reports [Special Issue]. Journal of Business 
Ethics. 76(1):103–122.
Haniffa RM, Cooke TE. (2002) Culture, Corporate 
Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations. 
Abacus. 38(3):317–349.
Haniffa RM. (2002) Social Responsibility Disclosure: 
An Islamic Perspective. Indonesian Management and 
Accounting Journal. 1(2):128–146.
Haniffa RM, Cooke TE. (2005) The Impact of Culture and 
Governance on Corporate Social Reporting. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy. 24(5):391–430.
Hasan Z. (2009) Corporate Governance, Western and 
Islamic Perspectives. International Review of Business 
Research Papers.5(1):277–293.
Hassn WM. (2011) Corporate Governance Practices of 
Islamic Banks Versus Conventional Banks: Evidence 
from the Middle East.
Heflin F, Shaw KW. (2000) Blockholder Ownership and 
Market liquidity. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis. 35(4):621–633.
Hidayat SE, Abduh M. (2012) Does Financial Crisis Give 
Impacts on Bahrain Islamic Banking Performance? A 
Panel Regression Analysis. International Journal of 
Economics and Finance. 4(7):79–87.
Hosmer LT. (1994) Strategic Planning as of Ethics Mattered. 
Strategic Management Journal. 15 (Special Issue):17–
34.
Hossain M. (2008) The Extent of Disclosure in Annual 
Reports of Banking Companies: The Case of India. 
European Journal of Scientific Research. 23(4):659–681.
Htay SNN, Rashid HMA, Adnan MA, Meera AKM. (2012) 
Impact of Corporate Governance on Social and 
Environmental Information Disclosure of Malaysian 
listed Banks: Panel Data Analysis. Asian Journal of 
Finance & Accounting. 4(1):1–24.
Htay SNN, Rashid HMA, Adnan MA, Meera AKM. (2011) 
The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Voluntary 
Accounting Information Disclosure in Malaysian Listed 
Banks. In Global Economics, Finance and Management 
Conference, 9-10 June 2011. Intercontinental Toronto 
Centre, Toronto, Canada. Unpublished.
Huafang X, Jianguo Y. (2007) Ownership Structure, Board 
Composition and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: 
Evidence from Listed Companies in China. Managerial 
Auditing Journal. 22(6):604–619.
Islamic Financial Services Board (2005) IFSB-2: Capital 
Adequacy Standards for Institutions (other than 
Insurance Institutions Offering only Islamic Financial 
Services IIFS) Islamic Financial Services Board. Kuala 
Lumpur.
Jensen MC, Meckling WH. (1976)Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 3:305–350.
Jensen MC. (1993) The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, 
and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of 
Finance. 48:831–880.
Jones TM. (1995) Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: 
A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics. Academy of 
Management Review. 20(2):404–437.
Karim RAA. (1990) The Independence of Religious and 
External Auditors: The Case of Islamic Banks. Accounting, 
Auditing, and Accountability Journal. 3(3):34–44.
Karim RAA. (1995) The Nature and Rationale of a Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting by Islamic Banks. 
Accounting and Business Research. 25(100):285–300.
Karim RAA. (2001) International Accounting 
Harmonization, Banking Regulation, and Islamic Banks. 
International Journal of Accounting. 36(2):169–193.
Kayed RN, Hassan MK. (2011)The Global Financial Crisis 
and Islamic Finance. Thunderbird International Business 
Review. 53:551–564
Khan HUZ. (2010) The Effect of Corporate Governance 
Elements on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Reporting. International Journal of Law and Management. 
52(2):82–109.
Khodadadi V, Khazami S, Aflatooni A. (2010) The Effect 
of Corporate Governance Structure on the Extent 
of Voluntary Disclosure in Iran. Business Intelligence 
Journal. 3(2): 151–164.
Lim S, Matolcsy Z, Chow D. (2007) The Association 
Between Board Composition and Different Types of 
Voluntary Disclosure. European Accounting Review. 
16(3):555–583.
Lipton M,Lorsch JW. (1992) A Modest Proposal for Improved 
Corporate Governance. Business Lawyer. 48:59–77.
Mohd AN, Archer S, Abdel KRA. (2009) Issues of 
Transparency in Islamic banks. Review of Economics. 
13(1):89–103.
Mohd GNA, Weetman P. (2006) Perpetuating Traditional 
Influences: Voluntary Disclosure in Malaysia Following 
the Economic Crisis. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation. 15(2):226–248.
Moody’s Investor Service (2010, September) GCC Islamic 
Investment Banks: Mid-Crisis Collapse to Force Improved 
Risk Management. Hassoune A, Carasse F,Nerby P.
Ning Y, Davidson WN, Wang J. (2010) Does Optimal 
Corporate Board Size Exist? An Empirical Analysis. 
Journal of Applied Finance. 20(2):57–69.
Pallant J. (2010) SPSS Survival Manual: A Step-by-Step 
Guide to Data Analysis Using SPSS (4th Ed) McGraw 
Hill. New York.
Rouf M. (2011) The Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: 
A Study of Listed Companies in Bangladesh. African Journal 
of Business Management. 5(19):7836–7845.
Said R, Zainuddin Y, Haron H. (2009) The Relationship 
Between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
and Corporate Governance Characteristics in Malaysian 
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 19
Determinants of ethical identity disclosure among Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks
Public Listed Companies. Social Responsibility Journal. 
5(2):212–226.
Scott WR. (2004) Institutional Theory. In George Ritzer 
(Ed) Encyclopedia of Social Theory. Sage. Thousand 
Oaks, California.
Stemler SE. (2001) An Overview of Content Analysis. 
Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation. 7(17):137–
146.
Weisbach MS. (1988) Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. 
Journal of Financial Economics. 20:431–460.
Williams DR, Duncan WJ, Ginter PM, Shewchuk RM. 
(2006) Do Governance, Equity Characteristics, and 
Venture Capital Involvement Affect Long-Term Wealth 
Creation in US Health Care and Biotechnology IPOs? 
Journal of Health Care Finance. 33(1):54–71.
Zubairu UM, Sakariyau OB, Dauda CK. (2011) Social 
Reporting Practices of the Islamic Bank of Britain. 
International Journal of Current Research.  33(5):118–
125.

Developing Inclusive and Sustainable Economic and Financial Systems
Cite this chapter as: Musa M A (2015). Islamic business ethics and finance: An exploratory study of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. In H A El-Karanshawy et al. (Eds.), Ethics, Governance and Regulation in Islamic Finance. Doha, Qatar: 
Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation
Islamic business ethics and finance: An 
exploratory study of Islamic banks in Malaysia
Muhammad Adli Musa
Asia Institute, Faculty of Arts, The University of Melbourne, Department of Qur’an and Sunnah Studies, Kulliyyah  
of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia.  
adlimusa1400@gmail.com/m.musa@student.unimelb.edu.au, +61423716252/+60192622725
Abstract - Ethics has become increasingly important in the financial services sector on the grounds 
that the aim of business activities in general and financial services in particular is the creation of 
value for the consumer. Furthermore, an ethical environment in the business and financial sectors 
provides vital support for maximising long-term owner value. If ethics played a larger role in the 
financial services sector, the recent global financial crisis might have been averted. Islamic finance 
which claims to offer global financial stability and high ethical standards should reflect Islamic 
values in all facets of behaviour to bring about collective morality and spirituality, which when 
integrated with the production of goods and services advance the Islamic way of life. However, 
there is an apparent lack, in the current literature around Islamic finance and Islamic business 
ethics, of an evaluation of the extent to which the ideal ethical norms of Islam are implemented 
by Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). International standard setting organisations such as the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for IFIs 
(AAOIFI) have published the Guiding Principles and Conduct of Business for Institutions offering 
Islamic Financial Services and the Code of Ethics for the Employees of IFIs respectively. While the 
relevant authorities may issue appropriate frameworks or standards, which are necessary to ensure 
that public interest is adequately served, joint commitment from the IFIs concerned is essential. 
Against the above-mentioned background, this paper attempts to investigate the consistencies or, 
if any, inconsistencies and explore the relationship between the Islamic business ethical norms and 
the practices of Islamic banks in Malaysia. In doing so it tries to address the current imbalance of 
emphasis and the lack of a comprehensive discussion on business ethics from a wider cultural and 
religious perspective with reference to Islam, particularly focussing on selected Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. The main research question of this study is: How do the current practices in Malaysian 
IFIs mirror the Islamic ethical norms in business? The findings in this paper would potentially assist 
in the improvement of practices among IFIs to conform with the ethical norms established by Islam, 
which are in fact the core of their existence.
Keywords: religion, business ethics, Islamic finance, ethical perception
1. Introduction
Ethics has always been a part of business. However, the 
business ethics movement is relatively new and can be 
traced back to the 1960s, which witnessed the rise of 
social issues in business where business came under attack 
due to the lack of social consciousness and the harm it 
inflicted upon society in various ways (De George, 1995). 
The 1980s saw business ethics being institutionalized as 
an academic field, where a growing number of books, 
journals, institutes, professors, consultants and university 
courses in business ethics emerged (De George,1987; 
Jones, Parker and Ten Bos, 2005). Both public awareness 
of the scandals in the business world which appear 
to result from too little regard for morality, and the 
problems related to business which expose the fact that 
laws and regulations, have failed to a certain extent, 
have contributed to the rise of interest in business ethics 
(Chryssides and Kaler, 1993). Furthermore, the recent 
global financial crisis, which began in the USA, has once 
again redirected business ethics in the glare of publicity.
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For Muslims, Islam is considered as a way of life and 
not merely a religion. Hence, business ethics cannot be 
separated from ethics in other aspects of a Muslim’s daily 
life (Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Hasanuzzaman, 2003). 
It is claimed that in the climate of Islamic philosophy, it 
is ethics that dominates economics and not vice versa 
(Naqvi, 1981), and that Islamic economics is characterized 
as being ethical (akhl q ) besides being Godly (rabb n ), 
humane (ins n ) and balanced (wa’a’ ) (Al-Qara’ wi, 
1995). The concept of Taw’ d (monotheism, singularity, 
oneness or unity of God) has been identified as the core 
of Islamic ethics, along with trusteeship or stewardship 
(khil fah), justice or equilibrium (al-‘adl), free will or 
freedom (ikhtiy r), responsibility (far’) and benevolence 
(I’s n) (Faruqi, 1992; Naqvi, 1981; Rice, 1999; Beekun, 
1997; Haneef, 2005). On a more practical level, the 
manner for proper Islamic ethical conduct in business is 
based on leniency, which encompasses good manners, 
forgiveness, removal of hardship and compensation; 
service motive, where businesses provide needed services 
to  the community; and consciousness of All h, which 
requires Muslim businessmen to be mindful of All h in 
their conduct of business (Abeng, 1997).
In the financial services sector, ethics has become 
increasingly important on the basis that the purpose of 
business activities in general and financial services in 
particular is the creation of value for the consumer (Duska 
and Clarke, 2002). The financial services environment 
should not be an environment where there is a dichotomy 
between the personal ethical attitudes and the attitudes 
governing one’s business life (Duska and Clarke, 2002). 
Moreover, it is suggested that an ethical environment will 
coincidentally pave the way to improved performance 
as in the case of the British Cooperative Bank’s ethical 
policy (Kitson, 1996), and provides essential support for 
maximizing long-term owner value (Sternberg, 2000). The 
recent global financial crisis might have been averted if 
ethics played a larger role in the financial services sector.
Islamic finance has been recognized as a rapidly increasing 
integrated compartment of global finance (Warde, 2000) 
with assets worldwide estimated to be worth $700 billion 
as a result of growth at a rate of more than 10% annually 
during the past decade (Standard & Poor’s, 2009). With 
respect to ethics, IFIs are considered to be ethical since 
the foundation of their business philosophy is grounded in 
the Shariah, often referred to as ethics in action, which is 
concerned with promoting justice and welfare (al-‘adl wa 
al-I’s n) in society and seeking God’s blessing (al-barakah) 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). The difference between Islamic 
and conventional financial systems is that the former has 
to preserve certain social objectives and is based on equity 
rather than debt (Venardos, 2005).
Malaysia’s Financial Sector Master-Plan explicitly mentions 
that it would like to “epitomize Malaysia as a regional Islamic 
financial centre” (BNM, 2001). A distinguishing feature of 
the Malaysian economy is that Islamic finance has been 
fully integrated into its existing financial system, which 
demonstrates the sector’s inventiveness and capacity for 
innovation (Venardos, 2005). It is also worth highlighting 
that the Malaysian Islamic finance market is considered to be 
well developed with a huge future potential (Al-Omar and 
Abdel-Haq, 1996). The first IFI established in Malaysia was 
the Malayan Muslims Pilgrims Savings Corporation, which 
began operations in 1963. Twenty years later, in 1983, the 
first Islamic bank—Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad—started 
operations after continuous pressure on the Malaysian 
government to assist in establishing an Islamic bank (Man, 
1988). The seriousness of the Malaysian government in 
furthering the cause of Islamic finance can be seen in 
the Financial Sector Master-Plan’s vision to see Islamic 
banking evolve in parallel with conventional banking to 
achieve 20% of the banking market share, represented by 
a number of strong and highly capitalized Islamic banking 
institutions, offering financial products and services which 
are underpinned by a comprehensive and conducive 
Shariah and regulatory framework (BNM, 2001).
2. Current predicament
It is claimed that the issue of ethics in business was 
primarily theological and religious prior to the 1960s (De 
George, 1987). However, theological contributions could 
have been ignored in the current discourse and literature of 
business ethics, when in fact an understanding of religious 
traditions would put ethics with regard to business in a 
broader perspective (Wilson, 1997). Furthermore, the 
current trend is to treat business ethics more narrowly as 
an applied philosophy and social science despite that on 
a practical level, religion matters to business ethics since 
religion’s moral precepts and narratives inform and shape 
the morality of a substantial portion of the population 
making business ethical decisions (Calkins, 2000). It must 
be noted that voluntarily held ethical mores which stem from 
religious beliefs that are accepted by believers as binding 
cannot be substituted by non-binding general frameworks 
of ethical rules and norms (Naqvi, 2003). Despite the trend 
towards globalization, the current discussion on business 
ethics is strongly Western oriented and informed by 
Western social, religious and cultural values, overlooking 
other religious and cultural perspectives in the wider global 
context (Mohammed, 2007).
On the other hand, though business ethics is considered to 
be integrated within the large framework of established 
Islamic ethical values, a large part of Islamic literature on 
the subject is either theologically oriented or superficial and 
inadequate in its assessment of Islamic business principles 
and to date remains fragmented and spread over a variety 
of sources, which does not sufficiently provide a systematic 
model or framework of business ethics despite the existence 
of a rich vein of the concept in Islam (Mohammed, 2007). 
Furthermore, in most cases, the literature on Islamic 
economics, in which businesses operate, though full of 
reference to primary sources, deals with basic principles in 
a rhetoric and simplistic style and lacks a comprehensive 
discussion of the basic beliefs and values (Khan, 2007). IFIs 
also tend to emphasise the Islamic legality of the products 
and services offered at the expense of giving due attention 
to the ethical dimensions of their business practices. Muslim 
scholars (‘ulam ’ ) have also mainly been restating the position 
of the Shariah on various issues, and although their discourse 
contains an implicit awareness of the social reality, their 
emphasis has been on the legal dimension (Khan, 2007).
It is observed that currently the financial services sector 
operates in a culture where the pursuit of money, an 
instrumental good, turns into the ultimate goal of human 
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beings, leading towards ethical corruption (Duska and 
Clarke, 2002). It is claimed that this is in stark contrast 
to the climate of Islamic philosophy, which dictates 
that ethics should dominate economics, as previously 
highlighted. Moreover, IFIs should reflect Islamic values in 
all facets of behaviour to create a collective morality and 
spirituality,which, when combined with the production 
of good and services, advances the Islamic way of life 
(Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). At the operational level, it 
has been mentioned that the difference between Islamic 
and conventional finance is that the former is equity based 
while the latter is based on debt. As such, the conventional 
financial system has been shaken by frequent crises, due to 
its instability, in spite of the existence of various regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks (Mirakhor and Krichene, 
2009b). In contrast, the Islamic financial system which is 
void of interest, un-backed credit, abundance of liquidity, 
high leveraged financial transactions and speculation, 
ensures inherent stability (Mirakhor, 2009a).
There is an apparent lack in the current literature of 
Islamic finance and Islamic business ethics of an evaluation 
of the extent to which the ideal ethical norms of Islam 
are implemented by IFIs. Though there are rare cases of 
financial scandals involving IFIs, Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad recorded a loss of over RM500  million and 
RM1.3  billion for its financial years of 2005 and 2006 
respectively, after tax and zak t (BIMB, 2008), in one of 
Malaysia’s worst financial ‘scandals’. Consequently, the 
then Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, directed 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad to take stern action against 
its officers who were responsible for such a huge loss as 
a result of approving lending that should not have been 
approved (Basri, 2005). This demonstrates that in spite 
of the claimed resilience, stability and ethicality of IFIs, 
there are chances of failure due to inconsistencies between 
theory and practice.
3. Islamic business ethics and finance
3.1. Business ethics
In the first place, is there a need for ethics in business? 
Without ethics, neither businesses nor individuals could 
function. The absence of an ethical framework governing 
actions leads to the non-existence of behaviour standards 
of a civil society, which would result in chaos and disorder 
(Stewart, 1996). Hence, it is no wonder that ethics has 
always been a part of business and many have written about 
ethics in business for centuries. Although business ethics 
is sometimes considered an extension of an individual’s 
personal ethics, it is argued that specialised knowledge 
and skills are required in dealing ethically with complex 
decisions in business (Dean, 1997).
In tracing the developments of the business ethics 
movement, De George (1995) identifies the 1960s as the 
period of the rise of social issues in business where business 
came under attack due to its lack of social consciousness 
and the harm it inflicted upon society in various ways. The 
1970s then witnessed the entry of a significant number of 
philosophers into the field, which helped shape the structure 
of what developed into business ethics (De George, 1987). 
The 1980s saw business ethics being institutionalized 
as an academic field, where a growing number of books, 
journals, institutes, professors, consultants and university 
courses emerged (De George, 1987; Jones, Parker, ten Bos, 
2005).
Chryssides and Kaler (1993) observe that both public 
awareness of the scandals in the business world, which 
appear to result from too little regard for morality, and 
the problems related to business, which expose the fact 
that laws and regulations have failed to a certain extent, 
have contributed to the rise of interest in business ethics. 
More generally, Jones and Pollitt (1998) observe that 
the “growing disillusionment” with materialism in most 
Western countries has contributed to a “renewed interest” 
in all aspects of morality. On the other hand, pressure on 
businesses to perform ethically and the realisation that good 
ethics is good business has also contributed to the increased 
emphasis on ethics within business (Dean, 1997).
There is no a single definition for business ethics. This is not 
surprising as business ethics is a relatively new distinctive 
academic field. No wonder there is great confusion when 
business ethics is mentioned in any discourse (Jones, 
Parker and ten Bos, 2005). Obviously and simply, business 
ethics refers to ethics as it is applied to business, i.e. it 
is concerned with moral issues in the field of business 
(Chryssides and Kaler, 1993). The term could also refer to 
“the rules of conduct according to which business decisions 
are made” (Jones and Pollitt, 1998) and deals with the 
expectations and requirements of society from businesses 
(Grace and Cohen, 1995). Jones, Parker and ten Bos (2005) 
in an attempt to clear the confusion about business ethics, 
describe the academic inquiry on business ethics as the 
“discipline of business ethics”, while the applied practices 
of business ethicists who are involved in explaining legal 
and ethical issues, writing legal codes for businesses etc. 
is described as “applied business ethics”. This is similar to 
Masden’s (1995) call for looking at business ethics from two 
different angles; business ethics as a doing or a practice, 
and business ethics as a theorising about business and its 
ethical context.
Business ethics is not safe from criticisms. Friedman 
(1998) opposes the notion that businesses have social 
responsibilities though individuals might have certain 
social responsibilities. The sole responsibility of businesses 
is to make as much money as possible while abiding to the 
basic rules of the society embodied in both law and ethical 
customs. He views the call for businesses to have social 
responsibilities as “preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism”, which is against free market mechanisms. 
However Donaldson (1982) refutes the notion that the 
only responsibility of businesses is to increase profits as 
they owe society for the basis of their very existence. He 
views businesses as being morally obliged to produce goods 
and services efficiently for society. In a similar vein French 
(1979) argues that though corporations are not literally 
individuals, they qualify as individuals on the pretext 
that their decision-making structure permits the use of 
moral reasons. Hence, corporations, like individuals, have 
obligations to behave in an ethical manner.
Stark (1993)—in What is the Matter with Business Ethics?—
describes the discipline as being too general, theoretical 
and impractical for those involved in business and that a 
new direction is needed for business ethics to be worthy of 
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attention. Some see the term as an oxymoron and that it is 
impossible to apply business ethics as generally there is so 
much disagreement about ethics in the first place (Grace 
and Cohen, 1995). The most profound division in Western 
ethical theory is between cognitivism, which claims that 
there are objective moral truths, and non-cognitivism, 
which in contrast argues that objective assessment of moral 
belief is not possible as all are subjective. Thiroux (1990) 
elaborates that under cognitivism, two major perspectives 
emerge: consequentialism, which is based on or concerned 
with consequences, and non-consequentialism where acts 
are to be judged regardless of consequences. Most textbooks 
on business ethics would provide an introduction to ethical 
theory, which in a sense supports the notion that the field 
is being dominated by philosophy. The strong philosophical 
approach towards business ethics can be traced to the 
fact that the field has been primarily “populated” by 
academicians with an academic background in philosophy, 
who are concerned with teaching business ethics courses 
and publishing research in journals dedicated to ethical 
issues in business (Masden, 1995). Ironically, moral 
philosophy is not a pre-requisite to being ethical as ethics is 
often expressed in the lives of individuals who have never 
heard a “philosophical syllable” in their lives (Grace and 
Cohen, 1995). It is interesting to note that Vinten (1990) 
suggests that the slow demise of philosophy in universities 
may have led to the current philosophical interest in 
business.
Despite the apparent emphasis on the “discipline of business 
ethics” within academic circles, as opposed to “applied 
business ethics”, there is a slight shift in trend, where 
research is being done on the practice of business ethics. 
Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes (2007) for instance propose 
the “ethics as practice” approach, which is concerned with 
understanding and theorising ethics as a form of practice. 
There is also a realisation that the “discipline of business 
ethics” should produce workable and usable tools, which 
could assist businessmen in dealing with moral issues 
that typify business decision-making (Masden, 1995). In 
this sense Phillips (1992) is correct to say that business 
ethics should depart from highly abstract philosophical 
discussions and deal with the difficulties faced by “real” 
individuals in “real” situations with the aim to assist them 
in making ethical choices.
4. Religion and business ethics
Calkins (2000) observes that business ethics is currently 
treated more narrowly as an applied philosophy and social 
science though on a practical level, religion matters to 
business ethics since religion’s moral precepts and narratives 
inform and shape the morality of a substantial portion of the 
population making business ethical decisions. Furthermore, 
Wilson (1997) opines that theological contributions could 
have been ignored in the current discourse and literature of 
business ethics, when in fact an understanding of religious 
traditions would put ethics with regard to business in a 
broader perspective.
Naqvi (2003) proposes that the integration of ethics and 
economics provides a richer view of human motivation and 
conduct than that offered by value-neutral positivism. He 
also points out that ethical mores which stem from religious 
beliefs that are accepted voluntarily by believers, as binding, 
cannot be substituted by non-binding general frameworks 
of ethical rules and norms. In a similar vein, Wilson (2001) 
states that belief in God provide the imperative for adhering 
to a set of standards grounded in moral certainty. Conroy 
and Emerson (2004) and Parboteeah, Hoegl and Cullen 
(2007) respectively discovered that religiosity affects 
ethical attitudes and that behavioural aspects of religion 
are negatively related to justifications of ethically suspect 
behaviours.
In analysing the development of business ethics in the 
United States, De George (1987) identifies that the first 
stage was the ‘ethics in business’ stage where theology and 
religion were the primary driving forces. He admits that 
religion and theology do play a role till today albeit the 
emergence of business ethics as a constituted distinctive 
academic field where philosophers tend to take the lead. 
Jones, Parker and ten Bos (2005) posit that currently 
business ethics is expected to fill the “moral vacuum” as a 
result of the apparent gap between business and religion, 
whereas in the past religion regulated public morality. 
According to them, despite the fact that there are many 
people who are religious, religion has increasingly lost 
its awe in regulating business and politics. Others such 
as Vinten (1990) argue that since religious texts do not 
primarily address the issue of a religious perspective on 
the world of business, interpretations of the texts are full 
of ambiguity and uncertainty. However, Wilson (1997) 
believes that the legal framework needed to regulate 
markets effectively could be derived from religious laws.
Prince Philip of Great Britain and Prince Hassan bin Talal 
of Jordan initiated consultations in 1984 with the objective 
to produce a common inter-religious (between Abrahamic/
monotheist faiths; Judaism, Christianity and Islam) 
declaration on ethics in international business (Dion, 
2002). As a result, in 1993, a Code of Ethics in International 
Business for Christians, Muslims and Jews was finalised in 
Amman, Jordan. The declaration identifies justice, mutual 
respect, stewardship and honesty as four key concepts that 
form the basis of human interaction. The declaration also 
includes guidelines on business and political economy, the 
policies of business and conduct of individuals at work, 
which should be adopted as a basis for the relationship 
between parties in international business (Webley, 1996). 
This code of ethics, which is spiritually driven, can provide 
a greater depth of understanding of many ethical problems 
that arise in international settings (Jackson, 1999). Jackson 
(1999) interestingly proposes that if “law controls/directs/
guides business”, and “morality control/directs/guides 
law”, while “spirituality controls/directs/guides morality”, 
then “spirituality controls/directs/guides business”.
Schwartz (2006) argues that God is and should be 
considered a managerial stakeholder for business 
individuals and corporations that accept God exists and 
can affect the world. This would potentially entail greater 
meaning for those involved in business, lead towards more 
socially responsible decisions, enhance ethical decision 
making and improve profitability (Schwartz, 2006). This is 
highly contested in modern times, as modernism, which is 
increasingly dominant in the West, addresses ethical issues 
without referencing God (Kim, Fisher and McCalman, 
2009). However, disregarding God results in moral 
relativism that is unable to determine absolute standards 
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of good or ethical behaviour (Shaw and Barry, 1992). Ven 
de Ven (2008) suggests that business ethics is a “pioneering 
moral-theological inquiry” and in order to remain relevant, 
moral theologians have to join the business ethics debate as 
a lack of understanding and communication characterises 
the relationship between religion and business.
5. Islamic business ethics
Muslims regard Islam as a way of life and not merely a 
religion. Therefore, business ethics cannot be separated 
from ethics in the other aspects of a Muslim’s daily life 
(Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Hasanuzzaman, 2003). In 
the climate of Islamic philosophy, it is claimed that ethics 
dominate economics and not vice versa (Naqvi, 1981), and 
that Islamic economics is characterized as being ethical 
(akhl q ) besides being Godly (rabb n ), humane (ins n ) 
and balanced (waha ) (Al-Qara’a¯wi, 1995). The concept 
of Tawh d (monotheism, singularity, oneness or unity 
of God) has been identified as the core of Islamic ethics 
(Faruqi, 1992; Naqvi, 1981; Rice, 1999; Beekun, 1997; 
Haneef, 2005), along with trusteeship or stewardship 
(khil fah), justice or equilibrium (al-‘adl), free will or 
freedom (ikhtiy r), responsibility (  farh) and benevolence 
(I’s n). On a more practical level, the manner for proper 
Islamic ethical conduct in business is based on leniency, 
which encompasses good manners, forgiveness, removal 
of hardship and compensation; service motive, where 
businesses provide needed services to the community; and 
consciousness of All h that requires Muslim businessmen 
to be mindful of All h in their conduct of business (Abeng, 
1997).
The Qur’an, which Muslims believe to be the word of God 
dating back more than fourteen centuries ago, speaks 
about ethics in business. Ahmad (1995) lays a set of norms 
contained in the Qur’an, which provides a comprehensive 
guidance for the conduct of Muslim businessmen. In his 
PhD thesis, Business Ethics in the Qur’an—a Synthetic 
Exposition of the Qur’anic Teachings Pertaining to 
Business, the vital question he attempts to answer is what 
characterises a Muslim’s behaviour in business life? Rather 
than limiting his work on exposition of Isl mic laws, which 
many have written on, he highlights the ethical dimension 
of business from the Qur’anic perspective. Al-Sharb t  
(2005), on the other hand, analysed the methodology and 
approaches of the Qur’an in establishing ethics related to 
financial transactions.
In light of the fact that Prophet Muhammad was born in 
Makkah, which was a major trading centre during that 
period, and that he spent a considerable period of his life 
as a businessman before his Prophethood, many Prophetic 
Traditions related to business ethics can be found in books 
of Had th under the chapter of trade (al-Tij rah) or buying 
and selling (al-Buy ’). For example, al-Tirmidh  records 
a tradition on the authority of Ab  Sa‘ d al-Khudr  where 
Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said, “The honest 
and trustworthy businessman [on the Day of Resurrection] 
will be amongst the Prophets, those who are truthful and 
the martyrs”, which Nik Yusoff (2002) sees as being the 
highest possible recognition for honest and trustworthy 
businessmen due to their considerable contribution to 
society’s prosperity. Musa (2007) presents ethics related 
to business as established by Prophet Muhammad and 
reported in the major books of Had th. The author also 
identifies the approaches adopted by Prophet Muhammad 
in establishing ethics related to business imitating the work 
of al-Sharb t  previously mentioned. Al-Nabah n  (1990) 
collected verses of the Qur’an, Prophetic Traditions and 
sayings of scholars, which he felt should be given attention 
by those involved in business, in his treatise which serves as 
a simple reference for those who would like to look up for 
narrations on ethical issues related to business.
The discussions of Muslim scholars of jurisprudence 
(fuqah ’) in matters related to business transactions would 
normally touch on the ethical dimension of business 
though it can be argued that the legal dimension tends to 
overshadow it as highlighted by Khan (2007). Moreover the 
distinction between the ethical and legal aspects of business 
seems vague in Islamic literature. In addition, for Muslims 
private morals are not seen as distinct from business ethics 
(Wilson, 2001). Beekun and Badawi (2005) observe that 
the great cultural diversity of Muslims worldwide and the 
different levels of religious commitment and practice are 
major challenges for understanding business ethics from 
an Islamic perspective, partly resulting in the scarcity of 
forthcoming articles on Islamic business ethics. Hence, 
the limited literature specifically on Islamic business 
ethics compared to that in the West. Despite that, there 
is a considerable amount of literature on Islamic ethics in 
business though Wilson (2001) is correct by saying that 
contemporary literature on Islamic economics, Islamic 
finance and Islamic banking is extensive compared to 
Islamic business ethics. The distinction between “ethics in 
business” and “business ethics” is as described by De George 
(1987) where the former refers to promotion of ethics in 
the conduct of business as in all other aspects of life and is 
primarily theological and religious in nature, whereas the 
latter refers to a constituted distinctive field.
There are a number of works in the Arabic language worth 
mentioning that address the issue of ethics in business from 
an Islamic perspective. Classical scholars of Islam such as 
Al-Ghaz l  (2005) in his encyclopaedia Ihy ’ ‘Ul m al-D n 
(Revival of Islamic Sciences) for instance, dedicates a 
chapter on the ethics of earning and living (Kit b al-A¯d b 
al-Kasb wa al-Ma‘ sh), which precedes the chapter  on 
lawful and unlawful matters (Kit b al-hal l wa al-haram), 
indicating the importance of ethical behaviour in 
earning a livelihood. Scrutinising this chapter of  Ihy ’, 
al-Ghazz l  identifies justice, truthfulness and benevolence 
as the main ethical values that must be internalised 
by parties involved in business transactions. Al-Mihr  
(1986), in al-Tij rah f  al-Isl m (Business in Islam), explores 
the foundations of business and its manners in Islam, 
identifying mercy, trustworthiness, honesty, tolerance 
and justice as constituting the essentials of Islamic ethics 
in business. According to Y suf (1990) economic pursuits 
are related to a Muslim’s creed, worship and morals, 
and the primary Islamic ethical maxims in business 
are honesty, trustworthiness, fulfilment of rights and 
good conduct. Muhammad (1990), in d b al-T jir 
wa Shur h al-Tij rah (Ethics of the Businessman and 
the Conditions of Business Transactions), preceded the 
discussion on the jurisprudential dimension of business 
transactions with a chapter highlighting the effect of the 
Islamic creed on parties in a business transaction and the 
ethics which should govern those involved in business. 
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Al-Qarah wi (1995) observes that only in recent years has 
Islamic economics been given due attention by Muslim 
scholars and researchers. He describes Islamic economics 
as being Godly, ethical, humane and balanced, and is of the 
opinion that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure 
that the theories of Islamic economics are implemented 
through the legislation of laws to uphold righteousness 
and ethics. Shah tah (1999) presents an Islamic model for 
a code of business ethics, realising the attention given by 
those in the West to ethics in the field of business, which 
is seen effective in deterring business failures and at the 
same time increasing long term profitability and growth. 
The author derived thirty-four Islamic codes of business 
ethics from the sources of the Shariah along with existing 
international codes and outcomes of various business 
conventions in line with the Shariah. He goes further by 
urging Muslim businessmen to take the lead in business 
and prove that adherence to Islamic principles does not 
compromise progress.
Wilson (2001) is of the opinion that the most notable study 
of Islamic business ethics to date is Business and Accounting 
Ethics in Islam by Gambling and Karim (1991) who are 
both accountants by training and profession. Karim was 
formerly the Secretary General of the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), which “promotes the development 
of a prudent and transparent Islamic financial services 
industry through introducing new, or adapting existing 
international standards consistent with Shariah principles” 
(IFSB, 2009). Gambling and Karim (1991) expose the 
fact that accounting, which must always involve some 
sort of faith, is somehow absurd in the current secular 
economising spirit found in business and administration. 
Throughout their book, the authors repeatedly mention 
the concept of khil fah (vicegerency of man), which entails 
adherence to certain divinely ordained ethical axioms. 
The authors also look into the history of religious control 
in business and propose an Islamic alternative to regulate 
economic affairs in a modern economy. They highlight 
that Islam views human beings as “naturally committed to 
good” in contrast to Christianity, which sees human beings 
as “fallen creatures”, and humanism, which supposes that 
human beings are by nature “rampant egoists”.
Naqvi (1981), a noted economist originating from Pakistan, 
identifies unity, equilibrium, free will and responsibility as 
four ethical axioms, which form the thrust of the Islamic 
system, around which all of man’s life must revolve. 
Employing these ethical axioms, the author derives the 
essentials of Islamic economics, which sets it apart from 
all other economic systems. Mohammed (2007) in his 
PhD thesis on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in 
Islam uses Naqvi’s axiomatic principles to elaborate on 
the conceptual framework of CSR in Islam and provides 
empirical evidence to determine the extent to which it may 
be practiced and implemented in Islamic organisations. 
In presenting the axioms of Islamic ethical philosophy, 
Beekun (1997) also adopts Naqvi’s ethical axioms but 
adds benevolence as an additional axiomatic principle. He 
then applies these axioms to business ethics by describing 
normative business ethics in Islam and provides a sample 
code of ethics for Muslim businesses, outlining the 
behaviour towards the multiple stakeholders of a business 
organisation. Ayub (2007) identifies just and fair dealing, 
fulfilment of covenants and payment of liabilities, mutual 
cooperation and removal of hardship, free marketing and 
fair pricing, and freedom from detriment as important 
norms in the Islamic framework of business. He highlights 
that the accountability of human beings before God is a 
unique norm that departs from the norms of mainstream 
business ethics. The author also stresses that Shariah 
principles governing business transactions are in fact 
important pillars of business ethics.
According to Hasanuzzaman (2003) “there is nothing 
to discover with regard to business ethics in Islam” as 
he claims that the “edifice of the entire Islamic way of 
life rests on absolute ethical values”. He also suggests 
that most Islamic ethical values are not unique to Islam 
and are universal in nature. Nik Yusoff (2002) suggests 
that the most significant concept of business in Islam is 
that business has economic, social as well as religious 
functions. He derives that absolute honesty in all business 
transactions and an open market as one of the important 
tenets of business in Islam. In Business Ethics in Islamic 
Context – Perspectives of a Muslim Business Leader, Abeng 
(1997) summarises the manner for proper ethical conduct 
in business to leniency, service motive and consciousness of 
God. He elaborates that leniency is the foundation of good 
manners that include politeness, forgiveness, removal of 
hardship and compensation, while service-motive provides 
the imperative for carrying out business activities to provide 
a needed service to the community, and consciousness of 
God demands one to be mindful of his business activities, 
ensuring that they are compatible with morality and higher 
values prescribed by God.
Beekun and Badawi (2005) propose that enforcement of 
Islamic business ethics begin at the level of the individual, 
which operates through the awareness and love of God, 
and the anticipation of His blessings in this world and 
the hereafter. Realising that most of the work done with 
regard to Islamic business ethics are normative in nature, 
they suggest that it would be interesting to investigate how 
far such ideal norms are currently implemented in the 
Muslim world. Jamal Uddin (2003) is also of the opinion 
that an empirical study to investigate the extent to which 
the affairs of businesses in the Muslim world mirror the 
prescribed model is worth pursuing. He stresses that in 
Islam the decision making process in a business situation 
should be substantially influenced by religious ethical 
principles. Blurring the distinction between the ethical 
and legal dimensions of business in Islam, he suggests that 
Islamic legal rulings pertaining to business transactions 
are applicable to everyone irrespective of their religious 
affiliations. In fact, Muhammad (2008) posits that one of 
the aims of the Shariah is to control human behaviour in 
order to establish Islamic ethics and that both the Shariah 
and ethics are two inseparable elements of Islamic legal 
theory.
Despite what has been mentioned above, Mohammed (2007) 
observes that a large part of Islamic literature on business ethics 
is either theologically oriented or superficial and inadequate 
in its assessment of Islamic business principles and to date 
remains fragmented and spread over a variety of sources, which 
does not sufficiently provide a systematic model or framework 
of business ethics despite the existence of a rich vein of the 
concept in Islam. Khan (2007) further elaborates that in most 
cases, the literature on Islamic economics, in which businesses 
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operate, though full of reference to primary sources, deals 
with basic principles in a rhetorical and simplistic style and 
lacks a comprehensive discussion of the basic beliefs and 
values. He is also of the opinion that Muslim scholars (‘ulam ’ ) 
have mainly been restating the position of the Shariah 
on various issues and their discourse contains an implicit 
awareness of the social reality, but their emphasis has been on 
the legal dimension.
6. Ethics and Islamic finance
Ethics has become increasingly important in the financial 
services sector on the grounds that the aim of business 
activities in general and financial services in particular 
is the creation of value for the consumer (Duska and 
Clarke, 2002). Duska and Clarke (2002) further opine that 
there shouldn’t be a dichotomy between personal ethical 
attitudes and the attitudes governing one’s business life in 
the financial services sector. Good ethics should also mean 
good business for financial institutions as in the case of the 
British Cooperative Bank, where its ethical policy paved the 
way to improved performance (Kitson, 1996). Sternberg 
(2000) suggests that an ethical environment in the business 
and financial sectors provides vital support for maximising 
long-term owner value. If ethics played a larger role in the 
financial services sector, the recent global financial crisis 
might have been averted.
The reality of the financial services sector paints a picture 
of a culture where the pursuit of money, an instrumental 
good, evolves to become the ultimate goal of human 
beings, leading towards ethical corruption (Duska and 
Clarke, 2002). This is in stark contrast to the climate of 
Islamic philosophy which dictates that economics should 
be subservient to ethics and not vice versa (Naqvi, 1981). 
Lewis and Algaoud (2001) reiterate that Islamic values in 
all facets of behaviour should be reflected in IFIs to bring 
about collective morality and spirituality, which when 
integrated with the production of goods and services 
advance the Islamic way of life. Islamic faith-based finance 
claims to offer global financial stability and ethics in 
business and banking, which in a sense are shared by all 
major faith-based traditions (Phoon, 2004). Elmelki and 
Ben Arab (2009) identify the establishment of justice and 
elimination of exploitation in business transactions as the 
most important objectives of Islamic finance, which are 
achieved through the prohibition of “illegal unjustified 
enrichment” and excessive risk and speculation.
Islamic finance has been recognised as a rapidly increasing 
integrated compartment of global finance (Warde, 2000). 
Standard & Poor’s (2009) report that the past decade 
witnessed the Islamic financial services sector growing at 
a rate of more that 10% annually and has accumulating 
assets estimated to be worth $700 billion worldwide. It is 
identified that the major difference between Islamic and 
conventional finance, at their operational level, is that the 
former is equity based while the latter is based on debt. Due 
to this fact, Mirakhor and Krichene (2009b) claim that the 
conventional financial system has been rattled by frequent 
crises, as a result of its instability, despite the existence 
of various regulatory and supervisory frameworks. In 
contrast, the Islamic financial system, which is void of 
interest, un-backed credit, abundance of liquidity and 
high leveraged financial transactions and speculation, is 
inherently unwavering (Mirakhor 2009a). In his keynote 
speech at the World Market Capitals Symposium held in 
Kuala Lumpur, Raja Nazrin Shah proposes that Islamic 
finance can assist in breaking the vicious cycle of boom and 
bust that has characterised global finance (Parker, 2009). 
Therefore, Hasan (2009) claims that many have turned 
to Shariah-compliant finance as a remedy for the recent 
credit-crunch, which evolved into a full-blown economic 
crisis.
It is claimed that Islamic finance is based on a system of 
ethics derived from revealed and divine texts, which are 
then applied through Shariah law (Walsh, 2007). Hence, 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) opine that IFIs are considered to 
be ethical since the foundation of their business philosophy 
is grounded in the Shariah, often referred to as ethics in 
action, which is concerned with promoting justice and 
welfare (al-‘adl wa al-ihs n) in society and seeking God’s 
blessing (al-barakah). Obaidullah (2005) states:
In an Islamic financial system, by definition, concerns about 
conformity to norms of Islamic ethics dominate all other 
concerns. All transactions in an Islamic system must be 
governed by norms of Islamic ethics as enunciated by the 
Shariah. Islamic systems are, in essence, ethical systems.
He further distinguishes the injunctions against rib  
(usury), qim r (gambling) and mays r (unearned income) 
as the significant differences between Islamic and 
mainstream financial systems. On a more fundamental 
level, the stark difference between Islamic and conventional 
financial systems is that the former has to preserve certain 
social objectives and is based on equity rather than debt 
(Venardos, 2005). Moreover, Islamic finance is said to lay 
emphasis on community values, socio-economic justice and 
a balance between material and spiritual needs of human 
beings (Elmelki and Ben Arab, 2009).
However, Wilson (2002) observes that despite the claim of 
IFIs to provide ethical financial services, no attempt is made 
to link what is ethical with the specific modes of carrying 
out financial transactions. He criticises IFIs for repeating 
emphasis on the standing of their Shariah regulators in 
their publicity material instead of projecting the moral 
teachings governing Islamic finance. This is supported by 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), who in their exploration of 
the discrepancies that exist between the communicated 
ethical identities via annual reports of seven Islamic 
banks in the Gulf and the ideal ethical identities based 
on the Islamic ethical business framework, discovered 
that six out of the seven Islamic banks they studied suffer 
from inconsistencies between the communicated and 
ideal ethical identities. However, Mohammed (2007) 
discovered in his study of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Islam that many current practices of Islamic banks 
mirror the expected practices generated in the Islamic 
framework. Moreover, he observes that the Islamic banks 
he surveyed implement the Islamic code of conduct rather 
extensively.
At the operational level, bodies such as the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for IFIs (AAOIFI) have published the Guiding 
Principles and Conduct of Business for Institutions offering 
Islamic Financial Services and the Code of Ethics for the 
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Employees of IFIs respectively. IFSB explicitly states the aim 
of its guiding principles is to “strengthen the relevant moral, 
social and religious dimensions in conducting business” 
in addition to providing a framework which “promotes a 
climate of confidence and a supportive environment that 
upholds transparency and fair dealing comparable to the 
conventional frameworks” (IFSB, 2009). However, the 
extent to which the items in the codes of ethics are being 
incorporated in and communicated to employees of IFIs is 
not well publicised.
More fundamentally, there have been criticisms on how 
Islamic finance is currently practiced. For instance, El-
Gamal (2006) observes that modern Islamic finance aims 
to “replicate in Islamic forms the substantive functions 
of contemporary financial instruments, markets and 
institutions”, which has arguably caused its failure in 
serving the objectives of the Shariah(maq hid al-shar ‘ah) 
and economic purpose. He proposes that attention should 
instead be given to the substance of Islamic finance 
rather than form. This would subsequently shift the 
current paradigm of Islamising every financial practice to 
emphasising on the social and economic ends of financial 
transactions. Foster (2009), who describes the Islamic 
financial system as being based on ethics and principles 
of fairness, similarly calls for the reconsideration of aims, 
institutional frameworks and contractual methodologies 
of the modern Islamic financial sector in order to 
provide a genuine alternative to the current operating 
financial systems. He quotes Tarek El-Diwany who views 
that the products currently offered by IFIs are often 
indistinguishable from interest-based institutions as 
both share the same material goals and employ the same 
institutional framework. Barom (2008) observes that 
recent debates on the practice of Islamic finance highlight 
the increasing divergence between theory and actual 
practice, as critics argue that faith-based ethical principles 
are being overridden by IFIs’ pursuit of profit maximisation 
and shareholder value. This is not surprising as when the 
benchmark of corporate performance is money, it is often 
difficult to place ethics before self-interest, even when an 
Islamic system is in place (Rosly and Abu Bakar, 2003).
7. Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia
The Malaysian Islamic finance market is considered to 
be well  developed with a huge future potential (Al-Omar 
and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Islamic finance has been fully 
integrated into Malaysia’s existing financial system, which 
demonstrates  the  sector’s inventiveness and capacity 
for innovation (Venardos, 2005). The seriousness of the 
Malaysian government in furthering the cause of Islamic 
finance can be seen in the Financial Sector Master-Plan’s, 
which states that it would like to “epitomize Malaysia 
as a regional Islamic financial centre”. It also visions to 
see Islamic  banking evolve  in parallel with conventional 
banking  to achieve 20% of the banking market share, 
represented by a number of strong and highly capitalised 
Islamic banking institutions, offering financial products 
and services, which are underpinned by a comprehensive 
and  conducive Shariah  and regulatory framework. 
Interestingly, code of ethics is identified as one of the core 
determinants in regulating IFIs, which would eventually 
result in less intervention of the central bank. (BNM, 2001).
The Malaysian International Islamic Financial Centre 
(MIFC), which was selected as the Best International 
Islamic Finance Centre 2008 at the second annual London 
Sukuk Summit Awards of Excellence, claims:
Malaysia’s Islamic financial industry distinguishes itself  as 
one of the proven platforms for conducting Islamic finance 
activities. The vibrancy and dynamism of Malaysia’s 
Islamic financial system is reflected by its continual product 
innovation, a diversity of domestic and international financial 
institutions, a wide range of Islamic financial instruments, a 
comprehensive Islamic financial infrastructure and adoption 
of global regulatory, legal and Shariah best practices. Malaysia 
also holds the distinction of being the world’s first country 
to have a full-fledged Islamic financial system operating in 
parallel to the conventional banking system; and has placed 
strong emphasis on human capital development in Islamic 
finance to ensure the availability of Islamic finance talent. 
(MIFC, 2009)
The first IFI established in Malaysia was the Malayan 
Muslims  Pilgrims Savings Corporation which began 
operations in 1963 to assist Malaysian Muslims in saving 
for  performing the hajj (pilgrimage to Makkah). It then 
evolved into the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board 
or Tabung Haji, as it is popularly known, in 1969 (Warde, 
2000). Tabung Haji acts as a finance company, which 
invests the savings of its depositors in accordance with the 
Shariah. However, its role is quite limited to a non-banking 
financial institution (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). In 1983, 
the first Islamic bank, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, started 
operations after continuous pressure on the Malaysian 
government to assist in establishing an Islamic bank 
(Man, 1988). This was made possible when the Malaysian 
parliament passed the Islamic Banking Act 1983, which 
provides strict but flexible regulations and supervision in 
Islamic banking (Al-Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Malaysia 
witnessed the incorporation  of its first takaful operator in 
1984 after the enactment of the Takaful Act 1984, which 
was to a large extent triggered by the Malaysian National 
Fatw  Committee’s ruling that life insurance in its form then 
as non-Shariah compliant due to the presence of uncertainty, 
rib  and gambling (BNM, 2004). It is worth noting that the 
Malaysian experience of Islamic finance has had a significant 
impact on neighbouring countries such as Indonesia and 
Brunei, which established their first Islamic banks in 1992 
and 1993 respectively (Al-Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996).
In 1997, Bank Negara Malaysia formed the National 
Shariah Advisory Council on Islamic Banking and Takaful as 
the highest Shariah authority to provide advice on Islamic 
finance operations, coordinate Shariah issues, and evaluate 
and analyse Shariah aspects of new products and schemes 
(Venardos, 2005). However, many “conservative”, mostly 
non-Malaysian Muslim, scholars observe that Islamic 
finance in Malaysia was “cutting too many corners” and 
too lax in its definition of acceptable products, which call 
for scrutiny not only by Shariah scholars in Malaysia, but 
also scholars from other countries to enhance its legitimacy 
(Warde, 2000; Al-Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). As a result, 
Malaysia became a founding member and host country 
of the IFSB in 2002, which is an international standard-
setting body consisting of regulatory and supervisory 
agencies, to ensure soundness and stability in the Islamic 
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financial sector (MIFC, 2009). As of October 2009, there 
are 17 Islamic banks, 16 Islamic windows, 3 international 
Islamic banks, 8 takaful operators, 4 retakaful operators 
and 1 international takaful operator operating in Malaysia 
(Abd Kadir, 2009).
In spite of the claimed resilience, stability and ethicality 
of IFIs, there are chances of failure due to inconsistencies 
between theory and practice. In Malaysia for instance, 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad recorded losses of over 
RM500  million and RM1.3 billion for its financial years 
of 2005 and 2006 respectively, after tax and zak t (BIMB, 
2008), in one of Malaysia’s worst financial ‘scandals’, 
attributed to officers who were responsible for approving 
lending which should have not been approved (Basri, 
2005). In another case, two senior general managers of 
Tabung Haji were found guilty of criminal breach of trust 
and cheating involving RM200 million and were sent to jail 
for 10 years (Mageswari, 2009).
8. Methodology
This research involves an empirical study of executives 
working in four diverse Islamic banks in Malaysia; two 
full-fledged stand-alone Islamic banks, an Islamic full-
fledged subsidiary of a Malaysian conventional bank 
and a foreign Islamic bank established under Malaysia’s 
Islamic Banking Act 1983. Four banks were chosen as 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) mention that as a general 
rule, “case studies of institutions vary from a minimum of 
approximately four to twelve organisations”. Islamic banks 
were purposely chosen to study Islamic business ethics in 
practice (i.e. applied business ethics) as they constitute a 
highly prominent sector with claims of operations based on 
the Shariah (Mohammed, 2007), which is often described 
as ethics in action. Therefore, it is presumed that the norms 
and practices of Islamic banks would be consistent with 
Islamic business ethics.
Quantitative data were collected by means of a 45-item 
survey. Items included an assessment of the perception 
of the executives of the Islamic banks along the following 
dimensions: the general ethics of the banks, attitudes and 
behaviour of employees, treatment of employees, code 
of ethics, management and social responsibilities. The 
survey was loosely designed based on the questionnaire 
developed by Bourne and Snead (1999) in their study on 
the Environmental Determinants of Organisational Ethical 
Climate, which was also adopted by Miller (2008) in his 
Doctoral of Business Administration dissertation on the 
Impact of Certain Determinants on the Ethical Perceptions 
and Attitudes of Corporate Managers in Malaysia.
Survey items were designed in a way that respondents 
could indicate their level of agreement with the statement 
under consideration. The data measurement entails a 
five-point Likert scale where respondents have a choice of 
answering: (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. To 
ensure content or face-validity of dimensions measured, 
the questionnaire was subjected to pre-testing where 
selected respondents who are familiar with the Islamic 
banking industry in Malaysia provided feedback via email 
regarding the content, clarity and relevance to the study. 
Since the items in the questionnaire have been primarily 
adapted from a previous validated study, it is safe to 
assume that the constructs measured in the questionnaire 
have been previously researched and is constructively 
valid.
A simple analysis to determine the mean of the responses 
to each item was undertaken using the Statistical Package 
for Social Science (SPSS), which provided a descriptive 
analysis of the ethical perception of the banks’ executives 
to each item in the questionnaire. A Cronbach’s a reliability 
test was also conducted on the scale of each of the dimension 
in the questionnaire.
9. Limitations
This is an exploratory study and the findings and results 
cannot be generalized as it only involves the study of four 
Islamic banks in Malaysia. At present there are seventeen 
Islamic banks in Malaysia, five international Islamic 
banks and six development financial institutions offering 
Islamic banking schemes. The findings presented in this 
paper are a component of the author’s PhD research 
on Islamic Business Ethics in Malaysian IFIs. His PhD 
research employs a mixed-method approach, where 
qualitative and quantitative approaches were adopted to 
answer the research question at hand. The quantitative 
component of the research only provides an overview of 
the Islamic banks’ executives’ ethical perception of what is 
being in their respective banks. A combination of both the 
qualitative and quantitative data would better answer the 
research question at hand.
10. Preliminary research findings  
and discussion
Table  1 below summarises the results in relation to the 
descriptive data regarding the individual statements 
measuring ethical perception of the Islamic banks’ 
executives  in the questionnaire. Generally, high mean 
values  were obtained for most positive individual 
statements. Some statements could also be considered to 
be  neither positive nor negative such as item B-2. Some 
items were purposely phrased in a negative sense and 
most  of such statements recorded low mean scores such 
as items B-10, B-11, B-13, B-14 and C-9.
Based on the results presented in Table I, the executives of 
the Islamic banks concerned viewed the bank as generally 
ethical. More than 90% of the respondents agreed that the 
operations of the bank they are working at are consistent 
with Shariah requirements. The author did not specify what 
Shariah requirements meant and left it to the respondents 
to determine what constituted Shariah requirements. 
Most probably, the respondents would have understood 
it as the Shariah compliancy of the products and services 
provided by the bank. A mean of above 4 was scored for 
the statement on the banks’ concern over their social 
impact and their truthfulness to customers despite it being 
potentially detrimental to their business. A mean of 3.981 
was achieved for the statement on ethical values prevail of 
profit realisation. This is quite encouraging as one might 
argue that the prime purpose of Islamic banks as with 
conventional banks is to remain profitable while ethical 
considerations would become secondary.
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Table 1. Results of descriptive analysis.
# Statement 1 f(%) 2 f(%) 3 f(%) 4 f(%) 5 f(%) Mean
General Ethics of the Bank
A-1 Operations consistent  
with Shariah
0 
(0.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
6 
(5.7%)
43 
(41.0%)
54  
(51.4%)
4.4190
A-2 Concerned with social  
impact
0 
(0.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
10 
(9.5%)
51 
(48.6%)
42 
(40.0%)
4.2667
A-3 Truthfulness 0 
(0.0%)
4 
(3.8%)
18 
(17.1%)
47 
(44.8%)
36 
(34.3%)
4.0952
A-4 Prevalence of ethics  
over profits
1 
(1.0%)
1 
(1.0%)
24 
(22.9%)
52 
(49.5%)
27 
(25.7%)
3.9810
Attitude and Behaviour of Employees
B-1 Consistency of personal  
and bank’s view of ethics
0 
(0.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
20 
(19.0%)
50 
(47.6%)
33 
(31.4%)
4.0857
B-2 Ethical norms is personal 18 
(17.1%)
26 
(24.8%)
22 
(21.0%)
26 
(24.8%)
13 
(12.4%)
2.9048
B-3 Religious motivation to  
behave ethically
1 
(1.0%)
3 
(2.9%)
16 
(15.2%)
37 
(35.2%)
48 
(45.7%)
4.2190
B-4 Exert best effort 0 
(0.0%)
3 
(2.9%)
15 
(14.3%)
42 
(40.0%)
45 
(42.9%)
4.2286
B-5 Respect working hours 0 
(0.0%)
7 
(6.7%)
21 
(20.0%)
46 
(43.8%)
31 
(29.5%)
3.9619
B-6 Adhere to outlined  
procedures
0 
(0.0%)
4 
(3.8%)
24 
(22.9%)
52 
(49.5%)
25 
(23.8%)
3.9333
B-7 Honesty with each other 1 
(1.0%)
7 
(6.7%)
38 
(36.2%)
48 
(45.7%)
11 
(10.5%)
3.5810
B-8 Avoid hurting each other 2 
(1.9%)
14 
(13.3%)
38 
(36.2%)
41 
(39.0%)
10 
(9.5%)
3.4095
B-9 Gifts in return for favour  
is normal
40 
(38.1%)
28 
(26.7%)
26 
(24.8%)
4 
(3.8%)
7 
(6.7%)
2.1429
B-10 False expenses claims are 
normal
62 
(59.0%)
24 
(22.9%)
12 
(11.4%)
7 
(6.7%)
0 
(0.0%)
1.6571
B-11 Bank’s assets often  
used for personal gain
44 
(41.9%)
35 
(33.3%)
14 
(13.3%)
10 
(9.5%)
2 
(1.9%)
1.9619
B-12 Advise one another 0 
(0.0%)
4 
(3.8%)
28 
(26.7%)
49 
(46.7%)
24 
(22.9%)
3.8857
B-13 Envy, malice, back-biting  
and picking on others are 
common
32 
(30.5%)
16 
(15.2%)
34 
(32.4%)
14 
(13.3%)
9 
(8.6%)
2.5429
B-14 Acting ethically are the  
minority
23 
(21.9%)
28 
(26.7%)
22 
(21.0%)
20 
(19.0%)
12 
(11.4%)
2.7143
B-15 Highly ethical 1 
(1.0%)
10 
(9.5%)
40 
(38.1%)
43 
(41.0%)
11 
(10.5%)
3.5048
B-16 Involved in corporate social 
responsibility activities
1 
(1.0%)
6 
(5.7%)
31 
(29.5%)
44 
(41.9%)
23 
(21.9%)
3.7810
Treatment of Employees
C-1 Respect 1 
(1.0%)
4 
(3.8%)
38 
(36.2%)
50 
(47.6%)
12 
(11.4%)
3.6476
C-2 Fairly compensated 4 
(3.8%)
11 
(10.5%)
43 
(41.0%)
34 
(32.4%)
13 
(12.4%)
3.3905
C-3 Equality 2 
(1.9%)
9 
(8.6%)
53 
(50.5%)
28 
(26.7%)
13 
(12.4%)
3.3905
C-4 Appropriately trained 1 
(1.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
24 
(22.9%)
60 
(57.1%)
18 
(17.1%)
3.8762
C-5 Trained on Shariah 
principles  
for Islamic banking
0 
(0.0%)
1 
(1.0%)
9 
(8.6%)
43 
(41.0%)
52 
(49.5%)
4.3905
C-6 Encouragement to  
observe personal Shariah 
obligations
1 
(1.0%)
3 
(2.9%)
14 
(13.3%)
30 
(28.6%)
57 
(54.3%)
4.3238
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Table 1. (Continued)
# Statement 1 f(%) 2 f(%) 3 f(%) 4 f(%) 5 f(%) Mean
C-7 Facilities for personal 
Shariah  
obligations
0 
(0.0%)
3 
(2.9%)
5 
(4.8%)
26 
(24.8%)
71 
(67.6%)
4.5714
C-8 Not exploited and good 
working  
conditions
1 
(1.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
25 
(23.8%)
53 
(50.5%)
24 
(22.9%)
3.9238
C-9 Pressure to conform 19 
(18.1%)
39 
(37.1%)
28 
(26.7%)
15 
(14.3%)
4 
(3.8%)
2.4857
C-10 Welfare 1 
(1.0%)
6 
(5.7%)
31 
(29.5%)
43 
(41.0%)
24 
(22.9%)
3.7905
Code of Ethics
D-1 Bank’s values clearly  
communicated
0 
(0.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
17 
(16.2%)
62 
(59.0%)
24 
(22.9%)
4.0286
D-2 Code of ethical conduct 
clearly  
communicated
0 
(0.0%)
3 
(2.9%)
21 
(20%)
53 
(50.5%)
28 
(26.7%)
4.0095
D-3 Reward for ethical  
behaviour
6 
(5.7%)
23 
(21.9%)
45 
(42.9%)
23 
(21.9%)
8 
(7.6%)
3.0381
D-4 Regulations essential  
to avoid exploitation
1 
(1.0%)
1 
(1.0%)
26 
(24.8%)
41 
(39.0%)
36 
(34.3%)
4.0476
D-5 Whistle-blowers not  
victimised
9 
(8.6%)
4 
(3.8%)
20 
(19.0%)
31 
(29.5%)
41 
(39.0%)
3.8667
D-6 Encouragement to  
report breach
0 
(0.0%)
1 
(1.0%)
12 
(11.4%)
42 
(40.0%)
50 
(47.6%)
4.3429
Management
E-1 Trust 1 
(1.0%)
5 
(4.8%)
41 
(39.0%)
43 
(41.0%)
15 
(14.3%)
3.6286
E-2 Respect 1 
(1.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
33 
(31.4%)
46 
(43.8%)
23 
(21.9%)
3.8381
E-3 Caring 1 
(1.0%)
7 
(6.7%)
34 
(32.4%)
48 
(45.7%)
15 
(14.3%)
3.6571
E-4 Highly ethical 1 
(1.0%)
5 
(4.8%)
38 
(36.2%)
44 
(41.9%)
17 
(16.2%)
3.6762
Social Responsibility
F-1 Supports organizations  
that benefit society
0 
(0.0%)
0 
(0.0%)
26 
(24.8%)
50 
(47.6%)
29 
(27.6%)
4.0286
F-2 Participates in  
government social  
activities
0 
(0.0%)
3 
(2.9%)
24 
(22.9%)
56 
(53.3%)
22 
(21.0%)
3.9238
F-3 Without ulterior  
motive
0 
(0.0%)
4 
(3.8%)
26 
(24.8%)
51 
(48.6%)
24 
(22.9%)
3.9048
F-4 Sponsors Islamic  
educational and social 
events
0 
(0.0%)
2 
(1.9%)
17 
(16.2%)
47 
(44.8%)
39 
(37.1%)
4.1714
F-5 Writes off debt as charity 19 
(18.1%)
25 
(23.8%)
35 
(33.3%)
16 
(15.2%)
10 
(9.5%)
2.7429
As for the dimension on attitude and behaviour of 
employees, the respondents were divided on whether 
ethical norms is something personal and hence cannot 
be imposed on employees or otherwise. All the negative 
statements under this dimension (B-10, B-11, B-13 
and B-14) recorded relatively low means, indicating 
disagreement that employees often used the banks’ assets 
for personal use, submitted false claims, malice was 
common and that ethical employees are the minority. 
Having said that, when asked whether employees behaving 
ethically are the minority, the mean (2.7143) was close to 
neutral.
Mean scores of below 4 were recorded for 7 out of 10 items 
under the dimension of treatment of employees. 50.5% 
of the respondents were neutral when asked about equal 
treatment without discrimination, which would be worth 
exploring and investigating. It is encouraging to note that 
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most respondents felt that their employers encourage the 
observation of Shariah personal obligations and provided 
good facilities for them do so. Moreover a mean of 4.3905 
was achieved for training in the understanding of Shariah 
principles for Islamic banking.
As for the code of ethics of the Islamic banks, most items 
under this dimension scored a mean of above 4 except for 
items D-3 and D-5 which asked the respondents whether 
acting in ethical manner is rewarded and whether whistle-
blowers were not victimised respectively. The mean 
for item D-3 was 3.0381, which was close to neutral. 
This might indicate that the banks have yet to have an 
ethical reward system in place to encourage ethical 
behaviour among employees of the bank. Nearly 75% 
of the respondents felt that regulations are necessary 
to ensure that the management of the banks does not 
exploit customers and employees. As for the items 
under management, all achieved a mean of below 4 but 
above 3.6, indicating that perception of the respondents 
towards management is not as high as desired. This 
might be caused by the complexity of the management-
employee relationship and reasons behind this are worth 
exploring.
The banks scored fairly well on social responsibility 
except that it wasn’t the banks norm to write off debt as 
charity in certain circumstances where debtors are not in 
a position to settle their debts. This might be attributed 
to the nature of Islamic banking products and services 
offered, which are not termed as loans, but known as 
financing. This might lead to perception of the absence 
of the creditor-debtor relationship between the banks 
and other parties. It would also be disadvantageous 
on the part of the banks, if clients did not service their 
financing, taking advantage of the fact that the banks 
would write off their debts. However, in genuine cases 
where clients of the banks are not able to fulfil their 
financing contracts, the banks should be lenient to its 
customers and try to restructure the financing agreement 
or in certain extreme cases relieve the clients of fulfilling 
their financing contracts. A system should be in place to 
deal with such circumstances to differentiate between 
Islamic and conventional banking systems. Having said 
that, Ayub (2007) reiterates that:
“IFIs have to work as business institutions so as to properly per-
form the functions of mobilisation and efficient allocation of 
resources. The myth in some circles that Islamic banks need to 
work as social security centres, providing charity to the needy 
and for benevolence are two separate things… Subject to the 
policies of their boards and in consultation with stakeholders, 
they can also take part in social and welfare activities, but this 
will not be their normal course of business.”
Table 2 below summarises the results of the Cronbach’s 
a reliability test to ascertain the reliability of the items 
under each pre-determined dimension. Except for the 
Table 2. Results of Cronbach’s a reliability test (shaded rows excluded from analysis).
# Statement
Scale mean  
if item  
deleted
Scale  
variance if  
item deleted
Corrected 
item – total 
correlation
Cronbach’s 
a if item  
deleted
General Ethics of the Bank: Cronbach a 0.794 (4 items)
A-1 Operations consistent with shar ’ah 12.3429 3.593 0.580 0.755
A-2 Concerned with social impact 12.4952 3.272 0.704 0.695
A-3 Truthfulness 12.6667 3.032 0.666 0.710
A-4 Prevalence of ethics over profits 12.7810 3.538 0.586 0.802
Attitude and Behaviour of Employees: Cronbach a 0.770 (15 items)
B-1 Consistency of personal and bank’s view  
of ethics
52.800 46.662 0.453 0.753
B-2 Ethical norms is personal 53.7905 51.533 -0.068 0.807
B-3 Religious motivation to behave ethically 52.6667 47.205 0.330 0.761
B-4 Exert best effort 52.6571 46.074 0.482 0.750
B-5 Respect working hours 52.9238 44.494 0.572 0.742
B-6 Adhere to outlined procedures 52.9524 45.180 0.581 0.743
B-7 Honesty with each other 53.3048 44.925 0.590 0.742
B-8 Avoid hurting each other 53.4762 46.752 0.353 0.759
B-9 Gifts in return for favour is normal 53.0268 48.432 0.131 0.783
B-10 False expenses claims are normal 52.5429 45.731 0.426 0.753
B-11 Bank’s assets often used for personal gain 52.8476 43.996 0.488 0.746
B-12 Advise one another 53.0000 46.404 0.450 0.753
B-13 Envy, malice, back-biting and picking on 
others are common
53.4286 42.747 0.449 0.750
B-14 Acting ethically are the minority 53.6000 44.858 0.305 0.768
B-15 Highly ethical 53.3810 44.950 0.555 0.744
B-16 Involved in corporate social responsibility 
activities
48.7733 30.313 0.372 0.555
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Table 2. (Continued)
# Statement
Scale mean  
if item  
deleted
Scale  
variance if  
item deleted
Corrected 
item – total 
correlation
Cronbach’s 
a if item  
deleted
Treatment of Employees: Cronbach a 0.784 (10 items)
C-1 Respect 34.1429 19.797 0.589 0.750
C-2 Fairly compensated 34.4000 18.685 0.577 0.748
C-3 Equality 34.4000 18.646 0.658 0.738
C-4 Appropriately trained 33.9143 20.291 0.537 0.757
C-5 Trained on Shariahprinciples for Islamic 
banking
33.4000 20.800 0.506 0.761
C-6 Encouragement to observe personal 
Shariahobligations
33.4667 20.097 0.450 0.766
C-7 Facilities for personal Shariahobligations 33.2190 21.365 0.385 0.773
C-8 Not exploited and good working conditions 33.8667 19.790 0.570 0.752
C-9 Pressure to conform 35.3048 24.252 -0.91 0.844
C-10 Welfare 34.0000 18.962 0.599 0.746
Code of Ethics: Cronbach a 0.695 (6 - 2 = 4 items)
D-1 Bank’s values clearly communicated 12.4000  2.877 0.618 0.550
D-2 Code of ethical conduct clearly communicated 12.4190  2.746 0.573 0.569
D-3 Reward for ethical behaviour
D-4 Regulations essential to avoid exploitation 12.3810  3.007 0.360 0.716
D-5 Whistle-blowers not victimised
D-6 Encouragement to report breach 12.0857  3.233 0.401 0.676
Management: Cronbach a 0.892 (4 items)
E-1 Trust 11.1714  4.701 0.833 0.835
E-2 Respect 10.9619  5.287 0.633 0.908
E-3 Caring 11.1429  4.720 0.800 0.847
E-4 Highly ethical 11.1238  4.763 0.790 0.851
Social Responsibility: Cronbach a 0.772 (5 items)
F-1 Supports organizations that benefit society 14.7429  6.962 0.591 0.719
F-2 Participates in government social activities 14.8476  6.669 0.661 0.697
F-3 Without ulterior motive 14.8667  6.463 0.663 0.692
F-4 Sponsors Islamic educational and social 
events
14.6000  6.877 0.571 0.723
F-5 Writes off debt as charity 16.0286  6.028 0.387 0.827
dimension on Code of Ethics, all the other dimensions 
achieved a Cronbach a of above 0.7. The Cronbach a 
of the Code of Ethics was 0.695, which could be safely 
approximated to 0.7 if rounded to the nearest decimal 
point. Items D-3 and D-5 were excluded as its inclusion 
would result in the Cronbach a of the Code of Ethics to 
be significantly low. It is realized that these items were 
in fact not directly related to the Code of Ethics and its 
removal from the Cronbach’s a reliability test is therefore 
deemed to be reasonable.
With respect to the Cronbach’s a reliability results in 
Table 2, it is generally assumed that a score of above 0.7 
would deem the data to be reliable. The a coefficient 
ranges from 0 to 1, where the reliability of the findings 
would be greater as the coefficient reaches 1. Generally, 
researchers are not in agreement as to the acceptable 
size of the coefficient and Cronbach’s a of 0.60 to 0.70 
are deemed to be at the lower end of acceptability (Miller, 
2008).
Notably, the Cronbach a for the group of items under the 
management dimension is highest at 0.892 compared to 
the other dimensions. The lowest Cronbach a is 0.695 for 
the dimension on the code of ethics, and this was achieved 
after removing items D-3 and D-5. If item D-4 was deleted, 
the Cronbach a would increase to 0.716. This might be due 
to the fact the ethics is often described as being more than 
abiding to rules and regulations, and hence the exclusion of 
the requirement of regulation from this dimension would 
increase the Cronbach a of this dimension. The removal of 
item F-5, which is related to the writing of a debt as a social 
responsibility of the bank, would increase the Cronbach a 
of the social responsibility dimension to 0.827. The reason 
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for this has been explained in the discussion of the low 
mean score of the mentioned item.
11. Conclusion
Generally, from the descriptive quantitative analysis of the 
data presented, it can be fairly assumed that the practices 
of the Islamic banks in Malaysia under study do conform 
with the Islamic ethical norm in business based on the 
perception of executives working in the banks concerned. 
Individual positive and negative statements, which scored 
a mean of less than 4 and more than 2, respectively, are 
areas where the Islamic banks concerned must strive to 
improve. Particularly, the perception of the management 
among employees of the banks must improve as it is 
the management who determines the issue of business 
conduct and principles in a business organisation. Issues 
surrounding the treatment of employees such as equality 
and fair wages must also be addressed in line with business 
ethical norms established by Islam.
A preliminary look into the qualitative data of the PhD 
research of the author, which is not presented in this paper, 
suggests that the senior management, Shariah heads and 
Shariah Supervisory Board members of the Islamic banks 
under study are aware of the importance of incorporating 
Islamic ethics in the operations of their respective banks. 
However, the climate in which the banks operate does not 
necessarily support such notions. Furthermore, Islamic 
banks might not feel compelled to abide by Islamic ethical 
norms in business if the consumers of their products and 
services do not strongly demand so.
The emphasis on Shariah compliancy of products and 
services has arguably resulted in the ethical dimension 
of Islamic finance to be somehow sidelined. Shariah 
compliancy is indeed the essence of Islamic finance but 
beyond that, Islamic banks should be at the forefront of 
ethical banking, whereby they take into consideration the 
impact of their activities on the society at large. Islamic 
banks must also strive to adopt the recommendations by 
the IFSB and AAOIFI in their published Guiding Principles 
and Conduct of Business for Institutions offering Islamic 
Financial Services and the Code of Ethics for the Employees 
of IFIs respectively as best practices in the industry.
12. Future research
It is desirable that this research be extended to a wider 
scale, where more respondents, from different Islamic 
banks are included in the study. This would allow for more 
generalisations to be made. Qualitative approaches could 
also be adopted to further explain the findings of what has 
been presented to gain a more in-depth account of any 
issues at hand. As the research only involved executives of 
the banks, other stakeholders’ perceptions of the ethicality 
of Islamic banks are also worth pursuing and could be 
compared to each other.
Research needs to be conducted using various techniques 
to answer the questions at hand. Realising that, the author 
in his PhD study has interviewed the senior management, 
Shariah heads and Shariah Supervisory Board members 
of the banks concerned to obtain their views on Islamic 
business ethics in relation to Islamic banking practices in 
Malaysia. The author also included in his PhD research the 
ethical identities of the banks concerned based on their 
annual reports and other materials accessible to the public 
such as the banks’ websites and other publications.
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Abstract  -  Although the phenomenon of spirituality in the workplace has received enormous 
attention from other religious faiths, the construct of Islamic spirituality has not been much 
explored.  This empirical study attempts to enrich the understanding of the spirituality in the 
workplace phenomenon from the Islamic management perspective.  The surveyed data used for this 
empirical research was drawn from 405 Muslim employees in business organizations in Malaysia.  
After yielding an instrument to measure Islamic spirituality, exploratory (using SPSS version 18.0) 
and confirmatory (using AMOS version 18.0) factor analyses were conducted.  The construct 
validity of Islamic spirituality led to the major finding of the research, thus, Islamic spirituality 
in the organizational context is explained by four determinants: rituals (Ibadat), forgivingness/
repentance (Al a’fw), belief (Iman) and remembrance of Allah (Dhikrullah). The incorporation of 
these determinants in contemporary organizations can lead to several benefits towards improving 
sustainable growth, economic development and profitability.
Keywords: Islamic spirituality, Islamic management, rituals (Ibadat), forgivingness (al a’fw), belief 
(Iman), remembrance of Allah (Dkhikrullah)
1. Introduction
Most businesses in recent times are facing daunting 
behavioral repercussions from employees’ attitudes, from 
theft cases to sexual harassment, which in turn lead to 
inherent effects towards organizations’ overall sustainable 
and economic developments. As posited by Al-Attas 
(2001), Islam can provide meaningful solutions to these 
organizational challenges faced by nations worldwide. 
Leaders as well as organizations are looking for meaning 
and higher purpose that brought spirituality, religion and 
faith to the world of business (Kouzes and Posner, 2002).
However, until recently, there is insufficient research geared 
towards Islamic spirituality and its contribution to the 
overall development of modern organizations. As asserted 
by Tayeb (1997) and Junaidah (2009), everywhere in 
the Islamic world, stretching from Morocco to Malaysia, 
and Iran to Indonesia, Muslims have witnessed a “return” 
to Islamic traditions and the fundamentals of their faith 
as a way of asserting their identity, a means to fight the 
unjust social and political oppression experienced in their 
societies, and an alternative to avert materialism and 
pressures of the twentieth century.
Junaidah (2009) further contended that many Muslim 
countries have begun their efforts to re-institute their 
territories in their own indigenous ways of running the 
social, educational and commercial organizations. These 
contentions by Junaidah (2009) and Tayeb (1997) lead 
us to the belief that Islam’s role has become more evident 
and significant in shaping people’s attitudes, values and 
behaviors.
2. Research problem
This empirical study attempts to study spirituality from 
the Islamic perspective as captured in the Islamic texts, the 
Qur’an and the ahadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammd, 
peace be upon him).  This need has become imperative due 
to the fact, that the current spirituality studies emanating 
from the western value systems do not give apt consideration 
to the Islamic perspective of spirituality.
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Another important fact that needs mention with respect to 
Islamic spirituality (IS) is the comprehensive characteristics 
together with that intrinsic motivation embedded in IS, 
that has the tendency to propel employees in general and 
Muslim employees in particular towards exhibiting generous 
behaviors in organizations. Although there has been some 
research works that look into these characteristics and 
the intrinsic motivations, no sufficient research has been 
conducted with respect to Islam’s perspective. In addition 
to this, there is also a dearth of research conducted with 
respect to inculcating IS concepts in Muslim employees 
working in western organizations or even in Muslim 
employees working in Muslim organizations. Islam is the 
religion on the sight of Allah (Qur’an, 3:19). It is the religion 
with a complete set of rules, regulation, ethics, guidance 
and mercy to mankind as espoused in several verses and 
chapters of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, i.e., the teachings 
of the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.). The Qur’an and the 
Sunnah have been in existence for over 1400 years.
The empirical research is guided by the following research 
questions; (1) what are the underlying dimensions 
of the Islamic spirituality (IS) construct? (2) What 
determinants explain the Islamic Spirituality construct in 
the organizational context?
3. Islamic spirituality
Islam recognizes that human being consists of two parts. 
The first part is the body, which is the physical dimension. 
The second part is the spirit, which is called “nafs” (in 
Arabic language) whiles the human is living and “ruh” 
(soul) when the human dies. Al-Gazzali (2004) indicated 
that human beings have four distinguished classes of 
characteristics: animal characteristics, evil characteristics, 
wild characteristics and spiritual characteristics. Spirituality 
is rooted in faith (Iman) demonstrated by the Islamic rituals 
of prayer, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca (haj) and charity 
(zakah). These rituals according to Nasr (1987) are the 
means by which Muslims get closer to the Creator.
Al-Gazzali (2004) stated that Ibadah such as prayers (salat), 
fasting, (zakah), and pilgrimage to Mecca (haj) should 
improve a person’s relationship with Allah and people, 
otherwise humans then become just empty rituals with no 
value. All the rituals Allah instructed the believers to carry 
out such as fasting and prayer are only for their benefits so 
they could reach to the highest state of spiritual and physical 
fitness (Ibrahim, 1997). In line with this contention, Hawa 
(2004) posits that spirituality could not be maintained 
unless all rituals (Ibadah) of fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca 
(haj) and charity (zakah) are observed regularly. Allah 
had imposed these rituals (Ibadah) on Muslims to provide 
them with daily, weekly and yearly meals for their spirits, 
which can strengthen and renew their beliefs and cleans 
their hearts from stains of sins and impurity. In view of 
the contention by Hawa (2004) and Al-Gazzali (2004), 
it is worth noting that spirituality does not depend on 
facial looks or wealth, personal backgrounds or race, but 
depends on how clean one’s heart is from stains of sins and 
disobeying Allah’s commands.
In strengthening this position, Hawa (2006) also captured 
that purification of soul is achieved through performing 
rituals (Ibadah) such as prayers, charity (zakah), pilgrimage 
to Mecca (haj), reading Qur’an and fasting. Recitation 
of the Qur’an is a significant way to enlighten the spirit and 
it complements what prayer, charity, fasting and haj do in 
realizing the spiritual potential of human beings. In much the 
same way, Al-Helali (2000) mentioned that spending in Allah’s 
ways gets a person closer to Allah as in the following verse: 
“And of the Bedouins there are some who believe in Allah 
and the last day, and look upon what they spend (in Allah’s 
cause) as means of nearness to Allah, and a cause of receiving 
the messenger’s invocations. Indeed the expenditures are a 
means of nearness for them” (Qur’an, 9:99).
To add to the elaboration of the benefits and importance 
of spirituality, (Hawa, 2004) explained that Islamic 
spirituality is capable of producing a complete Muslim who 
would worship Allah and also be a valuable member to his 
society through kindness. Ali (2005, p. 34) also captured 
that: “Spiritual and mental needs strengthen the quest for 
perfection and actualization of one’s potential in serving 
the community and organization, while pursuing his/her 
activities.” Spiritual people enjoy minds that are motivated 
towards good deeds and “complete satisfaction and self-
actualization” (Ali, 2005, p. 28).
From the Western perspective, it is difficult to find a common 
definition for spirituality (Laabs, 1995; Strack and Flotter, 
2002). As highlighted by Krishnakumar and Neck (2002), 
there are three views as regards spirituality. The first view 
considers spirituality as internal matter, the second links it 
to religion, and the third view sees it as involving meaning 
(Krishnakumar and Neck, 2002). To Griffin (1988), 
spirituality is an inherent human characteristic that does 
not intrinsically refer to any religious meaning. According to 
Mitroff and Dento (1999), spirituality is “the basic feelings 
of being connected with one’s complete self, others, and 
the entire universe” (p. 86). According to Dehler and Welsh 
(1994, p. 19), spirituality is “a specific form of work feeling 
that energizes action”. Strack (2001) considers spirituality 
as defined by Beazley to have two dimensions. The first 
dimension is called definitive dimension of spirituality, 
which is composed of living the faith relationship and 
prayer or mediation involving the transcendent. The second 
dimension is called correlated dimension of spirituality, 
which is composed of honesty, humility and service to others. 
It is called correlated because it might exist with or without 
spirituality. However, the common grounds of spirituality 
among the different definitions are that spirituality has to 
do with personal relations and experience with supreme 
power (Tischler, Biberman, and Mckeage, 2002).
Comparing the Islamic view of spirituality with the above 
definitions, a common ground exists among most of them, 
which is the realization of the existence of supreme power 
and the importance of the relationship with this supreme 
power. In this study, spirituality encompasses more than 
prayer and it includes the conformity of other obligations. 
According to Mohsen (2007) Islamic spirituality is a concept 
that is embedded in Taqwa (God-consciousness/piety). To 
identify the characteristics of IS, the concept of Taqwa was 
thoroughly explored from the Qur’an, found in six areas 
of the Qur’an; (2:3–4), (2:177), (2:183), (3:133–136), 
(5:8–9), (23:1–11) and (25:63–76). From these verses, 
the characteristics of the Muttaqqeen (pious people) was 
collected and grouped under two main categories; namely, 
Islamic Spirituality (IS) which is defined as the relationship 
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between the Creator and man (Mohsen, 2007); and 
Islamic social responsibility (ISR) which is defined as the 
relationship between man and his fellow man, nature, and 
other creations (Mohsen, 2007).
Owing to the scope covered by this study, only the IS aspect 
is captured in this research. The IS as captured in the Qur’an 
comprises of certain salient spiritual aspects associated 
with the pious people. These include; careful observance 
of the Rituals (Ibadat) which comprises of prayers (salat), 
fasting (saum), charity (zakat) and pilgrimage to Mecca (at 
least once in a life time) i.e. (haj); Forgivingness attitude 
(Al a’fw); Belief in Allah (Iman bil-lah) and constant 
Remembrance of Allah (Dhikrullah). Preceding sections 
discuss the theoretical and operational definitions of these 
IS aspects used this study.
4. Prayer (salat)
Prayer (salat) is the second pillar of Islam. Muslims are 
encouraged to perform salat in congregation to enhance 
their social relationship (Al-Khalifah, 1994). When prayer 
is performed in congregation, it promotes a bond of 
brotherhood and unity among worshippers. As held by Al-
Gazali (2004), avoiding wrongdoing is the core and real 
benefit of prayers, which leads to righteousness. Prayer 
includes “doa” which brings “barakah” and reduces stress 
(Al-Helali, 2000). Operationally, prayer implies increasing 
the bond between oneself and Allah, which brings a robust 
support for enjoining good and forbidding all kinds of evil.
5. Obligatory spending in Allah’s course 
(Zakat)
Zakat is the third pillar of Islam. Spending in Allah’s ways 
purifies the soul and corrects behaviour (Al-Helali, 2000). 
Spending in Allah’s ways strengthens the brotherhood and 
establishes social cohesion. The person who spends in Allah’s 
ways is close to the hearts of the people (Mohsen, 2007). A 
penny, when spent in Allah’s course, make the giver feels more 
satisfied, which motivates him to work harder and give more. 
Helping and concerns for other drive out fear, anger, jealousy 
and guilt and provide joy, peach and serenity that in turn lead 
to loyalty, high organizational commitment, reduces stress 
and improve productivity (Fry, 2003). Operationally, zakat 
implies the act of living in a state of readiness to offer financial 
help and support to co-workers in organizations.  
6. Fasting (Saum)
Fasting during the month of Ramadhan is the fourth pillar 
of Islam that all capable Muslims must perform (Qur’an, 
2:183). Apart from the obligatory fasting of the month of 
Ramadhan, there are other optional fastings that Muslims 
are encouraged to observe. Fasting, among its several salient 
benefits, leads to physical fitness, which is a characteristic 
of effective people.
According to the medical experts, fasting has several health 
benefits including lowering blood sugar, cholesterol and 
blood pressure (Athar, 2001). In addition to the health 
benefits, it also has some psychological effects including 
peace and tranquillity, with personal hostility at the 
minimum. All these benefits lead to better stability in the 
blood glucose (Athar, 2001). Operationally, fasting signifies 
enjoining optional and obligatory fasting and encouraging 
co-workers to observe optional and obligatory fasting in the 
right manner in order to strengthen one’s bond with Allah and 
enjoy the several positive outcomes to oneself which may lead 
to quality job at the workplace.
7. Pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj)
Performing haj is the fifth pillar in Islam, which is mandatory 
for all capable Muslims to observe it once in their lifetime 
(Qur’an, 2:196–200). It may be repeated by capable 
individuals as (Sunnah) but the first time experience is 
the most required of all Muslims to observe. Operationally, 
haj implies the act of enjoining the pilgrimage to Mecca and 
encouraging Muslim co-workers in organizations to observe 
haj when they are capable which may strengthen ones bond 
with Allah, and leads to enjoying the guidance and barakah 
of Allah, which will lead to positive guidance in ones dealings 
in organizations. 
The four pillars of Islam (salat (prayer), zakat (mandatory 
spending in Allah’s course), Saum (fasting) and haj 
(pilgrimage to Mecca)) together with Kalimat Shahada 
(which is the first pillar) are all termed as Ibadat, i.e., rituals. 
The practice of the ibadat (rituals) lead to reinforcement 
of loyalty, sensitivity, and identity among Muslims’ groups 
(Ali, 2005).
8. Remembrance of Allah (Dhikrullah)
The frequent remembrance of Allah with the heart and the 
tongue is one of the main characteristics of the people who 
possess Taqwa. Due to its importance in the lives of Muslims, 
Dhikrullah has been mentioned in several places of the 
Qur’an. For instance in Qur’an (33:35), Allah says “.....the 
men and the women who give sadaqat (i.e., zakat and alms), 
and the men and the women who observe saum (i.e., fast, 
the obligatory fasting during the month of Ramadhan and 
the optional (nawafil) fasting), the men and the women who 
guard their chastity (from illegal sexual acts), and the men 
and the women who remember Allah much with the hearts 
and tongues Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and 
a great reward (i.e., Paradise).” Operationally, Dhikrullah 
implies the frequent remembrance of Allah by an employee 
whilst at the workplace in order to strengthen the bond with 
Allah which will lead to receiving a divine intervention from 
Allah in the decisions one make in the workplace.
9. Forgivingness/repentance (Al A’fw)
When a person forgives another’s faults and mistakes, 
peace and tranquillity is established and one feels satisfied 
in the heart. As mentioned in the Qur’an (41:34) “Good 
and evil are not alike. Repel evil with what is better. Then 
he, between whom and you there was hatred, will become 
as though he was a bosom friend.” Forgivingness describes 
individuals who have good intentions towards others, fear 
Allah, have the softness of heart to forgive those who have 
hurt them, and feel happy if others are successful even if 
they have harmed them before (Al-Amar, 2008).
They cannot go longer than three days without seeking to 
reconcile with others who have upset them and they always 
look at positive side of things. As mentioned by the scholars, 
all good behaviors are united in the quality of being forgiving. 
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According to Stone (2002), for employees to exhibit their 
talents and innovative skills, they need to feel a sense of 
freedom which could be experienced only if forgivingness is 
practiced in the workplace, and this enhances organizational 
performance. Operationally, forgivingness refers to tolerating 
and leaving the burden of guilt and reciprocating evil with 
good towards those who have offended them in order to obtain 
the good pleasure of Allah.
10. Belief in Allah (Iman Bil-Lah)
Iman provides the believers with the motives for self-
examination and actualization, as it supplies the believers 
with the ability to realize their role in life. This role shall 
continue even after his death through his good deeds and 
good offspring. According to Ali (2005), belief in Allah 
signifies a deep realization of the unity of direction (Tawhid), 
clarity of goals, prevention of misconduct, and of equality 
between people. Operationally, belief in Allah (Iman) implies 
being steadfast on Allah’s course at the workplace whilst 
striving to achieve organizational goals and objectives.
In view of these developments, this research hypothesizes; 
that the determinants of Islamic Spirituality (IS) in the 
organizational context is explained by four dimensions of 
Rituals (Ibadat), Forgivingness (Al a’fw), Belief in Allah 
(Iman bil-lah) and Remembrance of Allah (Dkhikrullah). 
11. Research methodology
The technique of disproportionate stratified random 
sampling was applied in selecting the respondents of the 
study in three stages. In stage one, 50 Muslim majority 
companies in Malaysia (from the list of companies in 
Malaysia) were chosen at random. In the second stage, 
employees were grouped under two strata (Muslim and 
non-Muslim employees) in all 50 companies. In the third 
stage, Muslim employees (in all 50 companies) were picked 
at random to answer questionnaires for the main study. The 
total number of questionnaires distributed per company 
varies (disproportionate) owing to the size of the company 
and the total number of Muslim employees.
The questionnaire used for this consisted of 17 items. 
Owing to the sensitivity of this study with regard to 
examining the spirituality aspects of employees, the 
authors used a scale of “1 – Never” to “7 – Always.” 
This is to provide respondents with ample flexibility in 
responding to the survey instrument. The instrument was 
translated from English to Bahasa Melayu by a Malaysian 
professional translator. To assess the credibility of the 
translation, a back-translation (Bahasa Melayu-English) 
of the same earlier translated document was given to 
another professional translator. It was found that both 
versions (original and the back-translated) were similar. 
The questionnaire was printed out with a coloured cover 
page with the logo of the International Islamic University 
Malaysia on it to attract respondents to the questionnaire.
To estimate the hypothesis put forward by this research, 
SPSS (version 18.0) for Principal component analysis 
(PCA) and AMOS (version 18.0) for confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) were used. Out of the 1000 questionnaires 
distributed, only 419 were returned, out of which 14 
comprise of serious missing information (more than 
25%) at various parts of the questionnaire. Following 
the guideline by the scholars (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2010), these questionnaires were excluded from the total 
usable questionnaires. Also, out of the 405 total usable 
questionnaires left, only 9 questionnaires (approximately 
2%) have two or three items unanswered.
Considering the fact that the scale used by this study 
satisfies the missing at random assumption (MAR) (i.e. 
the probability of missing data on a certain variable is 
independent on the values of that variable for the IS, 
ISR and OCBIP items), and the small number of missing 
values (2%), the similar response imputation approach 
was employed, whereby the researcher logically deduced 
a response to the few missing items. According to Wang, 
Sedransk and Jinn (1992), this approach is better than 
listwise, casewise, or the mean imputation method, 
especially when MAR assumption is satisfied and missing 
information is less.
12. Profile of respondents
The demographic results of respondents showed that, in 
terms of experience (duration in position), a total number 
of 173 (n=173) respondents (i.e., 42.7%) had work 
experience between 2 to 5 years, followed by respondents 
with 6 to 10 years of work experience, 19.3%. 17.3% of 
respondents had 1 year or less work experience, followed 
in percentage by respondents with 50 years and above 
work experience. Respondents with 11 to 15 years of work 
experience numbered the least (8.1%) among the group.
It was also noted from the demography results that the 
gender of respondents drawn from the survey was quite 
close, with male respondents constituting 50.9% and female 
respondents 49.1%. The age of respondents also show 
some sharp contrast, whereby majority of the respondents 
(up to 37.3%) were aged 31 to 40, which is considered 
the working class group. This is followed by respondents 
between 26 and 30. This type of respondents consists 
mainly of newly graduated students from the university 
who now join the company with high aspirations to build 
a career for themselves. This assertiveness to develop 
themselves and to succeed may have accounted for them 
responding more eagerly to the survey compared to other 
class groups. Next after this was the respondents aged 41 
to 50 making up 15.6% of respondents aged below 25 (up 
to 10.1%) and last but not least, respondents 51 years old 
and above constituted up to 5.2%. This class of respondents 
(aged 51 years and above) was mostly composed of retired 
employees who were on consultancy services, or maybe 
old employees who were about to retire. This may have 
accounted for their small number partaking in the survey 
of this study as most consultants only visit the company at 
odd hours.
13. Dimensions of Islamic spirituality
The study aimed to identify the construct validity of IS on 
the basis of data collected from 405 respondents (n = 405) 
who were Muslim employees of companies in Malaysia. 
The dimensionality of the IS was sought through a principal 
component analysis (PCA) after which a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to confirm the 
dimensionality obtained through PCA.
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14. Exploratory factor analysis (principal 
component analysis)
The PCA was to explore the underlying dimensions of 
IS within the Malaysian organizational context. First, the 
statistical assumptions of PCA were tested. The exercise 
revealed that a substantial number of variables were 
correlated (r ≥ .30). In addition, the two measures for inter-
correlations among variables supported the use of PCA. 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was statistically significant 
[χ2 (136) = 3083.677, p =  .001], while the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of the sampling adequacy (MSA) was 
.883, indicating that the inter-correlations were sufficient 
for PCA.
PCA with Varimax rotation was performed on the 
data collected. Four latent factors were extracted with 
eigenvalues greater than one, explaining 63.753% of total 
variance. Thus, the results show that four latent IS factors 
were successfully extracted on 17 variables. Table 1 shows 
that factor loadings are between .857 and .522. Following 
the guideline provided by the scholars (Byrne, 2010; Hair 
et al., 2010, Kline, 2011) to consider higher factor loadings 
and adequate number of items, all four factors were named 
as rituals (Ibadat), forgiveness (Al-a’fw), belief (Iman) and 
remembrance of Allah (Dhikrullah), respectively.
The internal consistency of all the factors were obtained by 
computing the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient on the three 
extracted factors for IS that were retained by PCA. In view of 
the guidelines by researchers (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010), 
Cronbach’s Alpha was employed to estimate the reliability 
of the extracted factors of the IS as presented in Table 1. 
All four factors [rituals (Ibadat), forgiveness (Al-a’fw), 
belief (Iman) and remembrance of Allah (Dhikrullah)] 
had good reliability indices of .819, .821, .712 and .821, 
respectively.
15. Construct validity of IS
This section presents the results of CFA to support the 
construct validity of IS. CFA was performed to examine 
the following hypothesis:
The hypothesized measurement model of Islamic Spirituality 
(IS) in the organizational context is explained by four 
dimensions, i.e. rituals (Ibadat), forgiveness (Al-a’fw), belief 
(Iman) and remembrance of Allah (Dhikrullah).
Table 1. Factor loadings and internal consistency of four rotated factors for IS.
IS Item
Rituals 
(Ibadat)
Forgiveness 
(Al-a’fw)
Belief 
(Iman)
Remembrance  
of Allah  
(Dhikrullah)
 4. I encourage my co-workers to pray together at work .784
 3. I practice optional fasting .751
 1. Whenever possible, I encourage my co-workers  
to visit the prayer rooms for prayers
.748
 2. I inspire my co-workers to fast and breakfast collectively .704
 5. When I am confronted with competing alternatives  
in decision making, I perform istikhara prayer
.703
17. I apologize for my mistakes when I realize them at work .783
13. I ask forgiveness from my co-workers that I have wronged .774
14. I deal with co-workers with justice and generosity .766
12. I do my best in my work because Allah is watching me .522
16. I stay away from haram acts in my work to avoid  
Allah’s divine wrath
.724
15. I direct my dedication to Allah alone .693
10. I do my best to perform all five prayers regardless  
of how busy I am
.661
11. I do my duties in the best way I could and leave  
the outcomes to be determined by Allah
.541
 6. Whenever I pay my zakat, I make sure I calculate  
it correctly
.522
 8. I supplicate Allah whenever I face difficulty in my work .857
 7. I ask Allah to help me when I make important decisions  
at my work
.823
 9. Whenever I make a mistake I ask Allah’s forgiveness .647
Eigen Value 6.310 2.275 1.191 1.061
% of Variance Explained 37.117 13.385 7.007 6.244
Reliability (Cronbach α) .819 .821 .712 .821
KMO (MSA) .883
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Figure 1. The hypothesized measurement model of the 
IS construct.
16. Model specification
The four factors derived from the results of the PCA 
were hypothesized as the latent variables of IS. 
The hypothesized measurement model, as shown in 
Figure  1, contains the four latent variables loaded 
on 17  indicators. The first latent variable is Rituals 
(Ibadat), second latent variable is Forgiveness (Al-
a’fw), third is Belief (Iman) and fourth is Remembrance 
of Allah (Dhikrullah). The internal consistencies of 
the four latent factors were .819, .821, .712 and .821, 
respectively, based on the data collected from 405 
Muslim employees (n = 405).
The interrelationships among the 17 measures of IS were 
checked and it was shown that the indices were statistically 
significant (See Table 2). For normality, the use of AMOS 
(version 18.0) showed, through the indices of skewness 
and kurtosis, that there was no serious violation of the 
assumption of normality (thus, all values of skewness were 
negative and less than 0.1). Also, there was no outlier in 
the Mahalanobis distance (observations farthest from 
the centroid). This is the justification for the researcher’s 
adoption of CFA to answer Question.
17. Model estimation
A CFA was performed on the data collected from 405 
Muslim employees through AMOS (Version 18.0), using 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Byrne, 2010). 
The measurement model of the four latent exogenous 
variables showed that the overall fit of the model was 
χ2 (113)  =  488.194, p  =  0.000, which was statistically 
significant, indicating an inadequate fit between the 
covariance matrix of the observed data and the implied 
covariance matrix of the model.
Other indices of model fit were also used following the 
guideline by the scholars (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010) 
whereby at least one absolute fit index and one incremental 
fit index was used in addition to the χ2 statistic and the 
associated degree of freedom. Following this guideline, 
the normed chi-square (i.e. CMIN/DF), the Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) were adopted in estimating the 
model in addition to the χ2 statistic and the associated 
degree of freedom.
The CFI was found to be 0.875, which is below the threshold 
value of 0.92 (Hair et  al., 2010). Also, the Normed chi-
square was 4.32, which is above the acceptable ≤ 3 cut-off. 
Similarly, the RMSEA value for the hypothesized model was 
.091, thus, falls outside the acceptable range of .05 and .08. 
However, the values of loadings for the observed variables 
of the model ranged from .35 (IS6) to .83 (IS7), which 
were all statistically significant. Accordingly, the fit indices 
presenting the overall fit of the model were not encouraging 
as the normed chi-square, CFI and RMSEA were not found 
to be within their various acceptable limits.
Owing to the less encouraging data-model fit, the 
study sought a better-fit model. Careful examination of 
indicators with lower loadings was carried out. A total 
of five indicators were found to be problematic and were 
excluded from the model, doing which improved the 
goodness-of-fit of the model. These items include: item IS6 
loading .35 on the belief latent variable, item IS16 loading 
.68 also on the belief latent variable, item IS5 loading .61 
on the rituals latent variable, item IS3 loading .71 also on 
the rituals latent variable and item IS17 loading .73 on the 
forgiveness latent variable.
In addition, post hoc model modification indexes were 
examined in order to identify a more parsimonious model. 
The model was re-estimated, and three inter-correlations 
among six errors were freed based on the suggestions 
of the parameter of Modification Indices (MIs). The 
following connections were established: error 9 (item 
IS12) and error 13 (item IS11); error 11 (item IS15) and 
error 15 (item IS8); and error 15 (item IS8) and error 16 
(item IS7). These connections were allowed to co-vary to 
reduce the total amount of 361.996 chi-square and hence, 
increase the fit indices. These inter-correlations were 
supported methodologically through the use of AMOS and 
theoretically because the two elements of measurements 
errors were correlated, showing commonalities among 
pairs of observed behaviors.
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Table 2. Inter-variable correlation, mean and standard deviation of IS items.
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Figure 2. The fit indices of the revised model of the IS 
construct.
Table 3. Squared multiple correlation 
(SMCs) of items in the revised model.
Estimate
IS9 .731
IS7 .497
IS8 .410
IS11 .579
IS10 .394
IS15 .469
IS12 .611
IS14 .462
IS13 .483
IS2 .473
IS1 .705
IS4 .474
Table  4. Goodness-of-fit, parameter estimates and 
variance explained for the hypothesized model and the 
revised model.
Model comparison
Fit indices
Hypothesized  
model
Revised  
model
Model Chi-square (χ2) 488.194 126.198
P value .000 .000
CMINDF (χ2/df) 4.32 2.80
CFI .875 .960
RMSEA .091 .067
18. The revised model of IS
As indicated in Figure 2, the goodness of fit indices show 
that the overall fit for the revised model was consistent with 
the data. The chi square statistic was statistically significant 
[χ2 (45) = 126.198, p = 0.000], implying that there is no 
difference between the covariance matrix of the observed 
data and the implied matrix of the revised model.
However, the revised model fits the observed data, since 
the value of the normed chi square (CMIN/DF) was 2.80, 
the cut off recommended by statisticians is ≤ 3 for χ2/df to 
reflect good fit for the model (Hair et al., 2010). Similarly, 
other fit indices showed good indicators for the revised 
model (CFI  =  .960 and RMSEA  =  .067). Following the 
guideline by the scholars (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010), 
for the complexity of this model (i.e. four latent constructs, 
12 total indicators and 405  sample size (n  =  405), CFI 
threshold of more than .92 and RMSEA threshold of less 
than .07 reflects a good fitting model.
In addition to this, the parameter estimates were also 
examined and were found them to be statistically significant 
(See Figure 2). They were free from any offending estimates 
and showed logical direction. Also, the squared multiple 
correlations (SMC) provided reasonable values to explain 
the variance in the 12 observed variables, ranging from 
.731 (IS9) to .394 (IS10) (See Table 3).
19. Comparison between the hypothesized 
model and the revised model
It is worth noting from Table 4 that the hypothesized model 
did not show encouraging goodness of fit indices; the χ2 
value was statistically significant (χ2 = 488.194, p = .000), 
which implies that there was different between the two 
matrices for the observed sample and implied population. 
Other indices also did not show reasonable fit, i.e., CFI 
(.875), and RMSEA (.091).
The revised model also showed a significant chi square 
statistic owing to the large sample size (n = 405) 
(χ2 = 126.198, p = .000). However, other fit indices showed 
that the revised model has a good data model fit, i.e. 
CMINDF (2.80), CFI (.960), and RMSEA (.067).
20. Relevance of findings to sustainable 
growth and economic development
The findings from the present empirical study are quite 
relevant towards sustaining growth and improving 
economic development. As posited by economists and 
business researchers, sustainable growth for one, cannot 
be possible without paying heed to the twin cornerstones 
of growth strategy and growth capability (Sowinski, 2006). 
Companies that are unable to balance their efforts in these 
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 45
Articulation of spirituality in the workplace: The case of Malaysia
areas are tantamount to failure in their efforts to sustainable 
growth and overall economic development practices.
It is worth noting, that the employees of a particular company 
form an integral part of its development in all facets of 
organizational goal achievements, from analysis of growth 
strategy, through formulation and to implementation of the 
strategy. These in turn lead to growth capability which can 
go a long way towards increasing the company’s competitive 
advantage with which the company stands a high chance 
of outcompeting its rivals. In other words, no matter how 
excellent a growth strategy or economic development 
strategy or Islamic economic model is, it remains a mere 
promise on paper without the necessary qualified and 
highly motivated workforce to materialize it.
In view of this, the present empirical research has shown 
that Muslim employees who in most cases dominate Muslim 
corporate organizations in Muslim nations in particular, 
need a unique aspect of motivation which comes through 
realizing the cornerstones of their spirituality. Increasing the 
understanding towards employees’ Islamic spirituality and 
their values, and making attempts to create awareness to it 
can lead Muslim employees to portray all positive behaviors 
at the workplace. Non Muslim employees may also benefit 
from this study as it may increase their awareness of the 
values of their Muslim co-workers, respecting which will 
lead to mutual co-existence and increased understanding 
at the workplace, which can lead to sustainable growth 
and overall economic development in the organization. 
With highly motivated employees equipped with a sense 
of purpose in life as shown via the determinants of Islamic 
spirituality, thus, rituals, forgivingness, belief in Allah 
and the remembrance of Allah, the formulation and 
implementation of growth strategies and capabilities can 
be realized.
21. Conclusion and recommendation for 
further research
In the recent times, most research on spirituality was 
conducted from the Judeo-Christian and Hinduism faiths. 
What has not been explored sufficiently in this field is the 
potential of looking at the spirituality in the workplace 
phenomenon from other socio-cultural and religious 
contexts, and specifically from the Islamic perspectives. 
This study, therefore, has sought to narrow this research 
gap by attempting to develop and present new knowledge 
through the findings from an empirical study of important 
issues pertinent to Islamic spirituality.
It has particularly focused on some relevant aspects of 
spirituality in the Qur’an and the prophet tradition, which 
represent the viewpoints of one of the major religions of 
the world, i.e., Islam. Due to this, the study has played a 
pioneering role into determining the determinants of Islamic 
spirituality from the two major sources of knowledge: 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, which when followed are expected 
to result in higher levels of outcomes. Conducting this 
empirical study has led to the major finding that Islamic 
spirituality in the organizational context is explained by its 
four determinants, namely, rituals (Ibadat), forgivingness 
(Al a’fw), belief in Allah (Iman bil-lah) and remembrance of 
Allah (Dhikrullah).
Economists, business researchers and human resource 
deve lo pment scholars and professionals may use the 
findings of this research to rationalize their efforts in 
designing, developing, and implement appropriate 
learning and performance improvement interventions, 
so that Islamic spirituality could be improved incessantly 
among Muslim employees. This could lead to attaining high 
ethical and moral values of employees that might control 
many undesirable behaviors, such as greed, corruption, 
disobedience, etc., of employees that are negatively 
affecting contemporary organizational performance.
In addition, non-Muslim professionals and employees can 
also take relevant initiatives in this regard. Particularly, 
the research finding will provide new insights to the 
people of other faiths in proper understanding Muslim 
employees’ values and spiritual inclinations. The 
increased understanding of the values and organizational 
perspectives of people from various faiths will help in 
developing increased tolerance among members of 
increasing multi-cultural, multi-religious organizations of 
today’s changing social and business environments. 
In the future, this research could be replicated in other 
contexts (other Muslim majority countries with different 
socio-cultural values), and study the impact of several 
contextual variables in this regard. Since this is the first 
research on the contemporary issues of Islamic religion 
and spirituality, findings from this study may trigger more 
research interests among the current and future scholars 
who might be interested in this field.
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Abstract - Given the phenomenal increase in Islamic banking activities globally, it is important that 
there exists good governance practice around Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). This is primarily 
to ensure its sustainability in the long run. More importantly, in order for Islamic banks to play 
an optimum role in the development of Islamic countries, it is pertinent to develop regulatory 
structures to control fraud, exploitation, and un-Islamic behavior. Additionally, the development of 
strong governance practices will win public confidence and thereby promote trust amongst equity 
holders, investors and other parties dealing with these IFIs. However, promulgating and developing 
standards and guidelines on corporate governance (CG) may not be adequate. What is needed is 
to examine the extent IFIs are actually following such guidelines. This is precisely what we have 
attempted to do. There are two stages to the study. A disclosure index is first developed using the 
guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM), the standard on CG promulgated by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the framework 
introduced by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). The index developed in the first stage 
is then used to assess the annual reports of all 16 IFIs operating in Malaysia. This paper reports on 
the second stage of the study. The results do not appear too promising. On a scale of 0 to 100, the 
CG disclosure index ranges from a low of 42.28 to a high of 68.29, with the average score hovering 
around 51.42. The implications of the results, the limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research are also discussed.
Keywords: Islamic financial institutions (IFIs), corporate governance, general governance guidelines, 
specific governance guidelines, Malaysia
1. Introduction
A series of corporate failures of “giant” corporations 
worldwide (e.g., Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, Pharmalat, 
etc.) has shaken the confidence and trust of stakeholders. 
Consequently, this has brought increasing attention 
to corporate governance (CG) issues. Increasing CG 
disclosures in annual reports may be interpreted as a way 
by which companies try to secure the level of confidence 
and trust of its stakeholders. More importantly, the issue 
of transparency has now become pertinent. Bhat, Hope 
and Kang (2006) opine that the knowledge of a firm’s 
governance practices is useful in assessing the credibility 
of financial information presented in its annual report. 
This is because governance-related disclosure aids users in 
assessing the quality of information and guides stakeholders 
in more accurately setting expectations about the future of 
an organization’s performance. Specific to Islamic banking, 
one observes a proactive stance on the part of regulators 
to improve the regulatory and supervisory framework 
in supporting higher CG standards for Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs). Given the uniqueness of IFIs, an 
international guideline developed by OECD or the Cadbury 
Report may not address CG issues of IFIs, as governance 
structures are industry specific (Adam and Mehran, 2005).
In line with the global focus on CG, various regulatory 
bodies for IFIs have moved a considerable distance toward 
improving the regulatory and supervisory framework 
in developing higher CG standards. The CG Guidelines 
and standards issued by the Accounting and Auditing 
Organizations of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), 
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the 
Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) are some examples. 
These guidelines may well assist IFIs to establish their 
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governing structures. Consequently, such guidelines may 
improve the governance practices of IFIs and thus enhance 
its transparency. However, promulgating and developing 
standards and guidelines on CG are insufficient. What 
is needed is to examine the extent IFIs are actually 
complying with such guidelines. This is precisely what 
the study attempts to do. Specifically, this research will 
examine CG disclosure practices of IFIs in Malaysia using 
a two-stage process. The first stage is the development of 
a comprehensive CG index. Consistent with prior studies, 
the index acts as a proxy for disclosure quality. The 
comprehensive corporate governance disclosure (CGD) 
Index used in this study is based on three governance 
guidelines and codes promulgated by AAOIFI, IFSB and 
the Central Bank of Malaysia (later on collectively referred 
as “Guidelines”). The CG index developed is then used to 
assess the quality of CG of IFIs in Malaysia. This constitutes 
the second stage of the study, which is the focus of this 
paper.
The study contributes to the literature in several important 
respects. The use of a comprehensive index to examine 
CG practices of IFIs in Malaysia will greatly enhance the 
literature on CG in IFIs. Second, the CG index developed 
from three recently released governance guidelines 
available to IFIs (2006, 2007 and 2008) speaks of the 
currency of the research. Finally, the division in terms of 
general and specific governance related information, to 
the authors’ knowledge, is a first in studies concerning CG 
and IFIs. Understanding the quality of CG disclosure by 
examining its extent and focus is a fundamental starting 
point in gaining insights into the preference of IFIs on 
CG disclosure information. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows: The following section discusses the 
literature review while section 3 focuses on the theoretical 
framework of the study. Section  4 describes the data 
collection and the findings, while section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
Corporate governance (CG), broadly defined, is a set of 
processes, policies and laws affecting the way an organization 
is directed, administered and controlled. Bansuch, Pate 
and Thies (2008) defined CG as a set of formalised values 
and procedures implemented by the owners, directors and 
the management of the business in its various operations 
as well as its interactions with stakeholders. Holder-Webb, 
Cohen, Nath and Wood, (2008) defined CG as the provision 
of effective boards, strong shareholder rights, and broad 
disclosures in managing a business. From the perspective 
of IFIs, governance specifically addresses issues pertaining 
to the role and conduct of the Shariah Supervisory Boards 
(SSB). More specifically, CG of IFIs should include the 
following:
 i. Safeguarding interests of investment account holders
 ii. Compliance with Shariah
iii.  Governance and risk management of Mudaraba and 
Musharaka contracts
iv.  Establishment of a comprehensive CG framework 
articulating the fiduciary responsibilities of the board 
and senior management
A focus on all the above will lead to an improvement in the 
level of trust and confidence in the Islamic finance industry 
(Iqbal and Greuning, 2008). More importantly, AAOIFI 
claims that strong governance practices will win public 
confidence and thereby promote trust amongst their equity 
holders, investors and other parties dealing with them. 
Subsequently, this would enhance Shariah compliance.
In order to examine if indeed there exists differences 
between CG of IFIs and other organizations, it is important 
to understand what are the unique characteristics of IFIs 
in the first place. The uniqueness of IFIs emanates from 
its fundamental principle to conduct its operations in 
accordance with Islamic Shariah, the primary issue being 
the prohibition of the receipt and payment of riba (interest). 
A pre-determined fixed rate of return on capital – where one 
party bears the risk while the other party receives a reward 
irrespective of the outcome of the use of the borrowed 
amount—would mean an uneven distribution of risk and 
reward in the transaction. More importantly, riba also leads 
to the concentration of wealth by transferring wealth from 
the poor to the rich. This is primarily why riba is prohibited. 
The alternative to avoid dealing with interest is the various 
forms of profit-sharing contracts that are peculiar to Islamic 
banking. These contracts are said to enhance justice and 
equitable distribution of profits and risks in investment 
(Bashir, 1984).
Archer and Karim (2007) identified two main types of 
accounts offered by IFIs to mobilize funds from its customers. 
The first is the profit–sharing and loss bearing mudharabah 
contract. This type of limited duration investment account 
is distinct from equity shares. The relationship between the 
investment account holders (IAH) and the bank is that of a 
provider of funds and a fund manager. More importantly, 
there is a transfer of control over investment decisions from 
the IAHs to the bank as a mudharib. Thus, the IAHs have 
no right to intervene in the mudharib’s decisions over the 
funds. Further, IAHs do not possess any right of governance 
or oversight, making this a unique feature of IFIs and IAHs. 
This then gives rise to the importance of proper governance 
procedures in order to ensure that the rights of IAHs are not 
compromised. In the absence of a right to manage, the only 
choice possible to IAHs is the right to withdraw their funds 
when there is dissatisfaction in the bank’s performance. 
Udovitch (1970) argued that in a mudharabah contract, 
the bank as a mudharib acts as a steward with respect to the 
capital entrusted to him. As such, the bank is not liable for 
any losses occurring in the normal course of business and if 
there is no negligence (Archer and Karim, 2007: 315).
Another major issue pertinent to IFIs is the need for IFIs 
to balance financial performance with ethical behavior. 
The latter provides an incentive to disclose specific-
governance information, which may not necessarily 
attribute to financial outcomes, but could moreso serve the 
purpose of attaining fairness and equity for a wider group of 
stakeholders. In several important respects, the specificities 
of IFIs impact how CG should be structured. According to 
Erricco and Farahbaksh (1998), depositors of Islamic banks 
have more incentive to assess the performance of banks 
because their capital value and returns on investment 
deposits are not fixed and guaranteed. The outcomes of their 
investment depend on the bank’s performance in investing 
depositors’ funds. Indeed the incentive for depositors to 
scrutinize the performance of banks is to ensure protection 
of the capital value of their funds as well as to ensure that 
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the rates of return paid to them reflect a fair application of 
the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) principles (Erricco and 
Farahbaksh, 1998:14).
Lewis (2005) contends that there are two aspects that 
give shape to the nature of Islamic corporate governance 
(ICG). The first aspect is the Shariah. Shariah claims 
sovereignty over all aspects of human life, including ethical 
and social matters. Thus, every act of believers must 
conform to Shariah and ethical standards derived from 
Islamic principles. The ethical principles defined what is 
true, fair and just, the nature of corporate responsibilities, 
and the priorities to society, along with some specific 
governance standards. Ethical production and distribution 
are regulated by the halal-haram code and adhered to the 
notion of “adl” (justice). The second aspect is the specifics 
of Islamic economics and financial principles. For example, 
issues such as zakah (the alms tax), the ban on riba (usury) 
and the prohibition on speculation have a direct impact 
upon corporate practices and policies.
Specific to the appointment of the board of directors, 
Chapra (2007) identified three matters of importance. 
The first pertains to the need for board members to 
possess a high degree of moral integrity and professional 
competence in the banking business. These qualities may 
help them to effectively perform their expected duties 
toward the institutions. Second is to ensure that the board 
member is well-versed in Shariah matters concerning 
Islamic banking. Finally, board members must make sure 
that there is adequate transparency in the disclosure 
of activities of IFIs. More specifically, IFIs must adhere 
to guidelines/standards laid down by the supervisory 
authority of the country. In Malaysia, for example, the 
guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Malaysia would 
rank supreme.
Hameed and Sigit (2005) conducted a comparative study 
of CG disclosures in annual reports of Malaysian and 
Indonesian IFIs between the period of 2000 and 2003. A CG 
disclosure index developed important issues related to IFIs, 
such as the internal Shariah review; social responsibilities 
for stakeholders; bases for profit allocation between owner 
equity and IAHs; the PER (profit equalization reserve); IRR 
(investment risk reserve), and the SSB. The score obtained 
for each bank was rated using the rule of classification 
suggested by Irwanto (2002). Irwanto (2002) grouped the 
scores into four (4) categories: 81–100 (very informative); 
between 66 and 81 (sufficiently informative); between 
51 and 66 (less informative) and between 0 and 51 (not 
informative). Overall, there was an increasing trend of CG 
disclosures for both Malaysian and Indonesian IFIs from 
2000 to 2003. Additionally, the scores for Malaysian IFIs 
were higher, ranging from “not informative” to “sufficiently 
informative” (a score between 0 and 81). On the other 
hand, scores for IFIs in Indonesia range from 0 to 51 (not 
informative). What comes as a surprise is the fact that none 
of IFIs disclosed specific items that are unique to them, such 
as internal Shariah review and bases for profit allocation 
between owner equity and IAHs.
Hassan and Christopher (2005) examined corporate 
governance disclosure of one IFI in Malaysia. The study was 
unable to offer an extensive list of governance requirements 
due to the limited number of governance guidelines for 
IFIs at the time the study was undertaken. They argued 
that IFIs operate on a different set of rules to comply with 
the requirements of the Shariah. Specifically, IFIs, to meet 
the expectations of the Muslim community, must provide 
financing that accords with Shariah. As indicated earlier, 
because of the prohibition of riba, the PLS contracts are 
prevalent in IFIs. This suggests a different relationship from 
those offered by conventional banking. In line with this 
argument, the authors inferred that IFIs should be selective 
with regards to the appointment of board members and 
managers in terms of specific qualification requirements. 
Emanating from the notions of unity in Islam, universal 
brotherhood, trust and accountability in Shariah, IFIs are 
expected to provide greater transparency in disclosure 
(Hassan and Christopher, 2005).
3. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework of this study merely concentrates 
on the quality of CG information disclosure practices by 
IFIs in Malaysia. It focuses on examining the extent that 
CG information is disclosed by IFIs and the difference of 
CG disclosure quality between local and foreign owned IFIs 
in terms of their preference to prioritize either specific or 
general kinds of governance information in their annual 
reports in 2009. More specifically, the primary objective of 
this study is thus to examine the quality of CG disclosure 
provided by IFIs in Malaysia in their annual report. Figure 1 
below presents the research framework.
The stewardship theory was chosen as a framework for this 
study on account of the contextual characteristics of IFIs. 
Contextually, the multifaceted objectives, which focus on 
more than just economic factors, include having an ideal 
composition of board structure supported by strategic board 
committees – nominating, remuneration, risk management, 
and audit. The good structure of these elements supports 
proper accounting for risk, handling effective internal 
control systems, related parties transactions, an adherence 
to issued guidelines, and the production of various 
management reports for achieving operational efficiency 
among IFIs. However, the integration of the PLS mechanism 
in the basic operation and the ethical conduct of business 
attached to the “ultimate goal of Maqasid Shariah” (Bhatti 
and Bhatti, 2009:72) of the Islamic financial industry has 
been perceived as being in the best interests of the group, 
as opposed to individual financial rewards. This context 
means accountability to a broader group of the community 
(ummah). The essence of Maqasid Shariah substantially 
curbs any endeavour to acquire wealth by unlawful means, 
which leads to social inequality and social waste (Bhatti 
and Bhatti, 2009). As such, the governance structure in 
IFIs should include the establishment of a Shariah and 
governance committee, the performance of an internal 
Shariah review as an assurance of continuous Shariah 
compliance and the provision of relevant information 
intended to govern the relationship with IAHs.
The first type of governance information targeted 
operational efficiency, which is common in all kinds 
of commercial entities. However, the second type of 
governance information is to pursue and exclusively 
secure the attainment of goals set by Maqasid Shariah. 
The concern for both types of governance information by 
stewards may be seen as an equilibrium response to the wide 
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spectrum of an institution’s obligation to commercial and 
religious affairs. The two types of governance information 
are: GCGi (general CG information), which is related to 
institutional efficiency in operation, and SCGi (specific CG 
information), which is related to the type of activities to 
protect the proper application of Shariah requirements. 
The SCGi is of particular importance as the philosophy 
of Islamic financial business dealings, as enshrined by 
the Shariah, promote relatively greater reliance on the 
equity (Mudharabah and Musyarakah) or the PLS modes 
of financing (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002:1). In such 
arrangements, IFIs and their stakeholders (particularly 
IAHs) become partners in the relationship. In such a 
relation, the partnership attributes (i.e., commitment, 
coordination and trust) and communication behavior 
are vital as determinants of the successful relationship 
between partners.
Based on the stewardship theory, the emphasis is on 
coordination where the relationship is based on trust and 
personal power (respect and expertise) (Davis et al., 1997). 
As stewards, the managers and directors of IFIs need to 
focus on managing the interaction process with their wide 
array of stakeholders by “increased value commitment and 
identification” (Davis et  al., 1997). This ultimately aims 
at creating trust and enhancing goal alignment between 
the IFIs and their stakeholders. The establishment of CG 
information in the annual report, in particular the SCGi, is 
argued to be a direct expression of IFIs to gain the trust of 
stakeholders. Once confidence is achieved, it facilitates the 
collaboration and serves as an important lubricant of the 
social system (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) between 
IFIs and their stakeholders.
The application of a liaison device such as communication 
also enables firms to establish mutual understanding 
and cooperation. This is in line with the general theme 
of Islamic social order, which emphasises cooperation 
and mutual consultation (Shura) (Sulaiman, 2005: 22). 
This study proposes that the means of building shared 
understanding among managers, directors and executives 
with their stakeholders is through communication. Such 
disclosure may include the presentation of respective 
governance concerns and contributions (i.e., GCGi and 
SCGi) about the risks that they can assume through 
their involvement with the institutions to regulators and 
other stakeholders. This approach can provide a basis 
for dialogue between the firms and stakeholders, as they 
can evaluate the appropriate disclosure to match their 
expectations. Under the implicit assumption of stewardship 
theory, the study hypothesizes that the tendency of IFIs 
is to prioritize specific kinds of governance information 
(H1) as it is considered an expression by IFIs attempting 
to gain trust from their stakeholders. Furthermore it 
is directed to achieve goal alignment based on shared 
culture and norms strictly followed the requirements 
made in Shariah.
Theoretically, the PLS system practiced in IFIs is ine-
xtricably intertwined with collectivism spirits promoted in 
Shariah requirements. In this arrangement, management 
of IFIs are beneficiaries of trust. Similar claims were made 
by Bundt (2000:761) that “the principal-stewardship 
relationship depends on trust, where trust in this 
relationship is the expectation that the other will act in 
good faith in situations in which that party has the power 
to affect one’s own interests.” By adopting the stewardship 
perspective, this study expects that the management of 
IFIs would voluntarily adopt activities that can enhance 
the trust of stakeholders to enter into collaboration 
with IFIs.
The underlying ideas in reference to their focus on 
governance related information is that GCGi is usually 
pursued with the aim of maximising the financial 
performance of the banks. Meanwhile, the specific-
governance information, which may not be directly 
related to the financial implications for the banks, might 
be important to serve as a basis “to build trust, elicit 
cooperation and create a shared vision amongst those 
involved in the firms” (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001:160). 
As the theory assumes that the steward possesses of a 
high value commitment, Bundt (2000:761) argued that,
“the principal must believe that the steward will make 
decisions in the best interests of the organization and 
will be capable of carrying the decisions out. Failure to 
meet this condition may constrain the steward—either 
literally by rules and regulations or psychologically by 
demoralization.”
Types of Corporate Governance
Information;
•  Specific governance related
    information (SCGi) and 
•  General governance related
    information (GCGi)
Corporate Governance
Quality
Types of Institutional Ownership of IFIs;
•  Locally owned IFIs and
•  Foreign owned IFIs.
H1
H2
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Figure 1. Research framework.
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 51
Corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia
This argument may partly clarify the claim made by 
Brown and Caylor (2006), who stated that governance 
matters, which are unrelated to firm value (in such case, 
SCGi does not necessarily directly contribute to economic 
enhancement), might be of importance for other purposes, 
such as for the case of IFIs. As the IFIs alter their policies to 
exactly match the intrinsic organizational motivations with 
their stakeholders’ of creating a shared portfolio focusing 
on the preferred mix of financial and religious issues in 
business affairs.
Drawing on a simple steward and principal model, this 
study hypothesizes that firms will be particularly motivated 
to disclose specific-governance related information as and 
when they realize that these elements are the antecedent 
of their trustworthiness to guarantee their accountability 
towards the fair operation of the banks. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is formulated.
H1: IFIs will disclose more specific-governance related 
information (SCGi) compared to general-governance 
related information (GCGi).
Additionally, under the implicit assumption of stewardship 
theory, the study hypothesizes that foreign owned IFIs 
have a broader group of community (ummah). Foreign 
owned IFIs are likely to make more disclosure relating 
to governance information as their status to put them 
in a position to adopt foreign governance guidelines in 
addition to domestic standards to attract the confidence of 
stakeholders both at home and abroad. This study argues 
that foreign owned IFIs will exhibit different levels of 
compliance to the Guidelines (hence CGD quality) to reflect 
the different quality of governance, which is dependent 
upon their operational specificity and motivations. It is 
an expectation that the roles played by foreign IFIs in 
the global marketplace also contribute to the disparity of 
their CG quality. The twin roles of institutions operating 
in foreign countries as identified by Kim, Prescott and 
Kim (2005), are that of specialized contributor and local 
implementer. These roles are assumed to have an effect on 
the stewardship objective of managing the IFIs interactions 
with their wider range of stakeholders, hence, the quality 
of their governance reporting.
As a specialized contributors, foreign banks are highly 
dependent on the global scale of stakeholders. As the 
case may be, the foreign banks may be subjected to close 
supervision by the headquarters (if they are subsidiaries) 
or the regulators of their origin countries. Thus, this 
study assumes that foreign banks are also affected by 
the standards and guidelines applied to headquarters for 
control purposes. Regulators in their country of origin may 
impose rules on foreign banks, which might not be the same 
as the rules of the domicile country. The tendency to adopt 
several standards in addition to the domestic guidelines is 
highly likely for foreign banks. Thus, this study assumes 
that higher governance information disclosure can be 
expected from foreign banks.
Porter (1986) argued that being local implementers, 
foreign banks seek to “meet unusual local needs in products, 
channels, and marketing practices in each country” (Kim 
et al., 2005: 50). As a result, this study assumes that foreign 
banks might comply with domestic governance guidelines 
as well as they are able. This approach can be seen as an 
effort by foreign owned banks to gain the trust of the local 
regulators concerning their capability to suit the local 
needs. Thus, it is an assumption of this theory to expect 
to see more CG disclosures in annual reports of foreign 
owned IFIs as compared to their local counterparts. On the 
basis of the above argument, the following hypothesis is 
developed.
H2: The quality of corporate governance of foreign 
owned banks is likely to be of better quality than that of 
locally owned banks.
4. Data collection and findings
The index
A comprehensive CG index was first developed using the 
guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM), 
the standard on CG promulgated by the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) and the framework introduced by the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB). Altogether there were 123 
items grouped into 14 dimensions as follows:
D1: Board structure and functioning (D1–1:21)*
D2: Nominating committee (D2–25:32)
D3: Remuneration committee (D3–33: 41)
D4: Risk management committee (D4–42: 49)
D5:  Audit committee/audit and 
governance committee
(D5–50: 61)
D6:  Shariah committee/Shariah 
supervisory board
(D6–62: 76)
D7: Risk management (D7–77: 85)
D8a and 8b: Internal audit and control (D8–86: 93)
D9: Related parties transaction (D9–94: 95)
D10: Management report (D10–96: 97)
D11: Non-adherence to guidelines (D11–98: 99)
D12:  Customers/investment account 
holders
(D12–100: 113)
D13: Governance committee (D13–114: 119)
D14: Shariah compliance (D14–120: 123)
*Items in brackets denote the number of items in the 
dimension.
The maximum score that IFIs can achieve is 123 items. 
Disclosing all 123 items will indicate full compliance with the 
CGD Index. Further, in order to examine if IFIs are actually 
disclosing items that reflect their unique nature, the present 
study divides the dimensions into two specific categories: 
general-governance related information (GCGi) and specific-
governance related information (SCGi). The former (i.e., 
GCGi) comprises D1 (board structure and functioning), D2 
(nominating committee), D3 (remuneration committee), 
D4 (risk management committee), D5 (audit committee or 
audit and governance committee), D7 (risk management), 
D8 (internal audit and control; (a) general-governance 
information and (b) specific-governance information), D9 
(related parties transaction), D10 (management report), and 
D11 (non-adherence to guidelines). These dimensions are 
oriented towards the achievement of operational efficiency 
to lead to an achievement in economic objectives. The SCGi 
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consists of D6 (Shariah committee or Shariah supervisory 
board), D12 (customers/investment account holders), D13 
(governance committee), and D14 (Shariah compliance). 
These dimensions extend the orientation towards the 
realization of ethical and socially corporate values through 
the application of partnership-based business principles. 
The split into 10 dimensions of general-governance related 
information, and 4 dimensions of specific-governance 
related information, provides an opportunity to understand 
the inclination of the type of CG information being disclosed 
by IFIs in Malaysia. Specifically, the CG information 
(SCGi) constitutes dimensions that align with the unique 
characteristics of IFIs, such as Shariah compliance, Shariah 
committee, Governance committee (specifically indicated in 
the IFSB guidelines) and Investment Account Holders (IAH).
5. The results
We examined the annual reports of 16 IFIs in Malaysia; 10 
local banks and 6 foreign owned banks. Content analysis 
was used to determine the extent IFIs comply with the 
index. A score of “1” was given if a particular item was 
reported, and a score of “0” if the item was not included 
in the annual report. A CGD Index score, consistent with 
Pahuja and Bhatia (2010), was then computed using the 
following formula
CGD Index
Total Score of the Individual Bank
Maximum Possib
=
le Score Obtainable by the Bank
× 100
Table  1 presents the overall CG disclosure index score of 
each IFI. The extent of compliance indicates the quality 
of disclosure. Thus, the assumption taken in the study is 
that greater disclosure of CG information (according to 
the index) will be regarded as having higher quality CG 
disclosure. Theoretically, the CGD Index could range from 
zero (0) to one hundred (100) percent. A bank that reports 
all 123 items will score 100 percent.
As indicated in Table 1, RHB Islamic Bank Berhad had the 
highest score at 68.29%, while Standard Chartered Saadiq 
Berhad and OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad had the lowest at 
42.28% in 2009. The highest score for foreign owned IFIs 
was Asian Finance Bank Berhad at 57.72%. Interestingly, it 
is the foreign owned IFIs that had the lowest CG score. The 
average score for all IFIs was 51.42%, which is just above 
the half way mark. Additionally, the results revealed that 
of the 16 IFIs, 10 (62.5%) had an index of more than 50%. 
Following Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006), it has been 
argued that IFIs having an index of more than 50% can be 
considered as “good disclosers.” Thus, one may conclude 
that overall IFIs in Malaysia may be regarded as “good” 
Table 1. CG disclosure quality of each IFI (N = 16).
No. Names of IFIs Total score
Disclosure as % of 
maximum possible  
score Overall rank
Local owned banks
 1 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  53  43.09 12
 2 Alliances Islamic Bank Berhad  76  61.79  2
 3 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad  62  50.41  8
 4 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad  66  53.66  6
 5 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad  69  56.10  4
 6 EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad  54  43.90 10
 7 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad  66  53.66  6
 8 Maybank Islamic Bank Berhad  57  46.34  9
 9 Public Islamic Bank Berhad  66  53.66  6
10 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad  84  68.29  1
Total 653 530.90
Average score (N=10)  65.3  53.09
Foreign owned banks
11 Al Rajhi banking & Investment  
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
 63  51.22  7
12 Asian Finance Bank Berhad  71  57.72  3
13 HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad  67  54.47  5
14 Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad  54  43.90 11
15 OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad  52  42.28 13
16 Standard Chartered SaadiqBerhad  52  42.28 13
Total 359 291.87
Average score (N=6)  59.83  48.65
Grand total 1012 822.77
Average Score (N=16)  63.25  51.42
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disclosers of CG information. Further, it can be observed that 
the mean score recorded by locally owned IFIs at 53.09% 
is slightly higher than foreign-owned IFIs (48.65%). This 
evidence seems inconsistent with the expectation in the 
hypothesis (H2) that CG quality is better in foreign owned 
IFIs.
We then examined the extent IFIs are reporting on each CG 
dimension (D1 to D14). A comparison between local and 
foreign owned IFIs was also undertaken. Table 2 presents 
the results of the overall mean scores for each dimension 
partitioned by ownership classification of IFIs (i.e., whether 
local or foreign owned). The rankings for the overall mean 
scores are given to illustrate the relative importance of 
CG disclosure practices of IFIs. Additionally, a bar chart 
is included in the appendix for ease of reference on the 
overall rankings.
As can be observed, the overall results of the CG disclosure 
analysed by dimensions indicate that the most frequently 
reported elements are on the risk management committee 
(Dimension 4) followed closely by information on the 
nominating committee (Dimension 2). Interestingly, 
information on risk management had a score of only 54.86; 
a score that is way below that of the risk management 
committee. This appears to indicate that while IFIs do 
have risk management committees, they are not willing 
to provide as much information on their risk management 
procedures. Alternatively, this may signal a lack of proper 
risk management procedures in place. Thus, it may be 
interpreted that a well-established risk management 
committee does not necessarily lead to an enhanced 
disclosure on risk management issues or the presence 
of proper risk management procedures. The scores for 
Dimension 8a (internal audit and control; mean score of 
33.33) and Dimension 14 (Shariah compliance; mean score 
of 28.12) were also considerably low. The least disclosed 
dimension was information pertaining to customers/
investment account holders (mean score of 2.68). However, 
what is most alarming is the total absence of information 
on the governance committee (Dimension 13).
A Mann-Whitney U test was then undertaken to examine 
if there exists any significant difference in the disclosure 
scores between local and foreign owned IFIs on each 
dimension. The only significant differences detected (at a 
10% level of significance) were for D11 (Non-adherence 
to guidelines), D6 (Shariah committee) and D14 (Shariah 
compliance). For both D11 and D14, it is the foreign banks 
that were disclosing more. Accordingly, the hypothesis that 
foreign owned IFIs have better quality CG disclosure may 
be partially supported. On issues pertaining to the Shariah 
committee, however, it is the local IFIs that were disclosing 
more.
The literature advocating CG disclosures in IFIs emphasizes 
the necessity of reporting specific governance information 
unique to their nature such as the internal Shariah review 
and bases for profit allocation between owner equity and 
IAHs (Hameed and Sigit, 2005). In line with this, we 
Table 2. CG Disclosure of IFIs Partitioned intoGCGi and SCGi.
Dimensions
No. of  
sub-items
Overall  
mean  
(N = 16)
Overall  
mean  
rank
Local owned  
IFIs mean  
(N = 10) Sig.
Foreign owned 
IFIs mean 
(N = 6)
GCGi
D1: Board structure and functioning  24 66.67  4 69.58 0.172 61.81
D2: Nominating committee   8 81.25  2 82.50 0.262 79.17
D3: Remuneration committee   8 69.53  3 85.00 0.106 43.75
D4: Risk management committee   8 85.16  1 87.50 0.415 81.25
D5: Audit committee/audit and  
governance committee
 12 62.50  7 60.83 0.695 65.28
D7: Risk management   9 54.86  9 53.33 0.861 57.41
D8a: Internal audit and control   6 33.33 10 33.33 1.00 33.33
D9: Related parties transactions   2 65.63  5 70.00 0.628 58.33
D10: Management reports   2 62.50  6 55.00 0.182 75.00
D11: Non-adherence to guidelines   2  9.38 13 0.00 0.059* 25.00
Overall for GCGi  81 60.95 60.10 0.355 60.37
SCGi
D6: Shariah committee/SSB  16 59.38  8 63.13 0.086* 53.13
D8b: Internal audit and control   2  9.38 12 15.00 0.150 0.00
D12: Customers/investment  
account holders
 14  2.63 14  2.10 0.439  3.50
D13: Governance committee   6  0.00 15 0.00 - 0.00
D14: Shariahcompliance   4 28.13 11 22.50 0.059* 37.50
Overall for SCGi  42 26.37 27.07 0.151 25.20
Overall for CGDs index 123 51.42 53.09 0.301 48.64
(*) A significant difference at the 10 percent level (2-tailed).
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examined the difference between SCGi and GCGi for all 
IFIs on an overall basis (i.e. all IFIs). Subsequently, the 
analysis for local and foreign owned IFIs were undertaken 
separately. Finally, we examined each individual IFI. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Overall, it can be observed that IFIs in Malaysia were 
focusing more on general governance information 
(60.95%) as compared to specific CG information (26.37%). 
Overall, the percentage score for GCGi was higher 
(63.95%) as compared to the score for SCGi (26.37%) 
This seems to indicate that less emphasis is being placed by 
IFIs on matters related to its specificity (to demonstrate its 
uniqueness). To examine if the focus on SCGi and GCGi was 
statistically significant, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was 
undertaken. The results indicate a significant difference 
between disclosure on SCGi and GCGi. Similar results were 
obtained when local and foreign IFIs were examined. On 
the basis of this, we may conclude that HI is not supported. 
Accordingly, one may conclude that IFIs in Malaysia appear 
to disclose CG information of a more generic nature. 
Further, the percentage of specific-governance information 
(SCGi) met by IFIs ranged from 19.51% for Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad and EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad to 
34.15% for Maybank Islamic Bank Berhad and RHB Islamic 
Bank Berhad. Thus, one may conclude that CG disclosure 
of SCGi is still at a nascent stage amongst IFIs in Malaysia. 
On the other hand, the percentage for GCGi lies within a 
range from 50% (Affin Islamic Bank Berhad) to 85.37% 
(RHB Islamic Bank Berhad).
6. Conclusion
Over the past decade, CG of IFIs has moved to become 
main stream and is increasingly prevalent in both 
academic debates, and, more generally, the international 
business media and conference circuit. IFIs pursue two 
primary objectives: sound financial performance and 
ethical operations that align with the Shariah. More 
importantly, IFIs exist to serve the needs of the ummah. 
The unique aspect of IFIs emanates from its fundamental 
principle to conduct and operate in accordance with the 
Islamic Shariah, the primary issue being the prohibition of 
riba (interest). Given this, IFIs emphasize the PLS system. 
In such a system, transparency issues become pertinent 
as investment depositors would be exposed to the risk of 
Table 3. The CG Disclosure Score of each IFI Partitioned by GCGi and SCGi.
No. Names of IFIs
GCGi  
(Max. 81  
items)
Disclosure as % 
 of maximum  
possible score
SCGi  
(Max. 42  
items)
Disclosure as %  
of maximum  
possible score Sig.
Local owned banks
 1 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 41   50.00  12  29.27
 2 Alliances Islamic Bank Berhad 65   79.27  11  26.83
 3 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 54   65.85   8  19.51
 4 Bank Muamalat Malaysia  
Berhad
54   65.85  12  29.27
 5 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 58   70.73  11  26.83
 6 EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad 46   56.10   8  19.51
 7 Hong Leong Islamic Bank  
Berhad
57   69.51   9  21.95
 8 Maybank Islamic Bank Berhad 43   52.44  14  34.15
 9 Public Islamic Bank Berhad 54   65.85  12  29.27
10 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 70   85.37  14  34.15
Overall mean (N=10)   68.10  27.07 0.005***
Foreign owned banks
11 Al Rajhi banking & Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
53   64.63  10  24.39
12 Asian Finance Bank Berhad 59   71.95  12  29.27
13 HSBC Amanah Malaysia  
Berhad
55   67.07  12  29.27
14 Kuwait Finance House  
(Malaysia) Berhad
45   54.88   9  21.95
15 OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 43   52.44   9  21.95
16 Standard Chartered  
Saadiq Berhad
42   51.22  10  24.39
Overall mean (N=6)   60.37  25.20 0.028**
Total 839 1023.17 173 421.95
Average Score (N=16) 52.44   63.95  10.81  26.37 0.000***
(***) A significant difference at the 1 percent level (2-tailed). 
(**) A significant difference at the 5 percent level (2-tailed).
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loss. This constitutes a core issue of IFIs to manage the 
exposed risks that primarily arise because of the absence 
of protection for investment depositors (Erricco and 
Farahbaksh, 1998). Accordingly, CG in IFIs is of utmost 
importance. Indeed the fundamental issue addressed in 
this research is the extent that IFIs in Malaysia provide CG 
information in their annual reports. For the overall basis, 
the mean score achieved by IFIs was recorded at 51.42 
percent. Based on the benchmark rule set by Mohd Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006), the CG information disclosure in IFIs 
in Malaysia can be considered as “good.” Additionally, the 
minimum disclosure score was 42.28 percent (Standard 
Chartered Saadiq Berhad and OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad) 
and the maximum disclosure score was 68.29 percent 
(RHB Islamic Bank Berhad). A possible explanation for 
such low scores can be attributable to the fact that all three 
guidelines were only issued quite recently. Thus, it may 
take time before IFIs actually comply with the guidelines.
Summing up, even if the intrinsic objectives that 
characterise  the “best practices” governance are not 
perfectly  attained yet, CG orientation in IFIs seems to 
converge on a pool of ethical and socially responsible 
issues that are wider than that in one generic industry. 
This can be traced back to the fourteen dimensions 
covered in the annual reports of IFIs. As may be recalled, 
D1 (board structure and functioning), D2 (nominating 
committee), D3 (remuneration committee), D4 (risk 
management committee), D5 (audit committee or Audit 
and governance committee), D7 (risk management), 
D8 (internal audit and control; (a) general-governance 
information and (b) specific-governance information), D9 
(related parties transaction), D10 (management report), 
and D11(non-adherence to guidelines) were oriented 
towards the achievement of operational efficiency to 
lead to an achievement in economic objectives, while D6 
(Shariah committee or Shariah supervisory board), D12 
(customers/investment account holders), D13 (governance 
committee), and D14 (Shariah compliance) extended the 
orientation towards the realization of ethical and socially 
corporate values through the application of partnership-
based business principles.
For the overall CG disclosure of IFIs for year 2009, 
eight dimensions are dominant, which, in order, are 
Dimension  4  (risk management committee), Dimension 
2 (nominating committee), Dimension 3 (remuneration 
committee), Dimension 1 (board structure and functioning), 
Dimension  9 (related parties transactions), Dimension  5 
(audit  committee/Audit and governance committee) and 
Dimension 10 (management reports) and Dimension 6 
(Shariah committee/Shariah supervisory board). The analysis 
goes on to test the first hypothesis concerning whether IFIs 
were actually disclosing more SCGi (i.e., D6, D8b, D12, D13 
and D14). The expected strategy of CG structure in IFIs was 
that they must give due consideration to specific kinds of 
governance dimensions, which come together to compose 
the ‘best practice’ CG in the institution. The results, however, 
reveal that the formulated hypothesis was not  supported. 
IFIs in Malaysia generally disclose more GCGi.
The considerations above allow this study to conclude 
that at the time this study was undertaken, IFIs tend to 
converge on general-governance related information–more 
related to information pertaining to risk management 
committee (RMC) and nominating committee (NC). It can 
be interpreted that the major concern for IFIs is handling 
various risks and hiring persons with the credentials to lead 
the institutions. Of less concern to IFIs is the disclosure of 
general-governance information pertaining to the non-
adherence to guidelines (9.38 percent) and information 
pertaining to the specific kind of governance information, 
such as the information relating to Shariah compliance 
(28.13 percent), the specific part of internal audit and 
control (9.38 percent), and customers/ IAHs (2.63 percent). 
While information on governance committee was not a 
concern for any of the IFIs, other information, (in order of 
preference) on remuneration committee, board structure 
and functioning, related parties transactions, audit 
committee/AGC, management reports, Shariah committee/ 
SSB and risk management were satisfactorily disclosed 
by IFIs (scores more than the 50 per cent threshold). The 
provision of information on the general part of internal 
audit and control and Shariah compliance was minimal.
The analysis shows that IFIs seem to be in agreement about 
what structure should be set in the institution. The lack of 
SCGi disclosure may be attributable to deficiencies in the 
prevalent CG reporting framework and to the attitudes 
of IFIs management concerning the perceived costs and 
benefits of CG disclosure. Nevertheless, the presence of such 
information (however minimal) in the annual reports of the 
IFIs is an indication of a growing awareness of the importance 
of this type of governance information. The limited supply 
of specific-governance information in the annual report of 
IFIs may possibly indicate that this kind of information is 
uncommon in annual reports but could be disclosed through 
other means (i.e., websites, pamphlets, etc.).
The results, however, should be interpreted in light 
of certain limitations. First, the small number of IFIs 
considered in this study is a limitation in itself. Future 
studies should, therefore, attempt to include IFIs in other 
countries. Second is the use of cross sectional data that 
merely examined evidence on patterns at a particular 
moment as opposed to observing the changing levels 
of compliance over time (thus ignoring the trend of 
CG disclosure over time). Accordingly, a longitudinal 
study in the future may address this. Third, each item 
in the CG index in this study is assumed to have equal 
importance. However, this may not be necessarily so. 
Thus, the application of a weighted approach for the 
items in the CGD index would greatly improve the index. 
Fourth, the focus on just the 3 Guidelines; BNM/ GP1-i 
(2007), IFSB-3 (2006) and GSIFI (2008) in developing 
the CGD index is another limitation of the study. Future 
studies may want to include recommendations from 
other sources such as the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) and Listing requirements of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). Finally, the use of 
content analysis raises a methodological limitation to the 
analysis. However, according to (Florou and Galarniotis, 
2007), content analysis of annual reports and web pages 
are expected to produce less subjective governance ratings 
as compared to self-completed questionnaires.
The study provides insights into the CG quality in both 
locally owned and foreign owned IFIs in Malaysia. In 
both instances, there is no requirement for an IFI to adopt 
suggested governance guidelines and yet this study found 
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some evidence that they do so voluntarily. In addition, the 
overall qualities to which voluntary governance guidelines 
are implemented are considerably satisfactory as they met 
more than half of the items in the CGD index developed. 
Nascent development is also detected on the existence of the 
disclosure on the specific-governance related information.
The challenge before IFIs today is to improve all crucial 
aspects of CG that are unique to them as in the specific 
CG information that have suggested in this study. More 
specifically, IFIs should focus on information pertaining to 
the Shariah committee/SSB, specific matters on internal 
audit and control, customers/investment account holders, 
detailed information on governance committees and Shariah 
compliance aspects. Various banking crises over time have 
dramatically illustrated the catastrophic consequences 
flowing from the poor corporate governance of banks (Yunis, 
2007). To provide a cushion against these flaws, there is a 
need to have a rigorous re-evaluation of CG principles of 
IFIs. This is important as CG may be regarded as a key factor 
in understanding the institution and its management. Good 
CG is pertinent as this will enhance investor confidence in 
the decision taken by the managers and board of directors of 
the institution (Gandia, 2008) – moreso in the case of IFIs.
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Abstract - Corporate social activities have become major subjects because of their effects on the 
quality of life of citizens, in particular, and on society at large. Currently, there is an increased 
awareness of social responsibility due to the challenges faced by financial institutions (particularly 
Islamic banking) globally. This paper examines the influence of characteristics of the board of 
directors, that is, board size, board composition, and the separation of the roles of chief executive 
officer (CEO) and chairman, on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. After controlling 
bank size, financial performance and the relevant public, the research focuses on 53 annual 
reports of Islamic banks of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Based on the framework 
of legitimacy theory, the findings show that CSR disclosure has a negative and insignificant 
relationship with board composition. By contrast, the study found a positive association, although 
insignificant, between CSR disclosure and other characteristics of the board of directors (board size 
and separation of the roles of CEO and chairman). With regards to the controlled variables, the 
study indicates that bank size and financial performance have a positive and significant influence 
on CSR disclosure, while the relevant public has no effect. Therefore, the results indicate that the 
corporate governance structure of a board of directors within Islamic banks of the GCC region does 
not play a major role in CSR disclosure, largely due to family control. These findings suggest a need 
to improve best practice of corporate governance for Islamic financial institutions by imposing 
additional constraints on the board of directors’ characteristics. The importance of this evidence is 
that both policy makers and investors will be more aware and will understand better the role of the 
board of directors in relation to CSR disclosure.
Keywords: corporate governance, board of directors’ characteristics, Islamic banks, GCC countries, 
bank performance, legitimacy theory
1. Introduction
Corporate governance has become a vital subject during the 
past twenty years (Chapra and Ahmed 2002). This is because 
of the recent high incidence of corporate collapses, such as 
Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance, and Global Crossing, 
together with the increased global awareness of the need 
for sound corporate governance based on stakeholder 
accountability and financial transparency (McLaren 2004).
Recently, Islamic financial institutions have experienced 
collapses similar to those of conventional banks, such as 
the failure in 2001 of Ihlas Finance House (IFH) in Turkey, 
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this being the most famous case for Islamic financial 
institutions. This collapse happened because of the weak 
corporate governance being practiced (Dusuki 2006). 
According to Grais and Pellegrini (2006a), there are many 
reasons behind the failure of IFH, including collusion of 
the board of directors with the management, audit failure, 
and excessive risk taking by management.
Most studies previously have examined the impact of the 
corporate governance mechanisms, including the board of 
directors, on voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; 
Li et al. 2008; Haufang and Jainguo 2007; Zeghal et al. 2007; 
Barako et al. 2006; Gul and Leung 2004; Eng and Mak 2003; 
Ho and Wong 2001). Other studies have investigated the 
association between the board of directors’ structure and 
CSR disclosure in non-financial industries (Abdur Rouf 2011; 
Said et  al. 2009; Rashid and Lodh 2008; Buniamin et  al. 
2008; Haniffan and Cooke 2005). However, few studies have 
examined the influence of the board of directors’ attributes 
on CSR disclosure in the financial sector (Barako and Brown 
2008; Khan 2010). No serious attempt has yet been made to 
study the influence of the structure of the board of directors 
on CSR disclosure within the Islamic banking industry. 
Islamic banks claim to follow Shariah principles and rules in 
their activities, which influence the welfare of community. 
This study contributes in four ways to current knowledge of 
the determinants of CSR disclosure based on the board of 
directors’ structure in the unique sector of Islamic banking:
1. It addresses the question of whether the lack of 
association between board size and CSR disclosure, as 
observed in many other industries, is apparent within 
the context of Islamic banking.
2. The question of whether having a greater proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board is positively 
related to CSR disclosure, as found in previous studies, 
is explored.
3. There is an empirical examination of whether separation 
of the roles of CEO and chairman has the same impact 
on CSR disclosure among Islamic banks as is apparent 
from the current literature.
4. The results of the study may prove useful to regulators 
for evaluating current corporate governance standards, 
in terms of whether these requirements are sufficient for 
users of CSR information, such as investors, when making 
investment decisions. More important, the findings 
have policy implications for corporate governance 
mechanisms, which suggest that separation of the roles 
of CEO and chairman has no effect on CSR disclosure.
2. Islamic banks in GCC countries
The GCC comprises six oil-producing countries located 
in the Middle East: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. The 
total population of GCC countries is around 42  million 
people. Currently, one of the most important strategies for 
achieving rapid economic growing in Islamic countries, 
such as those of the GCC, involves the banking sector. The 
banking industry in GCC countries is primarily owned by 
nationals due to the restrictions on foreign ownership. For 
instance, foreigners in Qatar are not allowed to possess 
more than a 49 percent share, whereas in Oman, the figure 
is only 35 percent ownership (Alkassim 2005).
Today, there are more than 300 Islamic financial institutions 
operating in 75 countries throughout the world, with the 
annual rate of 12–15 percent. The total assets of Islamic banks 
increased from US$822  billion in 2009 to US$1.3  trillion 
in 2010 (New Horizon-Islamic Banking 2010), and are 
expected to reach US$3 trillion by 2016 (Eurasia Review 
2011). The greatest proportion of these financial institutions 
is found in the GCC countries, as the Gulf region is the main 
source of financing for Islamic banking transactions. At the 
end of 2007, more than 40 percent (US$262.6 billion) of the 
total Shariah-compliant financial assets (US$640  billion) 
was invested in GCC countries (Wilson 2009). The strength 
of the banking industry in GCC countries is based on large 
profits and assets (see Table 1); the profitable banking sector 
supports stability in the financial system and, consequently, 
a stable local economy (Zeitun 2011).
Islamic banking provides a large range of services and 
products that are in conformity with Shariah principles 
and rules. The main principle of Islamic financing is profit-
loss sharing. There are a number of principles that make 
Table 1. Leading Islamic banks by asset values (US million).
Islamic ranking  
2010 Institution Country Assets Profits
22 Emirates Islamic Bank UAE 6.886 35.5
23 Masraf Al Rayan Qatar 6.627 242.0
27 Dubi Bank UAE 4.737 -79.1
28 Investment Dar Co. Kuwait 4.697 469.2
29 Bank AlBilad Saudi Arabia 4.643 -66.2
30 Alima Bank Saudi Arabia 4.615 161.4
31 Noor Islamic Bank UAE 4.591 -302.5
33 Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 4.547 140.5
34 Arcapita Bank Bahrain 4.372 -87.9
35 Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 4.350 70.8
37 Amlak Finance PJSC UAE 4.315 54.4
39 Kuwait International Bank Kuwait 3.976 -28.6
Source: Asian Banker Research.
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Islamic banks different from conventional banks (Zeitun 
2011; Chong and Liu 2008; Olson and Zoubi 2008):
• The most important principle of Islamic banking is 
the prohibition on interest (riba).
• Investments must be in non-prohibited activities.
• All operations must be free from uncertainty (gharar) 
and gambling (maiser).
• Zakah must be paid by an Islamic bank or shareholders 
to eight kinds of people as mentioned in the Quran.
• All transactions of Islamic banks must be consistent 
with Shariah principles and rules.
For financial operations to be Shariah-compliant, there 
must be a reliable affirmation mechanism. Islamic banks in 
GCC countries took steps to establish boards of specialists 
in Islamic Commercial jurisprudence (figh al-muamalat) in 
order to give advice on the financial services and products 
provided. Each Islamic financial institution has its own 
Shariah board that provides approval for new kinds of 
finance services. Indeed, particularly in GCC countries, the 
Shariah compliance system develops the markets by offering 
various products and expanded customer alternatives.
3. Corporate governance in Islamic banks
Corporate governance is defined as a “set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders” (Chapra and Ahmed 2002), and 
aims to achieve justice to all stakeholders by increasing 
transparency and accountability. It also aims to monitor 
and control management in order to maximize company 
value. The main components of corporate governance 
include investors’ relations, as well as relationships between 
stakeholders, including employees, clients, and customers.
From the Islamic perspective, the framework of corporate 
governance is quite distinctive under Islamic banks because 
they must follow a unique set of principles based on the 
Holy Quran and the Sunnah.
According to Bhatti and Bhatti (2009), scholars of Shariah 
stated that the concepts of Islamic corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) were quite 
similar. The fundamental objective of Islamic financial 
institutions, such as banks, is compliance with Shariah 
principles, which contain principles of social justice and 
accountability (Farook and Lanis 2005). In the context 
of Islam, the ethical objectives of the community must 
be integrated with the objectives and policies of Islamic 
banks. Accordingly, Hassan and Abdul Latiff (2009) 
asserted that the CSR is a primary condition of Islamic 
banking transactions. Actually, the CSR is involved in the 
Corporate Governance standard of AAOIFI (Governance 
Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 7: 
Corporate Social Responsibility Conduct and Disclosure 
for Islamic Financial Institutions). The Shariah rulings 
and the principles of Islamic economy and finance must 
be set to determine a suitable structure of corporate 
governance for Islamic banks. Zakah, prohibition of 
riba, prevention of gharar, prohibition of hoarding, and 
the sharing of profit and loss are the major principles 
of Islamic economics. All these principles influence the 
corporate governance structure of Islamic banks. The 
Islamic corporate governance structure is derived from 
the structure of conventional corporate governance, but 
based on the ethical codes of Shariah.
The model of corporate governance for Islamic banks is 
supposed to be grounded on the principle of property rights 
in Islam; the system that is set must comply with Shariah 
rulings and the protection of the rights of stakeholders, 
who consist of shareholders, investors, creditors, employees 
and wider society as well (Bhatti and Bhatti 2009; Hasan 
2008). According to Grais and Pellegrini (2006a), the 
unique attributes of Islamic banks must be clarified in 
order to produce a regulative structure that supports the 
development of their corporate governance.
In the last two decades, Islamic banks have experienced 
collapses similar to those of the conventional banking 
sector, because of the weak corporate governance being 
practiced within these financial institutions. According 
to Grais and Pellegrini (2006b), the reasons behind these 
failures are the collusion of the board of directors with 
the top management, the collapse of audit, and extreme 
risk-taking by management. The best examples of the 
collapses of Islamic financial institutions are the failure of 
Ihlas Finance House of Turkey in 2001 (Dusuki 2006) and, 
in 2003, the Patni Cooperative Society of Surat of Indian 
(Grais and Pellegrini 2006b).
In the light of these scandals, organizations have taken 
steps to strengthen their corporate governance, not only by 
making the board of directors more independent, but also 
by enhancing the firm’s transparency through the adoption 
higher disclosure standards (Hauswald and Marquez 2006).
Strong corporate governance of a bank is a crucial component 
for the improvement of the Islamic finance industry; 
international corporate governance standards that are 
compliant with the Shariah can be accepted and applied.
The Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance in 
Islamic Financial institutions (Chapra and Ahmed 2002), 
Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions 
Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (IFSB 2006), and 
the standards of AAOIFI have set up corporate governance 
devices to improve transparency and accountability. 
Corporate governance comprises a number of practices 
including a requirement regarding the size of the board, an 
independent directors’ board, the separation of CEO and 
chairman, and the independence of the chairman.
As for many other developing economies including 
Taiwan (Yeh et  al. 2001), Thailand (Wiwattanakantang 
2002), Turkey (Ararat and Ugur 2003), and South Korea 
(Joh 2003), banks in GCC countries are in many cases 
family-owned, with family members directly involved in 
management (Arouri et al. 2011).
Briefly, positive corporate governance is much more 
than a desirable concept. It supports the construction 
of capital, reduces capital costs, develops the climate of 
investment, and assists to create good markets. Therefore, 
the participants in the market with an vested interest in 
the improvement of sustainable national capital markets 
can also play an important role in elevating governance 
standards by setting the expectations of the market for 
what is preferable corporate behaviour.
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4. Islamic social reporting in Islamic banks
The first and the major objective of reporting by Islamic 
financial institutions is to show that the transactions of 
banks are in compliance with Shariah principles and 
rules (Haniffa 2002; Baydoun and Willet 1997). Although 
considered to be the primary objective in the Western model, 
assessing the decision-makers in their making of economic 
decisions is a secondary goal for business organizations 
from the Islamic viewpoint (Maali et  al. 2006; Mukhazir 
et  al. 2006). For Islamic banks and financial institutions 
that have set by the AAOIFI, this main objective is included 
in the objectives of financial statement. Consequently, 
financial corporate reporting emphasizes the principles of 
full disclosure and accountability in meeting the needs of 
the society. The meaning of full disclosure is that Islamic 
banks should provide all necessary information to the 
society related to their transactions (Maali et  al. 2006). 
Based on this concept, the community (ummah) has the 
right to know the influence of the banks’ operations on the 
welfare of society, and to ensure that they are in compliance 
with the requirements of Shariah.
The truth is a very important issue in the Islamic context, 
and it must be disclosed as a duty for both businesses 
and individuals (Maali et  al. 2006); Islam forbids the 
withholding of truth (Askary and Clarke 1997). The Quran 
emphasizes this duty in the following verse: “and cover not 
the truth with falsehood, nor conceal the truth when you 
know” (2:42). Six verses in the Quran refer to one meaning 
related to disclosure of all facts (Askary and Clarke 1997). 
As accountability to Allah includes an accountability to the 
community, the duty to disclose is owed primarily to Allah, 
as well as to society (Maali et al. 2006; Al-Mograbi 1996). 
The implication of this position for Islamic banks is that 
disclosure of the truth is intended to be in the public interest 
as the banks will know the influence of their transactions 
on the welfare of community. One of the primary objectives 
of Islamic banks is to eradicate poverty through generating 
jobs, and encouraging charitable activities that lead to help 
for the poor and needy. In the Quran Allah says: “of their 
goods take alms that so thou mightest purify and sanctify 
them” (9: 103). Furthermore, they are required to pay zakah 
as a religious obligation. Accordingly, Muslim investors need 
information related to spiritual, ethical, and other religious 
requirements, such as prohibition of riba (interest), payment 
of zakah, and the certification that banks do not engage in 
haram (unlawful) transactions (Mukhazir et al. 2006).
Maali et  al. (2006) stated the three main objectives of 
Islamic social reporting:
1. Show compliance with Shariah principles through 
contracting fairly with various parties inside and 
outside business organizations, such as employees, 
shareholders, and government.
2. Clarify the influence the activities of Islamic businesses 
on the welfare of society.
3. Enable Muslims to perform their religious obligations 
easily.
In the context of Islamic reporting, it is expected that social 
issues would be a significant component of disclosure in the 
annual reports. Consequently, as suggested by prior studies, 
business organizations in Islam must be more transparent in 
their disclosure practices related to social activities, which 
affect the welfare of community (Cho and Patten 2007; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Hamid 2004; Patten 1992). This 
would lead to achievement of the main objectives of Islamic 
social reporting, that is, social accountability and full 
disclosure (Othman et al. 2009; Baydoun and Willet 2000).
5. Theoretical framework
Legitimacy theory acts as the tool to build, maintain 
and legitimize economic and political regulations, 
organizations, and ideological groups, which add to the 
benefits of the company. According to Guthrie and Parker 
(1990), disclosures have the capability to transfer the 
social, political and economic meanings for a pluralistic 
set of people or groups receiving the report. Legitimacy 
theory has become one of the major theories quoted in the 
area of social and environmental accounting (Campbell 
et al. 2003; Deegan 2002). According to legitimacy theory, 
a corporation discloses CSR information in order to 
establish or sustain its legitimacy by obtaining community 
acceptability of its actions (Deegan 2002). In other words, 
based on legitimacy theory, the extent of a company’s CSR 
disclosure is a response to the pressures by the public. In 
fact, the majority of recent studies on CSR utilize legitimacy 
theory (Brown and Deegan 1998; Deegan and Rankin 
1997; Patten 1992; Guthrie and Parker 1990), which 
explains disclosures with regard to the environmental and 
social behaviour of organizations (Campbell et  al. 2003; 
Hooghiemstra 2000). Furthermore, Gray et  al. (1995) 
argued that legitimacy theory has an advantage over other 
theories in providing disclosing strategies. According to 
Ullman (1985), while stakeholder theory states that the 
company and management work in conformity with the 
needs and pressure of its different stakeholder interests, 
legitimacy theory concentrates on the firm’s transactions 
with the community as a whole. Finally, in the context of 
legitimacy theory, social and environmental disclosure is a 
way to legitimize a firm’s continued existence or operations 
in the society (Hooghiemstra 2000; Gray et al. 1995).
In the literature of social and environmental accounting, 
a number of researchers agree that CSR disclosure can be 
used by companies to mitigate the legitimacy threat and to 
decrease the legitimacy gap (see, for example, Chen et  al. 
2008; Deegan et al. 2002; Deegan et al. 2000). Consequently, 
legitimacy theory suggests that the top management of 
organizations is responsible for meeting the legitimacy gap, 
practising the necessary social activities, and making provision 
for the different groups of stakeholders, this including 
accountability. Therefore, the corporate governance structure 
of the board of directors (board size, board composition, and 
the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman) is expected 
to play an important function in decreasing the legitimacy 
gap by expanding the disclosures of CSR.
6. Relevant studies and development 
of hypotheses
Board size
Empirical evidence in corporate governance suggests that 
the board size impacts the level of control, monitoring, and 
disclosure (Akhatruddin et al. 2009; Chaganti et al. 1985). 
The benefit of larger boards is an increase in the company 
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value, because they provide a firm with specialist members 
from different fields of expertise. In addition, boards with 
more members have the capability of better monitoring 
and, therefore, have the ability to practice their function 
effectively with respect to governance and disclosure. The 
most important advantage of a greater number of members 
is that they have a greater capacity to solve problems. 
Despite these benefits of larger boards, the size may have 
a negative impact on decision-making and the costs of 
this could outweigh the advantages (Lipton and Lorsh 
1992). An increase the number of board members leads to 
problems in co-ordination (Jensen 1993), and makes them 
less effective in monitoring top managers (Yermack 1996).
In the context of Islamic banks, while there is no limitation in 
terms of the number of members of a board of directors, the 
perfect number comprises between five to seven members 
(Florackis and Ozkan 2008; Jensen and Ruback 1983). 
Common the number of members of a board of directors in 
an Islamic bank is seven or more, which is consistent with the 
best practice of corporate governance (Hawkamah 2011). 
The greater number of members in a board of directors 
tends to be more effective in monitoring, and makes better 
collective decisions, according to resource dependency 
theory. The larger number of directors will further control 
and supervise the banks’ transactions to make sure of 
conformity with Shariah principles. This type of board 
could provide more transparency, moral behaviour, respect 
for stakeholder groups, and maximize CSR disclosure. 
According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), a larger board size 
may decrease the possibility of information asymmetry. 
Moreover, the greater number of board members may also 
reduce uncertainty and the lack of information (Birnbaum 
1984). The members of a board of directors should ideally 
be knowledgeable in Islamic law and economics rather than 
being specialized in business and accounting practice (fiqh 
almuamalat) (AAOIFI 2005). The combination of Shariah 
and financial experience among the members of a board of 
directors brings varied resources of information, skills, and 
legitimacy (Hillman et al. 2000).
Board size can add to the differences of viewpoints, offering 
greater choices for solutions and more decision criteria, so 
achieving the goals of the board and objectives concerning 
investors’ behaviour (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; 
Schweiger et al. 1986). In the context of Islamic banks, it is 
expected that the board size will not affect CSR disclosure. 
This is, in fact, due to the teachings of Shariah that Muslim 
individuals and business organizations are responsible for 
performing their actions in the best way. So, there should 
be no differences in the disclosure level between banks that 
have a small or a large board size.
This leads to our first hypothesis, that, based the Islamic 
viewpoint, board size has no impact on CSR disclosure 
(hypothesis 1).
Composition of board
The independent board of directors is considered to be 
the main corporate governance structure. It is expected 
that directors’ independence can strengthen the board 
by monitoring management behaviour, and protecting 
investors’ interests (Petra 2005), as well as reducing agency 
cost (Choe and Lee 2003). Because of the importance of the 
function of the non-executive members of the board, UK 
firms tend to increase the number of independent directors 
(Higgs 2003; Hampel 1998). The possible reasons for this 
are that external board’ members have good skills and 
experience (Kor and Misangyi 2008); they are informed 
and more effective at monitoring (Linck et al. 2008); and, 
they are willing to confront undesirable CEO decisions 
(Rachdi and Ben-Ameur 2011).
The main role of the board of directors is advising and 
counseling top management, in addition to monitoring 
its activities (Anderson et  al. 2004). From an Islamic 
perspective, the members of the board of directors must 
have the reputation of moral integrity and be technically 
qualified for the banking business in order to play their 
role effectively. They must also have additional abilities to 
enable them to understand and be aware of the principles 
and rules of Shariah, and the Islamic teachings related to 
business and finance.
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) asserted that corporate social 
disclosure practices can be viewed as a policy that is 
intended to close the legitimacy gap perceived between 
management and shareholders through the non-executive 
directors. In addition, non-executive directors are likely to 
respond to concerns about the reputation and obligations, 
and would generally be more interested in satisfying the 
social responsibilities of a company (Zahra and Stanton 
1988) that may support their status and reputation in the 
community. Therefore, non-executive directors may be 
able to put pressure on firms to provide CSR information in 
their annual reports.
Furthermore, it can be derived from these arguments that 
a greater percentage of independent directors on the board 
will lead to greater CSR disclosure by Islamic banks, so 
increasing transparency, since the independent directors 
will be able to motivate the management to provide 
more social disclosure. Many studies indicate that board 
composition, as measured by the proportion of independent 
directors on the board, has a significant impact on CSR 
disclosure, which is in line with the theoretical expectation 
(see, for example, Htay et al. 2012; Khan et al. 2012; Jo and 
Harjoro 2011).
Our second hypothesis is that board composition has 
positive influence on CSR disclosure (hypothesis 2).
Separation of roles of CEO and Chairman
Another aspect to examine in relation to the independence 
of the board is the “dominant personality” phenomenon 
(Chapra and Ahmed 2002; Ho and Wang 2001; Forker 
1992). The issue refers to role duality, in which the same 
person undertakes both the roles of CEO and chairman. 
Segregation of the two roles gives the necessary checks 
and balances of power and authority on management 
behavior (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Blackburn 1994). 
From an Islamic perspective, there is an obvious separation 
of accountabilities in the top management of an Islamic 
bank through the separation of CEO and chairman, who 
perform two distinct functions. This leads to one of the 
most important constraints on the management of Islamic 
banks, which is that a key decision should not be made by 
one person (Chapra and Ahmed 2002).
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On the other hand, role duality can facilitate the CEO 
managing the functions of the board such as meetings, 
agenda discussion, as well as choosing the board’s 
members (Al-Arussi et al. 2009). Role duality also allows 
the CEO to regulate the company in achieving its goals and 
enhances the leadership in a firm (Dahya et al. 1996). From 
stewardship theory, there is no problem if the two functions 
are combined.
Forker (1992) showed that CEO duality is correlated with a 
lower level of voluntary disclosure, and separating the roles 
of CEO and chairman could help enhance the monitoring of 
quality and improve the disclosure quality. Consistent with 
this result, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Gul and Leung 
(2004) found a negative significant association between 
duality and disclosure. Their findings are also supported by 
Al-Arusi et al. (2009), who found an association between 
the separation of the function of chairman and CEO and 
voluntary financial and environmental disclosure by 
Malaysian firms. On the other hand, Said et al. (2009), Li 
et al. (2008), Barako et al. (2006), Eng and Mak (2003), and 
Ho and Wong (2001) found an insignificant relationship 
between duality and disclosure.
In the context of Islamic banks, role duality is not common, 
but the possible effect on disclosure is considered to be an 
important consideration. This is because numerous firms 
have combined the roles of chairman and CEO on their 
boards, and are working successfully, as well as having the 
capacity to keep the top management in check (Haniffa and 
Cooke 2002; Eisenhardt 1989).
Hence, it could be argued that separation of roles of the 
CEO and chairman has no effect on the CSR information 
disclosed by Islamic banks, particularly since the majority 
of these banks are family owned.
Therefore, our hypothesis is that separation of the roles of 
the CEO and chairman has no influence on CSR disclosure 
(hypothesis 3).
7. Research design
Sample and data gathering
The study used cross-sectional data from the annual reports 
of Islamic banks for the year 2008. The sample includes 
53  banks operating in five GCC countries (see Table  2). 
The fiscal year of 2008 was chosen for this research as most 
of the banks had uploaded their annual reports in their 
websites.
The sample size multivariate regression should preferably 
be one to ten (Roscoe 1975), or five (Coakes 2005; Green 
1991), for each variable tested. The sample size of 53 is 
quite sufficient in light of the effort required for the process 
of data collection.
Specification of the model
The study uses regression analysis to examine the association 
between the structure of the board of directors and the 
disclosure level of CSR. In addition, it tested the assumptions 
of normality and multi-collinearity according to the analyses 
of skewness and kurtosis and the variance inflation factor 
(VIF). The following is the regression equation:
CSRD = a + b1 BOARDSIZE + b2 BCOM + b3 SCEO  
    + b4 BSIZE + b5 BPERFOR + b6 RELPUB + e
where:
CSRD =  corporate social responsibility disclosure 
index
BOARDSIZE = size of board of directors
BCOM =  proportion of non-executive directors to 
total directors on the board
SCEO =  dummy variable, 1 if CEO ≠ chairman, 0 
otherwise
BSIZE = natural logarithm of total employees
BPERFOR =  return on equity (net profit divided by total 
assets)
REVPUB =  percentage of Muslim population to total 
population in a country
The characteristics of the board of directors are the size 
of board of directors (BOARDSIZE), board composition 
(BCOM), and the separation roles of CEO and chairman 
(SCEO). Furthermore, the study employed control variables, 
which have been used widely in previous studies regarding 
social disclosure. This study used control variables consisting 
of bank size (BSIZE), bank performance (BPERFOR), and 
relevant public (REVPUB) that will enhance the association 
between board of directors structures and CSR disclosure.
BOARDSIZE is the number of directors on the board. When 
the board size is large, the board is likely to be more effective 
in terms of monitoring the management and, consequently, 
will provide greater social and environmental information 
(Buniamin et  al. 2008). BCOM is the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board. Non-executive directors, 
who have no executive position in the corporation, may 
have more effect on environmental and social disclosure 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2005), and may be more interested 
in satisfying the company social responsibility (Zahra 
and Stanton 1988). SCEO refers to the separation of roles 
between the CEO and chairman on the board. Distinction 
of the function of CEO from that of chairman is more likely 
to be related to a higher level of CSR disclosure, since 
there may be a lesser degree of CEO discretion, and this 
may enable the CEO to practice more accountably in the 
stakeholders’ interest (Gul and Leung 2004; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2002).
Larger companies are intended to provide more information 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Bigger corporations respond to 
significant awareness from different stakeholder groups 
Table 2. Sample distribution by country.
Country
Number  
of banks
Bahrain 22
Kuwait 17
Qatar 4
Saudi Arabia 4
UAE 6
Total 53
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in the community and, therefore, would be under strong 
public pressure to provide social activities to legitimize 
their businesses. Profitable firms provide more CSR 
disclosures (Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Profitability allows 
management the freedom and flexibility to practice, and to 
give additional information related to social responsibility 
activities to all stakeholders, particularly shareholders. 
Profitable corporations demonstrate their contribution 
to the welfare of the community, and legitimize their 
existence by providing social information. Companies that 
face more pressure from a relevant public (community) 
provide additional CSR information to legitimize their 
activities (Farook et al. 2011; Newson and Deegan 2002). 
This variable is used to control the political and economic 
differences within GCC countries.
Dependent variable—corporate social 
responsibility disclosure
The study employed a content analysis approach in order to 
gather data from the annual reports of Islamic banks. This 
method has been used widely in previous studies of social 
disclosure (Abdul Rahman et  al. 2010; Menassa 2010; 
Guthrie et  al. 2008; Maali et  al. 2006; Gray et  al. 1995; 
Zeghal and Ahmed 1990; Guthrie and Parker 1989).
This research developed a self-constructed disclosure index 
to measure the level of CSR disclosure. The items contained 
in the disclosure index are identified based on the Islamic 
literature review related to CSR disclosure (Haniffa and 
Hudiab 2007; Maali et  al. 2006; Muwazir et  al. 2006). 
Fourteen themes were identified from previous studies: 
vision and mission statement; top management; SSB; 
unlawful transactions; zakah; quard hassan; charitable and 
social activities; employees; late repayments and insolvent 
clients; environment; products and consumer; customers; 
poverty; and, other aspects of community involvement.
The CSR information is gathered from the reading and 
analysis of annual reports from Islamic banks’. Each item 
is coded onto coding sheets related to the theme under 
which the item belongs based on chosen standards. Each 
incidence of an item was coded according to the number of 
occurrences and the frequency of incidences. The disclosure 
nature is classified as either quantitative or qualitative, 
and the frequency of events (i.e., number of sentences) 
which are commonly observed. The study has extended 
to Islamic social reporting the same procedures and 
exercises recorded in the literature as used for corporate 
environmental reporting..
To increase reliability in recording and analyzing data, 
credible coding instruments with well-specified decision 
rules have been developed to reduce discrepancies and 
meet objectivity, or re-analyze the discrepancies that have 
existed and resolve the variations (Guthrie et al. 2008). By 
doing so, the need for the costly use of multiple coders can 
be reduced. The following rules covering the application of 
content analysis were developed:
• All CSR disclosure must be related to the Islamic 
bank and its operations.
• When the same sentence of CSR is disclosed more 
than once in the annual report, it must be recorded 
each time it is mentioned.
• Where a single sentence of CSR includes more than 
one main idea, the sentence should be recorded 
related to the activity most emphasized in the 
sentence.
• Any sponsorship activity which includes CSR has no 
problem in terms of how often it is advertised.
Additionally, the coder should have sufficient training 
to achieve reliability by reviewing a small sample of 
annual reports during the pilot study stage. Furthermore, 
sentences were chosen as the units of measurement for 
content analysis in order to increase reliability (Milne and 
Adler 1999).
This study uses the number of sentences to determine the 
disclosure level of CSR for several reasons. First, Ingram 
and Frazier (1980) chose sentences as the unit of analysis 
stating that “the sentence was selected as the unit of analysis 
for the final research since a sentence is easily identified, is 
less subject to inter judge variations than phrases, classes 
and themes, and has been evaluated as an appropriate unit 
in previous research”. Also, sentences are more accepted 
units of written English communication than individual 
words (Hughes and Anderson 1995), and the use of single 
words also has been discarded as words do not convey 
any meaning without sentences (Milne and Adler 1999). 
Compared with words and pages, a sentence is a conformist 
unit of speech and writing, whereas a part of the page 
measurement is not, and there is no need to compute for, or 
standardize, the number of words (Walden and Schwartz 
1997; Hackston and Milne 1996). Most prior studies in the 
content analysis of social disclosure have used sentences as 
the basis for coding data, as the sentence provides perfect, 
reliable and meaningful data for more analysis (Oxibar and 
Déjean 2003; Milne and Adler 1999).
To examine the internal consistency (the reliability of 
measurement) of the CSR disclosure index, the Cronbach 
coefficient alpha was employed (Cronbach 1951). The 
examination is based on the average correlation within 
items (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The Cronbach 
coefficient alpha is used to repeat the measurement 
for evaluating the degree to which correlation within 
the measurements is narrowed to the random error 
(Botosan 1997). The logic behind this examination is 
that if the inter-correlations within the items are great, 
the measurement of items will be the same among the 
construct. Sureshchandar et  al. (2002), Hair et  al. 
(1998), and Liouville and Bayad (1998) declared that 
if the alpha is less than 0.60, it is considered poor, 
while it is acceptable at 0.70; in the meantime, if alpha 
is over 0.80, it is considered to be good. The Cronbach 
coefficient alpha is 0.697 for all themes, which exceeds 
the minimum acceptance level of 0.60. This finding is 
accepted rather than the alpha of 0.51 and 0.62  in the 
studies of Aribi and Gao (2010) and Gul and Leung 
(2004), respectively.
8. Empirical findings
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
and independent variables used in the present study. 
The average CSR disclosure is 83.3 sentences. This average 
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is more than the 25  sentences found in the study by 
Maali et al. (2006). The mean board size is 8.3 directors, 
indicating the existence of a quite a reasonable size to 
ensure effectiveness, as suggest by Jensen and Ruback 
(1983). The sample average board independence value 
is 0.83 percent, showing that a majority of Islamic banks 
have a board of directors, which is fully independent. The 
mean value of leadership structure (SCEO) is 0.92 percent, 
indicating that most banks have a separate leadership 
structure. This result is consistent with the best practice 
of corporate governance for Islamic financial institutions 
that requires the two occupations to be held by different 
persons. As for control variables, the sample banks have 
the mean values of 917.35 employees for BSIZE, and 2.86 
percent for the financial performance (PERFOR), which 
are quite low values. The average value for the proportion 
of Muslim population to the total population (REVPUB) is 
85.97 percent.
Table  4 reports the correlation matrix between the 
dependent and independent variables employed in 
the multiple regression of the study. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure is positively correlated 
with board size (BOARDSIZE) (p  =  0.321), financial 
performance (PERFOR) (p  =  0.313), and the separation 
of the roles of CEO and chairman (SCEO) (p  =  0.087). 
However, CSR disclosure is negatively associated with 
board composition (BCOMP) (p  = -0.299), and relevant 
public (REVPUB) (p = 0.340). Thus, it can be summarized 
that a larger BOARDSIZE, lower number of non-executive 
members on the board of directors, and separation of the 
roles of CEO and chairman have higher CSR information 
disclosure. Furthermore, BOARDSIZE is positively 
correlated with all independent variables except board 
composition (BCOMP).
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression results
Table 5 presents the empirical findings of OLS regression. 
It indicates that the coefficient of R2 is 35 percent, and the 
adjusted R2 is 27 percent, and shows a computation of the 
reasonable variance proportion. The table also shows that 
the p-value of the model is significant at 0.002. Because 
all values of tolerance exceed 0.10, there is no problem 
of multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables 
(Menard 1995). Additionally, the VIF for all independent 
variables is very far from 10, indicating that there is no 
issue of multi-collinearity between the variables (Naser 
et al. 2006; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Myers 1990; Kennedy 
1998).
The table reveals that the greatest values for the t statistics 
are 2.562 (p-value < 0.05), and -1.721 (p-value < for bank 
size, and relevant public, respectively, which indicaes that 
the two variables have a significant effect on CSR disclosure 
at a 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. Expressly, these two 
variables are considered by Islamic banks as the foundation 
for making decision to disclose CSR information.
Board size has a positive and insignificant impact on CSR 
disclosure. This result is supports hypothesis 1, but not 
legitimacy theory, and is consistent with previous studies 
(Said et al. 2009; Matoussi and Chakroun 2007; Arcay and 
Vázquez 2005; Lakhal 2003). This finding may be explained 
by the Islamic viewpoint that there is no reason why a bank 
with more members on the board of directors would provide 
more CSR information than a bank with fewer directors, 
since all Islamic banks must disclose information related 
to CSR in their annual reports according to the Islamic 
principle of full disclosure. The negative and insignificant 
t statistics of board composition (BCOMP) highlight the 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics (N = 53).
Variables Min Max Mean Med. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
CSRD 20.00 166 83.30 87.5 39.22 0.276 -0.863
BOARDSIZE 4.00 13 8.30 9 1.98 0.058 -.369
BCOMP 0.14 1 0.81 0.88 0.21 -1.540 1.933
SCEO 0.00 1 0.92 1 0.27 -3.309 9.297
BSIZE 18 8299 917.35 250 1700.41 3.374 13.652
PERFOR -30.06 22.87 2.86 11.9 6.76 -1.432 11.897
REVPUB 76.20 97 85.97 0.75 7.89 0.303 -1.736
Table 4. Correlation matrix (N = 53).
Variables CSRD BOARDSIZE BCOMP SCEO BSIZE PERFOR REVPUB
CSRD 1 0.321** -0.299** 0.087 0.327** 0.313** -0.340**
BOARDSIZE 0.321** 1 -0.114 0.190 0.245* 0.255* -0.078
BCOMP -0.299** -0.114 1 -0.069 0.041 -0.173 0.338**
SCEO 0.087 0.190 -0.069 1 -0.060 0.315** -0.330**
BSIZE 0.327** 0.245* 0.041 -0.060 1 -0.093 0.039
PERFOR 0.313** 0.255* -0.173 0.315** -0.093 1 -0.322**
REVPUB -0.340** -0.078 0.338** -0.330** 0.039 -0.322** 1
**/*: correlation is significant at 0.05/0.10 level, respectively.
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fact that when the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board increases, the level of CSR disclosure decreases. 
Thus, hypothesis 2 is rejected. This result is supported by 
the previous studies of Barako et al. (2006) and Eng and 
Mak (2003). It implies that Islamic banks with boards 
having fewer non-executive directors would emphasize 
societal interests and organizational legitimacy and, 
therefore, would provide more CSR information. The result 
shows a positive and insignificant relationship between 
the separation of the roles of the CEO and the chairman, 
and the disclosure level of CSR. Expressly, it implies that 
the separation of the function of CEO and chairman does 
not affect CSR disclosure by Islamic banks and so supports 
hypothesis 3. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies (Said et al. 2009; Li et al. 2008; Barako et al. 2006; 
Eng and Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ho and Wong 
2001). A possible explanation is that a person who is held 
to act as chairman and CEO of an Islamic bank at the same 
time is likely also to be a shareholder; hence, whether or not 
the two functions are separated presents no problem. This 
result is in line with the stewardship theory. Furthermore, 
the role duality allows the CEO to manage the company in 
achieving its objectives, and enhancing the leadership in a 
bank (Dahya et al. 1996).
With regards to the control variables, the results show 
that bank size (BSIZE) has a positive significant effect 
on CSR disclosure. Larger Islamic banks provide more 
CSR information showing their compliance with the 
principles of accountability and full disclosure, since they 
have more resources, such as human capital, and greater 
investments. This result is consistent with previous studies 
(Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Othman et al. 2009; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005; Hamid 2004), and indicates that the banks 
use annual reports as a channel to publicize their image 
and legitimize their social activities. The association 
between size and CSR disclosure supports the legitimacy 
theory (Gray et al. 2001; Patten 1991). Also, the findings 
reveal a positive and insignificant association between 
financial performance (PERFOR) and the disclosure 
level of CSR. The insignificance of PERFOR is consistent 
with previous studies (Barako 2007; Barako et al. 2006; 
Garcia-Ayuso and Larrinaga 2003; Hackston and Milne 
1996; Cowen et al. 1987). This indicates that the decision 
to provide CSR information is not affected by the financial 
performance level. However, the results reveal that the 
relevant public (REVPUB) has a negative and significant 
impact on CSR disclosure at the 0.10 level. This result 
contrasts with the findings of Farook et al. (2011). From 
an Islamic perspective, a possible underlying explanation 
is that there is no reason why a country with a great 
population would necessarily have banks that provide 
more CSR information than a country with a lower 
population, since all Islamic banks must comply with 
Shariah principles and rules.
9. Discussion and conclusion
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of 
characteristics of the board of directors (board size, board 
composition, and the separation of the roles of CEO and 
the chairman) on CSR disclosure by Islamic banks of 
GCC countries. The study found that none of these three 
attributes of the board of directors has any impact on CSR 
disclosure, this being due to the absence of some important 
aspects of corporate governance practices. These results 
are consistent with the extant literature (Said et al. 2009; 
Barako et al. 2006; Eng and Mak 2003). The key conclusions 
from the empirical results are that the decision to provide 
CSR disclosure is guided by bank size, and relevant public, 
but not by governance structure.
The insignificance of the board of directors’ characteristics 
lies in the different legal and cultural factors that appear 
to affect bank governance mechanisms on CSR disclosure. 
Furthermore, the system of corporate governance in GCC 
countries is derived from major shareholders, which means 
that the influence of agency problems on CSR activities 
is small. This is due, in fact, to the larger shareholders 
monitoring the internal bank governance system, and 
being responsible for approving a bank’s transactions and 
management policies regarding CSR activities.
The paper highlights the potential effect of the 
characteristics of a board of directors on the CSR disclosure 
for Islamic banks of GCC countries. It expands the literature 
regarding the influence of company-specific attributes 
on CSR disclosure in the banking industry by examining 
some of the board of directors’ variables. This may help 
users of CSR information, such as investors in making 
Table 5. OLS regression findings (N = 53).
Variables Pred. Sig. Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF
CSRD 3.027 0.004***
BOARDSIZE No 0.164 1.264 0.213 0.837 1.194
BCOM + -0.182 -1.427 0.160 0.868 1.152
SCEO No -0.085 -0.645 0.522 0.820 1.219
BSIZE + 0.319 2.562 0.014** 0.907 1.103
PERFOR + 0.220 1.652 0.105 0.791 1.264
REVPUB + -0.235 -1.721 0.092* 0.755 1.325
R Square 0.353
Adjusted R Square 0.269
F-value 4.181 (0.002***)
Durbin-Watson 2.163
***, ** and * Significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively.
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investment decisions. The study also shows that there may 
be a need to motivate the policy makers of Islamic banks 
to ensure that banks practise the mechanisms of corporate 
governance effectively. This practice should be compatible 
with the business environment of GCC countries, including 
adopting the same governance standards in order to 
ensure uniformity of disclosure level among the banks 
(Dudley 2004; Karim 2001). It is expected that employing 
the best practice of corporate governance characteristics 
will contribute to improving efficiency, effectiveness and 
monitoring in the Islamic banks of GCC countries; and this 
can only be applied by developing the regulatory and 
enforcement frameworks.
Future research into other important corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as ownership structure, audit committee 
attributes, and cultural factors should be considered. 
Further research into the effect of the board of directors’ 
characteristics on CSR disclosure by Islamic banks of GCC 
countries might use larger samples over a longer timeframe, 
and apply a different methodology for data collection.
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Abstracts - One of the goals of Islamic banking operations is to increase the economic growth 
towards a better and just society. This study aims to examine the criteria and Islamic instrument 
of corporate social responsibility towards the creation of a sustainable economic development. 
Specifically, the study analyses the various approaches to improve the quality of life and alleviate 
poverty and the methods of applying Islamic instruments to corporate social responsibility 
programs in Islamic banking. Based on the review of literature and findings resulted from in depth 
interview with the expertises of Islamic banking in Indonesia, the study reveals that there are six 
(6) fundamental criteria and 34 items considered critical for corporate social responsibility to make 
an impact on the society. These criteria are namely: Shariah compliance, equality, responsibility 
in work, the guarantee of welfare, the guarantee of environmental sustainability and charity for 
preservation of virtue. Then application of Islamic corporate social responsibility in the society 
should be guided by two Islamic principles; first, the application of maslahah (the public good) 
which provides a better framework that managers can use when faced with potential conflicts 
arising from diverse expectations and interests of any corporation’s stakeholders. Second, corporate 
social responsibility programs should pay more attention to the importance of social capital in the 
society. The corporate social responsibility practices in Islamic banking should not only be based on 
responsibility al kifayah (obligatory upon community) and get a positive corporate image but can 
also be deemed as a method to alleviate poverty and achieve the true economic goals of Islam.
Keywords: Islamic corporate social responsibility, Islamic banking and poverty alleviation
1. Background
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR)1 
is corporate responsibility for sustainable economic 
development in the effort to improve the quality of life and 
environment (Obaloha, 2008:538; Hay and Gray, 1974:9; 
Dusuki and Dar, 2005:390). In the last thirty years, the 
concept of CSR has become an issue of discussion related 
to the relationship between business and society. One issue 
discussed was the importance of harmonious relationship 
between the stakeholders2 with the corporate institutions.
The concept of CSR began in the West in the 1970s, and 
discussions on the concept of CSR often focused on the view 
that is founded on the norms, cultures and beliefs of the 
West, especially Europe and America. Western perspective 
of CSR has become common practice for a corporation to 
run CSR programs.
Nevertheless, the concept of CSR can be studied and 
explored critically from a different source that has been 
developed in the West. The concept of CSR can be studied 
from the culture and norms of societies like those found 
in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China  or across 
religions and belief systems like Islam, Buddhism and 
Hinduism. Every culture and system of norms and beliefs 
incorporates different philosophies and epistemologies on 
the form and practice of CSR.
In Indonesia the discourse about CSR has been growing 
significantly. After having been issued, Act No. 40  in 
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2007 article 74 refers to the obligation of corporations on 
corporate social responsibility and society. Thus, corporates 
in Indonesia inevitably are obliged to enact CSR programs. 
If the CSR programs are not implemented, the government 
can impose penalties in accordance with the provision 
of applicable law (Article 74 paragraph 3). Adherence 
to conduct CSR based on the legitimate law becomes an 
incentive for corporations to do CSR. Therefore, CSR is 
undertaken for one of four reasons, first, responsibility of 
economy; second, the responsibility of law fulfilment; third, 
the responsibility of ethics, and fourth, charity (Carroll, 
1999:264).
CSR  for the community  and increasing corporate 
participation in society must be interpreted as an effort to 
create a common good for corporations and for society. As a 
result, the awareness about the importance of CSR becomes 
a collective responsibility to create harmony and alignment 
with the existing range of stakeholders.3
Therefore, the position of Islamic Banking Institution (IBI) 
as one corporation of the area of finance that has been 
operating either nationally or internationally is obliged 
to be the pioneer of finance institutions in carrying out 
CSR programs based on Islamic values, which differ from 
CSR developed in the West. It is  not only to fulfill the 
law and order or good corporate governance. Far beyond 
that, the implementation of CSR on IBI is based on strong 
foundations and the philosophy of Islam, being one of the 
financial institutions that  can bring up prosperity for the 
community. CSR on IBI should be a form of accountability to 
Allah, humans and the environment.
In addition, the implementation of CSR in IBI must be 
believed and understood as a share to fulfill the commitment 
of Shariah compliance in the operations of IBI. CSR is not just 
making fame or merely to obey the obligations of law. IBI’s 
CSR program must appropriately touch the fundamental 
purposes for human rights of society towards a better 
economy and alleviation of poverty. CSR programs should 
not be a mask for the pursuit more profits (The Economist, 
2005) or not the desire to get law legitimatimation for 
operation the corporate (Rizk, et al., 2008: 306).
This study aims to examine the criteria and Islamic 
instrument of CSR towards creation of sustainable 
economic development. Specifically, the study analyses 
the approaches to improve the quality of life and alleviate 
poverty and methods of applying Islamic instrument to 
CSR programs in IBI. The presence of IBI is to meet social 
responsibility; this is the differentiating favour between 
IBI and conventional banking institution (Sudin Haron, 
2005:107). It must be admitted that the existence of Islamic 
banking is to fulfill social responsibility.
2. Literature review of CSR in Islamic 
Banking Institutions (IBI)
Researchers vary in defining CSR (Obaloha,  2008:539; 
Votaw  and Launche, 1973; Preston  and Post,  1975; 
Makower,  1994). For example, Bowen (1953) defines 
CSR as a corporate decision to give benevolence to the 
community. Fredrick (1960) defines CSR as a community 
resource, used by economic and human beings to maximize 
the benefits to society in addition to corporate profits and 
corporate owners. Based on the theory of Elkingston (1997), 
CSR is a concept for the corporates obligation to consider 
the interests of customers, employees, shareholders, 
communities and the environment in all aspect of their 
operations. This obligation applies broadly beyond  the 
obligations stipulated by law.
Carroll  (1999) mentions that CSR takes the form of 
economic responsibility, law, ethics and charity. According 
to Carroll (1999) CSR is described to be pyramid like, 
where economic responsibility  is the  key  to corporate 
responsibility, followed by a responsibility to the laws, 
then ethics, and then lastly to charity (Carroll, 1999: 264). 
Dashrud  (2004)  has reviewed  37 definitions that are 
often used by investigators in defining CSR; he concludes 
that there are five dimensions that are often used in CSR; 
environmental dimensions, social dimensions, economic 
dimensions, stakeholder dimensions and charity 
dimensions.
From these variants of existing definitions, it can be 
concluded that CSR is a form of corporate commitment to 
continuing economic development in an effort to improve 
the quality of life in society and the environment. In other 
words, CSR is a form of corporate social responsibility 
towards local society based on a series of corporate 
activities related to economic welfare of the community for 
distribution to all parties.
Most studies on CSR a few decades ago have focused on 
the form of CSR in Western societies. CSR developments 
in  the  west are certainly influenced by ethical values, 
culture and beliefs of western society, particularly Europe 
and America. This may be found in several studies that have 
be done, like Bowen (1953); Carroll (1976, 1991, 1993, 
2004); Davis (1960, 1973); Freeman (1984); Watrick and 
Cohchran (1985); Wood (1991); Donaldson  and Dunfee 
(1994); Donaldson and Preston (1995); Smith (2000); 
Post, Lawrence and Weber (2002); Birch and Moon 
(2004). These studies found that the values and culture 
that flourished in the West became the standard pattern of 
relationship between the corporation and the community.
The concept of CSR developed in the West is not the same 
with the concept of CSR in Islam. CSR in Islam built on the 
basis of tasawur (world view) and epistemology of Islam, 
which is different from the CSR developed in the West. 
And the principles of Islamic CSR are based on corporate 
philosophy according the Qur’an and Sunnah. While CSR 
in the West based on the view of Western culture. Hence, 
the implementation of Islamic CSR needs to study of CSR’s 
principles based on the Islamic values. It becomes a liability 
related to Islamic corporations that were born from the 
womb of Islam.
Social responsibility in Islam is a familiar subject. Social 
responsibility has begun to exist and has been practiced for 
the past 14 centuries. The discussion of social responsibility 
is frequently mentioned in the Qur’an. The Qur’an always 
links business success and economic growth, which are 
highly influenced by ethical entrepreneurs in their business. 
Allah said in the Qur’an:
“Give full measure when ye measure, and weigh with a 
balance that is straight: that is the most fitting and the 
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most advantageous in the final determination” (al Isra, 
17:35)
Islam gives attention to business through the moral aspects 
to achieve maximum profits. This shows that Islam is 
concerned with the economy and morality, both of which 
cannot be separated. This aspect is also affirmed by the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).  The Prophet (PBUH) has 
said in the hadist narrated by Malik ibn Anas: “A worker/
employee is entitled to at least get good food and clothing with 
a decent size and is not burdened with ability to work outside 
the limits. (Malik, 795, 2:980)
The hadith above concludes that minimum wages should 
allow a worker or employee to obtain good food and feasible 
clothing, reasonable amount for himself and his family, 
without having to work hard (Yusuf, 2008:151). Uthman 
ibn Affan, states:
“Do not force a woman beyond in her quest for life, because 
if you do that to her, she might be doing acts contrary to the 
moral, and not force your man with a job outside the limit 
of their ability, because if you do that against him, perhaps 
he would do the theft (Malik, 795: 2:981).
The Qur’an also considers environmental sustainability 
one of social responsibilty. All the effort of business should 
ensure environmental sustainability. Responsible to 
environment, Allah states in al Qur’an:
And when he turns his back, His aim everywhere is to 
spread mischief through the Earth and destroy crops and 
cattle. But Allah loved not mischief” (Chapter al-Baqarah, 
2:205)
This verse describes how Islam considers environmental 
sustainability.  All the effort of business or non-business 
should ensure environmental sustainability. The relationship 
between humans and the environment is very close and 
cannot be separate. Islam has clearly phohibited anything 
that is harmful to the individual or the environment at 
large. Thus, it is one of the obligations for human to care 
for the well being of society and to guarantee enviromental 
sustanability for the next generation.
While in social welfare, Islam encourages highly Islamic 
charity to those in need and less ability in work through 
sadaqah4 and welfare loans (Qard hasan)5. Allah says in al 
Qur’an:
“So fear Allah as much as ye can; listen and obey and 
spend in charity for the benefit of your own soul and those 
saved from the covetousness of their own souls, they are 
the ones that achieve prosperity” (Chapter al Taghabun, 
64: 16)
The verse describes the responsibility of Muslims to help 
others through charitable contributions and donations and 
stinginess is abomination in Islam.6 The benevolent loan 
(qard hasan) described in the al Qur’an:
Who is he that will loan to Allah a beautiful loan, which 
Allah will double unto his credit and multiply many times? 
It is Allah that giveth (you) want or plenty, and to Him 
shall be your return (Chapter al Baqarah, 2:245).
Besides affecting social welfare, the act of benevolent 
loans can also bring double benefits for individuals and 
corporations. First, benevolent loan can be creating a 
positive image for individuals and corporations as well as 
and the second, getting a new business network formation, 
which may result in increasing profits.
The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said in a hadith narrated 
by Salman bin Amir,
“Alms for the poor is charity.  And the charity to family 
has two advantages, namely the rewarding for Allah 
and strengthening brotherhood” (Narrated by Tirmidhi, 
1993: Hadith No. 653).
The statement above shows that the concept of social 
responsibility and the concept of justice has long existed 
in Islam, as long as has the presence of Islam brought 
by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) realised social responsibility and created justice in 
line with the guidance of the Qur’an. Likewise, the practice 
of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in the application of 
social responsibility and justice in society becomes a source 
of reference for guidance to the next generation, known as 
al Sunnah. Both the Qur’an and the Sunnah have been very 
harmonious in upholding true justice.
Although the verses of Qur’an and the hadith do not directly 
refer to CSR but there are many verses in the Qur’an and 
hadith, which explain  the obligations  of individuals to 
bear the needs of others. Therefore for individuals that 
come together to create a corporate have the obligations to 
help the public and give benefits to others. The existence 
of corporates were viewed by jurists such as Shafi’i, Ahmad 
bin Hambal, Ibn Hamid al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Faraj, Ibn Al 
Jawzi which occupied a position as fard kifaya.7 Corporates 
can do what individual find hard to do, corporates can bear 
and take care the interests of the larger community, such as 
foundation (Ibn Taymiyya, 1314H).
In fact CSR corporations not only bear and care for living 
creatures around them, but more than that, CSR is the 
obligation of humans to comply with Allah’s laws. Allah has 
commanded humans to obey Him, and a form of obedience 
to Allah is to ensure the survival of human kind and the 
natural surroundings. Allah says in the Qur’an:
I have only created Jinns and men, that they may serve Me. 
(Chapter al Dzaariyat, 51; 56).
Allah also says:
It is He who hath made you (His) agents, inheritors of the 
Earth: He hath raised you in ranks, some above others: 
that He may try you in the gifts He hath given you: for thy 
Lord is quick in punishment: yet He is indeed oft-forgiving, 
most merciful. (Chapter al An’am, 6: 165).
The existence of Muslims in the face of the earth has two 
tasks; obedient servant to Allah and the fair caliph. The 
relationships between the two main tasks are in line and 
should not be separated from one another. As a servant 
who worships Allah, each individual has an obligation to 
make all events of his life as a form of perfect devotion 
to Allah. In this case, the concept of worship is necessary 
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to be understood in a broader sense. This means that apart 
from the specific worship of ritual piety, each individual 
is required to perform other common rituals of all the 
activities that bring about the welfare of man and nature in 
compliance with certain conditions, with right intentions, 
and has to ensure that those actions are allowed according 
to the Shariah (Suhaila binti Abdullah, 2008: 64–68, Zahari 
bin Mahad Moses, 2008: 77–78, Abdullah al Mushlih and 
Shalah al Shawiy, 1998: 161). It also gives the meaning 
that human beings carrying out their duties as vicegerents 
on Earth cannot arbitrarily act, but must do so based on the 
Shariah rules as evidence of slavery to Allah as the creator.
As a vicegerent, humans are entrusted to manage this 
environment involving human relationship with other 
human beings and human relationships with Allah’s 
creation, including animals, plants and the environment. Al 
Mawdudi interpreted meaning of the word “vicegerent” as 
“representative of Allah on Earth” (Abu al-A’la al Maududi, 
n.d:16–23). As a representative, humans must be and 
act like nature, will and actions of the substitute. As the 
vicegerent of Allah on Earth humans do not have absolute 
freedom to do whatever impunity. Mankind must act within 
the authority delegated to him by Allah. This is as described 
in the Qur’an, Allah says:
O David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on Earth: 
so judge thou between men in truth (and justice): Nor 
follow thou the lusts (of thy heart), for they will mislead 
thee from the Path of Allah: for those who wander astray 
from the Path of Allah, is a Penalty Grievous, for that they 
forget the Day of Account. (Chapter Shaad, 38; 26).
Ibn Kathir explains humans purpose of ruling the Earth 
(khalaif al Ard) in verse 6; 165; is as executors for the 
prosperity of the Earth from time to time to be utilized by 
future generations (Ibn Kathir, 1996:185). This means the 
continuity and sustainability of the vicegerent task is not 
just limited to one generation, but responsible to the next 
generation.
Both interpretations quoted by al Maududi and Ibn Kathir 
regarding the meaning of vicegerent, gives a clear picture 
of the duty of every human being to be responsible to 
Allah as the giver and the representative of the human and 
natural on the Earth to create harmony life. Accountability 
requires that people take care of nature and all its contents 
for the salvation of man himself and the continuity of other 
creatures of Allah. He is also a form of trust to be guarded 
and escorted from the various forms of fraud. All this is 
proof of gratitude to Allah the creator of His servant, so 
that they are not classified into categories of heathen of 
mercy. Allah says:
He it is that has made you inheritors in the Earth: if, 
then, any do reject (Allah), their rejection (works) against 
themselves: their rejection but adds to the odium for the 
unbelievers in the sight of their Lord: their rejection but 
adds to (their own) undoing. (Chapter Fathir, 35; 39).
Precisely the position of CSR in Islam is one of the essential 
human tasks, which are a mandate from Allah. On one hand 
CSR is the obedience to Allah, on the other hand it serves as 
a human responsibility as the vicegerent of Allah on earth. 
Therefore, those who were bestowed by advantages and 
higher position by Allah are obliged to help other humans 
in order to ease the burden on those who are not affluent 
and face weaknesses.
Therefore, Islamic CSR obligations are the responsibility 
of individuals who come together in one corporation to 
give a positive impression for the environment in order to 
empower the weak and to preserve natural surroundings. 
Leaving CSR activity causes the wrath of Allah and brings 
punishment. In contrast implementing CSR will give birth to 
pleasure and comfort in building cooperative relationships 
between the corporations and community and create 
intimacy within society. Allah says:
It is He who hath made you (His) agents, inheritors of 
the Earth: He hath raised you in ranks, some above others: 
that He may try you in the gifts He hath given you: for thy 
Lord is quick in punishment: yet He is indeed Oft-forgiving, 
Most Merciful. (Chapter al An’am, 6: 165)
The study of corporate social responsibility in Islam has 
been revealed by some researchers like Ekawati (2004), 
Mohammed (2007), Irwani and Dusuki (2007), Dusuki 
(2008), Zinkin and William (2010). There studies have 
been carried out to explore the concept of CSR in Islam and 
also to explore the values of equating Islamic CSR with CSR 
in the UN Global Compact.8
A study conducted by Ekawati (2004) was to explore the 
concepts zakat, CSR and community development.  She 
describes community development done by the corporate 
community in Indonesia by using zakat and CSR practices. 
Both Zakat and CSR have the same ultimate goal in efforts 
to create the social welfare in society. She only sees zakat 
as an instrument for corporations to implement CSR. This 
study was limited in exploring the concept of Islam that 
was quite broad to create justice and social welfare of the 
community.
More specific studies to explore the concept of CSR in Islam 
have been done by Mohammed (2007). One study was 
conducted to explore the Islamic philosophy of corporate 
social responsibility in Islam.  He concludes that social 
responsibility in Islam is built on four basic principles: unity, 
justice, free will and responsibility. This thesis was an early 
study that laid the foundations on Islamic CSR paradigm.
According to Dusuki (2008) the basic concept of CSR is based 
on the concepts of khalifah (vicegerency) and paradigms 
of taqwa (piety). The concept of vicegerency denotes that 
mankind is the representative of Allah on Earth and as such 
Allah has entrusted mankind with stewardship of Allah’s 
possession. It means the corporate business works endowed 
by the power of Allah to conduct business in accordance 
with the laws of Allah. On the other hand, corporations are 
trying to make profit for shareholders, on another side it 
is trying to maintain and develop the economic resources 
of society, covering issues such as good environmental 
practices, safety, charitable contributions, social benefits 
and avoiding dangerous activities. This is done to seek the 
pleasure of Allah (Dusuki, 2008: 22).
Paradigm of taqwa (piety) means a person is imbued with 
a strong understanding that their role in this world is to 
manage and develop the world in accordance with the 
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Shariah. This means harmonizing and integrating material 
well-being with moral-spiritual values, which in turn 
determines their fate in this world and in the hereafter. 
It provides a number of values for shaping social life and 
clarifies the status of human beings and their position in 
relation to the rest of creation. Furthermore, it defines the 
nature of human beings’ relationship with Allah, with each 
other and with the natural environment (Dusuki, 2008: 
15–17). This will produce a godly paradigm concept of CSR 
practices that focus on maintaining human dignity, freedom 
of work, justice and recognition of individual rights, beliefs 
and responsibilities.
The conceptual framework of Islamic CSR introduced by 
Mohammed (2007) and Dusuki (2008) became the basic 
reference to develop further Islamic CSR models. Mohammed 
(2007) and Dusuki (2008) reflected a broad paradigm of 
Islamic business practices adherence to the principles of 
Shariah. However, the studies did not provide a framework 
of CSR criteria in Islamic corporate practically. Islamic CSR 
criteria can be used as the model for the implementation 
of CSR. They also did not measure how the concept of CSR 
was disclosed in line between concept and implementation 
in the field with a quantitative approach. Furthermore, 
Muhammed (2007) and Dusuki (2008) had given part of 
the Islamic CSR principles for implementing CSR.
Dusuki and Irwani (2007) reveal the effects of maqasid 
Shariah (Islamic law purposes) and maslahah (public 
interest) to the concept of CSR. Using the approach of 
maqasid Shariah and maslahah, CSR practices are divided 
into three categories; essentials (dharuriyyah), necessary 
(hajiyyah) and luxury (tahsiniyyah). Three catagories 
of maslahah can be used by corporate or management to 
consider the facts and situation changes when implementing 
CSR which also provide a better framework for managers 
in dealing with conflicts of interest that may arise from 
stakeholders (Dusuki and Irwani, 2007: 1). Dusuki and 
Irwani (2007) also have detailed the CSR guidelines 
using the maqasid Shariah and maslahah.  The study 
provides guidance to corporate managers to implement 
CSR according to considerations of the three categories 
of maslahah.
However, a research finding conducted by Zinkin and 
Williams (2010) were contrary with the findings Mohammed 
(2007) and Dusuki (2008). Mohammed (2007) and Dusuki 
(2008) concluded that there were fundamental differences 
between Islam and the Western concept of CSR, while 
Zinkin and William (2010: 17) concluded there were no 
fundamental difference between the Islamic concept of CSR 
and the UN Global Compact concept of CSR.
Zinkin and William (2010) in fact has erroneously 
reviewed the philosophy and foundation of Islamic CSR. 
The philosophy of Islamic CSR has a very different base 
from CSR in the UN Global Compact. These differences 
may cause differences in terms of CSR activities. Islam does 
not just look at the economic side only, but also focuses 
on spiritual values, which is not emphasised by Zinkin 
and William (2010). CSR activities in Islam have clear 
demarcations between permitted and forbidden which is 
fixed indicator from Shariah. CSR activities cannot change 
permitted (halal) to forbidden (haram) or vice versa. From 
another side, the accountability of hereafter arises from an 
understanding of taqwa to produce different values in the 
implementation of CSR.
Islamic CSR has a philosophy from al Qur’an and al Sunnah 
as the guidance in the various activities of life, including 
CSR practices in Islamic corporates like Islamic banking. 
Islamic CSR must be understood as part of Shariah 
compliance. Islamic CSR is to be practiced in line with the 
principles of al Qur’an and al Sunnah and not just merely 
fulfil al kifayah (obligatory upon community) and giving a 
positive image to corporate, but also as method to reduce 
poverty and achieve the true economic goals in Islam.
Mohammed (2007) divides Islamic principles of CSR into 
four; unity of Allah, justice, free will and responsibility. 
Dusuki (2008) only mentions two, caliphate and taqwa 
(piety), Ekawati (2005) mentions zakat as one of CSR 
instruments as a form of charity in Islam, while Dusuki and 
Irwani (2007) describes a guide for corporate managers 
to implement CSR approach and the theory of Shariah 
purpose and public interest.
The Islamic principles of CSR described above are 
summarized in table 1.
The principles that have been discussed in the previous 
studies can be concluded by three principles of Islamic CSR. 
There are the principle of unity and justice by Mohammed 
(2007) and the principles of caliphate by Dusuki (2008). The 
zakah raised by Ekawati (2005) is one kind of instrument 
that can be used in the CSR practice. However zakah is 
not one of the CSR principles. While the concept of free 
will and responsibility as state by Mohammed (2007) and 
taqwa mentioned by Dusuki (2008) were the effects that 
arise when the principles of unity, justice and the caliphate 
were applied. It is not a stand-alone principle.
Principle is defined as base, initial, basic rules (Suryadi, 
1980: 190). According to Juhaya (1995: 69), principles are 
the beginning that is the point of departure (al-mabda).  In 
the terminology, principle is the universal truth that naturally 
exists in Islamic law and the starting point of its construction. 
It is a basic legal form and produces all branches (Juhaya, 
1995). It can be concluded that a base or fundamental is used 
as the basis for the foundation of the work practices.
Consequently, the position of the implementation of 
Islamic CSR can be categorized into three dimensions 
of relationship responsibilities. Firstly, it is the relationship 
of responsibility to Allah. Secondly, the relationship  of 
responsibility to human being. And the last is the 
relationship of responsibility towards the environment.
To realize the three links at Islamic CSR practice on IBI, 
require the principle that are inter-related to each other, 
that is the principle of unity of Allah, caliphate, justice, 
brotherhood, and creation maslahah (public benefit). The 
five principles of Islamic CSR practice in CSR IBI’s programs 
may affect the interests of the very basic to fulfil the needs 
of all stakeholders at IBI.
The implementation of Islamic CSR principles in the 
IBI and  responsibilities of the position of the three 
relationships  that must be played by a Muslim can be 
described in the following figure:
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Figure  1 above explains that the implementation of CSR 
is the  manifestation of three strong relationships and 
intertwined among each other; relationship with Allah, 
human relationships and relationship with nature. To 
optimize these three relations in the implementation of CSR, 
it must be guided by the principles of unity of Allah, caliph, 
justice, solidarity. The four principles are aimed at realizing 
the end of the fifth principle which the creation of maslahah 
(public benefit) for humans and the nature. Creating maslahah 
on IBI is a key goal in implementing all the functions of 
Islamic banking transactions included in the implementation 
of Islamic CSR. As a result, all the implementation of CSR 
in Islamic banking transactions should be guided by halal 
outlined by Islam and abandon any prohibition as prevented 
in Islam. All of these principles are practiced with the sole 
purpose of perfect devotion to Allah SWT.
Implementation of Islamic CSR principles in IBI based on 
Qur’an and Sunnah in the whole Islamic banking activities will 
be a vein that drives the economy of the people, not just profits 
Table 1. Principles of CSR practices in the Islamic view.
Researchers
Islamic Principles  
of CSR in Practices Research objectives
Ekawati (2004) 1. Zakat as an instrument of CSR To explore the relationship between zakat,  
CSR and community development at Bank  
Muamalat Indonesia
Mohammad (2007) 1. Unity of Allah 
2. Justice 
3. Free will 
4. Responsible
To expose the Islamic paradigm of CSR  
and differences with CSR in the west.  
The study also looks at how the values  
of CSR practiced by Islamic bank using  
in depth interviews with managers of  
Islamic bank.
Dusuki (2008) 1. Caliphate 
2. Taqwa (Piety)
To review and produce the concept of CSR  
in Islam and compare with CSR in the west.
Dusuki dan Irwani (2007) The practice of CSR is divided  
into three categories: 
1. Emergency (essentials) 
2. Interest (necessary) 
3. Luxury (embellishment)
To provide guidance for corporate managers 
to implement the CSR program in line  
maqasid Shariah and maslahah.
Source: Ekawati (2004), Mohammed (2007), Dusuki (2008), and Irwani Dusuki (2007).
HaramHalal
Islamic CSR Principles
NATUREHUMAN BEINGS
ALLAH
Creation
Of
Maslahah
Unity
Caliphate Justice
Brotherhood
Figure 1. Conceptual implementation of Islamic csr principles of IBI and relationship 
responsibilities should be played by a muslim.
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for shareholders alone, but affect the larger environment for 
economic empowerment of society through all CSR practices.
3. Criteria and instruments of CSR in Islamic 
Banking Institutions (IBI)
The criteria which have been studied by researchers are 
assembled in a conceptual framework. This conceptual 
framework can be used as the standard in the implementation 
of CSR in IBI. In general, social responsibility in Islam can be 
categorized into three forms of relationship responsibilities. 
Firstly, it is the relationship of responsibility to Allah. 
Secondly, the relationship of responsibility to human being. 
And the last is the relationship of responsibility towards the 
environment. To realize the three links at Islamic CSR practice 
on IBI, require the five principles that are inter-related to each 
other, that is; the principle of unity of Allah, caliph, justice, 
brotherhood, and creation maslahah (public benefit).
From the five principles produce six criteria’s and 34 items 
for instrument to measure corporate social responsibility 
in the IBI. Six criteria’s of CSR in IBI come out from deep 
reading of many literatures and understanding from 
Qur’an and hadith. Six criteria’s of CSR in IBI, namely, (1) 
Shariah compliance; (2) equality, (3) responsible in work; 
(4) guarantee of welfare; (5) guarantee of environmental 
sustainability and (6) charity for preservation of virtue.
As the following criteria, there are 34 items to be an 
instrument for measuring these criteria are:
First, the criteria of Shariah compliance have five items: (1) 
Instruments IBI compliance with Shariah; (2) Financing 
IBI compliance with Shariah; (3) IBI’s investment in halal 
products; (4) Avoiding profit from non-halal; (5) Selections 
of customer according to Shariah
Syari’ah compliance criteria and five items to measure 
those criteria are based on the interest to keep all IBI 
products and investment lawful as outlined by the Qur’an. 
There are many verses describing these obligations, Allah 
says in verses al-Mu’minun: 51; al-Baqarah: 188, 275, 278, 
279, and al-Nisa’: 10.
The prophet Muhammad PBUH said in hadith:
“Searchin the halal is obligatory on every Muslim.” 
(Narrated by Ibnu Mas’ud).
In banking and finance, all forms of transactions are 
possible, unless there is any clear evidence or injunction 
banning a transaction. Therefore each transaction in 
IBI must be based on Shariah in instruments, financing 
schemes, investment and customer selection.
Second, the criteria of equality has four items; (1) The 
existence values of brotherhood; (2) Services excellent; (3) 
Avoid discrimination and (4) Have the same opportunity.
Equality in life has been described in the Qur’an, in chapter 
Ali ‘Imran, 3: 103, al-Anfal: 62–63, al Mukminun; 23:8, 
al  Hujurat; 49:13. The verses explain that the people 
living in various communities have the duty to respect and 
cultivate the values of brotherhood with human being in 
various activities.
The prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said in varieous hadith:
“The glory of a believer is because religion, dignity is at 
the intellect and position is dependent on ethic” (Narrated 
Baihaqi).
“Allah loves when you do a job to work correctly and 
properly” (Narrated by Baihaqi).
Third, the criteria of responsible in work has eight items; 
(1) Trust, (2) Working accordance with the limitations 
and responsibilities, (3) Fulfill every contract demand; (4) 
Transparency; (5) Optimal for using time and expertise; 
(6) Reducing the adverse impact of the investment; 
(7) Integrity in the work; (8) Fair competition and (9) 
Accountability.
Responsible in work is something very important in 
Muslim life. Every employee must be responsible not only 
to his employer but more than that to Allah also. He will be 
asked in the Hereafter of what he had done in the world. 
Obligation to be responsible in their jobs have described at 
numerious verses in the Holy Qur’an in Surah al Maidah, 
5:2, al Munafikun, 63:9, Al Baqarah, 2: 237, Al Baqarah, 
2: 195, al Qashash: 77, al Nahl, 16:97. While in sunnah, 
Muhammad (PBUH) said;
“Muslim traders who are true and trusted in trading are 
with the martyrs on the Day of Judgment” (Narrated by 
Ibnu Majah dan Tirmizi).
“Jabir bin Abdullah said that the Rasulullah PBUH 
said; Allah loves to his servants who acts politely and 
considerately when selling, buying or reclaiming debts.” 
(Narrated by Ibnu Majah)
Fourth, the criteria of guarante of welfare has six items; 
(1) place of work safe and comfortable, (2) Free will, (3) 
Eligible of Wages; (4) Training and Education; (5) Work 
does not exceed the limits and time; (6) Profit and loss 
sharing; (7) Insurance for employee.
Islam is very concerned in giving guarantee of welfare for 
the people who are involved in every jobs. The relationship 
between employers and workers, staff and manager must 
have regulation with the norms of compulsory specific 
guidelines for creating both sides fairly and qualified. This 
is the order of Allah in the Qur’an, as mentioned in Surah 
al-Nahl 16: 90. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) also 
said:
“A worker/employee is entitled to at least get food, proper 
clothes and not be burdened with the job beyond his ability” 
(Narrated by Malik, n.d: 2:980).
“It is not a Muslim who was sleeping in a gorged while 
his neighbour is in conditions of hunger” (Narrated by 
Bukhari).
Fifth, the criteria of guarantee of environmental 
sustainability has four items: (1) To ensure that investment 
does not harm the environment, (2) Involve an active 
in  protecting the environment, (3) Educating employees 
to care for and treat the environment and (4) The used of 
recycled materials to fulfill needs of the IBIs.
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The relationship between humans with nature is very close 
and cannot be seperated. Interaction with nature is part of 
evidencing the greatness of Allah for making the universe 
to support human being. Allah describes this at the Qur’an 
in chapter Rum, 30: 41. al Baqarah, 2: 204–206 and al-A 
`raf 7: 56.
Sixth, the criteria of charity for preservation of virtue 
has five items; (1) The selection of investors to support the 
activities for social welfare, (2) Alleviate social problems 
(such as opening the welfare funds and donations) (3) 
Support and help fund welfare (such as helping to fund 
education, social donations, and ease the life of orphan) 
(4) Playing the role of welfare without looking solely for 
profitability, and (5) The empowerment of communities 
through IBIs products (such as Qard hasan, financing 
micro-economics to poor families and small businesses).
Islam highly asks humans to give welfare assistance to 
anyone in need and who does not have ability to work. The 
Qur’an explains a lot about this. Among them are found in 
chapter al Nahl, 16:71 and 75, al Maidah, 5; 2, Al Taubah, 
9; 71. In addition, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said:
“Anyone who doesn’t love mankind, it’s not loved by 
Allah” (Narrated by Bukhari, Muslim).
“Abu Huraira said, Rasulullah has said: Those who seek 
to help widows and the poor are similar in rank to those 
who fight in Allah, pray at night and fasting during the 
day” (Narrated by Bukhari).
Islamic criteria of CSR in IBI can be related with 
stakeholders and CSR principles of Islam can be shown in 
table 2 below:
Table 2. Criteria, item and relationship with stakeholder and principle of Islamic CSR.
Criteria Item
Islamic banking  
stakeholders Islamic CSR principle
1.  Shariah  
compliance
1.  Instruments IBI compliance  
with Shariah
Worker and  
shareholder
Unity
2.  Financing IBI compliance  
with Shariah
Shareholder, worker  
and customer
Unity, caliphate and justice
3.  IBI’s investment in halal  
products
Shareholder, worker  
and customer
Unity, caliphate and justice
4. Avoiding profit from non-halal Worker and  
Shareholder
Unity and caliphate
5.  Selection of customer  
according to Shariah
Shareholder, worker  
and customer
Unity, caliphate and justice
2. Equality 1.  The existence values  
of brotherhood
Shareholder, worker,  
community, customer
Brotherhood, justice
2. Services excellent Shareholder, worker,  
community, customer
Brotherhood, justice
3. Avoid discrimination Shareholder, worker,  
community, customer
Justice
4. Have the same opportunity Shareholder, worker,  
community, customer
Justice, brotherhood  
and creation of maslahah
3.  Responsible  
in work
1. Trust Worker, customer Unity
2.  Working accordance  
with the limitations  
and responsibilities
Worker Justice
3.  Fulfill every contract  
demand
Worker and customer Justice
4. Transparency Worker, customer  
and shareholder
Unity
5.  Optimal for using time  
and expertise
Worker Justice
6.  Reducing the adverse  
impact of the investment
Worker and customer Unity, creation  
of maslahah
7. Integrity in the work Worker, customer,  
and community
Unity and justice
8. Fair competition Worker, customer  
and shareholder
Justice, creation  
of maslahah and  
brotherhood
9. Accountability Worker, customer,  
shareholder and  
community
Justice, creation  
of maslahah and  
brotherhood
(Continued)
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Table 2 above, reflects the relationship between the criteria 
of CSR, stakeholders IBIs with Islamic principles of CSR. It 
is a network that can not be separated from one another. 
Each criteria has an impact on the stakeholders; and each 
criteria is based on the principles derived from al Qur’an 
and al Sunnah.
The description on the criteria and items to be included 
Islamic CSR instruments can be used as the conceptual 
framework for the implementation of CSR in IBI (see 
Figure  2). It can be described as a series of IBI activities 
in performing all banking transactions with appropriate 
responsibility to Allah, human being and in ensuring 
environment sustainability. Three dimensions of 
responsibility is to be implemented with the fourth 
principles which are unity, caliphate, justice and 
brotherhood. And fourth principle is intended to create the 
fifth principle which is the creation of maslahah to human 
and the environment.
Creation of maslahah is the main purpose of the IBI in 
performing of all the functions of banking transactions. 
Six criteria for CSR at IBI is to ensure that operational IBI 
occupies the terms and implement syari’ah correctly. Thus, 
the objective of IBI to provide for greater social impact 
within the environment can be achieved (IAIB 1990, 
Wahbah Zuhaili, 2003, Sudin Haron, 2005).
The conceptual framework in the implementation Islamic 
CSR in IBI described above can be seen in figure 2.
Table 2. Continued.
Criteria Item Islamic banking  
stakeholders
Islamic CSR principle
4.  Guarantee  
of welfare
1.  Place of work safe  
and comfortable
Shareholder and  
worker
Unity, caliphate  
and brotherhood
2. Free will Worker, shareholder  
and customer
Caliphate
3. Eligible of Wages Worker Justice and brotherhood
4. Training and Education Worker, customer  
and community
Caliphate
5.  Work does not exceed  
the limits and time
Worker Justice and creation  
of maslahah
6. Profit and loss sharing Shareholder, customer  
and community
Justice and brotherhood
7. Insurance for employee Shareholder and  
worker
Justice, Caliphate  
and brotherhood
5.  Guarantee of  
environmental  
sustainability
1.  To ensure that investment  
does not harm the  
environment
Worker, customer  
and nature
Unity and caliphate
2.  Involve an active in protecting  
the environment
Worker, Shareholder  
and community
Unity and caliphate
3.  Educating employees  
to care for and treat  
the environment
Shareholder, worker Unity and caliphate
4.  The used of recycled  
materials to fulfill needs  
of the IBIs
Worker, Shareholder Unity, caliphate and  
creation of maslahah
6.  Charity for  
preservation  
of virtue
1.  The selection of investors  
to support the activities  
for social welfare
Worker, Shareholder Unity, caliphate and  
creation of maslahah
2.  Alleviate social problems  
(such as opening the welfare  
funds and donations)
Shareholder, worker  
and community
Brotherhood, creation  
of maslahah
3.  Support and help fund  
welfare (such as helping  
to fund education, social  
donations, and ease the life  
of orphan)
Shareholder, worker  
and community
Brotherhood, creation  
of maslahah
4.  Playing the role  
of welfare without  
looking profitability
Shareholder, worker  
and community
Brotherhood, creation  
of maslahah
5.  The empowerment of  
communities through  
IBIs products
Worker and  
community
Brotherhood, creation  
of maslahah
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4. Background of research participants
The purpose of acquiring this information is to ascertain 
the research participants’ authority to discuss Islamic 
criteria’s of CSR. Each of the respondents was asked to give 
and confirm to the criteria of CSR in Islamic banking. Every 
feedback from the respondents directed to the removal, 
addition and modification of each banking CSR criteria 
established by researcher.
To ensure that the admissions made coincide with 
the actual purpose of the study, respondents are selected 
based on two conditions; first, have experience in the 
field of Shariah, Islamic banking and finance and second, 
are directly involved as policy makers in the Islamic 
financial institutions or have been appointed to be Shariah 
Advisory Board of Islamic banking. The sampling method 
used is purposive sampling, by selecting all the experts 
interviewed as participants representing four categories; 
academics, members of the Shariah Advisory Board of 
Islamic banking, director of Islamic banking and regulator 
of Islamic banking. The selection method is used to obtain 
information, views and in depth opinions from authority 
in Islamic banking on the phenomenon being studied.
Combinations of respondent in four categories were found 
to obtain more comprehensive view of CSR criteria in 
Islamic banking. It does not just examine purely from the 
theoretical aspects but also the practical aspects of the 
parallel existence of Islamic banking. Information of all 
respondents are shown in table 3 below:
NatureHuman Beings
Shariah Compliance
Charity for Preservation of
virtue
Guarantee of Enviromental
Sustanaibility
Responsible in Work
ALLAH
Creation of
Maslahah
Unity
Caliphate Justice
Brotherhood
Criteria of  Islamic CSR in IBI
The Principles of  Islamic CSR
Equality Guarantee of Welfare
Figure 2. The criteria’s and instruments Islamic CSR: Result of an empirical survey in Indonesia.
Table  3. Information of research participants’ based on 
agencies.
Category Respondent
Academic •  Prof. Dr. Alyasa’ Abubakar, MA 
Director of Post Graduate State  
of Islamic Studies Institute Ar  
Raniry, Banda Aceh, Indonesia.  
A Former Head of Official  
Syariah Islam in Aceh  
2004–2009
Shariah Advisory  
Board of Islamic  
Banking
•  Prof. Dr. Muslim Ibrahim, MA 
Head of Consulative Council  
of Aceh “Ulama. Head of  
Shariah Advisory Board Islamic  
Bank of Aceh Shariah
Director of  
Islamic Bank
•  Isnaini Mufti Aziz 
CEO of Baity Maal Muamalat. 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia  
(BMI)
•  Hizir Ismail 
Director of Islamic Bank of Aceh 
Syariah
Central Bank  
of Indonesia  
(Bank Indonesia)
•  Ali Sakti 
Bank Researcher Islamic Banking 
Research and Development 
Team,  
Directorate of Islamic Banking
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The background of the participants, who were well 
experienced, experts and professional, give opinions and 
endorsement for the criteria of CSR in Islamic banking. 
The academic and members of the Shariah Advisory Board 
of Islamic banking with expertise in Islamic jurisprudence 
were authorized to enlighten the practice of Islamic banks 
in accordance with the Shariah principles. The director of 
Islamic banking and regulator of Islamic banking related 
their experience and how CSR was implemented.
5. Result of survey criteria of CSR 
in Islamic banking
Six criteria’s of CSR and 34 items of the instrument 
to measure CSR in the IBI were collected to the experts 
using a semi-structure questionnaire. Every  respondent 
validates between the scales of 1 to 10 and gives reasons 
for  their agreement to these criteria. Six criteria of 
corporate social responsibility in the Islamic bank 
are: (1) Shariah compliance; (2) Equality, (3) Responsible 
in work; (4) Guarantee of welfare; (5) Guarantee 
of environmental sustainability and (6) Charity for 
preservation of virtue.
The result of the confirmation was given by experts to 
criteria’s of CSR applying in Islamic bank are:
Criteria of Shariah compliance
In general, all respondents agree with the criteria of Shariah 
compliance and all items in Shariah compliance item’s to 
measure implementation of CSR at the IBI, because IBI have 
to be social responsible due to their operation in adherence 
to Shariah naturally (table 4).
The above matrix imply CSR in IBI have to adhere with 
Shariah compliance. All respondents agree and give hight 
grade of each item to measure Shariah compliance. One 
of them pointed out:
…Islamic Bank as a institution based on Shariah, it must 
be based on the Shariah itself. Every instrument in Islamic 
bank must adhere with Shariah compliant, as well as 
financing and investment too.
Another respondent said:
I agree with all of these items in the first criteria, because 
basic concept of Islamic banking must appropriate with 
Shariah. We cannot leave the concept of Shariah in Islamic 
banking.
However, have misperceptions about two respondents 
reminded about the fifth “Selection of customer according 
Shariah” under the first criteria. One of them said:
But item fifth should be clear, Islamic banking also has 
partner with users outside of Islam, Islamic banking as 
rahmatal lil alamin (mercy for the universe). So anyone 
can interact with Islamic bank, whether Muslim or not 
Muslim. Customer IBIs as conventional banks are not 
differentiated, so that it occurs universally. We cannot 
select or prioritize only Muslim consumers; the most 
important thing is instruments and financing products 
that must be considered properly in line with Shariah.
Other respondent said:
I think item fifth may be misperception most people. 
The reason, if customer Islamic bank came from among all 
non-Muslim, such as Chinese, maybe people will think not 
possible in Islamic bank, but actually anyone can involve 
in Islamic bank. This item make people to think that the 
customer Islamic bank just come from Muslim only, however 
in Shariah, anyone can relate to the bank even though it is 
not a Muslim. It means, if non-Muslim accompany Islamic 
bank, Islamic bank still compliance with Shariah.
Both views from respondent was approved by the 
researcher. Selection customer according to Shariah does 
not mean that the IBI customer’s should be a Muslim but a 
non-Muslim can be a part of IBI. Selection customer means 
that, IBI have to ensure that the customer should not be 
involved with money laundering or affected as a corruptor 
by law. IBI should ensure that the money put in bank from 
a third party are lawful with Shariah and goverment even 
though it has no obligation to the bank to ask where the 
money come from. On the other hand, IBI cannot invest 
or finance customers who have business propositions that 
violet Islamic tenets of business transaction. For instance, 
Casino or Karaoke bars that serve alcohol, due to prohibition 
(haram) of gambling and alcohol in Islamic jurisprudence.
Criteria of equality
The criteria of equality denotes a sense of balance among 
various aspects of a man’s life to produce the best social 
order. Allah has created everything with balance to 
maintain equality and equilibrium. As chaliphate of Allah 
on earth, mankind is expected to maintain equity in society 
through social responsibility and justice. A middle part 
must be maintained in all social economic affairs of the 
Muslim society. Adherence to this criteria, in Islamic society 
Table 4. Criteria and items of Shariah compliance.
Criteria Item Score by experts
Shariah Compliance E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total Average
1 Instruments IBI compliance with Shariah 8 10 10 10 10 48 9.6
2 Financing IBI compliance with Shariah 8 10 10 10 10 48 9.6
3 IBI’s investment in halal products 8 8 10 10 10 46 9.2
4 Avoiding profit from non-halal 8 10 8 10 10 46 9.2
5 Selection consumer according with shariah 8 10 4 10 10 42 8.4
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or organization will ensure a harmonious society through 
aggregation of nature and social forces.
IBI’s as Islamic organizations are expected to facilitate the 
criteria of equality through their practices of maintaining 
balance in social-economics sphere. Equitable distribution 
of work/job, services and no discrimination are important 
aspects of this criteria. The manner in which IBI implement 
this criteria of equity conclude is in the following items 
(table 5):
The average values given by all respondents indicated a 
very high level of their agreement to the criteria of equality 
for measure CSR in IBI. One of respondent said:
I agree with four items of the second criteria due to two 
reasons. First, Quran ask us not to discriminate regardless 
of race, class, position, and age. Our difference is only in 
taqwa. Second, in terms of business conduct, discrimination 
is also not allowed and we have to give best services for all 
customers.
Criteria of responsibility in work
The criteria of responsibility in work is a significant part 
of the Muslim’s faith that he/she is accountable to Allah 
in the Heraafter for every deed on this earth. Achieving 
Allah’s favour and blessing by adhering to the divine 
commandment is a significant motivation of faithful’s 
action. Every individual is accountable and ultimately 
responsible for his own actions. The manner in which IBI 
implement this criteria of responsible in work conclude in 
the following items (table 6):
All respondents mentioned the criteria af responsibility 
in work is something very important in the Muslim life 
and organization-collectively to be socially responsible. 
Similarly, the values given to the criteria responsible in 
work by all respondents is high grade. They agree to the 
criteria responsible in work and items that can be used to 
measure CSR in IBI. One of the respondent said:
Actually, there are ethical considerations/understood by 
the performer banks to safeguard the rights of consumers. 
Item trust and all these items are ideal. Moreover, 
fairness in the competition items (item 8), the Central 
bank of Indonesia as regulator, have made sure that the 
competition between bank must be healthy. I gave a value 
of 10 to each item.
Other respondent who give emphasis on item 6:
In general, all investment banks would be assisted by 
the feasibility study related to investment, but most 
of the feasibilty study only see the feasible return and 
get profit, it is not a visible impact on the environment. 
I  think reducing the adverse impact of the investment 
is an important item to be created. I hope IBI pay more 
attention to this item.
Guarantee of welfare criteria
In order to achieve its ideal of socio-economic justice, 
Islam  imposes social rights over individual wealth such 
as rights of the poor relatives for financial support, rights 
of the needy neighbors for assistance, rights of the slaves 
and servants for help, rights of the wayfarers, friends and 
general Muslims who need financial aid. IBIs as Islamic 
organization have to make sure every stakeholder are 
guarantee to get welfare. Therefore to measure welfare 
guarantee to stakeholder, there are six items to fulfill the 
right stakeholder in Islamic banking (table 7):
Table 5. Criteria and items of equality.
Criteria Item Score by experts
Equality E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total Average
1 The existence values of brotherhood 7 10 8 10 10 45 9.0
2 Services excellent 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
3 Avoid discrimination 9 8 10 10 10 47 9.4
4 Have the same opportunity 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
Table 6. Criteria and items of responsibility in work.
Criteria Item Score by experts
Responsible in work E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total Average
1 Trust 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
2 Working accordance with the limitations  
and responsibilities
9 10 8 10 10 47 9.4
3 Fulfill every contract demand 9 9 10 10 10 48 9.6
4 Transparency 8 9 9 10 10 46 9.2
5 Optimal for using time and expertise 8 10 10 10 10 48 9.6
6 Reducing the adverse impact of the investment 8 10 10 10 10 48 9.6
7 Integrity in the work 9 9 10 10 10 48 9.6
8 Fair competition 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
9 Accountability 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
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There was a general consensus among all respondents that 
IBI contribute to the well-being of society by providing an 
Islamic option of dealing with wealth. The stakeholder of 
IBI’s have freedom to choose or reject their services. Likewise 
the IBI’s worker have work place safety and comfortable, 
convenient of wages and workload that do not exceed the 
limit and time. And for customer or shareholder, Islamic 
banks have to make sure every profit and every loss share 
together among them. IBI’s contribute to the welfare and 
well being of society through various avenues including 
stakeholder. One of the research respondents illustrated 
this:
I agree in general with this item, because this is part 
of the professional demands. I mean professionals are 
not professionals in the Western understanding but 
professionals who uphold high ethical values that Islam 
ask to do. Good place for work, wages, education and the 
provision of reward and punishment should be balanced.
One of the respondent that give additional item to put in 
the guarantee of workers’ walfare is guarantee of insurance. 
Insurance was considered a significant item to make sure it 
is convenient for worker to be good worker in IBI.
Guarantee of enviromental sustainability criteria
Islam has clearly phohibited anything that is harmful to 
individual or hazardous to the environment. Thus, IBI do 
not deal with or finance tobacco realted businesses, as it 
is harmful. Similarly, some IBI do not finance logging 
campanies because they simply log and do not replant, 
causing harm to the ecological environment. IBI also 
required compliance to the pollution effect from businesses 
that are hazardous to the environment. Thus, it is one 
of obligation for IBI to care for the well being of society 
to guarantee enviromental sustanability for the next 
generation. The manner in which IBI implement criteria 
of Guarantee enviromental sustainability conclude in the 
following items (table 8):
The average values given by all respondents indicated 
general consensus among all respondents that IBI must 
fulfill their obligation to environment by providing 
every invesment in IBI that do not harm environment 
sustainability. One of the respondents said:
Now the Central Bank of Indonesian is conducting a 
green bank campaign. This was done gradually from 
several aspects. Currently, we are providing, financing or 
credit and do not give to the corporate that destroy the 
environment, and creating hazardous industrial waste. 
Then we also build coordination with the ministries of the 
environment. In the ministry of the environment, there is a 
grading for each other corporate. The grading in the both 
ministries are supposed to match each other. The bank 
is healthy, quite healthy, less healthy and an unhealthy, 
it would be equated with the existing corporate criteria 
on the assessment from the ministry of the environment. 
Corporate has grading, namely green, yellow, red and 
black. When corporate is green, it means the corporate 
take care of the environment. If corporate is black, this 
means corporate is really damaging the environment. …
well if black corporate is getting finance from a bank, it 
will affect the soundness of the bank. Now, this idea is being 
rolled out in the Central Bank of Indonesian. I strongly 
agree with this item
Charity for preservation of virtue
Essentially, the philosophy of Islamic banking can be fully 
understood in the context of the overall objectives of Islamic 
economic system. Many prominent Islamic economists, like 
Chapra (1985, 2000a, 2000b), Ahmad (2000), Siddiqui 
(2001) and Naqvi (2003) assert that Islamic banking is a 
subset of the overall Islamic economic system that strives 
Table 7. Criteria and items guarantee of welfare.
Criteria Item Score by experts
Guarantee of Welfare E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total Average
1 Place of work safe and comfortable 8 10 10 10 10 48 9.6
2 Free will 7 10 6 10 10 43 8.6
3 Eligible of Wages 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
4 Training and Education 8 9 10 10 10 47 9.4
5 Work does not exceed the limits and time 8 9 4 10 10 41 8.2
6 Profit and loss sharing 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
Table 8. Criteria and items guarantee of enviromental sustainability.
Criteria Item Score by experts
Guarantee of environmental sustainability E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total Average
1 To ensure that investment does not harm the environment 8 9 10 10 10 47 9.4
2 Involve an active in protecting the environment 8 9 10 10 10 47 9.4
3 Educating employees to care for and treat the environment 8 9 10 10 10 47 9.4
4 Use recycled materials to fulfill needs of the IBIs 8 5 10 4 10 37 7.4
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for a just, fair and balanced society as envisioned and 
deeply inscribed in the objectives of Shariah (Dusuki, 2008: 
6). Therefore, Islamic banking is much more than just 
refraining from charging interest and conforming to the 
legal technicalities and requirements on offering Islamic 
financial products. It is a system which aims at contributing 
to the fulfilment of the socio-economic objectives and the 
creation of a just society.
The duty of Islamic banks towards the society in which 
they operate by providing a clear expression outlined in the 
public statement of the International Association of Islamic 
Banks (IAIB):
“The Islamic Banking system involves a social implication 
which is necessarily connected with the Islamic order itself, 
and represents a special characteristic that distinguishes 
Islamic banks from other banks based on other philosophies. 
In exercising all its banking or development activities, the 
Islamic bank takes into prime consideration the social 
implications that may be brought about any decision 
or action taken by the bank. Profitability – despite its 
importance and priority – is not therefore the sole criterion 
or the prime element in evaluating the performance of 
Islamic banks, since they have to match both between the 
material and the social objectives that would serve the 
interests of the community as a whole and help achieve 
their role in the sphere of social mutual guarantee. Social 
goals are understood to form an inseparable element of the 
Islamic banking system that cannot be dispensed with or 
neglected.” (p. 27)
This statement represents the core of what the advocates of 
Islamic banking expect to do in terms of social obligations. 
The form of social obligation or social objectives from 
IBI to community can be charity for preservation of virtue. 
The manner in which IBI implement this criteria conclude 
in following items (table 9):
Items of charity for preservation of virtue above indicated 
the banking industry generally cater to segment community, 
it must care for the less fortunate in society to maintain 
equalibrium and social justice. The extent to which IBI’s 
implement this criteria of caring for the less fortunate in 
practice is explored in the following responses of research 
respondents.
I agree with five items criteria of charity for preservation 
of virtue, but my advice, for item 1 (the selection of 
invenstor...) should replace with the priority of investors 
because it is difficult for banks to choose investors who 
support the activities of social virtue, if not profitable, but 
if this priority, I think more better.
Other respondent said:
I agree with all the items, I hope Islamic banks can be a 
bank that empowers people, Islamic banks do not rely on 
any profit (profit-oriented). So we should also focus on 
empowering a good people in the finance.
But one respondent said:
I do not agree if Islamic banks come to a social bank 
for the poor, because on other side Islamic banks must 
also provide benefits to shareholders. Moreover, Islamic 
banks do not pursuit for profit alone. Islam strives for 
a balance between profit and social in every work that 
we do.
However it is ill-conceived for anyone to believe that 
Islamic banks are charitable or welfare organisations 
which only have concern for the unprivileged or to provide 
monetary assistance as requested (Rosly and Bakar, 
2003). Similarly, it is inappropriate for the management 
of Islamic banks to emphasise on the profit maximisation 
policies alone, while neglecting other social obligations 
(Haron, 1995). Instead, Islam strives for a balance 
between profit and social objectives. It is considered 
unjust for Islamic banks if they are unable to provide 
sufficient returns to depositors and shareholders who 
have entrusted them with their money. At the same time, 
Islamic banks are not supposed to make excessive profits 
at the expense of their customers or undermining and 
neglecting their social responsibility and commitments to 
their various stakeholders (Chapra, 1985; Ahmad, 2000: 
Dusuki, 2008; 7).
The empirical survey results reveal that the criteria 
of  Islamic CSR to measure CSR in IBI have systematized 
framework came out from Islamic paradigm from the 
Qur’an and Sunnah. IBI quite extensively are implemented 
principles and criteria’s Islamic CSR when practicing 
in IBI.
One of the goals of Islamic banking operations is to increase 
the economic growth towards a better and just society. 
Hopefully, the criteria and Islamic instrument of CSR in IBI 
can create a sustainable economic development. Specifically, 
improve the quality of life and alleviate poverty.
Table 9. Criteria and items of charity for preservation of virtue.
Criteria Item Score by Experts
Charity for preservation of virtue E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total Average
1 The selection of investors to support the activities for social welfare 8 10 8 5 5 36 7.2
2 Alleviate social problems (such as opening the welfare funds  
and donations)
9 10 8 10 10 47 9.4
3 Support and help fund welfare (such as helping to fund education,  
social donations, and ease the life of orphan)
9 10 8 10 10 47 9.4
4 Playing the role of welfare without looking profitability 9 10 8 10 10 47 9.4
5 The empowerment of communities through IBIs products 9 10 10 10 10 49 9.8
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6. How to implement Islamic CSR IBI’s 
in society?
Implementation of Islamic CSR in the society should be 
guided by two Islamic principles, first, the application 
of maslahah (the public good) which provides a better 
framework that managers can use when faced with 
potential conflicts arising from diverse expectations and 
interests of any corporation’s stakeholders. Secondly, CSR 
program should pay more attention to the importance of 
social capital in the society
First, the application of maslahah. Maslahah means 
something of benefit, opposite the word of mafsadat, which 
means damage or destruction. Maslahah means something 
to raise the benefits and profits (Macluf, 1976: 432). 
Maslahah consists of considerations which secure a benefit 
or prevent harm. Protection of life, religion, intellect, 
lineage and property is maslahah.
Acording to al Ghazali (1322: 286) the objective of the 
Shari`ah is to promote the well-being of all mankind, which 
lies in safeguarding their faith (al din), their human self (al 
nafs), their intellect (al `aql), their posterity (al nasl) and 
their wealth (al mal). Whatever ensures the safeguard of 
these five serves public interest and is desirable.
Al Syatibi described the objective of the Shari`ah is to 
promote the well-being of all mankind not all at one level. 
Al Syatibi and al-Ghazali divides maslahah in Shariah to 
be achieved in three levels (al Syatibi, t.th: 4, al-Ghazali, 
1322: 1: 286). First, al Dharuriyyah (the essential); second, 
al hajiyyah (the necessary); and third, al tahsiniyyah (the 
luxury).
Al Dharuriyyah: The essentials are the self-interests upon 
which people essentially depend, such as faith, life, 
intellect, posterity, and wealth, if neglected, would lead to 
hardship and appear total disruption of life’s normal order. 
Al Hajiyyah: The complementary interests supplement the 
essentials and refer to those interests that, if neglected, 
would lead to hardship but not to the total disruption of 
life’s normal order. In other words, they are needed to 
alleviate hardship so that life may be free from distress and 
predicament. Al Tahsiniyyah: The embellishments refer to 
those interests that, if realized, would lead to refinement 
and perfection in the customs and conduct of people at all 
levels of achievement (al Syatibi, t.th: 4, al Ghazali, 1322: 
1: 286, Dusuki and Irwani, 2007:32).
In the case of priority to achieve between three levels 
al dharuriyyah (essential), al hajiyyah (necessary), al 
tahsiniyyah (luxury), the Islamic scholars have agreed that 
level al tahsiniyyah and al hajiyyah have different levels, as 
well as al daruriyyah. Level al daruriyyah most necessary 
than level al hajiyyah and al tahsiniyyah. Therefore, if 
there is conflict between the benefit of al tahsiniyyah with 
al hajiyyah, al hajiyyah is preferred then al tahsiniyyah. 
Likewise, if benefits of al hajiyyah or al tahsiniyyah compete 
with al dharuriyyah, al dharuriyyah is preferred (Qarrafi, 
1925, 3: 94).
Hence, Qarrafi asserts that the above classification is 
related to and deeply rooted in the Shari`ah’s objectives 
to ensure that society’s interests are preserved in the 
best fashion both in this world and in the Hereafter. 
According to his views, such a classification implies how 
a maslahah-based methodology could be used to derive 
new rulings from the Shari`ah, meet society’s changing 
needs, and solve contemporary problems related to socio 
economic endeavours. Thus, these principles can help 
establish guidelines for moral judgments and balancing the 
individual’s self-interests with social interests. Especially 
in conditions where the Qur’an and al-Sunnah are not 
explicitly explain in detail. This framework could be basis 
reference for implementing CSR in IBI.
There are two ways for using maslahah which can be 
made by IBI to implement CSR. First, the positive side by 
performing CSR activities are for maintaining and ensuring 
the creation of mashlahah for stakeholders. And the second, 
negative side by refusing and avoiding all the possible of 
mafsadah happened or will happen in the IBI’s.
The implementation of Islamic CSR based on principle of 
maslahah, IBI can create many programs of CSR for arising 
welfare society. This principle, by implication, reflects 
how Islam stresses the importance of considering public 
interests rather than merely individual interests. It provides 
a framework for making decisions and a mechanism for 
adapting to change. Perhaps this principle can further 
contribute to delineating the role of IBI in terms of their 
CSR. It also offers guidelines for moral judgment on the 
part of managers and other stakeholders, particularly in 
solving conflicts that may arise when pursuing CSR.
Accourding to Dasuki and Irwani (2007: 35–37) applying 
the maslahah to CSR can be described to look like a pyramid 
form (figure 3) below:
Dusuki dan Irwani (2007: 37) elaborate on the first 
level (the essentials), managers are expected to strive to 
preserve and protect their stakeholders’ essential needs 
(viz., religion, life, intellect, posterity, and property) and 
the public good in general. For example, under the CSR 
precept, they must protect their employees’ welfare or basic 
needs by providing adequate prayer rooms and protecting 
the employees’ safety and health in the workplace, thereby 
reflecting their responsibility to safeguard, respectively, the 
faith and values of life. Moreover, they must confine their 
operations to those that safeguard the above-mentioned 
Al Dharuriyyah
(The essentials)
Al Hajiyyah
(The necessary)
Al
Tahsiniyyah
(The luxury)
Figure 3. The Maslahah pyramid.
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essential values. Accordingly, corporations have a moral 
and social responsibility to avoid any activities that may 
cause disruption and chaos in people’s lives, even though 
pursuing them may engender higher profits. Such examples 
include business activities that can endanger people’s lives 
and disrupt their intellects as a result of environmental 
degradation and manufacturing illicit drugs for public 
consumption.
As soon as this level’s responsibilities have been fulfilled, the 
corporations may strive for the second level: the necessary. 
Here, it is deemed beneficial to remove difficulties that may 
not pose a threat to the normal order’s survival. For example, 
these managers may want to extend their social responsibility 
commitment by extending the employees’ essential needs, 
such as fair pay and a safe workplace, to include continuous 
training and enhanced human quality programs. The latter 
is not really essential, for neglecting it does not threaten 
the employees’ continued existence. However, assuming 
such a responsibility fulfills the complementary interest of 
advancing the workers’ intellectual well-being (knowledge 
and skills). In some cases, such an effort can be considered 
one of the essentials. For example, IBI needs to provide 
adequate Shari`ah training to their employees concerning 
the offered Islamic financial instruments in order to protect 
the interests of the faith.
At the highest level, the luxury, corporations are expected 
to discharge their social responsibilities by engaging in 
activities or programs that may lead to improving and 
attaining the perfections of public life. Giving charity or 
donating to the poor and the needy, as well as offering 
scholarships to poor students and providing sufficient, 
correct, and clear information or advertisement regarding 
all products, are some of the examples of CSR commitment 
with respect to realizing this level’s goal for society.
The pyramid’s three levels are not mutually exclusive; 
rather, all levels are inter-related and mutually dependent. 
The arrows pointing upward and downward reveal the 
flexibility and mechanism of change in the decision-making 
process, in the sense that any element comprising one level 
of maslahah may be elevated upward or pushed downward, 
depending on the different circumstances concerning 
the public at large. However, it should be noted that such 
flexibility is confined within the Shari`ah’s framework, and 
not vice versa.
This reflects the pyramid’s dynamism in assisting the 
decision-making process within each different context, 
time, and space. For instance, if circumstances change and 
corporations are encouraged to respond and, as a result, 
reconsider their roles within society, this will necessitate 
a realignment of their business institutions (e.g., mission, 
vision, policy deployment, decision making, reporting, 
and corporate affairs) to the new maslahah, so long as it 
does not contradict the Shari`ah’s principles (Dusuki and 
Irwani, 2007: 39).
The maslahah pyramid above can be used as frame of 
reference for CSR managers in IBI’s products of CSR for IBI’s 
stakeholders. CSR which refers to maslahah based on three 
levels of urgency that must be achieved. Maslahah reflects 
the urgency level of importance that should be achieved in 
the implementation of CSR. Lowest level is al dharuriyyah, 
which is the first and most major accomplishment to be 
achieved in the implementation of CSR. The second level 
al hajiyyah achieved when the first level al dharuriyyah 
have been fulfilled completely, as well as the third level 
al tahsiniyyah accomplishment after the first and second 
levels have been done (Qarrafi, 1925).
The maslahah pyramid, which functions as a framework and 
a general guideline to an ethical filter mechanism, provides 
managers with three levels of judgment to resolve the 
ethical conflicts that inadvertently emerge while applying 
CSR programs and initiatives. The levels also reflect the 
different degrees of importance in terms of responsibility 
fulfillment. The bottom level, the essentials, constitutes the 
most fundamental responsibility to be fulfilled, as compared 
to the complementary and the embellishments categories.
Secondly, CSR program should pay more attention to the 
importance of social capital in the society. 
Since in the beginning of 1990s where some influential 
works emerged (Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 
1995), in the various field of social sciences, analysis of 
social capital has grown with the perceived importance 
of their impact on socio-economic outcomes (Yamamura. 
2008). I will consider the role played by social capital 
in implementing Islamic CSR for IBI mainly from the 
standpoint of economics welfare.
Social capital is defined as features of social organization, 
such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action 
(Putnam 1993; 167). Social capital thus seems to play a 
critical role in preventing agents from taking opportunistic 
behavior, raising efficiency and so promoting the economic 
development (Hayami 2001).
Ostrom (1993) states the development utilizes social capital 
for the community’s to show better result. Social capital 
is one of the prerequisites for the success of development 
programs in community. Ostrom view’s have relevant with 
the research was conducted by Ohama (2001), Fukuyama 
(2000), Badaruddin (2006, 2008) and Ibrahim (2006). 
Therefore, implementation of Islamic CSR in IBI through 
micro-finance by utilizing the potential of social culture for 
local communities will provide high benefit impact to fulfill 
the basic needs of the community.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this study is to examine the criteria and Islamic 
instrument of CSR towards the creation of a sustainable 
economic development. Specifically, the study analyse 
the various approaches to improve the quality of life and 
alleviate poverty, and the methods of applying Islamic 
instruments to CSR programs in Islamic banking. Based on 
the review of literature and findings from in depth interview 
with the experts from the Indonesian Islamic banking, the 
study reveals that there are six (6) fundamental criteria and 
34 items considered as critical for CSR to make an impact 
on the society.
Implementation of Islamic CSR principles in IBI based on 
Qur’an and Sunnah in the whole Islamic banking activities 
will be a vein that drives the economy of the people, not 
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just profits for shareholders alone, but affect the larger 
environment for economic empowerment of society 
through all CSR practices.
Therefore, Then application of Islamic CSR in the society 
should be guided by two Islamic principles, first, the 
application of maslahah (the public good) which provides 
a better framework that managers can use when faced with 
potential conflicts arising from diverse expectations and 
interests of any corporation’s stakeholders. Secondly, CSR 
program should pay more attention to the importance of 
social capital in the society.
Notes
1. Emerging deals of CSR began from the United States 
in the 1970s. Corporations in America receive criticism 
from the community because they are powerful and 
that is considered anti-social. The spirit of corporations 
is to eliminate competitiveness in business and refuse 
the role of law and sometimes corporations can affect 
the law for their interest. Hence some corporations 
recognize the impact of criticism from the community. 
They advice to businessmen and corporations is to use 
their power to achieve social goals and work not only 
for profit. This approach produces new entrepreneurs 
in the business world. This idea is known as CSR 
(Frederick, et.al., 1988:28).
2. The stakeholders are the parties interested in and 
responsible for the existence of the corporation and 
have an influence on the decisions made. These include 
employees, suppliers, consumers; governments act as 
the makers (regulators), community and corporate 
owners (Frederick, et. al., 1988:77).
3. According to Clarkson, corporate stakeholders  can 
be divided into  two groups; namely, primary 
stakeholders and secondary stakeholders. The primary 
stakeholders  are the parties who have an interest  in 
economics to the corporate and bear the risk of losses as 
investors, creditors, workers and communities.  The 
government also included in the primary stakeholder 
groups, although  not directly, have economic ties,  but 
relations between them  are more transactional.  The 
second form is secondary stakeholders, namely the nature 
of their relationship is not determined by this group of 
stakeholders. Examples of secondary stakeholders  are 
the media and interest groups such as community social 
and unions (Clarkson, 1995:92–117).
4. In Islam, the word has two meanings sadaqah. Sadaqah 
first significant donation to charity, and required that 
both voluntary donations as charitable contributions.
5. Qard Hasan is good credit who do not take advantage. 
Total amount of loan repayments in accordance with 
the loaned property.
6. In the Al Qu’ran, Allah mentions in at least 64 section, 
which describes an important donation to charity. As of 
2:43, 83, 110, 177, 215, 263, 264, 270, 271, 273, 274, 
276, 277, 280, 4:77, 114, 162, 5:12, 45, 55, 7: 156, and 
others.
7. Fard kifayah mean anythings societies are obliged to 
possess, though the task of acquiring them may be left to 
certain individuals or groups. Implicit in the meaning of 
this category of knowledge or obligation is that without 
it a society would lack something that is important to its 
well-being.
8. Consists of 10 principles and four categories (human 
right, labor, environment and anti-corruption).
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Abstract - This paper seeks to explore the level of support investors attach to the social responsibility 
dimension in Islamic investment. The call to address this ‘neglected’ dimension as observed in the 
practice of Islamic finance is emphasized in the face of the rapidly growing Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) industry in the West and other developed markets, where various social, ethical, 
and environmental considerations are central to the investment decision. The empirical analysis 
of the paper is based on a survey conducted on Malaysian investors of Islamic funds from three 
leading fund management companies. The overall result reveals that the investors in general place 
a hierarchy in the elements they considered important; the observance of fiqh injunctions is ranked 
as the most important consideration, followed by economic and social responsibility dimensions. 
The findings are based on both the descriptive analysis and the composite scales constructed 
as a result of an exploratory factor analysis, which provide statistical evidence on the nature of 
social responsibility dimensions being acknowledged by the respondents as part of an important 
underlying factor in their investment decision. Despite being overpowered by the economic aspect, 
the findings suggest that social responsibility criteria in investment are perceived as important by 
a majority of the investors, and substantial proportion of the respondents consider the dimension 
to be as equally or more important than the economic dimension. Further analysis reveals that 
the level of importance investors attached to the social responsibility dimension is determined by 
ethnicity, religion, level of commitment to Shariah principles in investment, income, age, level 
of SRI awareness, as well as gender, marital status and participation in pro-social activities. The 
favorable attitude of the respondents on the importance of social responsibility issues can be an 
encouraging precursor to the incorporation of these concerns into Islamic investment practices.
Keywords: social responsibility; ethical and Islamic investment; Islamic economics and finance
1. Introduction
Recent debates on the development and practice of Islamic 
finance have highlighted the increasing divergence between 
the economics literature on Islamic finance and the actual 
practice of the industry players. Despite the progress made 
and the growing maturity of the industry, critics argue 
that the pursuit of profit maximisation and commercial 
orientation of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) often 
override the supposed faith-based ethical principles which 
had formed its underlying foundation. Moreover, while 
Shariah encompasses a holistic outlook of the system of 
life in Islam, many have expressed that the operation of 
Islamic financial services have been pre-dominantly shaped 
by a ‘legalistic’ outlook and have been considered by some 
as a ‘prohibition driven’ industry. This has led to the call 
for Islamic finance to address broader social responsibility 
outlook beyond the traditional legal compliance, in line 
with the normative goals of Islamic moral economy and the 
Maqasid as-Shariah (the higher objectives of the Shariah).
This paper attempts to explore such discussion, within the 
context of Islamic investment, which has gained tremendous 
growth and developed into a strong and viable area in the 
Islamic financial services industry. The call to address social 
responsibility concerns especially in the field of Islamic 
investment is further emphasized in the face of the rapidly 
growing Socially Responsible Investment Industry (SRI) in 
the West and other developed markets, which use various 
social, ethical, and environmental issues in their investment 
criteria in effort to promote socially responsible and 
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sustainable behavior among corporations. Although Islamic 
investment is founded by a totally different worldview and 
ethical foundation, Islam strongly shares the concerns 
towards social, ethical and environmental issues, and the 
incorporation of such concerns in Islamic investment will 
bring the industry to a new height and move it closer to the 
idealized aspiration of Islamic economics. Nevertheless, 
the viability of such an investment approach will ultimately 
depend on the favorable acceptance of the idea among 
investors. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is 
to investigate the perceptions in terms of the importance 
investors attached to the social responsibility dimension in 
Islamic investment and to explore the factors that influence 
this. The article starts by reviewing the Islamic investment 
industry, the prevalent nature of complying with the fiqh 
injunctions (as compared to its spirit and objective), and 
the prospect of incorporating broader aspects of social 
responsibility in the investment process in line with the 
experience of SRI. The paper continues with the description 
of the research methods, followed by a detailed analysis 
of a questionnaire survey on the issue conducted in 2009 
on Malaysian investors of Islamic funds. The last section 
highlights the main findings and concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
The defining feature of Islamic investment practices, which 
are also applicable in all of the sub-sectors of Islamic finance, 
is based on the ethical principles embodied in the Shariah 
(Islamic legal and ethical system), where its underlying 
objective are generally aimed at realizing overall human 
wellbeing and social justice. Some of the salient Shariah 
injunctions strictly observed in Islamic investment practices 
include the prohibition in all activities and transactions 
involving the elements of riba’ (interest), gharar (excessive 
uncertainty), maysir (gambling) and all other types of 
activities and transactions which are considered unethical 
or harmful as deemed by the Shariah. Such prohibitions 
necessarily remove sectors like conventional banking and 
insurance, gaming, alcohol, non-halal meat production, 
tobacco, entertainment, weapon and genetic biotechnology 
from the Shariah-approved investable universe. Similarly, 
conventionally structured financial products such as bonds, 
derivatives as well as excessively speculative transactions 
are also considered as Shariah repugnant (Wilson, 2004; 
Derigs and Marzban, 2008).
The desirability features of equity participation, where 
risks and returns are shared among different parties in a 
productive venture, naturally render common shares of 
companies in the capital market as readily legitimate forms 
of investment instruments. While it is almost unanimous 
among the contemporary Shariah experts that the equities 
of  companies where all of its transactions are in full 
conformity  with Shariah (including that the company 
neither borrows money on interest nor keeps its surplus 
in an interest  bearing account) can be purchased, held 
and sold  without any hindrance, the contention among 
the Shariah scholars focuses on the status of companies 
with lawful core business activities, but mixed with some 
impure sources of income or financing (Usmani, 1998). 
In a comprehensive review of the major resolutions and 
scholarly opinions on the issue, Yaquby (2000) concluded 
that the opinion of those arguing for permissibility is “closer 
to the truth.” His observation is based on the “strength of the 
sources they have cited from jurisprudence ( fiqh) provisions 
and legal principles,” as well as the wider acceptance of its 
permissibility among the Shariah scholars, including those 
who had previously argued against it (Yaquby, 2000). Other 
justifications being cited include serving the common interest 
of the public as well as the Islamic financial  institutions 
to participate in such a vital economic activity, as well as 
having the benefit of propagating the message and ethical 
principles of Islam globally.
Such acceptance however, comes with a number of Shariah 
parameters, which need to be strictly observed in the 
investment process. These parameters address some issues 
of concern from the Shariah point of view, particularly on 
the sources of income from unacceptable business activities, 
including incidental interest income from cash or cash-
equivalent assets of the companies; the prohibition against 
the interest-based financing of the business activities; and 
the prohibition of the sale of debt to a third party and the 
exchange of cash-like assets at values different from its par 
value. These criteria provide the threshold in which equities 
within the tolerable limit of the parameters are identified 
as Shariah-compliant securities. In order to ensure that 
returns from such investment are pure and legitimate, a 
process of “cleansing” or “purification” must be done to 
remove the elements of mixed sources of income, which 
are tolerated earlier. Therefore, despite some leniency on 
the permissibility status of companies with mixed business 
activities and income for investment, particularly in 
facilitating the common interest of the public and Islamic 
financial institutions to participate in such economic 
activity, the Shariah is very clear that Muslim investors 
must not benefit in any way from activities or transactions 
repugnant to the Shariah. Thus, if there exists some income 
from unacceptable business activities or interest-bearing 
accounts, the proportion of such income must be “cleansed” 
or “purified” usually through the channeling of such portion 
from the dividend received from the shares holding of the 
company, to charitable organizations or purposes.
These Shariah parameters and processes have been 
widely adopted and practiced by various institutions and 
index providers, including the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index (DJIMI) and FTSE Global Islamic Index Series. 
This development provides the industry standard in the 
methodology and processes for Shariah screening of 
equities. In general, these screening norms are known as 
sector (qualitative) and financial (quantitative) filters. 
Table 1 summarizes the salient features of such filters and 
the Shariah issues of concern addressed by such criteria.
While Shariah encompasses a holistic outlook of the system 
of life in Islam, it is apparent that the screening norms 
practiced by the industry emphasizes the “normative 
validity” of Islamic law, distinct from the notion of ethics 
and morality (Cattelan, 2010). Apart from the criteria 
related to weapon and genetic bio-technology adopted by 
some institutions, other sector screens focus on the “sin” 
activities considered as major prohibitions in Islam. All 
the three financial filters in one way or another, address 
the strict prohibition on the various forms of exposure to 
riba in the investment process. While such a legalistic and 
exclusionary approach is a necessary step, many scholars 
and commentators of Islamic finance have argued that it 
is insufficient in realizing the underlying objective of the 
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Table 1. Screening norms of Shariah-based investment.
Filter Shariah Issues of Concern Industry Norms1
Sector: Main  
business activities
–Business activities and transactions  
involving riba’, gharar, maysir,  
excessive speculation, and other activities 
or transactions repugnant to the Shariah 
are strictly prohibited.
–All securities with unlawful core  
business activities are excluded from  
the list of permissible securities;  
conventional financial services and  
products, insurance, gambling, liquor, 
production/ 
distribution of non-halal meat, hotels,  
entertainment services unacceptable in  
Shariah, tobacco, and some weapons and  
genetic bio-technology.
Sector: Mixed  
business activities
Lawful core business activities but  
mixed with some impermissible  
activities; discussions have been 
contentious among the Shariah  
scholars on the issue; many have  
accepted its permissibility (with 
relevant parameters) based on  
legal juristic opinion and present 
circumstances of the market and  
the industry.
Tolerable threshold of mixed income from  
impermissible activities were adopted to  
limit the exposure to such elements;  
e.g. total impure income must not exceed  
5% from the total revenue.
Financial: Interest  
ratio
Receiving interest income is  
unlawful, even if such income  
is not generated from its main  
business activity.
Interest income must be very negligible;  
both the combined unlawful income from  
mixed activities and interest income must  
not exceed 5% of total revenue; alternatively,  
ratio of liquid assets (e.g. cash, receivables  
and short-term investment) that can generate 
interest income over total assets/market  
capitalization is also used, e.g. must  
not exceed 33%.
Financial: Liquidity  
ratio
Concerns with the presence of  
substantial elements of liquid assets,  
e.g. accounts receivables,  
cash or cash equivalent, and  
short-term investment of the  
company; the prohibition of the  
sale of debt to a third party;  
money can only be exchange  
at par value; real assets must  
constitute a substantial  
component of the total assets.
The accepted level of liquid assets to total  
assets/market capitalization of a company  
varies between institutions and index  
providers; ranges from 33% to 80%.
Financial: Debt ratio Payment of interest is also  
unlawful; financing business  
activities using interest-based  
transactions is problematic; any  
involvement in such financing  
activities must be kept minimal.
The sum of total debt of a company  
must not represent more than 33%  
of the total asset/market capitalization.
Source: Summarised from Usmani (1998), Yaquby (2000), and Derigs and Marzban (2008).
Shariah and the normative goals of Islamic economics 
(Siddiqi, 1999, 2004; El-Gamel, 2006; Wilson, 2004; 
Lewis, 2010). Despite the fact that there were some 
recommendations to prohibit investing in companies with 
harmful policies, such as unfair treatment of workers 
and detrimental environmental actions (Yaquby, 2000), 
concerns have yet to make their way into mainstream 
Islamic investment practices.
It is interesting to note that the Western ethical and socially 
responsible investment (SRI) industry, originates from 
almost similar exclusionary screening of “sin” activities 
and evolves towards integrating broader social and 
environmental issues. In line with the holistic nature of 
Shariah, and its underlying objectives, it is imperative that 
the Islamic investment practices move to a new phase of 
development, where ethical and social responsibility issues 
are incorporated in the decision making process. The 
mainstreaming of SRI and the growing concern towards 
social responsibility issues globally has made it even more 
imperative for Islamic investment to incorporate such 
concerns. In the face of the increasing criticisms levelled 
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against the practice of Islamic finance, the move towards 
incorporating broader principles of Islamic ethics in the 
investment process seems to be a promising answer to this 
predicament (El-Gamel, 2006), and perhaps opening the 
way towards breaking the so-called “formalist deadlock” 
of Islamic finance (Bazl, 2010). Recent development shows 
encouraging gestures by the industry’s leading players 
in this respect. In the recent 11th International Islamic 
Finance Forum in Dubai, one of the largest gatherings 
of world’s leaders in Islamic finance, the issue of linking 
Islamic finance with microfinance and poverty eradication 
programs has been the highlight. Prior to that, in 2006, 
the same forum had emphasized the need for the Islamic 
investment industry to incorporate moral and social 
dimensions into its investment criteria in addition to other 
rules (Zawya.com, 2006). In other words, despite its 
compliance with Shariah principles, which mainly shun 
certain impermissible activities, the Islamic finance sector, 
including Islamic investment, should do more to encourage 
and promote socially responsible practices.
One important example of such an initiative in the context 
of Islamic investment is the launch of Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Sustainability Index. The criteria used for the index 
incorporate both the Shariah compliant principles and 
sustainability criteria, where the constituents of the index 
are required to pass both the screening process of the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market and the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index respectively. As described by the index provider, 
this is mainly a response to the repeated inquiries from 
asset managers who wish to integrate Islamic investment 
principles with the social, ethical and environmental 
criteria (Dow Jones and SAM Group, 2006). While this 
initiative can be considered to be an important milestone 
in this respect, the consideration for broader SEE issues 
are still lacking among Islamic financial institutions, and 
investment products that incorporate such concerns are 
still very rare in the market of Muslim countries. As the 
SRI industry is said to be a consumer driven phenomenon 
(Schueth, 2003), the support of investors on the issues is 
the key to the success of such investment products.
3. Data and research method
3.1 Instrument
In the light of the previous discussions, it is pertinent to 
obtain the perceptions and opinion of investors on the 
scope and the notion of Shariah principles subscribed in 
Islamic investment. The recognition of the importance 
of social responsibility commitment among the investors 
as part and parcel of the principles of the Shariah would 
therefore increase the support for social responsibility 
issues to be applied in the investment decision of Islamic 
investment products. For this purpose, respondents were 
surveyed on the elements that they perceive as important 
to be considered when investing based on Shariah 
principles. When commenting on the scope of Shariah 
supervision of Islamic funds, DeLorenzo (2004:16) 
highlights three different classes of rewards expected of 
Islamic investing: spiritual, financial and social. While the 
spiritual reward of the investors is frequently associated 
with the acknowledgement of the Shariah imperative and 
its compliance in the investment process, such compliance 
has been pre-dominantly focussed on the fiqh injunctions 
and the negative screening strategy. The social aspect 
of Islamic investing, however, would address broader 
ethical and environmental concerns and require not only 
exclusionary, but also positive screening, advocacy and 
engagement strategies with companies (DeLorenzo, 2004; 
Wilson, 2004), and the rewards will be experience as a 
result of the positive contribution and policies of such 
companies to the society. On the other hand, pecuniary 
returns from investment should not be limited to financial 
reward alone, as broader economic benefits can be realized 
when investment is efficiently used and allocated.
Based on the above, the three concerns – i.e., fiqh 
injunctions, economic, and social responsibility – are 
believed to be an appropriate characterisation of what is 
expected of a holistic approach in the practice of Islamic 
investment. For this purpose, a total of ten criteria were 
identified and selected that constitute various Shariah 
prohibitions normally used in investment screening criteria, 
aspects of risks-returns and efficient use of resources (as 
normally the concerns in any investment), as well as social 
responsibility issues often promoted in the literature of 
Islamic economics such as poverty eradication, social 
welfare and care about the environment. The items were 
measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = not 
important at all, to 5 = very important.
The questionnaire also gathers other important data of the 
respondents such as their socio-demographic information, 
commitment to Shariah principles in investment, pro-
social behaviors that they consistently participated in, 
and some investment related characteristics, such as their 
main investment objective, risk-return attitude and their 
level of SRI awareness. This information will then be 
used as potential explanatory variables to understand the 
respondents’ perceptions about the level of importance of 
social responsibility dimension in Islamic investment.
3.2 Respondents
The study involved a survey of investors in Islamic 
funds using a purposive sampling method from 3 fund 
management companies in Malaysia: Public Mutual 
Berhad (215 respondents), CIMB-Principal Asset 
Management Berhad (141 respondents) and Prudential 
Fund Management Berhad (95 respondents), with a 
total of 451 respondents. The three fund management 
companies represent different company sizes operating 
in the Malaysian unit trust industry. The survey was 
conducted between January and March 2009, through a 
network of agents and agency branches of the three fund 
management companies located in different areas of Kuala 
Lumpur, the financial center of Malaysia. In general, the 
sample reflects a wide representation of various groups in 
terms of its socio-demographic variables such as gender, 
ethnicity, religion, age, marital status, income, educational 
level and occupation. Male respondents constitute 58.1 
percent of the total sample, while female respondents are 
41.9 per cent. Apart from the responses received from the 
Malay ethnic group, which constitutes about 80 percent of 
the total respondents, the survey also included a total of 
73 (16.2%) respondents from the Chinese ethnic group, 
and 17 (3.8%) from the Indian ethnic group. In terms of 
religion, a total of 363 (80.7%) respondents were Muslims, 
43 (9.6%) were Buddhist, 29 (6.4%) were Christians, and 
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11 (2.4%) were Hindus. A cross tabulation of ethnicity by 
religion shows that all Malay respondents were Muslim, 
while another 3 Muslim respondents came from the Indian 
ethnicity. As the distribution of investors in Islamic funds 
across ethnicities and religions in the Malaysian market 
is not known, a direct comparison between the sample 
and the population could not be made. Nevertheless, the 
participation of investors from other faiths contributes to a 
comprehensive outlook by the study and is representative 
of the actual population. On another note, it appears 
that Islamic investment products are also marketable and 
consumed by fellow Malaysians from other faiths. The bulk 
of the respondents were also from middle-aged groups, 
middle and high income earners, and educated individuals, 
which is consistent with the segment of the market for such 
financial products.
Another important piece of information collected from the 
survey is related to the proportion of funds the respondents 
invested in Islamic funds in comparison to the overall unit 
trust investment. In the context of Muslim investors, this will 
reflect their commitment in observing Shariah principles in 
their investment decision. As seen in past SRI studies, it is 
common for SRI investors to have SRI based investments 
and at the same time holding in other non-SRI related 
investment (Nilsson, 2008; Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000). 
Some considered this behavior as an attempt to balance 
two conflicting motives; to avoid the feeling of guilt if not 
acting in a way that is in line with their ethical conviction 
while at the same time not wishing to substantially sacrifice 
financial returns on investment. In other words, such 
pragmatic behavior is consistent with the principle of “not 
putting all the eggs in one basket,” even if this involved 
matter of conviction or principles (Lewis, 2001). For 
this purpose, the respondents are categorized into three 
categories, with the non-Muslim investors constituting the 
first group, while the Muslim investors are divided between 
“pragmatic” and “committed” investors, based on their 
commitment to comply with Shariah principles in their 
choice of investment.
As seen in Table  2, from a total of 413 respondents who 
provide information on the pattern of their investment 
between Islamic and conventional funds, a total of 202 
(48.9%) investors, including 3 non-Muslim investors 
invest all their unit trust investment in Islamic funds. The 
remaining investors have varying percentages of their 
overall investment held between Islamic and conventional 
funds, including a total of 131 (31.7%) Muslim investors. 
This suggests that while religion (Islam) may be a strong 
factor in guiding the investment decision for some Muslim 
investors (i.e., the committed investors), it does not 
provide sufficient influence over others (i.e., the pragmatic 
investors) in complying with the Shariah principles in their 
investment decision.
4. Analysis and findings
4.1 Criteria perceived as important in Islamic 
investment
The analysis starts by presenting the descriptive results on 
the level of perceived importance of the ten criteria included 
in the questionnaire among the respondents. Table 3 shows 
the frequencies, mean and standard deviation of the criteria 
ranked according to their level of importance perceived by 
the investors using the mean scores of each item. It is quite 
apparent that the top three criteria are dominated by the 
fiqh injunction on the prohibitions of elements repugnant to 
Shariah, namely “not be involved in the production or sales 
of haram products,” “not be involved in gambling related 
activities,” and “not be involved in entertainment activities 
that are not acceptable in Shariah” with a mean score of 
4.572, 4.533, and 4.390, respectively. This is then followed 
by three economically-driven criteria, which include 
“manage risk prudently” (4.359), “maximize returns on 
investment” (4.340), and “use resources efficiently” (4.219). 
However, despite the fact that the trademark of Islamic 
finance is the interest-free system, the criterion of “not 
be involved in conventional financial services” only came 
seventh in the ranking with a mean of 4.171. The last three 
Table 2. Commitment to Shariah principles based on the percentage invested in Islamic funds in comparison to overall 
investment.
Commitment to Shariah Principles in Investment
Non-Muslim  
investors
Pragmatic  
investors
Committed  
investors Total
Percentage  
invested in  
Islamic funds
Less than 20% 13 
(35.1%)
24 
(64.9%)
0 
(.0%)
37  
(9.0%)
20–39% 17 
(34.0%)
33 
(66.0%)
0 
(.0%)
50  
(12.1%)
40–59% 27 
(57.4%)
20 
(42.6%)
0 
(.0%)
47  
(11.4%)
60–79% 19 
(38.8%)
30 
(61.2%)
0 
(.0%)
49  
(11.9%)
80–99% 4 
(14.3%)
24 
(85.7%)
0 
(.0%)
28  
(6.8%)
100% 3 
(1.5%)
0 
(.0%)
199 
(98.5%)
202 
(48.9%)
Total 83 
(20.1%)
131 
(31.7%)
199 
(48.2%)
413 
(100.0%)
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items in the mean rank constitute those criteria related to 
the social responsibility aspect of investment. These include 
“contribute to poverty eradication” (4.164), “contribute 
positively to the development of the society” (4.118), and 
“care about the impact to environment” (3.991).
The overall results as shown in Table  3  reveal several 
interesting patterns with respect to the ranking of the 
items. Except for “not be involved in conventional financial 
services,” all the other three items representing the major 
prohibitions in Shariah were ranked highly. Looking at the 
values of the standard deviation, it is quite apparent that 
among the four items representing the fiqh injunctions 
of the Shariah, “not be involved in conventional financial 
services” recorded the highest value of 0.9798. In fact, this 
value is the highest standard deviation measure for the 
whole ten items. This suggests that the perceived importance 
of the prohibition of interest-based transactions in Islamic 
investment registers greater variation in the responses. 
Perhaps such phenomenon can be explained on several 
grounds. First, unlike issues related to the production 
or consumption of “haram” products (liquor, pork, etc.), 
gambling and unacceptable entertainment (pornography, 
pubs, etc.), which are traditionally and culturally recognized 
as major sins in Islam (for both Muslims and Non-Muslims), 
the banning of interest is less comprehensible in terms of its 
unethical nature and harmful outcome. In fact, there is the 
practice of some government funds that claimed to invest 
ethically by excluding industries like gambling, liquor, 
pornography and some other related criteria, but still invest 
in companies related to conventional financial services 
(Pitluck, 2008). Secondly, while the Islamic financial 
products and services have been offered in the market for 
quite some time, and has experienced tremendous growth, 
the market share of interest-free products in the Malaysian 
market is still relatively small as compared to its interest-
based counterpart. The fact is Malaysia is practicing a dual 
system where conventional interest-based and Islamic 
banking systems operate in parallel and the pre-dominant 
nature of the former on the latter has perhaps made such 
practices common place in the financial dealings among 
the masses and has neutralized their perception on the 
strict prohibition of Islam against all forms of interest. In 
addition, note that the respondents involved in the study 
include investors from other faiths; and even among 
the Muslim investors, sizeable numbers held different 
proportions of their total investment in conventional 
funds. If such practice is also prevalent in other aspects of 
finance such as in banking and insurance, it is likely that 
these types of investors may also have use interest-based 
conventional financial service, and therefore be further 
desensitizing their attitude towards the importance of such 
prohibition. Whether or not the importance of the criterion 
of “not be involved in conventional financial services” is 
considered as distinct from the other type of prohibitions 
will be examined in later in the analysis.
Another interesting pattern emerging from the mean 
scores of the ten items is the fact that the criteria related 
to economic aspect were consistently rank higher from 
the three criteria representing the social responsibility 
dimension. This would imply that after complying with 
the fiqh injunctions, the next most important criteria as 
perceived by the investors would be related to economic 
consideration, such as prudent risk management, 
maximization of returns, and efficient use of resources. 
Table 3. Level of importance attached to criteria related to Islamic investment.
Items
Not  
important  
at all
Not  
important Neutral Important
Very  
important Mean
Std.  
deviation N
Not be involved in the  
manufacture or sale of  
prohibited products
6 9 31 80 323 4.570 0.8156 449
Not be involved in gambling  
related activities
6 9 36 74 295 4.531 0.8498 420
Not be involved in  
entertainment  
activities which are not  
permissible in Shariah
6 13 46 118 266 4.392 0.8826 449
Manage risks prudently 0 7 43 180 219 4.361 0.7189 449
Maximise returns from  
investment
1 6 40 195 206 4.337 0.7144 448
Use resources efficiently 0 17 55 190 188 4.220 0.8026 450
Not be involved in  
conventional  
financial services
7 24 69 134 214 4.170 0.9798 448
Contribute to poverty  
eradication
1 13 70 194 172 4.162 0.8053 450
Contribute positively to the  
development of the society
2 21 75 176 175 4.116 0.8788 449
Care about the impact to the  
environment
3 21 98 181 147 3.996 0.8904 450
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On the other hand, among the three items representing 
the social responsibility dimension, “contribute to poverty 
eradication” is rank the highest, followed by “contribute 
positively to the development of the society” and “care 
about the impact to the environment.” This is in line with 
the literature in Islamic economics, where issues related 
to poverty eradication received paramount attention and 
urgency.
Despite being at the lower end of the ranking, the mean score 
of the three criteria representing the social responsibility 
dimension, in its absolute terms, are within the range 
of “important” and “very important.” In fact, if based on 
the frequencies as presented in Table  3, the percentage 
of investors who consider the criteria either as important 
or very important is around 81 percent for “contribute to 
poverty eradication,” 78 percent for “contribute positively 
to the development of the society,” and 73 percent for “care 
about the impact to the environment.” Therefore, it can be 
safely said that despite the lower ranking of the items, these 
social responsibility criteria are still perceived as part of an 
important element in Islamic investment by a significant 
majority of the respondents.
4.2 Validating the underlying dimensions
The analysis on the perceived importance of social 
responsibility dimension in Islamic investment proceeds 
with an exploratory factor analysis on the ten items as 
presented in Table  2. In this context, the analysis would 
reveal whether the social responsibility dimension is 
recognized by the respondents as one of the distinctive 
factors in Islamic investment criteria. Subsequently, the 
results can then be used to investigate the importance of 
the social responsibility dimension in comparison to other 
dimensions and whether there is any significant difference 
in the perceived importance of social responsibility 
dimension among various investor groups. Analysis enables 
the use of the underlying factor as a composite measure 
(as opposed of using the individual items), therefore 
rendering subsequent analysis more parsimonious (Hair 
et al., 1998).
Before running the exploratory factor analysis, statistical 
tests were employed to determine the appropriateness of 
the data in terms of its sample adequacy and the strength of 
inter-correlation. The KMO measure shows a value of .891, 
which indicates a “meritorious” sample adequacy according 
to the Kaiser (1974) scale, and hence is deemed appropriate 
for factor analysis. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity also 
reaches statistical significance (0.000), supporting the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. Subsequent to this, 
an exploratory factor analysis was employed to the ten 
items as previously presented in Table 3. Given the nature 
of the data and the variables, principle axis factoring was 
employed for the extraction, and direct oblimin was chosen 
as the rotation technique as recommended by Costello & 
Osborne (2005).
As shown in Table  4, the rotated factor solution reveals 
three strong factor models with all the ten items exhibiting 
large factor loadings (above 0.3). Variables with factor 
loadings smaller than ±0.3 are normally considered not 
significant and therefore were suppressed in the table for 
easy interpretation. In brief, the exploratory factor analysis 
employed above verifies the existence of three underlying 
Table 4. Factor analysis-pattern matrix and commonalities.
Variable
Factor
Communality 
of Each  
Variable
1  
(Social  
Responsibility)
2  
(Fiqh  
Injunctions)
3 
(Economic)
Contribute positively to the  
development of the society
.918 .813
Care about the impact to the  
environment
.781 .719
Contribute to poverty eradication .556 .657
Not be involved in gambling related  
activities
-.948 .833
Not be involved in the manufacture  
or sale of prohibited products
-.889 .791
Not be involved in entertainment  
activities which are not permissible  
in Shariah
-.823 .729
Not be involved in conventional  
financial services
-.550 .482
Manage risks prudently .880 .723
Use resources efficiently .633 .690
Maximise returns from investment .552 .510
Average Commonalities
Post Rotation Eigenvalue 3.965 4.244 4.137
Cumulative% of Variance Explained 69.459
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dimensions, which “drive or control” the values of the 
variables that are being measured. All of the items load 
heavily to their respective factors as anticipated (based 
on the a priori factor structure), and are therefore named 
accordingly as “social responsibility,” “fiqh injunctions,” 
and “economic factor,” respectively.
The result of the factor analysis has also provided the statistical 
evidence on the nature of the criterion of “not be involved in 
conventional financial services” in relation to other criteria 
related to the fiqh injunctions. Note that the initial descriptive 
analysis (Table 3) has shown that the item was not perceived 
as important as the other criteria of Shariah prohibitions 
by the respondents and therefore might be perceived as 
representing a distinctly different underlying factor. However, 
the factor analysis has shown that not only are the items 
clustered together with the three other fiqh injunctions, but 
the criterion also show strong loading to the factor (.550). 
Therefore, despite having a relatively lower mean score, 
the factor analysis confirms the unidimensionality of the 
four items, suggesting that the respondents perceived these 
criteria as constituting the same construct.
4.3 Comparing the perceived importance of social 
responsibility dimension with other dimensions
4.3.1 Overall comparison
Given that the unidimensionality of each dimension has 
been established, it is possible now to construct a reliable 
scale that represents each of the dimensions. For additional 
confirmation, reliability tests using Cronbach’s Alpha are 
also conducted for all the three factors. Based on the above, 
three separate scales were constructed by computing 
the average of the individual scores of the constituent 
items for each of the three factors. The mean scores and 
other statistics for the three scales, which represent the 
three dimensions, is shown in Table  5 for the purpose of 
comparison.
The overall results show that the consideration of the fiqh 
injunctions is regarded as the most important dimension, 
with an overall mean of 4.416. This is followed by the 
economic and social responsibility dimensions with a mean 
of 4.306 and 4.093, respectively. This pattern of importance 
can also be seen from the values of the median and quartiles 
of the three dimensions, and is consistent with the earlier 
analysis based on the ten individual items (section  4.1). 
The hierarchy of importance between the three dimensions 
is further examined using the Friedman test. As can be 
seen from Table 5, the statistical result is highly significant, 
confirming the ordered ranking between the fiqh injunctions, 
economic and social responsibility dimensions.
4.3.2 Perceived importance of social responsibility 
dimension vis-a-vis economic dimension
Literature in the SRI industry has emphasised the presence 
of interaction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
returns faced by SRI investors in their investment decision. 
Therefore, it will be interesting to compare the degree 
of importance investors attach to social responsibility 
dimension vis-à-vis the economic dimension in the 
context of Islamic investment. In doing so, a new variable 
is computed by subtracting the economic scale from the 
social responsibility scale. This new variable will provide 
additional information in terms of the measurement of 
the importance of the social responsibility dimension in 
relation to the economic dimension.
Table 6 shows the frequency of this variable. For the sake 
of simplicity, this newly computed variable is known as 
“SR-Econ” scale. It ranges from 1.33 to -4.00 with a mean 
of -0.209 and a standard deviation of 0.549. Positive 
values indicate that the scores for the social responsibility 
scale are greater than the scores for the economic scale, 
and negative values imply that the scores for economic 
scale are greater than the social responsibility scale. It also 
means that a higher score of the “SR-Econ” scale indicates 
that the investors attach greater relative importance to the 
social responsibility factor as compared with the economic 
factor, and vice versa.
As can be seen from Table  6, around 38 percent of the 
respondents rate economic scale higher than the social 
responsibility scale, and this reflects their priority on 
the  perceived importance of economic aspects over 
social responsibility concerns. On the other hand, around 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics, cronbach’s alpha and friedman test statistic for the three dimensions.
Fiqh injunctions scale Economic scale Social responsibility scale
Mean 4.416 4.306 4.093
Median 4.75 4.33 4.00
Mode 5.00 5.00 5.00
Std. Deviation 0.7651 0.6411 0.7693
Percentiles
25 4.00 4.00 3.67
50 4.75 4.33 4.00
75 5.00 5.00 5.00
Cronbach’s Alpha .891 .820 .877
Friedman Test
Mean Rank N 415
Fiqh injunctions 2.26 Chi-Square 90.373
Economic 2.01 Df 2
Social Responsibility 1.73 Asymp. Sig. .000
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15 percent of the respondents scored social responsibility 
scale higher than the economic scale, implying that they 
prioritize social responsibility concerns over economic 
aspects. Interestingly, almost half of the respondents 
(47%) scored equally for the social responsibility and 
economic scale. Therefore, a total of 62 percent of the 
respondents perceive social responsibility issues as more 
or equally important to economic aspects within Islamic 
investment.
4.4 Factors influencing the perceived importance 
of social responsibility dimension in Islamic 
inv estment
As highlighted earlier, one of the objectives of this paper is 
to explore the factors that influence the level of perceived 
importance of the social responsibility dimension in Islamic 
investment among the respondents. Based on the measure of 
the perceived importance of social responsibility developed 
earlier, the analysis proceeds by examining whether there 
are any statistically significant differences between different 
sub-groups of investors, in the scores of importance they 
attached to the social responsibility scale and the SR-Econ 
scale. As highlighted in section  3.1, sub-groupings of the 
respondents that are used here as potential explanatory 
variables include socio-demographic profile, commitment 
to Shariah principles in investment, pro-social behaviours, 
and investment related characteristics. Mann-Whitney 
U tests are employed for variables with only two sub-
groups (df = 1), while Kruskal-Wallis test are performed on 
variables with more than two sub-groups (df > 1).
4.4.1 Comparing social responsibility scale 
between sub-groups of respondents
Table  7 presents the statistical results and the summary 
of the mean ranks for the social responsibility scale for 
different sub-groups included in the study. Looking at the 
findings for the socio-demographic variables, statistically 
significant difference at 0.05 level were not found among 
different sub-groups of gender, marital status, education 
and types of occupation.
Differences in opinions were more pronounced between 
respondents of different ethnicity, religion, age and income 
group with all of these socio-demographic variables 
reaching statistical significance at the 0.05 level. From 
Table  6, Malay-Muslim respondents register the highest 
mean rank statistics as compared to respondents from other 
ethnics and faiths. The perceived importance attached 
by the lower income groups to the social responsibility 
dimension of Islamic investment is also higher than 
those in higher income groups. This suggests that lower 
income earners are more receptive to the idea of having 
social responsibility criteria incorporated into the Islamic 
investment process. Perhaps this can be explained by the 
fact that criteria such as poverty eradication and societal 
development are issues that affect them directly. On the 
contrary, the higher income earners, who would likely have 
more funds under investment, and therefore have more at 
stake, would understandably be more reserved towards 
social responsibility concerns related to investment, 
especially if they perceive such non-economic consideration 
could compromise financial returns.
On the other hand, it appears that the perceived importance 
of the social responsibility dimension in Islamic investment 
takes a somewhat curvilinear relationship with respect to 
age. As shown in Table 6, higher mean ranks are observed 
among younger respondents (below 30) and the elderly 
(above 50), while those in the middle-age groups (31–40 
and 41–50) register lower values. The higher mean rank 
for the younger group of investors is consistent with 
some other studies on SRI that may be explained by the 
increasing awareness of the younger generation on social 
responsibility issues.
Differences in the social responsibility scale are not only 
prevalent between Malay-Muslim investors and investors 
from other ethnicity and religion, but also between different 
types of Muslim investors. As previously highlighted, the 
investors had been segmented into three groups, and 
the result shows that the mean rank for the committed 
investors is much higher as compared to the pragmatic 
and the non-Muslim investors. It also appears that there is 
a statistically significant difference in the scores of social 
responsibility scale between different level of participation 
in pro-social activities, with the respondents who have 
greater participation in socially responsible behaviors at the 
individual level responding with higher levels of perceived 
importance around the social responsibility dimension 
in Islamic investment as compared to other respondents. 
Another important grouping factor that contributes 
significantly to the variation in the social responsibility scale 
is the level of awareness of SRI. As shown in Table 7, higher 
mean ranks can be found in the group of investors with 
higher levels of SRI awareness. Other characteristics of the 
investors, such as their risk appetite and main investment 
objectives, are not statistically significant.
4.4.2 Comparing SR-Econ scale between sub-
groups of respondents
As the present analysis is an extension to the earlier 
analysis in section 4.4.1, it is useful to compare the results 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of SR-Econ scale.
Scores Frequency Per cent
Cumulative  
per cent
1.33 2 0.45 0.45
1.00 1 0.22 0.67
0.67 15 3.36 4.04
0.33 49 10.99 15.02
0.00 210 47.09 62.11
-0.33 76 17.04 79.15
-0.67 37 8.30 87.44
-1.00 27 6.05 93.50
-1.33 22 4.93 98.43
-1.67 2 0.45 98.88
-2.00 2 0.45 99.33
-2.33 1 0.22 99.55
-3.33 1 0.22 99.78
-4.00 1 0.22 100.00
Total 446 100.00
Mean -0.209
Standard Deviation 0.549
Barom
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in Table  8 for the SR-Econ scale with the one shown 
in Table  7. Some of the results in Table  8 are consistent 
with the previous analysis and therefore strengthen 
the earlier findings based on the social responsibility 
scale. For  instance, the Malay-Muslim respondents are 
associated with higher mean ranks for the SR-Econ scale 
as compared to the other respondents. The lower mean 
ranks among the respondents  from other ethnicities and 
religions also indicate that the importances of  economic 
factor over social responsibility are much greater among 
these groups. Another similar finding is with respect to 
income of the respondents, with lower income groups 
are associated with higher mean ranks for the SR-Econ 
scale.  While differences  between the sub-groups of 
age remain significant  in this analysis, interestingly, 
the somewhat curvilinear relationship between social 
responsibility scale  with age has change to a linear 
relationship in the  context of the SR-Econ scale, with 
younger respondents register higher scores for the SR-
Econ scale.
Turning to other characteristics of the investors, Table  8 
shows that significant differences between sub-groups 
on the SR-Econ scale can only be found among the types 
of investors based on their commitment to Shariah 
principles in investment and the level of SRI awareness. 
Similar to the findings in the previous analysis (Table 7), 
the pragmatic and the non-Muslim investors seemed to 
attach greater importance of economic consideration over 
social responsibility factor as compared to the committed 
investors. The insignificant values for other characteristics 
of the respondents such as pro-social behavior, risk-
return appetite and main investment objective suggest 
that there were no significant differences among the sub-
groups in the way they perceived the importance of social 
responsibility factors in relation to economic factors in 
Islamic investment.
Contrary to the findings based on the social responsibility 
scale, the analysis with the SR-Econ scale has shown 
that there exist statistically significant differences at 
the  0.05  level for gender and marital status. In this 
context,  compared to female and single respondents, 
male  and married investors put greater importance 
of  economic consideration over social responsibility 
concern as compared to female and single respondents.
Table 7.  Comparing scores of social responsibility scale between different sub-groups of respondents.
Variable
Chi-square  
(Z-score) Df Sig.
Results of Mean  
Rank Statistics
Gender (-1.040) 1 0.299
Marital status (-0.155) 1 0.877
Ethnicity 93.452 2 0.000 Malays have higher mean  
rank as compared to those  
from other ethnicities.
Religion 95.148 3 0.000 Muslims have higher mean  
rank as compared to those  
from other faiths.
Age 10.796 3 0.013 Young and elderly respondents  
have higher mean ranks as  
compared those in their middle-age.
Highest education 2.869 3 0.412
Income 30.141 5 0.000 Lower income earners have  
higher mean rank as compared  
to those having higher income.
Type of occupation (-0.486) 1 0.627
Type of investor 118.949 2 0.000 Committed investors have  
higher mean rank as compared  
to the pragmatic and non-Muslim  
investors.
Individual pro-social  
behaviour
10.553 2 0.005 Those with higher pro-social  
participation have higher  
mean rank.
Collective pro-social  
behaviour
3.936 2 0.140
Main investment  
objective
(-0.185) 1 0.853
Risk-return attitude 2.232 2 0.328
SRI awareness 14.714 4 0.005 Those having higher SRI awareness 
have higher mean rank.
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5. Conclusion
The overall result reveals that investors on whole place 
into a hierarchy the elements they considered important 
for investment, which is based on Shariah principles 
– with the observance of fiqh injunctions ranked as the 
most important consideration, followed by economic 
and social responsibility dimensions. Such findings are 
based on both the descriptive analysis of the individual 
items as well as the composite scale constructed as a 
result of an exploratory factor analysis, which among 
others, provide statistical evidence on the nature of social 
responsibility dimensions being acknowledged by the 
respondents as part of an important underlying factor 
in Islamic investment criteria. Despite being consistently 
overpowered by the economic concerns, descriptive 
analysis on the questionnaire responses (Table 2) suggest 
that social responsibility criteria are still perceived as 
important by the majority of the investors, and based on 
the SR-Econ scale, 62 percent of the respondents consider 
social responsibility more or equally as important as the 
economic dimension. These results provide the empirical 
evidence that the social responsibility dimension is 
recognized by investors as part of an important component 
in Shariah-based investment.
The analysis has also explored various potential factors 
that can influence the level of importance investors attach 
to the social responsibility dimension. In this respect, two 
scales were constructed for such measurement, namely 
the social responsibility scale and the SR-Econ scale. 
The findings for both scales show that ethnicity/religion 
are among the important factors related to the level of 
perceived importance of social responsibility, with Malay/
Muslim investors exhibiting higher scores as compared 
to other groups. Nevertheless, not all Malay-Muslim 
respondents showed strong commitment to the Shariah 
principles in their investment decision. As has been shown 
earlier, sizeable numbers of Muslim respondents in this 
study have a different proportion of their investments 
allocated between Islamic and conventional funds. The 
findings of this study have shown that those who strictly 
comply to Shariah principles in their investment, labelled 
as the committed investors, placed a greater importance on 
social responsibility in Islamic investment as compared to 
the ‘pragmatic’ investors and the non-Muslim investors.
Like many other studies in the field of socially and 
environmentally desirable behaviors, demographic 
profiling has been one of the important areas of interest. 
In this context, income and age have been found to be an 
important factor with lower income earners and younger 
investors having a more favorable attitude in terms of 
the level of importance of social responsibility in both of 
the scales used in the analysis. Other variables, such as 
pro-social behavior, gender, and marital status, were also 
found to be important factors based on one of the scales. 
As shown earlier, those who have higher participation in 
the individually oriented pro-social behavior tend to have 
higher scores for the “social responsibility” scale, while 
being female and single are linked with higher scores for 
the “SR-Econ” scale. Nevertheless, one factor that has 
consistently emerged as a strong and important variable in 
all the analyses is the level of SRI awareness. This result 
can prove to be promising as such an awareness may well 
increase over time, and the favorable attitude among 
investors towards the importance of social responsibility 
concerns in investment will likely to be stronger in the 
future.
Table 8. Comparing scores of SR-Econ scale between different sub-groups of respondents.
Variable
Chi-square 
Z-score Df Sig. Results of Mean Rank Statistics
Gender (-2.680) 1 0.007 Female respondents have higher mean rank
Marital Status (-3.322) 1 0.001 Single respondents have higher mean rank
Ethnicity 21.406 2 0.000 Malays have higher mean rank as compared  
to those from other ethnicities
Religion 21.466 3 0.000 Muslims have higher mean rank as compared  
to those from other faiths
Age 16.626 3 0.001 Mean rank increases with younger respondents
Highest Education 7.631 3 0.054
Income 35.091 5 0.000 Lower income earners have higher mean  
rank as compared to those having higher  
income
Type of Occupation (-0.855) 1 0.393
Type of Investor 19.612 2 0.000 Committed investors have higher mean rank  
as compared to the pragmatic and non-Muslim  
investors
Individual pro-social behaviour 1.307 2 0.520
Collective pro-social behaviour 2.836 2 0.242
Main Investment Objective (-0.132) 1 0.895
Risk-return Attitude 5.571 2 0.062
SRI Awareness 29.215 4 0.000 Those having higher SRI awareness have  
higher mean rank
The above findings offer important insights on the perceived 
importance of social responsibility dimension and the main 
factors underlying the support for such concerns in Islamic 
investment. While the incorporation of social responsibility 
criteria in Islamic investment provides new opportunities 
for product development and global convergence with the 
SRI movement, it will be a challenge for fund managers 
to balance economic consideration with the social 
responsibility concerns. Nevertheless, the continuous 
growth of the SRI industry and the empirical evidence on 
the performance of SRI funds globally provides reassurance 
that such an investment approach is viable, and certainly 
more sustainable in the long run. The realization of such 
an investment approach in the Islamic investment industry 
will necessarily bring the sector to a greater height, in line 
with the normative goals of Islamic economics and the 
higher objective of Shariah (maqasid as-Shariah).
Note
1. For details of the screening norms practiced by various 
institutions and index providers, see Siddiqui (2004), 
Derigs and Marzban (2008) and Rahman et al. (2010).
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Abstract - Social performance is incumbent as one of the maqasid Shariah of Islamic banks. 
A perception study involving questionnaire surveys was conducted of 152 Islamic bank managers 
in Malaysia as a means of searching for empirical evidence of what constitutes Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) indicators for Islamic banks. Using 50  indicators as a CSP construct, the 
study found that there are forty-seven important indicators for CSP in Islamic banks. The Shariah 
compliance activities such as annual payment of akat, transparent measurement of zakat, avoidance 
of unlawful transactions, and disclosure on the nature and extent of the unlawful transactions 
are among the most important indicators. However, in the dual Islamic banking framework in 
Malaysia, managers have a significant difference in perception of the importance of qard hasan 
financing, number of branches and vicinity, availability of e-Ibanking services, and third party 
verification for customer services as representative of Islamic banks’ social performance indicators. 
Remarkably, environmental protection and enhancement activities are considerably important CSP 
indicators even though the environment does not directly affect or effect Islamic banking activities. 
This study contributes to the development of social performance indicators specifically for a faith-
based business institution from the practitioner perspective. The indicators may be used to assess 
the incorporation of social function in Islamic banks towards fulfilling the maqasid Shariah and 
meeting the need of various stakeholders.
Keywords: Islamic bank, Maqasid Shariah, Corporate Social Performance Indicators, Stakeholders, 
Zakat, Qard Hasan, Investment Account Holders
1. Introduction
Islamic banking and finance is a fast-growing industry 
worldwide. Internationally, the industry operates in 75 
countries with over 500 Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) and total assets of nearly US$1 trillion, and is 
expected to capture half of the savings of the Muslim world 
(Austay 2010). In Malaysia the industry has also shown 
a tremendous growth over the last five year period. Total 
assets in the system increased from RM156, 810.8 million 
in 2007 to RM334, 982.6 million in 2011 (BNM Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin 2012). The industry has contributed 
significantly to the national economic system or Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of 9.2% in 2000, 11% in 2008, 
and 17% in 2011 (BNM 2009; 2012).
In Islamic faith-based commercial business organizations, 
banks are required to operate according to Shariah 
(Islamic law) with the aim of achieving maqasid Shariah 
(Shariah goal). The stress on achieving maqasid Shariah in 
Islamic banks is to ensure social fairness and justice in the 
protection of Islam as a religion (al din), the life of human 
self (nafs) or the individual person, the intellect (faculty 
of reasoning) (aql), the progeny or offspring (nasl), and 
the material wealth (mal) of the various stakeholders 
who are affected by and effect the Islamic banks’ earning 
process. In this case the stakeholders of Islamic banks are 
employees, the community, depositors, creditors, zakat 
receivers, investment account holders, the environment 
surrounding the banks, and the regulators (government). 
Bani et al.
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In this context, the goal of property management in Islamic 
banks is not purely for profit (economic objective) that 
satisfies the interest of the shareholders but also to ensure 
social responsibility to various stakeholders.
Many researchers argue that corporate social 
responsibilities  function as accountability to various 
stakeholders following stakeholder theory. The theory 
holds  that an organization has a responsibility to various 
parties affected or effecting the business operation in 
meeting its goal (Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, 2004) 
through optimizing their corporate system so that it can 
maximize the bank performance over a long term (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2004; Hasan, 2008; Hasan and Harahap, 2010). 
The theory provides that the bank’s corporate governance 
has the authority and accountability to manage the business 
property for the benefit of shareholders without neglecting 
the interest of other parties who have an implicit and explicit 
contract with the bank. In this regard, the bank’s managers 
are entrusted to mobilize their wealth (money deposited by 
depositors, and capital contributed by the investors, as well 
as investments made by the investment account holders) 
according to rules, regulations and policies issued by various 
regulating bodies with the aim of generating revenue.
The Islamic banks (the wealthy) are also required by Islamic 
law to promote social benevolence to various stakeholders 
(Chapra, 1985; Chapra and Khan, 2000; Munawar, Iqbal and 
Llywellyn, 2002) such as such as employees, communities, 
zakat recipients and the environment surrounding the 
banking business. The banks are also required to consider the 
property rights of various stakeholders through social and 
humanitarian works (Kahf, 2004). Consistent with Shariah 
emphasis, CSP undertaking needs to be carried out towards 
various stakeholders to ensure fair and just business dealings 
and maximization of their welfare, regardless of equity holding 
(Bhatti Ishaq and Bhatti Maria, 2011; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2004; Sulaiman, 2000; Abdul Rahman and Al Bureay, 1992).
In recent years, CSP has become a trend in the business 
market as companies with a good track of CSP are believed 
to have positive influence on corporate reputation. In 
Islamic banks, CSP to various stakeholders allows them to 
fulfill the social objective part of the maqasid Shariah. It also 
qualifies the banks for deductible expenses in the bank’s 
corporate tax. It benefits various stakeholders when CSP 
meets their various needs and expectations and, in return, 
the bank will get greater stakeholder support and loyalty 
which will enhance business profitability and legitimacy 
among the stakeholders, such as employees, community, 
zakat recipients and the environment surrounding them.
Though social fairness and justice is one of the maqasid 
Shariah of the banks, little is known about the banks’ 
social performance towards various stakeholders. This is 
particularly true in Malaysia because CSP has not been 
made mandatory in practice as well as in reporting. Banks 
may report the CSP on a voluntary basis in their mediums 
of communication such as the annual report, bulletin 
and through advertisement. Although it is reported, the 
information is not accessible to all stakeholders, resulting in 
a problem of information asymmetry to stakeholders. They 
are unable to evaluate how bank managers account for their 
stakeholder’s interest in the bank’s earning process, or what 
constitutes the expected social performances. Inconsistency 
of reporting coupled with the voluntary nature of disclosure 
will hinder the assessment of Islamic banks’ accountability 
to multi-stakeholders. Consequently, the true reflection 
of their actual social performance may be judged wrongly 
and a bank may be considered to have very low CSP as 
compared to the actual situation, or vice versa. The difficulty 
in assessing CSP is also felt in the absence of specific CSP 
indicators to various stakeholders for Islamic banks.
Several past studies have gauged the social function of 
Islamic banks through CSR disclosure such as those by 
Hanifa and Hudaib (2007); Aribi (2009); Hassan and 
Harahap (2010); and Hasan (2012). However, these studies 
mainly evaluated the social function or responsibility 
using indicators developed from Islamic values or ethical 
perspectives and measured the variation on the basis 
of information reported by Islamic banks. There is very 
limited research that has developed CSP indicators from 
a practitioner’s perspective especially in a country where 
Islamic banking is operated in a fully-fledged system (“fully-
fledged Islamic banking” – FFIB) as well as in subsidiary 
banks where the holding companies are conventional banks 
(investment savings banks – ISB). Hence, this study aims to 
identify what counts as important CSP indicators for Islamic 
banks from the managers’ perspective and to compare any 
differences in perception between FFIB and ISB managers 
on what they consider as important CSP indicators.
Findings in this study will add to the limited insight of 
what are considered to be CSP indicators of Islamic banks 
from a practitioner’s perspective using stakeholders’ theory 
towards fulfilling the maqasid Shariah.
2. Literature review: CSP indicators 
for Islamic banks
Acknowledging that social welfare underpins the 
responsibility or accountability of Islamic banks towards 
various stakeholders (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004; Hasan, 
2008; Hasan and Harahap, 2010), the terms corporate 
social responsibilities (CSR) and corporate social 
performance (CSP) are used interchangeably in this study 
to denote social or benevolent activities.
This study adopts Wood’s (1991) definition of CSP as the 
assessment of principles of social responsibility (CSR1), 
which motivate the company’s action, how determined it 
is to make use of social responsiveness processes (CSR2), 
the existence and nature of policies and programs designed 
to manage societal relationships, and the social impact 
(observable outcomes) of the firm’s actions, programs 
and policies. Based on this definition, CSP undertakings 
constitute the organizational entity, the environment, the 
individual executive manager, and the employees’ ethical 
and personal values towards the business society at large. 
The performance includes setting up favorable conditions 
for decision-making, designing activity (searching, 
discovering and analyzing possible decisions), and selecting 
and implementing particular choices of action. The ultimate 
value of this process is in term of economics (efficient 
output), power and integrated relationships between 
organizations and their environment (Swansons, 1995).
From the Islamic perspective, CSP involves keeping up trusts, 
promises and adherence to fulfill the contract with various 
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stakeholders in applying the essence of verses in the Quran 
(5:1; 23:8). This study looks at eight stakeholder groups for 
whom the contract is considered as specified in the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Islamic Banks in Malaysia (2007): 
shareholders and investment account holders; employees; 
the community; depositors; borrowers; zakat recipients; the 
environment; and regulators. The groups can be categorized 
further into explicit and implicit stakeholders. The explicit 
stakeholders are those who are affected by or are affecting 
certain contracts which provide rights and protection to the 
contracting parties. The examples of explicit stakeholders 
arise from a specific contract signed between them as seller 
and buyer, customer and banker, and advocate and solicitor 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The implicit stakeholders are 
those who are indirectly affected by the contracts carried 
out by the business operation, for example, the environment 
and zakat recipients.
Based on the eight stakeholders group mentioned above, the 
CSP indicators for various stakeholder groups are discussed 
with reference to Shariah and the current literature.
3. CSP indicators for shareholders 
and investment account holders
Islamic banks have a contract or obligation to shareholders 
and investment account holders (IAH) on the capital 
invested by them. It is the bank’s obligation to protect the 
wealth invested and to ensure the right to return on the 
capital invested.
A socially-responsible Islamic bank is required to provide 
transparent information about the investment policy to 
shareholders as well as to investment account holders in 
fulfilling their fiduciary responsibility and accountability 
to manage the account within the parameters of the 
given mandate (CCRG IIFS). Since the encouraged form 
of financing and investment activities in Islamic banks is 
through a partnership based on a profit loss sharing (PLS) 
arrangement (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007) the extent of 
investment using mudharabah and musyarakah will be an 
indicator of the CSP of an Islamic bank.
To fulfill the IAH’s right to monitor their investment 
performance, it is socially responsible for Islamic banks 
to indicate their internal guidelines on the eligibility of 
the employees in managing the IAH, the protection of 
IAH investments, the disclosure of relevant and material 
information to the IAH, and a proper and disclosed basis 
for profit allocation and investment policies based on the 
risk expectation of the IAH.
Islamic banks are also socially responsible for providing 
at least the normally available information on collective 
investment schemes (CIS), information on the PLS for 
the mudharabah investment account when the account is 
opened, consideration of the risk and return expectations 
of the IAH through knowing about customer mechanisms, 
employing qualified investment managers, and keeping 
the GC fully informed of the investment strategy adopted. 
Similarly, it means that IIFS shall inform the IAH about the 
practices of smoothing over returns by means of building 
up and drawing on reserves such as PER. The GC shall be 
mandated to scrutinize the utilization of PER and make 
recommendations to the board of directors (BOD), IIFS shall 
clearly distinguish the distribution rate and if the investment 
risk reserve (IRR) is used as a cushion, it shall be placed under 
the scrutiny and recommendation of CG (Yunus, 2007).
Another CSP indicator specified in AAOIFI (2001) is the 
capability of the Islamic bank to make disclosure of earnings 
or expenditures prohibited by Shariah, such as the amount 
and nature of earnings, the amount of the expenditure 
for those sources, and the policy regarding the disposal of 
these prohibited sources (FAS No1 AAOIFI paragraph 15).
4. CSP indicators for depositors 
or customers
Another party with whom Islamic banks have contracts 
is the  depositors. Depositors may deposit their money 
as current account deposits, or unrestricted investment 
deposits (in savings and mudarabah accounts), or off-
balance sheet deposits (in investment and special or 
restricted investment accounts) (Kahf, 2004).
Irrespective of the types of deposit, the social responsibility 
of Islamic banks is to provide the details of the contract they 
have entered into even though the contractual agreement 
between depositors and Islamic banks is not based on 
predetermined rates of return.
In turn, Islamic banks are contracted to maintain the trust 
of keeping the depositors money safely and not to use it in 
operations for deposits (safekeeping) under amanah. In 
safekeeping under the principle of Al-Wadiah (also known 
as a non-interest loan from depositors to Islamic banks), the 
bank has the right to use the current account to invest but 
with no promise of any return except for a guarantee for the 
entire deposit. Islamic banks may perform social services to 
these depositors through reward with a gift (hibah) with 
no specific or permanent amount or customary payment on 
the current account used for investment.
5. CSP indicators for borrowers
The social responsibility of Islamic banks to borrowers arises 
from financing facilities (from households and individuals, 
to small and medium size businesses, large business entities, 
as well as government and public sector organizations) that 
are to provide financing activities which are free from riba 
and grant them a suitable period based on the benevolent 
principle, as mentioned in the Quran (2: 280). The relevant 
verse does not, however, mean that debtors are encouraged 
to delay payment, or not to pay at all. This is because 
the Prophet (peace be upon him) said that “The rich person 
who delays in paying back a loan is a wrongdoer” (Sahih Al 
Bukhari Vol. 3. Book 34. No 291). As such, if the tradition is 
applied to financing activities this means that both Islamic 
banks and debtors are accountable and socially responsible 
for fulfilling the contract of financing given.
Anther general social responsibility that Islamic banks need 
to fulfill is to provide transparent information on the types 
and features of the financial services offered. They are not 
supposed to attract customers through false advertisements 
(Beekun, 1996). This is because such practices will deceive 
customers from actual or true information about the 
services or product defects and representation. It will 
create a false impression with which to induce customers 
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to choose services provided by the company. It is also an 
Islamic bank’s social responsibility not to hoard or undertake 
profiteering. Islamic ethics do not allow storing essential 
stocks secretly in order to exploit the price and emphasis 
on profit maximization during a period of scarcity, as it will 
create false scarcity and invite public disorder.
Moreover, services or products provided to customers must 
be able to reach various target groups so as to ensure that 
Islamic banking reaches not only established organizations 
and the rich, but also the needy. The needy are not to be 
neglected, but banks need to put in place careful selection 
procedures to ensure that they are financially able to repay 
the amount owed, thus meeting the commercial objective of 
Islamic banks. As such, financing may also include financing 
for the disabled and aged customers, customers who are 
difficult to reach (for, example, microfinance), small and 
medium industries, and to introduce qard hasan financing 
(interest-free financing) to the identified groups (Farooq, 
2007). With regard to providing sales of commodities 
and service, the Quran (17: 35) states clearly the social 
responsibility to adhere to accurate measurements and 
weights. Any weighing of commodities less than the actual 
measurement will be considered as exploitation. It is also 
the social responsibility of businesses to prohibit riba in 
all business transactions as it involves interest. Ethically, 
the transaction must be free from interest which burdens 
society greatly as stated in the Quran (2: 275).
Last, but not least, it is the accountability and social 
responsibility of Islamic banks not to undertake business 
which includes unlawful business activities to customers 
such as gambling, selling liquor, non-prescribed drugs and 
tobacco as this is considered a waste and will bring further 
ruination to society as mentioned in the Quran (2:219) 
which states: “They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. 
Say: ‘In them is great sin, and some profit, for men; but the 
sin is greater than the profit.’ They ask thee how much they 
are to spend; Say: ‘What is beyond your needs.’ Thus doth 
Allah Make clear to you His Signs: In order that ye may 
consider”. Thus, Islamic banks are socially responsible for 
ensuring that services and products offered are free from 
any elements of riba (interest) and gambling in compliance 
with the requirements of Shariah.
6. CSP indicators for employees
Employees’ labor efforts collectively are the catalyst for the 
fulfillment of business objectives by business organizations. 
Workers are supposed to be treated fairly according what 
they deserve and their salary needs to be paid when due 
according to the following rules as narrated by Abdullah 
ibn Umar: “Give the labourer wages before his perspiration 
be dry” (Tirmidhi Hadith: 2987 and Ibn. Majah) and based 
on the commandment narrated by Abu Huraira that the 
Prophet said “Allah said that I will be an opponent, on the 
Day of Judgment, against the person who engages someone 
on work and takes full work from him but does not give him 
(full) wages” (Sahih Bukhari No. 470).
A fair recruitment practice prescribed in the Shariah is that 
in order to employ new workers and give due promotion the 
employer should not practice discrimination due to race, 
religion, corruption nor nepotism. The selection needs to 
be based on trust and should be offered to the deserving 
person and responsibility should be given to the person 
who is able to bear and has the ability to do justice when 
the trust is given to him (Abul Quasem, 1975).
To improve employee knowledge, skills and commitment, 
Islamic banks need to send employees for training and 
state a clear policy on recruitment, retrenchment and 
profit-sharing programs to employees. Islamic banks also 
need to maintain a healthy, safe and conducive working 
environment for employees. A conducive and healthy 
working environment will allow improvement of work 
performance and will inculcate harmony and respect of 
others’ beliefs among workers even though they may be of 
different race or religion.
7. CSP indicators for the community
Besides employees and competitors, the implicit accountability 
and social responsibility of Islamic banks is also due to the 
community. Responsibility to the community is based on the 
relationship of businesses with fellow servants, or collective 
humanity (hablumminnan nas). Economic managers and 
entrepreneurs are individuals who administer the business 
organization in producing or trading in goods and are also 
considered to be “individual-in-community” and bear a 
responsibility to fulfill the pursuit of their economic activities 
in the advancement of fortune (Hasan, 2007).
According Abul Quasem (1975) in Al-Ghazali ethics, the 
individual-in-community is subject to two kinds of binding 
constraints, that is, the individual must sacrifice part of his 
income for charity to acquire virtue and he must internalize 
community preference as a responsible member of society 
and avoid conspicuous consumption (For example, luxury 
and extravagance). This means that the responsibilities of 
Islamic banks to the community are in the form of welfare and 
charity because, as a financial intermediary which consists of 
individual-in-community, they have the same responsibility to 
produce community-approved good and to avoid profiteering 
and other unfair trade practices (Hasan, 2007).
The obligatory corporate social responsibility of Islamic 
banks to the community in Islam is through payment of 
zakat, which literally means both purification and growth 
(Gambling and Karim, 1986). It embodies social identity 
and justice, and is the best substitute for interest because 
business zakat is a form of business wealth distribution 
(regular charity of wealth) from the property of the rich 
to the poor (Hassan, 2007); this purifies the heart of zakat 
payers from greed and removes the poverty of the needy (Al 
Islahi, 1988). It will be distributed to the needy as specified 
in the Quran (At-Taubah verse 60), namely the poor, the 
deprived, zakat collectors, new Muslim converters, to 
free the slaves, those who are unable to pay their debts, 
destitute travelers, and those in the path of Allah. Business 
zakat is levied both on the net worth (capital+reserve-
assets) and on the net profit at the rate of 2.5%. Some 
religious scholars have justified the spending of Zakat on 
health and education as well as other services but do not 
include the salaries and wages of those working in these 
sectors (Gambling and Karim, 1986).
Gambling and Karim (1986) suggest that a firm with real 
commitment to social justice might consider setting up 
its own zakat fund or an equivalent to cover social costs 
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not currently being met out of the state fund; thus, it is 
the management’s duty to give full attention to relieve 
the difficulties and complaints of its customers, suppliers, 
workers, neighbors, and to alleviate the effect of pollution 
from the internal zakat fund.
Besides zakat on wealth, other examples of social 
responsibility  in corporate organization are sadaqah (a 
non-obligatory social responsibility) (Hassan, 2007) and 
charitable activities (Farooq, 2007). Sadaqah is considered 
as spontaneous voluntary charity (Hassan 2007) with the 
purpose to “remove from you some of your (stains of) evil..” 
(Quran 2:271). There are two form of sadaqah: one-off 
and continuous. Waqf is a continuous sadaqah in which the 
voluntary charity is given in the form of assets in perpetuity 
or on a permanent basis (Ahmed, 2007). The benefits of 
waqf will flow continuously to the giver after his or her death 
(Ahmed, 2007). Examples of waqf are building up mosques, 
educational institutions, roads and other publicly owned 
premises and facilities, as well as supporting orphanages 
(Sadeq, 2007). Due to its voluntary nature, there are no 
limits to the amount and no specific guidelines except that 
it can be disclosed as well as concealed and it is best if given 
to the needy.
As a part of social responsibility financing, AAOIFI Governance 
Standard No 7 requires Islamic banks to provide qard al 
hasan (zero-interest financing) to the needy. The product 
arrangement requires the borrower to pay back the principal 
amount of the loan on maturity without any increment from 
the amount borrowed or interest (Anas and Mourina, 2009). 
It is based on a social welfare contract involving individuals 
and society to promote the well-being and welfare of the less 
privileged (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Adnan and Noraini, 
2009) and the bank will only charge administration costs of 
handling the loan and it is not based on the duration and the 
amount of the loan (Adnan and Noraini, 2009). This contract 
will enable the poor to create new job markets and business 
ventures using their merits, skills and expertise and thus 
eradicate the unemployment problem from society (Anas 
and Mourina, 2009). However, Adnan and Noraini (2009) 
argue that expenditure on other product such as rahn, credit 
card and charge card under this facility is contradictory to 
the aim as these products are involved in profit motivation 
rather than benevolent activities.
8. CSP indicators for the environment
Apart from the responsibility to society, business also has 
a social responsibility to the universe. Islamic banks will 
be considered as socially responsible to the environment 
when they are able to utilize and manage the element of 
nature or universe in an orderly manner as an act of natural 
submission to Allah (Quran 7:54, 22:18, 24:41), and in 
discharging responsibility as a khalifah and cabd (Quran 
2:60; 6:95–103; 15:16–23; 16:3–21).
Businesses also need to protect the environment (Haniffa, 
2002; Othman and Azlan, 2010; Maali, Casson and Napier, 
2003 & 2006; Dusuki, 2005). In using resources/bounties of 
Allah in this world, mankind is required to utilize them in 
the best way possible (Faroq and Lanis, 2005). Nature is not 
to be conquered nor must it be overcome in man’s pursuit 
for development of the world (Mohd Haneef, 1997). The 
responsibility to take care of the natural environment is 
emphasized in the Quran (2:30). In addition, the Quran (16: 
18:81) points to how nature needs to be protected and not to 
be harmed as it will create inconvenience to mankind at large. 
As such, an investment must be selected to be one that will 
not have an adverse impact on the environment and priority 
needs to be given to investments on social development and 
the environment, according to quotas (Farooq, 2007).
9. CSP indicators for regulators
Last, but not least, Islamic banks have accountability and 
social responsibility to the banks’ regulator (the external 
mechanism that sets rules and regulations), which 
will  influence Islamic banks’ operations. The intensity of 
government rules and regulation may influence the 
social responsibility to be carried by Islamic banks. The 
government has the power to set and enforce regulations 
and to impose penalties on those that do not abide by 
these regulations. The government may forward social 
responsibility programs to the nation through banks 
while in return banks need to attend to the scheme in 
support of the programs. For example, in Malaysia, the 
government introduced its social responsibility through 
Skim Pemilikan Perumahan Kebangsaan (national 
house ownership scheme) with lower loan rates but 
the allocation is provided through banks. Thus, it is the 
banks’ social responsibility to be committed in supporting 
such scheme and in offering it to prospective customers. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that, “organizations 
must attend to the demands of those in its environment 
that provide resources necessary and important for its 
continued survival’’ (Pfeffer, 1982).
A socially responsible bank will always be committed to 
ensure Shariah compliance. The indicator in doing so is 
through the setting up of a Shariah committee to oversee 
and monitor compliance to Shariah in its business (Banking 
and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) 1996, Section 124(3); 
Archer et al., 1998; Maali, Casson and Napier, 2003; Faroq 
and Lanis, 2005; Hanifa and Hudaib, 2007).
Table  1  summarizes the CSP indicators that have been 
utilized for Islamic banks in prior studies.
The majority of researchers in the past concluded that CSR 
disclosure in IFIs is still very low leading to an opinion 
that CSR practices in IFI are still weak (Hanifa and Hudaib, 
2007;  Aribi, 2009; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Hasan, 
2012). However the researchers evaluated CSR using 
mainly  their perspective. Even though the indicators 
are generally based on the benchmark of Islamic values 
and ethics there is no consensus as to what constitutes 
the indicators, nor the theme of Islamic banks’ social 
obligations  from the practitioner’s perspective. Thus, 
this study is aimed at identifying what will constitute 
CSP indicators from Islamic bank managers’ perspective. 
It is hoped that it will lead to further understanding 
of  management considerations concerning the most and 
least important CSP indicators in a controlled environment 
and with cultural differences (in Malaysia only).
10. Hypothesis development
Despite the vast commentary in the literature on the ideal of 
CSP indicators for various stakeholders, there is no common 
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Table 1. Summary list of CSP indicators utilized in prior studies.
No. Author No. of items Name of categories*
1 Dusuki  
(2005)
16 Workers health and safety (1)
Workers education and training (1)
Fair treatment to workers and applicants (1)
Energy and water conservation (1)
Waste recycling policies (1)
Financing companies not harming environment (1)
Financing companies not violating human right (1)
Financing SMEs (1)
Providing affordable service to deprived areas (1)
Supporting charities and community projects (1)
Paying zakat and giving sadaqah consistently (1)
Fostering Islamic values upon staffs (1)
Solving social problems (1)
Listening to public view and concern (1)
Granting interest free loan (qard hasan) (1)
2 Faroq and  
Lanis (2005)
32 Using Maali et al.
Shariah opinion unlawful (haram) transaction (6)
Zakah (tithe)(for banks required to pay (3)
Zakah(for bank not required to pay)(2)
Qard hassan (benevolent loans) (5)
Charitable and social activities (3)
Employees (4)
Late repayment and insolvent client(3)
Environment(2)
Other aspects of community involvement (4)
3 Haniffa and  
Hudaib (2004)
Mission statement and corporate objectives, 
Top management
Shariah Supervisory Board
Audit process
Products
Employees
Community
Islamic values
4 Maali, Casson and  
Napier (2003; 2006)
32 Shariah Supervisory Board opinion(4)
Disclosure of unlawful transactions(2)
Information of sources and distributions of zakat fund(5)
Information of sources and distributions of qard al hasan (5)
Disclosure of charity and other social responsibility(3)
Disclosure of employee relationship(4)
Disclosure of the treatment of the late payment and 
insolvent clients (3)
Disclosure of environmental responsibility(2)
Other community involvement aspects which regard  
to the development of ummah (4)
5 Hanifa and Hudaib  
(2007)
78 Themes
Underlying philosophy and values (22)
Provision of interest free products and service(10)
Focus on development and social goals (35)
Subjection to additional reviews by SSB(11)
Values
Vision and mission statement (9)
BOD and top management(13)
Product(10) 
Zakah, charity and benevolent loans(15)
Employees (9)
Debtors(4)
Community(7)
Shariah Supervisory board(11)
(Continued)
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understanding as to what the social responsibilities are that 
need to be carried out by Islamic banks, and to whom the 
responsibilities are owed.
There are two models that emphasise differently the social 
responsibility of Islamic bank. Ismail’s model (1986), for 
example, considers that social responsibility is implicit 
in nature and specifies that banks already achieved their 
social objective if they continuously make a profit, and 
are viable and sustainable. The social responsibility is 
considered discharged when banks pay zakat or tax and the 
government will be solely responsible for undertaking social 
responsibility activities and actions to various stakeholders. 
On the other hand, Chapra’s model holds the view that 
Islamic banks have a social responsibility to various 
stakeholders, both implicit and explicit, in the course of 
achieving profits. According to Lewis and Algaoud (2001) 
the differences pertaining to social responsibility in these 
Islamic banking models are probably due to differences in 
the mode of operations in the alternative banking systems.
In Malaysia, although Islamic banks have legal reforms, 
distinct licenses and a market that encourages the 
development of Shariah-compliant products and services, 
generally the Islamic banking services are offered by fully-
fledged Islamic banks alongside the conventional banks 
through a subsidiary, termed “Islamic subsidiary” (ISB) in 
this study. The ISB set-up may be the previous Islamic banking 
windows of conventional banks, or the newly incorporated 
subsidiary offering Islamic banking services under the 
auspices of conventional banks. The two distinct banking 
systems (FFIB and ISB) require two-fold the regulatory 
framework (Aziz, 2002). FFIBs are allowed to utilize their 
capital for Shariah transactions only. On the other hand, ISBs 
are required to comply with the regulation of having separate 
capital, Shariah-compliant and Shariah-non-compliant 
income, as well as funds providing for withdrawals.
As a result of these differences it is probable that managers’ 
choices in CSP decision-making will be different also. The 
manner in which a particular stakeholders’ group will be 
given priority in CSP is expected to be different in FFIB 
compared to ISB. It is expected that bank managers in FFIB 
will adhere strictly to the rule of Shariah because their bank’s 
economic and social aims will have been clearly identified 
since incorporation and will already be absorbed with due 
compliance. The other system (ISB), having migrated from a 
western setting to a banking system based on Islamic values 
will not be able to foster a total change in a manager’s mindset 
to incorporate the social objective of Islamic banking. The 
influence of western culture which already permeates their 
conventional system would cause them to have different 
sources of authority and a basis of accountability different 
from the Islamic viewpoint (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007); this 
will lead them to have differences in determining what they 
consider to be important CSP indicators for Islamic banks. 
In addition, a self-interested culture (according to agency 
theory) which is deeply rooted in the basic belief and values 
of western corporate culture (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009) is 
expected to widen the gap between the two groups.
Based on these arguments, it may be hypothesized that 
there are significant differences between managers in FFIB 
and ISB in Malaysia in terms of the importance attached to 
each CSP indicator (hypothesis 1).
11. Research methodology
This study used questionnaires to discover what constituted 
CSP indicators for Islamic banks from a practitioner’s 
Table 1. Continued.
No. Author
No. of  
items Name of categories*
6 Othman and  
Md Thani (2010)
43 Finance and Investment(6)
Product(4)
Employees(10)
Society(11)
Environment(7)
CG(5)
7 Dinar Standard and  
Dar Al Istithmar  
(2010)
13 AAOIFI Governance Standard No 7
Screening client for Shariah compliance
Responsible dealing with clients
Earning and expenditure prohibited by Sharia
Employee Welfare
Zakah(3)
Qard hasan(2)
Reduction of adverse impact on environment(8)
Social, development and environment based investment 
quotas(4)
Customer service
Macro, small business and social saving and investments
Charitable activities
Waqf management
Other miscellaneous activities not covered
*Number of items in each category is indicated in parentheses.
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Table 2. Population sample and questionnaire distribution.
No Bank name Ownership
Population  
sample
Questionnaires 
distributed
1 Affin Bank Malaysia Berhad Local-ISB 8 8
2 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad Local-ISB 7 7
3 AmIslamic Bank Berhad Local-ISB 9 9
4 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Local-FFIB 19 19
5 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad Local-FFIB 14 14
6 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad Local-ISB 13 13
7 EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad Local-ISB 6 6
8 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Local-ISB 6 6
9 Maybank Islamic Berhad Local-ISB 17 17
10 Public Islamic Bank Berhad Local-ISB 5 5
11 RHB Islamic Berhad Local-ISB 10 10
12 Kuwait Finance House (M) Berhad Foreign-FFIB 20 20
13 Asian Finance (M) Berhad Foreign-ISB 10 10
14 AlRajhi Banking & Investment Corp.(M) Berhad Foreign-FFIB 8 8
15 OCBC Al Amin Bank Berhad Foreign-ISB N/A Drop
16 HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad Foreign-ISB N/A Drop
17 Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad Foreign-ISB N/A Drop
Total 152 152
perspective. The indicators were self-constructed based on 
reviews of CSR AAOIFI standards, CSR in Malaysia (Bursa 
Malaysia CSR framework) and the code of corporate 
governance for Islamic banks (2007), and prior studies on 
CSR disclosure for Islamic banks in the earlier literature. 
A five point likert scale is used to sort out how relevant 
each indicator is to CSP. Based on these reviews, eight 
stakeholder groups were identified as relevant in the 
context of Islamic banks in Malaysia, namely, employee, 
community, customers, borrowers, environment, 
zakat, investment account holders, and government or 
regulators.
The targeted respondents for this study were IBs managers. 
Bank managers were chosen based on a purposive sampling 
technique. The selected unit analysis of the survey was 
a top management team committee of IBs. This was to 
ensure that the selected individuals had knowledge of CSP 
issues from the Islamic perspective and had an influence 
on allocating resources to social issues. For FFIB banks the 
term “managers” refers to the heads of the departments 
and, in the case of ISB, the targeted respondents are the 
management team committees of the ISB. They were 
chosen as the BOD delegates in business decision-making 
and deal with both internal and external stakeholders 
in daily banking operations (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; 
Lewis, 2005). Thus, they are expected to be among those 
who have decision-making power in terms of the corporate 
social responsibility of the bank.
The sample respondents for this study were drawn from 
seventeen licensed Islamic banks in Malaysia; however, due 
to the difficulty in identifying who were in the management 
team in the last four banks (no information was available 
either from the bank financial statement or websites), 
they were dropped from the list of potential respondents. 
Consequently, the sample respondents were drawn from 
only fourteen Islamic banks in Malaysia. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of questionnaires.
Researchers embarked on distribution of the questionnaires 
to the identified managers once permission to carry out the 
survey was granted by the chief executive officer (CEO) or 
the corporate communication manager. Each member of 
the management team had an equal chance of receiving a 
questionnaire and a researcher’s self-addressed envelope to 
return completed questionnaires.. In total, questionnaires were 
distributed to 152 managers from fourteen sample banks.
The reliability and validity of the CSP indicators construct 
and stakeholder grouping were tested in a pilot test involving 
thirty-eight students studying for Masters degrees in either 
Management or Islamic Finance at the International Islamic 
University, Malaysia. The important CSP indicators were 
analyzed using descriptive analysis (frequency and mean) 
while comparison of the perception of the FFIB managers with 
that of the ISB managers was analyzed using a simple t – test.
12. Analysis and results
Descriptive statistics
Response rate
The questionnaires yielded a response rate of 44%, a total 
of 67 respondents returning the completed questionnaires. 
The rate was considered high because two-thirds of the 
respondents held managerial posts in the respective banks, 
such as head of department, manager, CEO, and others.
Table 3. Responses according to IB type.
Bank type FFIB ISB Total
Sample 71 81 152
Percentage of total sample % 46.71 53.28 100
No of responses 24 43 67
Response rate% 33.80 53.08 44.08
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The response rate was considered acceptable as mail surveys 
normally result in a low response rate (Sekaran, 2003). 
The rate was higher compared with the standard response 
rate for mail surveys in Malaysia, which is 20% (Samat, 
Ramayah and Mat Saat, 2006). In addition, the sample size 
and response rate was also comparable to previous studies 
on stakeholders relevant for CSP (Gago and Antoline, 2004; 
Mishra and Suar, 2010; Jamali, 2008).
13. CSP indicators
In order to establish what are considered from managers’ 
perspective to be important CSP indicators for Islamic 
banks, the mean average of responses for each CSP indicator 
were analyzed. The findings are illustrated in Table  4. In 
aggregate, seventeen indicators are classified as important 
indicators (above 4), three are categorized as fairly 
unimportant indicators (mean above 3, but less than 3.49) 
and the thirty remaining indicators are regarded as fairly 
important indicators (mean average between 3.5 and 3.99).
In total, forty-seven of 50  indicators (94%) used in the 
questionnaires were perceived as important CSP indicators, 
these having an average mean score of 3.5 and above. Only 
three indicators were perceived as unimportant (mean 
score of less than 3.5), namely, third party verification 
of environmental performance, qard hasan financing 
(interest-free loans), and financial products for elderly and 
disabled customers.
These results illustrate that more than 80% of respondents 
perceived that the indicators mentioned are important 
CSP indicators for Islamic banks. It shows that managers 
in Islamic banks generally subscribe to the model that the 
objective of being an Islamic bank encompasses profit and 
also social objectives.
Table 4. Mean of CSP indicators.
Important CSP indicators N Mean Stakeholder
Payment of zakat annually 67 4.64 Zakat
Availability of training 67 4.45 Employee
Bank’s commitment to Shariah compliance 67 4.36 Regulator
Transparent in the calculation of zakat 67 4.34 Zakat
Clear health and safety standards 67 4.33 Employee
Avoidance of unlawful transactions and disclosure of nature and extent 67 4.33 Employee
Provision of housing or financing to employees 67 4.31 Employee
Employee appreciation 67 4.30 Employee
Transparent information on financial services types and features 67 4.25 Customer
Clear policy on recruitment 67 4.18 Employee
Actions handling customers complaints 67 4.15 Customers
Retirement, health and education benefit 67 4.13 Employee
Value added statements 67 4.12 Zakat
Continuous enhancement of new product features 67 4.06 Customer
Payment of tax and employee’s social security 67 4.03 Community
Policy of lender, depositors, suppliers and retail banking 67 4.01 Customer
Availability of E-banking services 67 4.00 Customer
Fairly important CSP indicators N Mean Stakeholder
Consistent donations or sadaqah 67 3.99 Community
Supporting charities 67 3.94 Community
Statement of P&L for investment account holders 67 3.93 IAH
Involvement in charitable programs 67 3.90 Community
Commitment to quality products and services (ISO) 67 3.90 Customer
Current or previous affiliation to charitable foundations 67 3.87 Community
Providing job training to fresh graduates 67 3.84 Community
Social and ethical criteria to asset management and investment 67 3.84 IAH
Accessibility of international frontiers 67 3.84 Customer
Fund allocation to investment account holders 67 3.82 IAH
BOD statement on bank commitment in offering Islamic investment & services 67 3.81 Regulators
Number of branches and vicinity 67 3.79 Customers
Financing small and medium industries 67 3.78 Borrowers
Equal employee opportunity 67 3.76 Employee
Policy on insolvent clients, charges and utilization of penalties 67 3.76 Borrowers
Announcement of material changes on profit, investment and earning for IAH 67 3.73 IAH
Third party verification of product innovation 67 3.72 Customers
Involvement in activities of public and private partnership 67 3.69 Community
(Continued)
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Table 4. Mean of CSP indicators. (Continued)
Important CSP indicators N Mean Stakeholder
Involvement in social sponsorships 67 3.69 Community
Third party verification for customer services 67 3.67 Customer
Availability of stakeholder dialogue and involvement procedures 67 3.66 Customer
Employee information changes and retrenchment 67 3.64 Employee
Products for difficult to reach customers 67 3.63 Customers
Mudharabah and musyarakah to be substantial financing 67 3.61 IAH
Policy of Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) 67 3.60 IAH
Lending profile (customer, industry,concept and social benefits) 67 3.58 Borrower
Involvement in environmental protection activities 67 3.57 Environment
Enhancement on environmental performance 67 3.55 Environment
Involvement in government social activities and programs 67 3.54 Community
Clear environmental management system or policy 67 3.54 Environment
Unimportant CSP indicators N Mean Stakeholder
Financial product for disables and elderly customer 67 3.49 Customer
Qard hasan financing 67 3.24 Borrower
Third party verification of environmental performance 67 3.16 Environment
Valid N (list wise)/Average 67 3.881 NA
The five most important CSP indicators for Islamic banks 
are:
1. Paying zakat annually.
2. Providing training to employees.
3. Commitment to Shariah compliance.
4. Transparency in the calculation of zakat.
5. Avoiding unlawful transactions and disclosing the 
nature and extent of the unlawful transactions.
Although the majority stated that zakat is an important CSP 
indicator, one anomaly was identified. This may be have 
been due to the respondent thought that business zakat is 
to be paid by the investors themselves, rather than being 
the institution’s responsibility.
With regard to the five least important CSP indicators 
in Islamic banks, surprisingly, qard hasan was among 
them. This is in contradiction to the required disclosure 
according to the AAOFI standards on CSR. Even though 
Islamic teaching encourages enhancement of social 
responsibility through providing non-commercial financing 
(free of interest and without additional finance charge 
or margin) (Mohd, Ariffin and Adnan, 2009), the Islamic 
bank managers did not perceived it to be an important 
CSP indicator in a commercial bank setting. This may be 
due to the fact that managers have a lack of knowledge 
on what constitutes qard hasan financing since it is not 
a widely-available financial service in Islamic banks in 
Malaysia (Mohd, Ariffin and Adnan, 2009). This may also 
suggest that, in commercial Islamic banks, CSP indicators 
in the manager’s perception are still tied to profit. The 
fact that qard hasan financing is a non-profitable product 
that has no commercial value (without profit, banks will 
be unable to cover the financing but it involves high levels 
of administrative work, high transaction cost, and risk of 
financing) meant that it received no support from top 
management as an important CSP indicator to be offered to 
various stakeholders. Financial products for disabled and 
elderly customers, and involvement in government social 
activities and programs may share the same reasoning as 
for qard hasan in being regarded as the least important CSP 
indicators.
Other items which fall under the category of least 
important CSP indicators are third party verification of 
environmental performance, and a clear environmental 
management system or policy. Though environment 
indicators fall under the least important factors because 
neither improvement in the environment nor destruction of 
the environment will affect the banking operation directly, 
in managers’ perception, involvement in environmental 
protection activities and enhancement of environmental 
performance and clear environmental management and 
policies are still important to Islamic banks (mean above 
3.5). The importance of environmentally-related issues 
apparent from this perception study is similar to managers’ 
actual practice in the Dinar Standard and Dar Al Istithmar 
study (2010), in which managers claimed that 38% of 
their investments were focused on environmentally-related 
investment. It can be inferred that the commitment of top 
management to environmental management is similar to 
the manager’s perceptions of the company’s environmental 
related issues.
Further analysis found that employees were perceived to 
be the most important stakeholder groups in terms of CSP 
(almost half of the important CSP indicators are related to 
this group). Next in the ranking was the customer group, 
followed by zakat.
As shown in Table  5, by further classifying indicators 
according to stakeholder groups, it was found that the 
most important CSP for zakat stakeholders was capability 
to pay zakat annually. For the employee stakeholder 
group, the essential factor was the opportunity to attend 
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training. For  the community stakeholder group, the vital 
factor was the bank’s action in paying tax and employee’s 
social security. For the customer stakeholder group, the 
prominent indicator was the commitment to provide 
quality  products and services (ISO). For the regulator 
stakeholder groups, the notable indicator was the bank’s 
commitment to offering Islamic investment and services. 
For borrowers, the key indicator was providing financing 
for small and medium industry, and, for the environment, 
the significant CSP indicator was the bank’s involvement 
in environmental activities.
In conclusion, the average mean result of 3.88 for 
50  indicators suggested that, in general, Islamic bank 
managers perceived that all indicators used in the study 
were important indicators of the prevailing state of the 
corporate social performance of Islamic banks. It is also 
suggested that the indicators chosen here were reliable 
in measuring the CSP construct within the Islamic bank 
setting. A value of 4.01 as the mean average for the most 
important CSP indicators for each stakeholder group 
indicates that all eight stakeholder groups are important in 
the consideration of CSP in Islamic banks.
14. Independent sample t-test
An independent sample t-test (a test of mean differences 
between two different groups) was carried out establish 
whether there were any significant differences in terms of the 
Table 5. Most important CSP indicator for stakeholder groups.
Stakeholder Most important indicator Mean
Zakat Pay zakat annually 4.64
Employee Availability of training 4.45
Community Payment of tax and employee’s social security 4.03
Investment account holders Statement of profit and loss for investment account holders 3.93
Customers/depositors Commitment to quality products and services (ISO) 3.90
Regulators/government BOD statement on bank commitment in offering Islamic investment and services 3.81
Borrowers Financing small and medium industries 3.78
Environment Involvement in environmental protection activities 3.57
Average Mean 4.01
importance of each of the CSP indicators between managers 
in FFIB and ISB. The results, which are shown in Table 6, 
illustrated that there were significant mean differences in 
perception between FFIB managers and ISB managers for 
four CSP indicators at 95% confidence intervals:
1. Qard hasan financing.
2. Number of branches at the vicinity.
3. Availability of e-banking services.
4. Third party verification for customers..
A low significance value for the t-test (typically less than 
0.05) indicates that there is a significant difference 
between the means of the two groups (Coakes, 2005). 
There is significant difference in the mean for FFIB and ISB 
managers in stating that qard hasan is an important CSP 
indicator. FFIB managers largely consider it as relevant 
(FFIB mean = 3.70) but ISB managers generally consider 
it as partly relevant (ISB mean = 3.00). This suggests that 
FFIB managers are more familiar with qard hasan financial 
services due to the fact that they have been exposed to such 
a facility since FFIB provide such financial services (for 
example, Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (M) 
Berhad, BMMB and Kuwait Finance House (M) Berhad) in 
Malaysia (Adnan and Mohd Ariffin 2009). This reasoning 
is also consistent with disclosure made in annual reports, 
BMMB being the only local Islamic bank that continuously 
carries out financing classified as qard hasan according to 
their annual reports for 2003 to 2008.
Table 6. Independent sample t-test on CSP indicators.
CSP indicators
Levene’s  
test t-test for equality of means
F Sig.
F  
(N = 24) 
I (N = 43) SD t df Sig.
Mean 
dif
SE 
dif
Qard hasan financing 3.910 0.05 F = 3.70 
I = 3.00
F = 0.974 
I = 1.381
2.149 65 0.035 0.696 0.324
Number of branches  
and vicinity
2.628 0.11 F = 3.43 
I = 3.98
F = 1.080 
I = 0.876
-2.220 65 0.030 -0.542 0.244
Availability of E-banking  
services
0.818 0.37 F = 3.61 
I = 4.20
F = 1.033 
I = 0.878
-2.481 65 0.016 -0.596 0.240
Third party verification  
for customer services
1.319 0.25 F = 3.30 
I = 3.86
F = 0.974 
I = 0.852
-2.429 65 0.018 -0.559 0.230
F = FFIB I = ISB
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Managers in FFIB and ISB also exhibit significant differences 
in perception as to whether the number of branches in the 
vicinity represents an important CSP indicator. The FFIB 
managers’ perception was more towards partly relevant 
indicators (mean = 3.43) while generally ISB considered it 
as a relevant indicator (mean =  3.98). This finding bears 
a considerable link to the existing set-up of Islamic banks 
in Malaysia. In FFIB, Islamic banking services are offered 
throughout all branches but many ISBs still operate their 
Islamic banking activities in collaboration with their 
conventional banks. Thus, the number of Islamic bank 
branches is still far below that of FFIB, their separation 
from conventional banking being still in its infancy. As an 
example, a comparison was made between Maybank and 
BIMB for the year ended 2008. Due to its early stage of 
operation, Maybank has only thirteen branches of Islamic 
banks compared with ninety branches of BIMB. Despite the 
fact that Maybank had 14% of the total number of BIMB 
branches, its total distributable income from business 
operations was about half of the total distributable 
income of BIMB (RM 642,853,000 for Maybank and RM 
1,168,837,000 for BIMB). In any case, Maybank managers 
may have perceived that the number of branches was a 
relevant CSP indicator for the expansion of their IB business 
operation, while for an established Islamic banking 
institution, the additional number of branches will bear 
only partial relevance to the CSP.
The third significant difference arises in the availability of 
e-banking as an indicator to CSP. ISB managers perceived 
this as very important (mean 4.20) while FFIB managers 
perceived it as partly important (mean 3.60, p =  0.016). 
Scrutinizing the degree of relevance of this indicator 
further, Table 6 indicates that ISB has double the number 
of FFIB managers (in percentage terms) who state that 
e-banking is a very relevant CSP indicator (45% compared 
with 21%). This may be due to the fact that the introduction 
of e-banking was already realized by ISB managers unlike 
FFIB managers, as the holding entity of ISB introduced 
e-banking much earlier than FFIB. This is consistent with 
the analysis of bank annual reports which showed that ISB 
introduced e-banking from the year 2000, whereas FFIB 
has made a quiet move into it quite recently.
The final indicator with vast significant differences is third 
party verification for customer services (mean FFIB =  3.30; 
ISB = 3.80). FFIB managers perceived this not to be an important 
CSP indicator while the ISB managers held the contrary 
opinion. This may also be a hint that third party verification is a 
more important CSP indicator in an ISB manager’s perception 
compared with an FFIB manager’s. It can also be interpreted to 
mean that for FFIB verification must come from their customer 
who already subscribes to services provided by the bank, rather 
than through verification by the third party.
These findings substantiate the position that significant 
differences exist between managers in FFIB and ISB in terms 
of their perception of how important the four indicators are 
in representing CSP to Islamic banks. In other words, these 
results also suggest that, even though managers are from 
two different settings of Islamic banks in Malaysia, their 
perception on the degree of importance of the forty-six CSP 
indicators used in this study are the same except for just 
these four indicators. Thus, hypothesis 1 – that there are 
significant differences between managers in FFIB and ISB 
in terms of the importance attached to each CSP indicator – 
is partly supported by the four indicators discussed.
15. Conclusions and limitations
This study examines the CSP indicators for Islamic banks 
from a practitioner’s perspective. The results revealed 
that Islamic bank managers of FFIB and ISB in Malaysia 
perceived that social performance towards various 
stakeholders is an important objective of Islamic banks 
in line with the maqasid Shariah to ensure social fairness 
and justice in the preservation and management of bank 
properties. These results also suggest that Islamic bank 
managers in FFIB and ISB are proactive in considering 
CSP activities that meet the need of various stakeholders 
affecting and affected by bank operations. The Islamic bank 
manager’s considerations for CSP were not dominated by 
the status of whether they have a contract either explicitly 
or implicitly with stakeholders. As such, CSP undertaken by 
Islamic banks will help them in meeting the philosophical, 
economic, ethical and social foundation in administering 
a faith-based commercial business institution.
The findings also indicate that the majority of Islamic 
bank managers are in support of Chapra’s model of social 
responsibility which proposes that the CSP of Islamic banks 
includes explicit responsibility to various stakeholders in 
the course of achieving profits. They generally perceive that 
Islamic banks fulfill their social function if they consider 
the interests of employees, customers, zakat recipients, 
regulators, and community.
Furthermore, the contradictory finding of Malaysian 
Islamic bank managers’ perception compared to the AAIOFI 
standards on qard hasan financing as a highly recommended 
social responsibility the shows that the product has not been 
given due attention in practice. If the product is universally 
acclaimed as the Islamic bank’s social function, the industry 
needs to give more significance to it so that it distinguishes 
the bank function from that of conventional banks.
Lastly, environmental issues and management will be 
a potential area of CSP for Islamic banks because their 
importance has attracted managers’ attention in this study, 
despite the fact that they are affecting or affected by the 
banking business.
The importance of CSP indicators in this study is limited 
to the perception of the Islamic bank managers only and 
excludes indicators pertaining to Tawhid or philosophical 
foundation, due to its subjectivity. In order to have a 
holistic view on what comprises CSP indicators for Islamic 
banks, future studies may also consider multi-stakeholders’ 
perceptions such as customers, borrowers, investors, board 
of directors and Shariah committee members. Future 
studies may also consider using constructed indicators in 
assessing the extent of CSP in Islamic banks in order to 
gain an insight into the status quo of each Islamic bank in 
upholding their social functions.
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Abstract - The growth and development of an Islamic capital market and finance depends on the 
institutions in which its dispute resolutions are anchored. The institution for Islamic finance dispute 
resolution and its practitioners must be knowledgeable and versed in Islamic finance. Despite 
this, those who are trained in common law, either as judges or advocates, continue to weigh a 
considerable influence in matters that border on Islamic finance dispute resolution. This problem 
is further compounded by the constitutional backing given to these judges and advocates. This has 
serious effects on the adjudication of Islamic finance disputes in Nigeria. Based on this premise, this 
paper analyzes how the common law trained judges and advocates have and may have considerable 
influence in the resolution of Islamic finance disputes in Nigeria. This more so emphasizes that 
dispute is inevitable in any human endeavors. It makes far-reaching recommendations, which if 
considered and applied will assist the growth and development of the dispute resolution sector of 
Islamic finance in Nigeria, being a member of OIC. Content analysis of legal issues is used to enrich 
the study.
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1. Introduction
Nigeria, with not less than 70 million Muslims, cannot afford 
to be left behind in an effort to benefit from the growing 
popularity of one of the world’s fastest-growing financial 
sectors – Islamic finance. Studies show that 30 percent of 
the Muslim population typically is interested in Islamic 
finance transactions (CNN, September 7, 2011). Also, 
50–60 percent will use Islamic finance products if the prices 
are fair enough (ibid). This shows that disputes in the course 
of this transaction, as would be the case with any other 
human endeavors, are inevitable (Sambo & Akanbi 2012; 
Kadouf & Sambo 2012). Yet, people who are not trained 
in the act of dispute relation in this sector play significant 
roles in the act of resolving disputes emanating from Islamic 
finance transactions. This is based on the influence that 
existing legal frameworks in Nigeria have bestowed on these 
categories of people in matters relating to Islamic finance.
The growth and sustainability of Islamic finance in Nigeria, 
like any institution, depends largely on how it nurtures 
and protects the institutions where disputes are finally 
resolved. In other words, the ability to settle Islamic 
finance disputes depends on knowledgeable practitioners 
and sound institutions for dispute resolution. Where this is 
not put in place, a lot would have been done in vein. Those 
who have their say in matters of Islamic finance ought to 
be people who are familiar with its rules and principles. 
This is more so that Islamic finance has received very stiff 
oppositions from those who lack the knowledge of what it 
is all about. To this extent, judges who are to decide matters 
on Islamic finance, and advocates of Islamic Finance, need 
some considerable knowledge in this respect.
The influence of those who do not have sufficient knowledge 
about Islamic finance but are allowed by law to decide such 
matters may cause miscarriages of justice. The ignorance 
may be expressed in a way that will result in injury of parties, 
thereby retarding the growth and development of the 
sector. For instance, the recent decision of the Federal High 
Court sitting in Abuja by Justice Gabriel Kolawole shows 
that civil courts, such as the Federal High Court or a High 
Court, should not decide matters relating to Islamic finance 
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in Nigeria (The Guardian, June 16, 2012). This is because, 
since there is non-recognition of Islamic law as a distinct 
legal jurisprudence (Haji & Sambo 2012), Islamic finance 
may be resolved based on sentiments of a particular judge 
(non-Muslim). This is clear in the decision recently handed 
down by the Federal High Court. It is elementary that the 
judge decided that the plaintiff lacked requisite locus standi 
to present the case, and it ought not to have gone into the 
merit of the matter. The reason is that the effect of lack of 
locus standi is to deny judicial assistance to the plaintiff 
by not looking at the merit of the case (Sambo, 2009). 
However, the court went ahead to pronounce diplomatically 
that the license issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
to an Islamic bank (Jaiz International Bank PLC) is illegal. 
In the words of the Court: “If not that the plaintiff has no 
locus standi to maintain this action, I would have nullified 
the illegal license issued to the Jaiz International Bank 
PLC by the CBN to operate non-interest banking under 
the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.” The Judge could 
not hide his hatred for or sentiment against Islamic bank 
when he further observed: “The so-called non-interest bank 
under the guise of Islamic banking has to come by Act of 
the National Assembly.” There is no doubt that the court 
has misdirected itself by making an unwarranted statement 
that Islamic banking is illegal and unconstitutional.
Against the above backdrop, this paper analyzes how 
the common law-trained judges and advocates have 
considerable influence in the resolution of Islamic finance 
disputes in Nigeria. It discusses the influence at various 
levels of the adjudication processes of Islamic finance, 
where matters are brought to court for its intervention.
2. Nature of Islamic finance in disputes
As part of the activities of Islamic finance, the account/
finance of the institution includes deferred payment sale; 
short-term deposit; retail current account; simple account; 
current account, and retail savings account. Generally, 
the Islamic finance product types are the classical 
contracts in Islamic finance–Murabaha, Ijarah, Mudaraba, 
Musharak, Islamic bonds (Sukuk) and Ijara (Lease) (Abdul 
Rahman 2010). Similarly, the solutions offered by Islamic 
finance allow access to funds, including non-interest 
banking, Takaful (Islamic Insurance), Islamic microfinance, 
Sukuk (Islamic Bonds), Islamic Asset Management.
Islamic finance is profit-oriented (Sanusi, 2011). However, 
its system is based on moral and ethical values that are 
based on the Shariah. It has proven to be the most developed 
form of profit and loss sharing banking, which is based on 
non-interest principles, mainly because of its international 
recognition. Despite its religiosity in origin, its products 
are useful to all who are willing to be fair and just in their 
economic endeavors. It is strictly based on no-interest rule 
as no interest can be paid or earned from a loan.
In the same vein, there are four key philosophies of Islamic 
finance, namely:
1. Existence of some risk, whether funds are used in 
commercial or productive venture
2. Funds are required to preferably finance ethically 
and socially productive activities
3. The requirement that financial risk should lie solely 
with the lender of the capital and not with the 
manager or agent working with the capital
4. Interest is prohibited as it is a predetermined, fixed 
sum owed to the lender irrespective of the outcome 
(success or failure) of the business venture in which 
the fund is invested
Also, Islamic finance prohibits all forms of transactions 
or conditions connected with the execution of business 
contract involving elements of Gharar (uncertainty), 
deceit, gambling, speculation, and so on. The objective is 
mainly to create the financial system, which serves as an 
efficient medium for intermediation between savers and 
investors. Gharar is prohibited, for instance, in order to 
prohibit risk or to prohibit derivative instruments in today’s 
financial markets, which are designed to transfer risks from 
one party to the other.
Also, transactions in Islamic finance are based on sound 
Islamic morality and legality. So, the need to scrutinize 
transactions in order to see their compliance with moral 
standards and Islamic finance principles become inevitable. 
Therefore, legal instruments, contracts and transactions, 
which involve dealings in pork, gambling, pornography, 
ammunition, alcohol, are not legally permissible because 
of their non-Shar ah compliance. The principles of Islamic 
finance are strictly aimed at avoiding interest; uncertainty 
or ambiguity relating to a subject matter; disproportionate 
speculation; unjust enrichment or unfair exploitation, and 
greed. Thus, financial products, services, transactions and 
contracts are structured to be in compliance with Islamic 
finance principles. Also, financial transactions are required 
to be asset-based or linked to real economic activities in 
order to create returns. Finance can only be extended for 
projects, trade and commercial transactions, as they are 
activities in the real sector which generate income and 
wealth.
It is observed that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) over 
the years granted licenses for the operation of Islamic 
finance in Nigeria. For instance, in the year 1992, the Habib 
Nigerian Bank limited (former Bank PHB Plc. now Keystone 
Bank Plc.) was granted license by the CBN to operate non-
interest banking services on a “window basis.” Similarly, 
in the year 2004, Lotus Capital limited, which is a halal 
fund (an ethical investment fund), started operation as 
an Islamic finance company dealing in Shariah compliant 
fund management and investment activities. Also, the 
first full-blown Islamic microfinance bank, Al-Barakah 
microfinance, began operations in April, 2010, in Lagos. 
Recently, the first complete non-interest bank, Jaiz Bank 
Plc., began operations as a regional bank in January, 2012, 
with branches covering Abuja, Kano State and Kaduna 
State of Nigeria.
In fact, Nigeria cannot afford to fail in providing effective 
and efficient legal frameworks for dispute resolution in the 
Islamic finance industry. This is based on the marvelous 
prospects for states and institutional cooperation and 
assistance across the continent. This is more so that Nigeria 
is a full member of Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
and the International Financial Services Board (IFSB), 
international organizations that set standard for the Islamic 
finance industry.
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 121
The continuing influence of common law judges and advocates in the adjudication of Islamic finance disputes in Nigeria
The above shows the nature of Islamic finance and the 
products it offers to the public. Consequently, disputes 
become unavoidable just like any human interaction as 
earlier stated. Here, the disputes could be, for instance, in 
relation to Islamic Capital Markets (ICM). In this area, there 
could be disputes among capital market services licenses 
holders who deal in securities or conducting trade in future 
contracts; disputes among some organizations involved and 
a stock exchange; disputes between an approved clearing 
house and an affiliate; disputes among those who participate 
in capital market transactions; disputes between the clients 
and capital market services licenses holders. Disputes 
of this nature seem to be emerging in some jurisdictions 
like Malaysia. Apart from this, since Islamic finance deals 
in certain products like waqf and inheritance, handling 
of Islamic wealth management, and cash waqf, disputes 
regarding these transactions are inevitable. In all these 
disputes, the principle issue among other things that the 
courts would need to determine is whether the transactions 
are Shariah compliant. This is because Islamic finance cannot 
derogate from the established principles of the Shariah.
It is also interesting to note here that issues like waqf and 
inheritance are within the jurisdiction of the Shariah court 
of appeal. However, in a situation where the transaction 
has to do with Islamic banking and finance, it is highly 
doubtful that the court has jurisdiction in this regard. This 
is because, as it will be seen later, the disputes will concern 
banking matters, which clearly fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Federal High Court or High Court (being banker/
customer relation, section 251(1) (d) CFRN 1999). Thus, 
the nature of Islamic finance and the nature of its products 
together with disputes emanating therefrom show that they 
go beyond what can be heard and determined by the Federal 
High Court or a State High Court. Yet, these courts have 
influence in the adjudication of such matters. The nature of 
influence is discussed in the next section of the paper.
3. Influence of common law judges at the 
high court
The High Court, especially the Federal High Court of 
Nigeria, is a creation of the Constitution (section  249(1) 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 as altered (CFRN, 1999)). The appointment as a 
judicial officer in the court is made by the president on 
the recommendation of National Judicial Council, subject 
to the confirmation by the Senate (section  250(2) of the 
CFRN, 1999). The qualification for appointment into such 
office is that a person must be qualified to practice as a legal 
practitioner in Nigeria and must have been so for a period 
not less than ten years (section 250(3) of the CFRN, 1999). 
Apart from this qualification, there is no requirement as to 
whether the person needs to be trained or knowledgeable 
in Islamic finance. Well, this is not expected because the 
reason for the creation of the Federal High Court is not to 
decide matters relating or connected with Islamic finance. 
So it would be unexpected that judges be appointed based 
on the criteria of having sound knowledge of Islamic finance 
or of the Shariah. However, the problem seems to be evident 
from the way and manner in which the jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court is stated.
The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court today covers 
matters that relate to Islamic finance. This is despite the 
fact that, as earlier stated, judges of the court need not 
be knowledgeable in matters relating to Islamic finance 
(there is no requirement for being knowledgeable in 
Islamic finance or the Shariah as part of its qualification 
(see section 250 (3) of the CFRN, 1999). Section 251 of the 
constitution provides that “notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary contained in this constitution and in addition 
to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an 
Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall 
have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other 
courts in civil cases and matters- (d) connected with or 
pertaining to banking, banks, other financial institutions, 
including any action between one bank and another, any 
action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising 
from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, 
bills of exchange, letters of credit, promissory notes and 
other fiscal measures, provided that this paragraph shall 
not apply to any dispute between an individual customer 
and his bank in respect of transactions between individual 
customer and the bank…”( section 251(1) (d) of the CFRN, 
1999). This shows that disputes in matters relating to 
Islamic finance fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court.
It should also be mentioned that where the matter relates 
to banker/customer relationship, the matter Federal High 
Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction (ibid). In other 
words, the plaintiff is at liberty to institute the action in either 
the Federal High Court or a state High Court. A state High 
Court is also a creation of the Constitution (section 255(1) 
and 270(1) of the CFRN, 1999). The appointment of judges 
into this court is made by the Governor (or President in 
the case of Federal Capital Territory, (F.C.T.) Abuja) on 
the recommendation of National Judicial Council subject 
to the ratification of the State House of Assembly (or the 
Senate in the case of the F.C.T) (section 256(1) and 271(1) 
of the CFRN, 1999). The qualification of persons into the 
office of a judge of the High Court is that such persons must 
be qualified to practice as legal practitioners in Nigeria 
and must have been so qualified for a period of not less 
than ten years (section  256(3) and 271(3) of the CFRN, 
1999). There is no requirement that such persons must be 
learned in Shariah or in principles of Islamic finance. This 
is unexpected actually in view of the fact that the court 
was not meant to determine such kinds of disputes. The 
problem seems to lie in the perspective on matters which 
border on Islamic finance.
The discussion above shows clearly that disputes relating to 
the affairs of Islamic banking and finance will be resolved 
by the Federal High Court or a State High Court. This is 
even to the exclusion of any other courts of law in Nigeria. 
The issue here is whether the judges of the Federal High 
Court of a State High Court are reasonably and justifiably 
competent enough to decide matters that relate to Islamic 
finance. This is based on the fact that – looking at the nature 
of disputes that may arise in Islamic finance and having 
regard to the qualification and backgrounds of the judges 
occupying the court – the court may not be competent to 
decide such matters.
It is well known that the main duty of the law courts is to 
interpret the law and to decide the claims/objections by the 
parties. But a question may be raised: given the nature of the 
cases, which are based on Shariah, are the courts concerned 
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(Federal High Court or a State High Court) competent to 
construe the legal issues and decide the cases? The answer is 
definitely “no.” The reason is that judges in these courts are 
not trained in this respect. Also, the legality to be determined 
relates mainly to the extent of Shariah compliance of the 
transaction. In other words, the main focus of the court is 
to see whether the transaction between the parties strictly 
complies with the Shariah and the principles of Islamic 
finance. This is beyond the competence of the Federal High 
Court or a State High Court. The reason is that judges in 
these courts are not trained in this respect. These disputes 
are based on different legal jurisprudence from the civil law 
in which the judges are trained. Also, matters of contracts 
signed by the parties are not related to the common law 
types of contracts. Although it has some similarities, it is 
fundamentally different in principles thereby making the 
construction or interpretation a totally different thing. One 
area of difference in the interpretation relates to the sources 
of law to be used by the judges. While the judges will simply 
rely on the law of contracts as applicable in Nigeria for the 
purpose of determining the contract, the primary sources of 
such interpretation under Islamic law are the Qur’an, Sunnah, 
Ijma and Qiyas. Also, while charging of interests does not 
render invalid contracts under the common law, which the 
judges may seek to apply, the hallmark of the principles of 
Islamic finance is to avoid interest-based transactions having 
been prohibited in strong terms by Allah (s.w.t.) (Sanusi 
2011; Sambo & Abdulkadir 2012). All these may occasion 
miscarriage or misplacement of justice in the courts.
Again, the jurisdiction conferred on the Sharia Court 
of Appeal does not solve the problem. As it is now, the 
Sharia Court does not have more than mere jurisdiction 
in Islamic personal law. Islamic finance is not covered by 
the definition of Islamic personal law in the Constitution. 
Although the Constitution does not define Islamic personal 
law, ingredients of Islamic personal law as envisaged by the 
Constitution were stated as: a) any question of Islamic law 
regarding marriage concluded in accordance with that law, 
including a question relating to the validity or dissolution 
of such a marriage or a question that depends on such a 
marriage and relating to family relationship or guardianship 
of an infant; b) where all the parties to the proceedings are 
Muslims, any question of Islamic personal law regarding 
a marriage, including the dissolution and validity of that 
marriage, or regarding family relationship, a foundling 
or guardianship of an infant; c) any question of Islamic 
personal law regarding waqf, gift, will or succession where 
the endower, donor, testator or deceased person is a Muslim; 
d) any question of Islamic personal law regarding an infant, 
prodigal or person of unsound mind who is a Muslim or the 
maintenance or guardianship of a Muslim who is physically 
or mentally infirm; and e) where all the parties to the 
proceedings being Muslims, have requested the court that 
heard the case in the first instance to determine the case in 
accordance with Islamic personal law, any other question 
(section 277 (1) and (2) of the CFRN, 1999). This shows 
that Islamic finance is not envisaged as Islamic personal law 
so as to confer jurisdiction on the Shariah Court.
The issue here is whether any House of Assembly can validly 
expand the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal.  In other 
words, although the State House of Assembly has the power 
to extend the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal 
through legislation, this cannot validly extend to matters 
on Islamic banking and finance. This is because issues or 
matters relating to banking and other financial institutions 
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High 
Court (see section  251 which starts with the expression 
“notwithstanding” anything contained in the Constitution.). 
Even where the matter has to do with banker/customer 
relationship, it is either the Federal High Court or the State 
High Court that has jurisdiction and not the Sharia Court of 
Appeal (proviso to section 251(1) (d) of the CFRN, 1999). 
An attempt by any state House of Assembly to confer such 
jurisdiction on the Shariah Court of Appeal may be regarded 
as an indirect way of amending the Constitution, which is 
beyond its competence. The effect of this, as earlier stated, is 
that, notwithstanding the fact that the matter has to do with 
an Islamic bank and its customer; an Islamic bank and its 
staff; an Islamic bank and other similar financial institutions; 
Islamic capital market and Islamic finance, the Sharia Court 
of Appeal will ultimately lack jurisdiction.
4. Influence of justices at the court of appeal
The justices of Court of Appeal have considerable influence 
in matters relating to Islamic finance. This is based on the 
fact that appeals from the Federal High Court or a State High 
Court, involving matters of Islamic finance, will be heard by 
the justices of the court (section 240 of the CFRN, 1999). The 
Court of Appeal is a creation of the Constitution (section 237 
of the CFRN, 1999), and the justices are appointed by 
the President of Nigeria on the recommendation of the 
National Judicial Council, subject to the recommendation 
by the Senate (section  238(1) of the CFRN, 1999). The 
issue here has to do with the qualifications of justices at the 
Court of Appeal, who may sit on matters relating to Islamic 
finance. The qualification required of the justices of the 
Court of Appeal is that they must be qualified to practice 
as legal practitioners and must have been so qualified for 
a period not less than twelve years (section 238(3) of the 
CFRN, 1999). For the purpose of sitting on matters, which 
relate to Islamic personal law, those justices hearing the 
case are required to be learned in Islamic personal law 
(section 247(1) (a) of the CFRN, 1999).
The problem with the above arrangement is that the 
Constitution does not categorize matters relating to Islamic 
finance as falling under Islamic personal law. In other 
words, the Constitution does not regard Islamic finance as 
personal law, which may justify the sitting of those learned 
in Islamic personal law on the matter. So, any justice of 
the Court, depending on the discretion of the president 
of the Court of Appeal, may be assigned to sit on matters 
of Islamic finance, which may include deciding whether 
the action of an Islamic bank is Shariah compliant. It is 
submitted that this is obviously a difficult task for any 
judge that does not have the background of Islamic law 
and considerable knowledge of Islamic finance. The end 
result is either a misplacement of justice or miscarriage of 
justice at appellate levels occasioned as a result of influence 
of a judge who does not have sufficient knowledge or 
background of a legal jurisprudence.
5. Influence of common law judges at the 
supreme court
The justices of the Supreme Court also have some influence 
in the adjudication of matters relating to Islamic finance. 
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This is based on appeals being brought before the Court 
from the decisions of the Court of Appeal in matters relating 
Islamic finance. It should be noted that the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria, like other courts mentioned above, is a creation 
of the Constitution (section  230(1) of the CFRN, 1999). 
The appointments of the justices are made by the President 
on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, 
subject to the confirmation of such appointment by the 
Senate (section 231(1) of the CFRN, 1999). A person is not 
also qualified to be a justice of the Supreme Court unless he 
is qualified to practice as a legal practitioner in Nigeria and 
has been so qualified for a period not less than fifteen years 
(see section 231(3) of the CFRN, 1999). There is no other 
requirement for qualification for such appointment (ibid). 
In other words, a person or certain number of persons, is 
not required to have knowledge of Islamic law or Islamic 
finance to be appointed to that position. This is unlike the 
position in the Court of Appeal, where some of the justices 
are required to be learned in Islamic personal law. Even for 
the purpose of hearing matters, which border or pertain to 
Islamic finance, no special qualification exists.
The problem with the above arrangement is that justices 
who do not have a background of Islamic finance or at 
least Islamic personal law will end up becoming final 
judges (decision makers) in matters that pertain to Islamic 
finance. It must be said that even if a justice of the Court 
perchance has sufficient knowledge of Islamic finance 
or Islamic law, it is submitted that this does not solve 
the problem. The reason is that majority rule in decision 
making applies at the Supreme Court. So, where one of the 
justices has knowledge of the principles of Islamic finance 
or Islamic law and others do not, the day may be carried by 
other justices with little or no knowledge of Islamic finance. 
While one of the justices may be satisfied in declaring a riba-
based transaction illegal for not being Shariah-compliant, 
for instance, others may not be favorably disposed to doing 
so. The end result is miscarriage of justice occasioned by 
ignorance or injustice at the highest bench of dispute 
resolution. This may affect the growth and development of 
dispute resolution aspects of Islamic finance knowing fully 
well that disputes in the course of such interaction, like any 
other human endeavors, are inevitable.
6. Influence of common law advocates at 
the various levels of adjudication
Advocates have influence in matters relating to Islamic 
finance at various levels of adjudication. By advocates, 
we are referring to those who are qualified to practice 
as legal practitioners under the Legal practitioners Act 
(section 2). The influence is witnessed at the High Court, 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The reason is 
that they represent litigants in any court of law in Nigeria. 
Once a person is called to the Nigerian bar, he has the 
right of audience in any court of law or judicial tribunal 
established by law in Nigeria including the Shariah Court 
of Appeal. More so, since the Constitution, as earlier 
stated, has conferred jurisdiction on banking matters 
including Islamic finance, on the Federal High Court or a 
State High Court as the case may be, legal practitioners’ 
right of audiences in these courts appear settled and 
beyond argument. Some of the advocates may not have 
knowledge, owing to their training, in Islamic law, 
let alone Islamic finance.
In view of the fact that the role of an advocate is to assist the 
court to reach a just conclusion, we wonder how significant 
is the role of an advocate who is not trained (owing to his 
educational background) nor endowed with the knowledge 
of Islamic finance in matters that pertain to adjudication of 
Islamic finance. It should not be forgotten that the principal 
question that the court may be asked to determine may 
border on the extent of a transaction’s compliance with 
the Shariah. This is coupled with the fact that the court, 
as earlier mentioned, which seeks to determine the matter 
in controversy, is one without sufficient knowledge of the 
basic principles of Islamic finance. Thus, the role of such 
practitioners will be nothing but playing of technicalities, 
increased costs and a delay in court proceedings as a result 
of asking for unnecessary adjournment thereby leading to 
the ultimate miscarriage of justice.
7. Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion, common law judges and 
advocates have and may continue to have considerable 
influence in the adjudication of Islamic finance matters 
in Nigeria. This is mainly because the legal framework 
has conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court or a 
State High Court, in matters that border on hearing and 
determination of Islamic finance. Yet, the appointments 
and qualification of judges in these courts do not qualify 
them to hear and determine matters on Islamic finance. 
Also, advocates are allowed by law to have right of audience 
in these courts despite the facts that the matters may have 
to do with Islamic finance. Thus, it is submitted, that most 
advocates in Nigeria are not trained in this regard, except for 
the few who studied Common and Islamic law. The effect of 
this is miscarriage or misplacement of justice occasioned as 
a result of ignorance or lack of sufficient knowledge on the 
part of those (judges and advocates) charged with the duty 
of dispute resolution in Islamic finance. More so, sound 
decisions of courts require sound knowledge on the part of 
judges and advocates, and this should be more pronounced 
in matters of Islamic finance. The industry is still at its 
nascent stage in Nigeria, and its growth and development 
largely depends on the institutions in which its dispute 
resolution is anchored.
Thus, to ensure the growth and development of Islamic 
finance in Nigeria, there is the need for suitable legal and 
institutional frameworks in which the system is to operate. 
To start with, there should be constitutional amendment 
to remove matters on Islamic finance from the control 
(jurisdiction) of the Federal or State High Court. This 
is more so that a judge, as noted above, has expressed 
his displeasure with Islamic finance. One can argue that 
the Shariah Court of Appeal may be conferred with such 
jurisdiction. The reason is that the Court is also a superior 
court of record in Nigeria with coordinate jurisdiction with 
the Federal High Court or a State High Court. The judges or 
Khadi of the Shariah Court are trained in matters of Islamic 
law including Islamic finance but they may be required 
to do a little more training in Islamic finance. However, 
the problem with this arrangement is that matters may 
still go on appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme 
Court, where the justices do not have sufficient knowledge 
(having regard to their background) in matters that border 
on the principles of Islamic finance. To solve this problem, 
it is suggested that more people who are learned in Islamic 
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finance and Shariah should be appointed to appellate courts 
to decide matters bearing on Islamic finance. Alternatively, 
the creation of the Shariah Supreme Court, separate 
from traditional Supreme Court, through constitutional 
amendment is suggested.
Again, in the meantime, the legal framework can be 
improved upon by permitting the appointment of a Shariah 
Advisory Board annexed to all Federal High Court and 
State High Courts, especially in northern Nigeria, where 
Islamic finance may flourish more or for any states of 
the Federation that desire such boards in their courts. 
This board will play a very important role in assisting the 
courts in adjudicating disputes on Islamic finance. The 
opinion of the board in matters relating to the transactions’ 
compliance with the Shariah or the rights and duties of the 
parties based on the principles of Islamic finance should 
be binding on the courts. This will reduce the influences 
of judges and advocates who are not trained in Islamic 
finance in the adjudication of disputes in matters of Islamic 
finance. It will also lead to high quality of courts’ decisions 
in matters of Islamic finance and ensure the justice of the 
matter. Finally, if these suggestions are considered and 
applied, it will lead to the growth and development of the 
Islamic finance industry, especially in the area of dispute 
resolution in Nigeria, being a member of OIC and other 
similar jurisdictions.
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Abstract - The paper’s purpose is to contribute to the existing body of work in the area of Islamic 
finance through the discovery of the feasibility of effective dispute resolution mechanisms for 
the resolution of disputes for Islamic banks and institutions offering Islamic financial services. 
This is investigated to determine whether the Shariah framework for the enforcement of financial 
contracts and dispute resolution is a legal risk or appropriate alternative mechanism to the 
world on whole, individual countries, the business environment, organisations and individuals. 
The research methodology employed in this study is an amalgamation of direct observation from 
legal and regulatory perspectives and case analysis of some landmark cases of the English and 
Malaysian courts. However, the Islamic legal framework remains the only hypothetical basis of the 
study. Through examining the above, the paper proposes to complement the civil court scheme 
with a hybrid feature of expert determination whereby the court would refer all issues pertaining 
to Islamic law to a recognized body of Shariah experts for an opinion that would bind the court. 
Such a body should be an independent arbitral tribunal, which may or may not be court-annexed, 
composed of Islamic finance experts whose decision is final. This will complement the work of the 
Financial Mediation Bureau, which has been handling small claims in banker-customer relationship. 
The paper concentrates on exploratory study of the viability of dispute resolution mechanisms for 
the resolution of Islamic finance disputes. The investigation has been supplemented by case analysis 
of some English and Malaysian courts.
Keywords: dispute resolution, Islamic finance, Shariah advisory council, Malaysian court, ADR
1. Introduction
The overwhelming growth and continuous expansion of 
the Islamic finance industry in the world during the last 
decade has been unparalleled. The faith-based finance, 
which spurns activities outlawed by Islam, is a viable 
ethical alternative to conventional financing. In addition to 
being legal under civil laws and tax, as well as cost efficient, 
Islamic finance is also Shariah compliant. The dispute 
resolution framework in Islamic finance as practiced in 
most countries has proven to be inadequate, particularly 
in its application and interpretation of the Shariah. Islamic 
law in Malaysia, which has a predominantly Muslim 
population that constitutes much of the Islamic economic 
sphere, is one of the major sources of law in the country. 
Islamic law is only applicable to Muslims and deals with 
property matters, matrimony, and religious offences. The 
law of commerce and business is still either determined 
by statute law or English law. Shariah courts only have 
jurisdiction over matters falling under the state list in the 
Federal Constitution. Islamic law is not applicable in the 
conventional Malaysian Judiciary, as it is administered 
separately in the Shariah courts. Consequently, Shariah 
compatibility in enforcement of financial contracts and 
dispute resolution becomes a legal risk.
Given the above mentioned legal complexity that Islamic 
finance casts over the law of the land, the study recommends 
to complement the civil court scheme with a hybrid feature 
of expert determination through mediation and arbitration 
whereby the court would refer all issues pertaining to 
Islamic law to a recognised body of Shariah experts for 
a binding decision that is enforceable in the court. This 
will facilitate the smooth running and operation of the 
Islamic financial system in the country. The study therefore 
explores the feasibility of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms as a form of resolving Islamic finance disputes. 
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This paper is divided into two broad areas. The first is 
based on the mechanisms used to serve the resolution of 
disputes between parties involved in the Islamic banking 
and finance industry, as the study focuses on legal and 
regulatory perspectives on the problem. The second is the 
current legal and institutional framework for the resolution 
of Islamic finance disputes in Malaysia. This is investigated 
to determine whether Shariah compatibility in enforcement 
of financial contracts and dispute resolution is a legal risk 
to the Islamic finance industry.
The first section gives an insight into the modern history 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the events 
that culminate into the paradigm shift to these forms of 
informal justice. The second section thereafter gives a 
brief overview of effective dispute resolution in Islamic 
law and the relevance of the ADR processes in Islamic 
law in modern Islamic finance disputes. The third section 
dilates on the dispute resolution framework in the Islamic 
finance industry in Malaysia through an examination of 
the institutional frameworks for the resolution of Islamic 
finance disputes. The recent trends in the resolution of 
Islamic finance disputes are also examined. The fourth 
section gives the conclusion, recommendations and 
potential areas for further research.
2. An insight into the history of alternative 
dispute resolution
Definition of alternative dispute resolution
Since time immemorial, dispute resolution has been 
practiced because disputes are inevitable in human 
relationships. ADR is a range of processes for amicable 
resolution of disputes outside the formal court procedure or 
litigation, where a third neutral party neutral intercedes to 
resolve the dispute. Though its definition seems to be simple, 
there is an ongoing controversy on the actual meaning 
of ADR, the acronym often used for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (Brown and Marriott 1999). The alternative 
processes give the idea of alternative to court litigation. 
However, some have referred to ADR as amicable dispute 
resolution while others prefer to merely call it. Whatever 
the case, ADR is an alternative to formal court litigation. 
When disputes are channelled through the formal court 
system, the parties tend to be farther from each other after 
the judgment because the judgment of the court leads 
to a win-lose situation where one of the parties rejoices 
with pomp while the other party wallows in anguish. In 
order to avoid a winner-takes-all syndrome as generally 
occasioned in litigation, effective alternatives were created 
that satisfy the needs of many litigants. The dramatic turn 
of events now shows the complementary nature of ADR in 
litigation. ADR facilitates the administration of justice and 
ensures speedy litigation without compromising the rights 
and liabilities of the parties. In essence, ADR leads to a 
win-win settlement where the parties resolve the ensuing 
dispute amicably and secure the ongoing relationship.
3. Recent history of alternative dispute 
resolution
The recent history of ADR can be traced to the bold attempt 
by Roscoe Pound to redress the popular disaffection in the 
administration of justice in the US at the annual meeting 
of the American Bar Association in August of 1906. In 
his seminal speech, he highlighted the causes of general 
disaffection in the system and proposed a way forward 
(Pound 1912-1913). Despite the fact that some of the 
recommendations he made were not taken seriously at the 
initial stage, the decades that followed his proposed reforms 
saw significant changes in the administration of justice 
in America. The remarkable development spurred further 
developments in other jurisdictions across the world. 
Though there was that latent conception and practice of 
amicable resolution of disputes in other jurisdictions, the 
remarkable speech ushered in a regime of formalised ADR 
systems throughout the modern world. The formalized 
court system began to appreciate their unutilised role of 
case management. Case management generally requires the 
court to facilitate amicable resolution of the dispute with 
some level of contribution by the parties, while upholding 
the rights and liabilities of the parties.
As time went on, people began to discuss the importance of 
access to justice and the manner at which the over litigation 
of the society has continuously denied an underprivileged 
segment of the society from formal justice through 
exorbitant costs of litigation and the protracted time to 
successful litigation from filing stage to the judgment 
stage (Resnik 1986). These, as well as other concerns, 
based on Pound’s seminal speech, constitute the “spark 
that kindled the white flame of progress” in the drive 
toward reforms in the administration of the justice system 
(Wigmore 1937). Despite the fact that there were pockets 
of reforms across the world among different civilisations 
where amicable means of resolving disputes have been in 
place for some centuries, there were no formal systems of 
ADR as proposed by Pound. In the developed world, little 
or no attention was given to Pound’s recommendations for 
the improvement of the administration of justice through 
meaningful reforms. However, the accumulated backlog of 
cases in the United States signalled a new direction toward 
reforms in the 1960s. The anti-litigation wave emerged in 
the 1970s; and by 1976, which marked seventy years after 
Pound made the remarkable speech, the Pound Conference 
was held. The need to improve the judicial system was 
highlighted during the conference (Kovach 2007: 1004). 
Frank E. A. Sanders of Harvard Law School proposed what 
is known as Multi-Door Courthouse, where parties to a 
dispute are at liberty to choose from a variety of processes 
that are most suited for amicable resolution of the dispute. 
This significant conference ushered in a new era of court-
annexed ADR that is now widely practiced across the world 
(Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Adjudication 1995).
Remarkable reforms were experienced in the succeeding 
decades. In 1998, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act1 
was introduced in the United States. This was specifically 
introduced to reduce the increasing backlog of cases in the 
Federal courts through mandatory court-annexed ADR 
programmes. These mandatory court-referrals must be 
made as a preliminary step to court litigation. The court 
keeps a list of neutrals from which the parties may choose 
after the court has ascertained the most suitable ADR 
process for the dispute. Section 3(a) of the ADR Act 1998 
defines ADR as follows: “For purposes of this chapter, an 
alternative dispute resolution process includes any process 
or procedure, other than adjudication by a presiding judge, 
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in which a neutral third party participates to assist in 
the resolution of issues in controversy, through processes 
such as early neutral evaluation, mediation, minitrial, 
and arbitration.” There is no doubt in the fact that this 
mandatory ADR program has tremendously reduced the 
backlog of cases in the Federal courts.
Earlier on, there had been series of efforts to introduce 
reforms into the civil justice system in the United Kingdom. 
“Since 1851, there have been some 60 Reports on aspects 
of civil procedure and organization of civil and criminal 
courts in England and Wales itself” (Rashid 2002). The 
difficulties attending the adjudication of disputes in the 
courts brought about the most recent report, popularly 
called Lord Woolf’s Report on Access to Justice. This Report, 
which was submitted in 1996, significantly introduced far-
reaching reforms in the civil justice system through the 
recommendation of court-annexed ADR as part of the case 
management role of the judge (Woolf 1996).
These reforms were meant to tackle head-on the negative 
aspects of litigation. Lord Woolf’s Report identified a number 
of the negative aspects of litigation apart from excessive 
cost. These aspects relate to excessive delay. The following 
five main areas of delay in litigation are summarised thus:
a. Delay in progressing the case from issue to trial: In 
London, High Court cases on an average took 163 
weeks; elsewhere 189 weeks
b. Delay in reaching settlement: Majority of the cases 
took four and six years to settle; late settlements 
involve the parties in substantial costs
c. Delay in obtaining a hearing date
d. Delay due to time taken by the hearing: No one 
knows for sure how long a hearing might last; 
frequent adjournments and long submissions by 
the lawyers are mainly responsible for this, and no 
remedy appears to be available
e. Low priority is given to civil cases, because in criminal 
cases there is a prisoner in detention awaiting trial, 
so civil cases come for hearing after the judge 
finished the criminal business—as the number of 
criminal cases is usually larger than the civil cases, 
they consume much of court’s time, and in recent 
times courts give more time to family cases than 
cases relating to business or contractual disputes 
(Woolf 1996; Rashid 2002: 5)
The recommendations contained in Lord Woolf’s Report 
were introduced in the amended Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR) in May 2000.2 Court referrals found their way, 
for the first time, into the CPR. As Mistelis rightly put it, 
“[t]he driving force behind the reforms was a combination 
of the lawyers involved in commercial litigation, a handful 
of academics, and the courts” (Mistelis 2003: 1). Rule 1.4 
provides inter alia:
1. The court must further the overriding objective by 
actively managing cases
2. Active case management includes —
e.  encouraging the parties to use an alternative 
dispute resolution procedure if the court considers 
that appropriate and facilitating the use of such 
procedure
 …
f.  helping the parties to settle the whole or part of 
the case3
This provision obliges the judge, as part of the case 
management role, to encourage the parties in a dispute 
to consider the use of an ADR process, and the court 
should facilitate the use of such a procedure (Nesic 
2001). Rule 26.4 CPR also enables the judge, either of its 
own initiative or with the agreement of both parties, to 
stay proceedings where they consider the dispute to be 
better suited to solution by alternative dispute resolution 
or other means. It is therefore the duty of the claimant 
to inform the court when a settlement is reached.4 With 
this, ADR has been inducted into the courts in England 
as a procedural rule, allowing the court to order parties 
to mediation (Trent 1999).
Islamic finance disputes cannot afford to suffer such 
protracted delays in the administration of justice system. 
The disputes emanating from the Islamic finance industry 
are sui generis that requires speedy and efficient frameworks 
for amicable resolution considering the need to secure 
ongoing business relationship and the recent fluctuations 
experienced in the financial markets across the world 
(Oseni and Hassan 2011).
4.  Alternative dispute resolution in Malaysia
Amicable dispute resolution in Malaysia is as old as 
the culture of the people of Malaysia. There are recorded 
historical facts that reveal elements of dispute resolution 
in the cultures of the predominant tribes in Malaysia—
namely Malays (Muhammad 2008), Chinese (Shijan 
MO 1999), and Hindus (Lahoti 1999). The customary 
values of these major races in Malaysia primarily provide 
for amicable settlement of disputes (Oseni 2010b). So, 
the formalised ADR introduced in the twilight of the 19th 
century was not new to Malaysia as a country. However, the 
models adopted by the court were based on best practices 
in Australia, United Kingdom and the United States. The 
court-annexed mediation programme is new to Malaysia 
as differentiated from the customary mediation practices 
common in the cultural heritages of the predominant 
cultures in the country. In 2000, the pilot project of court-
annexed mediation was introduced in Penang. This project 
was a success but there was a need to amend the Rules of the 
High Court 1980 to allow for court referrals (Yiam 2009). 
For 10 years, there has been series of calls for reforms 
in the civil justice system to scale up the adjudication process 
in line with the advances experienced in other common 
law jurisdictions such as England, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand.
As a welcome development in the civil justice system 
in Malaysia, the Chief Justice of Malaysia issued Practice 
Direction No. 5 of 2010 on 16 August, 2010. This is the 
Practice Direction on Mediation (Mohamed 2010). So, for 
the first time, the civil courts are given a suitable framework 
to explore every amicable process of dispute resolution 
before proceeding for court adjudication. For the Shariah 
Courts, each state has its enactment on court referrals to 
tahkim (arbitration), popularly known as hakam, which 
was introduced in 1984. The Islamic Family Law (Federal 
Territories) Act 1984 (“IFLA 1984”)5 introduced the 
framework for Íakam and the conciliatory committee. This 
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court referral programme is purposefully meant for Islamic 
family disputes. Similarly, sulh (mediation) was introduced 
in the 1990s in the Malaysian Shariah Courts, but the 
practice was consolidated in the next decade of 2000, 
where a series of enabling enactments were made. Both the 
sulh and hakam programmes were meant for Islamic family 
disputes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Shariah 
Court (Abdul Hak 2006).
It should be borne in mind that despite the fact that 
Islamic law matters are state issues according to Federal 
Constitution6, Islamic finance disputes are classified under 
the jurisdiction of the High Court (Mohamed Shariff 
2005). Therefore, for this purpose, a Muamalat Bench 
was introduced at the Kuala Lumpur High Court in order 
to encourage a sort of expert determination of Islamic 
finance disputes, albeit through adjudication. This Bench 
at the Commercial Division of the Court only hears and 
determines Islamic banking and finance cases.7 Despite the 
laudable efforts of this Bench as well as significant progress 
recorded over the years, certain problems have been 
highlighted. There is the problem of inadequate manpower 
to handle the increasing number of cases. This has led to 
a situation where other judges in the commercial division 
of the High Court who are not learned in Islamic finance 
hear and determine such cases. Judges who are ordinarily 
required to hear and determine conventional banking and 
finance cases now handle Islamic finance disputes. This has 
resulted in some untoward judgments that have attracted 
a lot of criticisms from Islamic finance practitioners. One 
aspect of the new Practice Direction on Mediation that would 
have been very useful to the amicable resolution of Islamic 
finance disputes is court-referrals. In order to encourage 
expert determination of Islamic finance disputes through 
amicable means, this Practice Direction on Mediation will 
play a significant role. But time will tell whether the judges 
in the Muamalat Bench practically consider the use of this 
Practice Direction.
5. Dispute resolution in Islamic law
Muslim scholars have continuously argued that ADR 
has its source in the prime sources of Islamic law since 
it is a practice encouraged in Islam. Therefore, dispute 
resolution in Islamic law is a wide area of study that, 
though similar to the conventional practice of ADR, has 
its unique principles and concepts. The varieties of dispute 
resolution processes have been practiced at different 
momentum since the advent of Islam about 14 centuries 
ago. These processes are worth exploring and formalizing 
to suit the modern needs of Muslims across the world in 
their various endeavours.
6. Definition of dispute resolution 
in Islamic law
There is no use of the term ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ 
in the Islamic sources but there are numerous references 
to amicable resolution of disputes. This has led modern 
Muslim thinkers to equate ADR to the Islamic ideals of 
dispute resolution encouraged in the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
For the purpose of this paper, the term “dispute resolution” 
is used for the Islamic law paradigm. The definition of 
dispute resolution in Islamic law is in no way different from 
the earlier definition of ADR given above. However, one 
thing that is added is the underlying principle of all Islamic 
transactions, whether contractual or otherwise. This is the 
concept of halal (permissible terms) and haram (prohibited 
terms) in concluding a contract. As the dispute resolution 
clause is considered a binding contract between the parties, 
such must not involve the permissibility of what is prohibited 
under the law or the prohibition of what is expressly 
permissible under the law. All types of compromises or 
amicable settlement of disputes among disputing parties 
is permissible except settlements, which make forbidden 
anything that is originally permissible in the eyes of the law 
and permit a thing that has been declared prohibited under 
the law (Zaidan 2007/1427).8
From the foregoing, dispute resolution in Islamic law can 
be defined as a range of processes for amicable resolution 
of disputes, either as court-annexed processes or outside-
court-settlement by a third party neutral based on the 
Islamic worldview without compromising the fundamentals 
of Islamic law. This is where another problem being faced 
in the Islamic finance industry lies. In a bid to adopt ADR, 
conventional arbitration tribunals that specialize in banking 
and finance are now handling Islamic finance disputes. This is 
a counter-productive approach toward solving the challenges 
posed by litigation of Islamic finance disputes. A step toward 
the introduction of a new framework for the resolution of 
Islamic finance disputes has led to the emergence of another 
problem (Oseni 2010a). As will be seen below, Islamic law 
has its unique standards and requirements for arbitration. 
If a proper Islamic framework is not introduced for the 
arbitration of Islamic finance disputes, the repercussion of 
arbitrating such disputes under conventional arbitration 
rules may be devastating in the long run.
7. Processes of dispute resolution 
in Islamic law
The dispute resolution processes in Islamic law are meant 
for different types of disputes and some are relevant at 
various stages of a dispute. The Islamic concept of dispute 
resolution is a continuum of not less than nine processes 
of dispute resolution. The common processes of dispute 
resolution in Islamic law are (Rashid 2004):
• Nasihah (Counselling)
• Sulh (Negotiation, mediation, conciliation, compromise 
of action)
• Tahkim (Arbitration)
• Med-Arb (A process that begins with mediation and 
ends in arbitration);
• Muhtasib (Ombudsman)
• Wali al-Mazalim (Chancellor or Ombudsman Judge)
• Fatwa of Mufti (Expert Determination)
• Med-Ex (A combination of mediation and expert 
determination)
• Qada (adjudication)
The treasure trove contained in these processes has not 
been fully explored in the modern practice of ADR (Oseni, 
2011; Yaacob, 2009; Oseni, 2009; Othman, 2007; Zahraa 
and Abdul Hak, 2006; Othman, 2005; Rashid, 2004; 
Masud, Messick and Powers, 1996; Al-Mawardi, 1983; 
Khalil, 1976). In fact, Muslim countries tend to adopt 
the conventional practices rather than looking inward to 
formalize some of these processes that have been practiced 
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for centuries. Though most of these dispute resolution 
processes are relevant to most contractual disputes, not 
all are relevant to Islamic finance disputes. We shall shed 
some light on the most relevant processes in the next sub-
section. The mostly used processes in Malaysia are sulh and 
tahkim for the resolution of family disputes in the Shariah 
court. Meanwhile, expert determination is used in most 
cases inadvertently for the purpose of dispute avoidance. 
The Shariah Advisory Council of the Central Bank of 
Malaysia plays this important role, which has helped in the 
avoidance of foreseeable disputes in the Islamic finance 
industry in Malaysia.
8. Relevance of alternative dispute 
resolution in Islamic finance disputes
The repeated instances of Islamic finance litigation in the 
civil courts call for the need to have an Islamic framework 
for the resolution of Islamic finance disputes. There is no 
doubt in the fact that Islamic finance disputes can be best 
resolved through Islamic processes of dispute resolution 
and not otherwise. As earlier observed, Islamic finance 
disputes require speedy and efficient processes owing to 
the nature of business disputes and the need to secure 
ongoing business relationship and avoid unnecessary public 
attention, which may affect the credibility of the financial 
outfit. We must decide which way to follow: whether to 
adopt the conventional ADR processes or look inward to 
evolve relevant processes for Islamic finance disputes.
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), a body that issues global 
standards on different aspects of Islamic finance, has issued 
the standard on arbitration. This is yet to be fully utilised 
by the Islamic banks and financial institutions including 
those in Malaysia. The AAOIFI standard on Arbitration is a 
welcome development, which mirrors the unique features 
of Islamic arbitration (Oseni, 2010a). Unfortunately, the 
Islamic banks and financial institutions in Malaysia and 
elsewhere only adopt other standards, which they feel 
affect their daily transactions while neglecting the aspect 
of arbitration. In cases of default, it is common for Islamic 
banks to head for the court rather than giving effect to the 
AAOIFI standard on arbitration. It is appalling to observe 
that many Islamic finance practitioners have continued 
to neglect dispute resolution in Islamic finance in their 
policies and practices. Rather, they have focused on other 
areas that directly affect the profit and risk involved in 
financial transactions. It must be mentioned here that if 
care is not taken, the courts will eventually restructure 
all Islamic finance transactions in line with their limited 
understanding of the dynamics of most transactions (Oseni 
2011).
As one of the countries with the most successful experiments 
of Islamic finance in the modern world, Malaysia is also 
leading in the increasing number of Islamic finance disputes. 
The number of cases has continued to rise over every 
passing day. The only judge in the Mu`amalat bench of the 
commercial division of the High Court in Kuala Lumpur is 
Dato’ Rohana Yusuf, who has considerable experience and 
expertise in Islamic finance. But a judge may not be enough 
for the current backlog of cases in the court. If the status quo 
is to be maintained, the Mu`amalat bench has no choice 
other than to embrace ADR or implement the instructions 
in the Practice Direction on Mediation. This will enable the 
learned judge to be able to make requisite court referrals 
to expert arbitral panels or tribunals. Another option is 
to refer the parties to the Financial Mediation Bureau for 
mediation. Once a settlement is reached, the court may 
adopt such terms of settlement as consent judgment. 
The complexities involved in Islamic finance transactions 
require expert determination, and there is a framework for 
court referrals to such in the current arrangement.
The Practice Direction on Mediation, if properly utilised, 
would be a veritable tool for the quick dispensation 
of justice through expert determination. According to 
the Practice Direction, all judges are required to “give 
such directions that the parties facilitate the settlement 
of a matter before the court by way of mediation.” This 
is to encourage the parties to amicably arrive at an early 
settlement without necessarily going through the rigors of 
a complete trial in the court. The advantages of settling the 
dispute in line with the Practice Direction include: parties 
are able to explore all options available; underlying issues 
and common grounds may be identified; good relationships 
are restored and maintained; terms agreed upon would be 
acceptable to both parties; settlement is expeditious; no 
delays in court hearings, and terms of settlement are final. 
This court-annexed mediation is in line with sulh, but one 
thing that must be emphasized is the need to make court 
referrals to experts in Islamic finance and not just mediators 
on the court’s list of neutrals.
There are two modes of referrals to mediation in the 
Practice Direction. The parties are given the option to 
choose based on the principle of party autonomy. Option 
A provides for judge-led mediation while Option B provides 
for the appointment of a mediator agreeable to the parties. 
The explanation given for these two options as contained 
in the Practice Direction is reproduced below.
Option A: Judge-Led Mediation
1. Unless agreed to by the parties, the judge hearing the 
case should not be the mediating judge; he should pass 
the case to another judge—if the mediation fails then 
it will revert to the original judge to hear and complete 
the case
2. The procedure shall be in the manner acceptable to both 
parties
3. Unless agreed to by the parties the judge will not see the 
parties without their lawyers’ presence except in cases 
where the parties are not represented
4. If the mediation is successful, the judge mediating shall 
record a consent judgment on the terms as agreed to by 
the parties
Option B: Court-referred Mediation
1. Mediator
1.1  A mediator may be chosen by the parties from 
the list of certified mediators furnished by the 
Malaysian Mediation Centre (“MMC”) set up 
under the auspices of the Bar Council, or any 
other mediator chosen by the parties.
1.2  Such a mediator shall facilitate negotiation between 
the parties in the dispute and steer the direction 
of the mediation session with the aim of finding a 
mutually acceptable solution to the dispute.
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1.3  If the parties so desire, they may appoint more 
than one (1) mediator to resolve their dispute.
1.4  Any mediator so chosen by the parties may agree 
to be bound by the MMC Code of Conduct and the 
MMC Mediation Rules, or not at all.
2. Procedure
2.1  If the parties agree that they be bound by the MMC 
Mediation Rules, upon direction of the Court, the 
Plaintiff’s solicitor shall, within (7) calendar days 
notify in writing the MMC; upon receiving such 
notification, MMC shall then proceed with the 
mediation process as provided under the MMC’s 
Mediation Rules.
3. Settlement Agreement
3.1  Any agreement consequent upon a successful 
mediation may be reduced into writing in a 
Settlement Agreement signed by the parties but 
in any case the parties shall record the terms of 
the settlement as a consent judgment.
This is a commendable effort on the part of the Malaysian 
judiciary, but there is still further room for improvement. 
Expert mediators in Islamic finance should be identified 
and appropriately utilised in the Muamalat Bench of the 
High Court of Malaya. The MMC may assist the court in 
identifying leading experts in the field of Islamic finance 
who will exclusively sit to mediate disputes involving 
Islamic financial transactions.
9. Dispute resolution in the Islamic finance 
industry in Malaysia
The dispute resolution framework for the resolution of 
Islamic finance disputes in Malaysia has assumed an 
advance stage in the modern world. The prime stage of 
this aspect of the Islamic finance industry in Malaysia and the 
recurrent regulatory and legal reforms being introduced 
to improve the delivery of Islamic financial services is 
enviable considering the diverse rate of development of 
the industry across different jurisdictions in the world. 
The current institutional framework for the resolution of 
Islamic finance disputes is encouraging but to what extent 
the Islamic finance practitioners and financial institutions 
have utilised the frameworks necessities further analysis. 
The dynamics of the growing case law on Islamic finance 
have been studied and are worth further exposition to 
streamline the process of dispute resolution in the industry 
(Yaacob 2011).
10. Institutional framework for dispute 
resolution in Malaysia’s Islamic finance 
industry
There are several institutions in Malaysia that undertake 
the services of resolving Islamic finance disputes through 
mediation, arbitration or any other process. Though 
these bodies are setup under different auspices, they 
tend to achieve a common goal. A quick overview of the 
institutional framework for ADR for Islamic finance cases 
includes the following bodies:
 i. Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration
  ii. Financial Mediation Bureau
iii. Shar 'ah Advisory Council of the Central Bank of 
Malaysia
iv. Malaysian Mediation Centre
i.  Kuala Lumpur regional centre for arbitration
The Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) 
is a dispute resolution body established under the auspices of 
the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO) 
in 1978 (Lau 2009). It provides institutional support as 
well as a convenient venue for domestic and international 
arbitrations. It introduced the Rules for Arbitration of 
Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (Islamic 
Banking and Financial Services) in 2007 to encourage 
the use of arbitration for disputes emanating from Islamic 
financial services. According to Rule 1, para 3, “These 
Rules shall be applicable for the purposes of arbitrating any 
commercial contract, business arrangement or transaction 
which is based on Shariah Shariah h principles.” Though 
the Rules have been criticized as being a complete replica 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976 with some 
modifications to suit the specific needs of parties in 
Islamic financial transactions (Oseni 2009), it represents 
a significant innovation in the drive towards introducing 
better ways of resolving disputes in the industry. At present, 
there are 23 panelists for Islamic banking arbitration, one 
of whom is from Singapore.9 During an informal discussion 
with one of the arbitrators, she revealed that not more than 
two cases have been arbitrated under the KLRCA Rules since 
2007. This is discouraging, as many of the Islamic banks 
and financial institutions prefer to head to the court to get 
their money in cases of default rather than arbitration. As 
earlier observed, many of the Islamic banks and financial 
institutions prefer to adopt other standards of AAOIFI that 
regulate their transactions rather than implementing the 
AAOIFI Standard on Arbitration. This situation is appalling 
and calls for concern from all the stakeholders in the 
industry.
ii. Financial mediation bureau
The Financial Mediation Bureau (FMB) is an amalgam of 
the erstwhile Banking Mediation Bureau and Insurance 
Mediation Bureau. The two earlier bodies were independent 
initiatives by Islamic banks and financial institutions 
closely supported by the Central Bank of Malaysia. While 
the Banking Mediation Bureau handled Islamic banking 
issues between customers and banks who are its members, 
the Insurance Mediation Bureau provides a simple process 
for the resolution of insurance disputes. The whole process 
is simple, efficient and without costs on the part of the 
customers or the financial institution. The two bodies were 
merged in January 2005, and the FMB was established 
(Segara 2009). The FMB provides dispute resolution 
services to customers and their financial services provider. 
As an alternative to the court system, FMB provides free, 
fast, and efficient service to customers and their financial 
services providers who are members. The body is under the 
close supervision of the Central Bank of Malaysia. A number 
of banks and financial institutions in Malaysia are members 
of FMB, including about 16 Islamic banks and financial 
institutions. Unlike the KLRCA, the FMB is very active in its 
service delivery in the Islamic finance industry because it 
is cost-effective and fast. From the case review released by 
FMB, most of the cases are petty disputes involving banker-
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customer relationships, such as loss of deposits over the 
counter and unauthorized ATM withdrawal. This is due to 
the limited jurisdiction. The FMB can only handle disputes, 
claims or complaints involving financial loss of which the 
amount claimed does not exceed RM100,000 for banking 
and financial related matters. The exceptions to this are 
fraud cases involving payment instruments, credit cards, 
charge cards, ATM cards and cheques, whose maximum 
limit is set at RM 25,000. On the other hand, the maximum 
claim in disputes, claims or complaints involving insurance 
or takaful must not exceed RM200,000 in motor and fire 
insurance/takaful and RM100,000 for others. Since it is 
the parties who head to FMB for the amicable resolution 
of a case with their financial service provider, the FMB 
handles a lot of cases unlike instances where the bank seeks 
to recover its money from defaulting customers through 
litigation.
iii. Shariah advisory council of Central Bank 
of Malaysia
People, including many Islamic finance practitioners, tend 
to believe the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Central 
Bank of Malaysia is only an advisory body saddled with the 
responsibility of performing its statutory functions. There 
is more to its functions, which is not expressly mentioned in 
section 51 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 (CBM 
Act).10 As the principal advisory body on Islamic financial 
services at the apex bank, SAC occupies a key position 
with respect to dispute resolution and dispute avoidance in 
Islamic law. Before unravelling the key role being played by 
SAC and the far-reaching effect in dispute avoidance in the 
Islamic finance industry, it may be necessary to enumerate 
the provisions of section 51 of the CBM Act on the functions 
of SAC.
The Shariah Advisory Council shall have the following 
functions:
a. to ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matter 
and issue a ruling upon reference made to it in 
accordance with this part
b. to advise the Bank on any Shariah issue relating 
to Islamic financial business, and the activities or 
transactions of the bank;
c. to provide advice to any Islamic financial institution 
or any other person as may be provided under any 
written law
d. other functions as may be determined by the bank
These functions serve two important purposes in ADR; 
dispute resolution and dispute avoidance. But the kernel 
of the functions is more of dispute avoidance. In simple 
terms, when there is a reference of a Shariah issue from the 
court or arbitral tribunal, SAC ascertains the Islamic law 
on such a matter and issue a ruling, which is considered in 
the final judgment or award of the court or arbitral tribunal 
respectively. Section 57 of the CBM Act provides that any 
ruling made by SAC pursuant to a reference made by either 
a court or arbitral tribunal shall be binding on such body. 
This helps in resolving the dispute expediently, effectively 
and promptly. The ruling of SAC at such instances of 
referrals serves as a catalyst that facilitates the quick 
disposal of the dispute. However, section 56 (1) of the Act 
provides for instances where the published rulings of SAC 
may serve as dispute avoidance mechanism. Any published 
ruling of SAC must be taken into consideration by the court 
or arbitral tribunal in any proceedings relating to Islamic 
financial business, where any question arises concerning 
a Shariah matter. The published rulings are also reviewed 
and considered by the Shariah Advisory Committees of 
Islamic banks and financial institutions in Malaysia, where 
reasonable steps are taken to streamline all contracts and 
financial dealings to avoid unforeseeable disputes with 
customers. The ultimate reference of the Shariah Advisory 
Committees is the ruling of SAC on any transaction in 
question. The publication of the rulings and guidelines of 
SAC allows potential investors, customers and the financial 
institutions to understand their rights and liabilities with 
regard to certain contracts in question. Therefore, SAC is 
more than a mere financial advisory body but may also be 
considered as a dispute resolution and dispute avoidance 
body.
iv. Malaysian mediation council
The Bar Council of Malaysia established the Malaysian 
Mediation Council (MMC) as a foremost body for both 
institutional and ad hoc mediation on 5th of November 
1999. This was the end result of the recommendations of the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee set up by the Bar 
Council in 1995 to look into the possibility of establishing a 
world class Mediation Centre in Malaysia. The services of the 
MMC include mediation services, assistance and advice on 
how to get the other side to agree to mediation if one party 
has shown interest, and provision of mediation training for 
those interested in becoming mediators. It also accredits 
trained mediators and maintains a panel of mediators. 
Over the years, there have been concerted efforts to form a 
formidable synergy with the judiciary by encouraging the 
parties to a dispute to explore ADR processes as part of the 
pre-trial procedures (Bukhari n.d.). These efforts by the Bar 
Council were consolidated with the issuance of the Practice 
Direction on Mediation in August 2010. As cited above, the 
Practice Direction expressly provides for the use of MMC 
Code of Conduct and Mediation Rules. Except otherwise 
provided by the parties, all court referrals are made to a 
mediator appointed from the list of neutrals furnished 
by the MMC. The Muamalat Bench of the Commercial 
Division of the High Court of Malaya will also have course 
to refer Islamic finance disputes to qualified mediators. 
Such mediators who have requisite expertise in the practice 
of Islamic finance with many years of experience should be 
exclusively considered for this purpose.
11. Current trends in Islamic finance 
litigation in Malaysia
The litigation of Islamic banking and finance disputes in 
Malaysia dates back to 1985. Once the Islamic Banking Act 
of 1986 came into force with the proliferation of Islamic 
finance products in the country, the High Court began 
to hear related cases.11 Though it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to review all the cases, it is important to briefly 
review some cases and suggest a better framework for the 
resolution of such litigated cases using appropriate ADR 
processes.12 The advantages of using ADR processes over 
litigation are obvious considering the legal complexities 
and procedural bottlenecks involved in Islamic finance 
litigation that may pose a threat to the future of the Islamic 
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finance industry.13 In fact, the Court of Appeal held in Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd v. Emcee Corporation,14 
that the law applicable to Islamic banking disputes is 
the same as that applicable to the conventional banking. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the case involved an Islamic 
facility, the court held that the procedure and principles 
applicable to conventional banking are also applicable 
in the case. This position is similar to the rulings of the 
English Courts in Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Shamil 
Bank of Bahrain E.C.15 where the court refused to apply the 
principles of Shariah as the governing law of the contract 
in a murabahah case.
The trends in Islamic finance litigation since 1986 have been 
classified into three phases: Phase One (1994-2002); Phase 
Two: (2003-2007); Phase Three: (2008 onwards) (Markom, 
et al. 2011), but we have modified the classification 
to reflect current trends. Phase One should be the period 
between 1986 and 2002, Phase Two (2003-2007), Phase 
Three (2003-2009), and Phase Four (2010 onwards). The 
reason for this additional phase is the affirmation of the 
value of the rulings of SAC in the new CBM Act 2009, which 
emphasises the binding nature of the rulings. Before this 
period, some judges were still sceptical about the weight to 
be attached to the rulings of SAC when cases are referred to 
it for its opinion. In Affin Bank Berhad v. Zulkifli Abdullah16 
Abdul Wahab Patail J. was reluctant in making referral to 
SAC. Similarly, Rohana Yusuf J. in Tan Sri Abdul Khalid 
bin Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd and another suit17 
expressly stated her views regarding the relevant provision 
of the law which requires the court to make referrals to 
SAC. Though she accepted the opinion of SAC, she however 
re-echoed the position of the law where she observed: 
“Having examined the SAC, its role and functions in the 
area of Islamic banking, I do not see the need for me to 
refer this issue elsewhere though I am mindful that under 
s 16B (7) I am not bound by its decision.”18 The CBM Act 
2009 expressly provides that the Shariah ruling of SAC is 
binding on the court or arbitrator. Therefore, this ushers 
in a new phase, which has been further complemented by 
the Practice Direction of 2010. This argument justifies the 
reason why the fourth phase should be introduced in the 
history of Islamic finance litigation in Malaysia.
12. Judicial precedents and legal risks 
in the Islamic finance industry
The negative effect of judicial precedents applicable in 
common law jurisdictions such as Malaysia is now being 
felt in the Islamic finance industry. The principle of stare 
decisis provides that the judgments of superior courts are 
binding on the lower courts. The lower courts must take 
into consideration previous decisions of superior courts of 
records in arriving at a decision. This has negative effects in 
the Islamic finance industry because even if the single judge 
of the Mu`amalat Bench at the High Court is learned in 
Islamic finance, what is the probability that the judges who 
will be sitting to hear the appeal at the Court of Appeal and 
ultimately at the Federal Court are similarly learned in Islamic 
finance? With due respect to the expertise of the judges of 
superior courts of record, there are very complex issues and 
terminologies involved in Islamic financial transactions that 
may not be known to the learned judges. If the judges at the 
appellate court are allowed to hear and determine an appeal 
from the Mu`amalat Bench without necessary guidance 
from experts, the decisions handed down by such appellate 
courts will be binding in subsequent cases in the lower courts. 
This constitutes a legal risk for Islamic financial transactions 
since the courts may restructure the generally known Islamic 
finance products by their judgements. There is a mandatory 
requirement for Shariah compatibility in the enforcement of 
financial contracts in Islamic finance. If judicial precedents 
supersede the mandatory Shariah requirements in financial 
contracts,  the Islamic finance industry will be facing legal 
risks because there are situations where the superior court 
will overrule the decision of a lower court as in the case of 
Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Lim Kok Hoe & Anor and other 
appeals.19 In this case, the Court of Appeal overruled the 
decision of the High Court, which likened Bai Bithaman Ajil 
(BBA) contract to conventional loan agreement. Without 
going into the validity of BBA contract, it suffices to observe 
that if the superior court’s decision is not in line with Islamic 
commercial law, then a binding precedent would have been 
created in the Islamic finance industry which would make 
such a decision binding on all subsequent similar cases until 
it is overruled by either another superior court or by itself.
13. Conclusion
The dynamics of dispute resolution in the Islamic finance 
industry seems to be complex, particularly in the aspect 
of Islamic finance litigation. In order to mitigate legal and 
regulatory risks in the dispute resolution aspect of Islamic 
finance in Malaysia, the existing ADR institutions and 
bodies should be strengthened to reflect the modern drift 
towards amicable resolution of disputes, which incidentally 
is the underlying spirit of Islamic contracts. Rather than 
duplicating efforts in the establishment of more ADR bodies 
that would help in handling Islamic finance disputes, the 
existing bodies should be consolidated and a formidable 
court-annexed programme put in place where experts will 
have the opportunity to mediate Islamic finance disputes 
while ensuring enforceability of such settlement. This 
is why Med-Ex—a combination of mediation and expert 
determination—may be the best bet for the existing 
court-annexed mediation in the High Court of Malaysia 
introduced through the Practice Direction on Mediation. 
The members of the Shariah Advisory Council of the 
Central Bank of Malaysia may be enlisted as neutrals for 
the purpose of court-annexed mediation at the Mu`amalat 
Bench. These recommendations will drastically reduce the 
existing tension in the Islamic finance industry, which is 
occasioned by the increasing number of cases in the court. 
Other potentially relevant areas of research include the 
practitioners’ perspectives on Islamic finance litigation and 
efforts towards the reutilization of in-built mechanisms of 
dispute avoidance in Islamic finance contracts (Oseni 2011). 
The future of ADR in Islamic finance is dispute avoidance, 
which should be vigorously pursued by all (Rashid 2002).
Notes
 1. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 1998 (HR 3528). 
President Bill Clinton signed it into law on October 30, 
1998.
 2. Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2000 (SI 221 of 
2000). It should be observed that the Civil Procedure 
Rules are the rules of civil procedure used by the Court 
of Appeal, High Court of Justice, and County Courts 
in civil cases in the whole of England and Wales. The 
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new rules came into force on 26 April 1999. The Rules 
were actually made in 1998. So, reference to the rules 
may sometimes read “Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
(L17 No. 3132 of 1998). Some amendments were 
incorporated into it in 2000.
 3. Rule 1.4(1) and (2) (e) - (f) CPR.
 4. See Rule 26.4 (1)-(4) CPR.
 5. There are corresponding Islamic Family Law 
Enactments across the States in Malaysia and they 
were modelled after the IFLA 1984 (Act 303). These 
enactments include Islamic Family Law Enactment 
1990 (Johor) (No. 5 of 1990); Islamic Family Law 
Enactment 2002 (Kelantan) (No. 6 of 2002); Islamic 
Family Law (State of Malacca) Enactment 2002 (No. 
12 of 2002); Islamic Family Law (Negeri Sembilan) 
Enactment 2003 (No. 11 of 2003); Islamic Family Law 
Enactment 1987 (Pahang) (No. 3 of 1987); Islamic 
Family Law (State of Penang) Enactment 2004 (No. 
5 of 2004); Islamic Family Law (Perak) Enactment 
2004 (No. 6 of 2004); Islamic Family Law Enactment 
1992 (Perlis) (No. 4 of 1992); Islamic Family Law 
Enactment 1992 (Sabah) (No. 15 of 1992); Islamic 
Family Law Ordinance 2001 (Sarawak) (Cap 43); 
Islamic Family Law (State of Selangor) Enactment 
2003 (No. 2 of 2003); Administration of Islamic 
Family Law Enactment 1985 (Terengganu) (No. 12 of 
1985).
 6. Article 74, Federal Constitution and section 1, Second 
List, Ninth Schedule to the Federal Constitution. 
Section 1 of the Second List in the Ninth Schedule 
provides in relation to the exclusive powers of State 
Legislature: “Except with respect to the Federal 
Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, Islamic law 
and personal and family law of persons professing the 
religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to 
succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, 
divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy 
guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable 
trusts; Wakafs and the definition and regulation of 
charitable and religious endowments, institutions, 
trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating 
wholly within the State; Malay customs. Zakat, Fitrah 
and Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious revenue, 
mosques or any Islamic public places of worship, 
creation and punishment of offences by persons 
professing the religion of Islam against precepts of 
that religion, except in regard to matters included 
in the Federal List; the constitution, organisation 
and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have 
jurisdiction only over person professing the religion 
of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters 
included in this paragraph, but shall not have 
jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as 
conferred by federal law, the control of propagating 
doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the 
religion of Islam; the determination of matters of 
Islamic law and doctrine Malay custom.” Also see 
the Malaysian Supreme Court decision in Mamat bin 
Daud v. Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 
(SC) where the apex court held in its majority decision 
that only the State Legislature will have the exclusive 
powers to enact laws on Islamic matters.
 7. See paragraph 2 of the Practice Direction No. 1/2003.
 8. This is a popular hadith which was reechoed in the 
principles enumerated in Caliph Umar’s letter to Abu 
Musa Al-Ash’ari on the latter’s appointment as a judge. 
An aspect of this letter which deals with mediation as part 
of the case management apparatus of the court is the text 
of the hadith narrated by Amr bin Auf who narrated that 
the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) said: “Conciliation is 
permissible among Muslims except the one which makes 
permissible what has been forbidden or forbids what has 
been permitted.” This hadith was related by al-Tirmidhi, 
Abu Dawud, Ahmad and Ibn Majah.
 9. For a complete list of the panelists, their affiliations, 
expertise and addresses, see Islamic Banking 
Arbitrators, Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for 
Arbitration at [http://www.klrca.org.my/KLRCA’s_
Panellists-@-Islamic_Banking_Arbitrators.aspx]
10. Act 701 of 2009.
11. The first reported case is Tinta Press v. Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad [1986] 1 MLJ 474.
12. Example of cases heard and decided by the civil courts 
in Malaysia include: Tinta Press v. Bank Islam Malaysia 
Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 474; Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v 
Adnan bin Omar[1994] 3 CLJ 735; and Dato Hj Nik 
Mahmud bin Daud v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [1996] 
4 MLJ 295 (High Court); [1998] 3 MLJ 396 (Supreme 
Court).
13. Hakimah Yaacob, “Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Islamic Finance…”, 135.
14. [2003]1CLJ 625.
15. [2004] EWCA Civ 19. Also see the decision of the 
English Court in the earlier case of Islamic Investment 
Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems 
N.V. and others [2002] All ER (D) 171.
16. [2006] 1 CLJ 438 HC.
17. [2009] 6 MLJ 416.
18. Ibid, pp. 426-427.
19. [2009] 6 MLJ 839; [2009] 6 CLJ 22.
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Abstract - This discursive research paper is appraising issues pertaining to legal compatibility of sukuk, 
which is at the heart of Islamic finance. Sukuk serve a powerful tool for Islamic financial institutions to 
mobilise funds from the Islamic capital market, and to extend financing through Islamic capital market 
operations. In Shariah values, sukuk has to represent the ownership of either underlying assets or 
usufructs or services of the business entity based on asset securitisation concepts, where the return is 
justified by risk taking coupled with risk mitigation principles. Nevertheless, the present state of sukuk 
practises is detached from ideal values because, to some extent, a western legal framework is not 
supportive enough for sukuk operations in the Islamic capital market to comply with Shariah values. 
As a result, the structure of sukuk is heavily influenced by conventional bonds practises governed by the 
western legal framework. Due to that fact, in this research, sukuk structures are scrutinised to examine 
legal impediments inherent in sukuk contracts. This research portrays that the western legal system is 
not supportive enough for sukuk to protect the rights of sukuk holders in the event of sukuk defaults. 
Regulatory and financial implications are suggested as anticipations to any future sukuk defaults. The 
objective of this research paper is to sustain sukuk development in the Islamic capital market, where 
Shariah and western legal frameworks can be in harmony to govern sukuk operations. 
Keywords: sukuk, Islamic capital market, legal challenges, Sharia, western legal framework
1. Introduction
Research background
The development of the Islamic capital market (‘ICM’) 
is crucial for the sustainable development of Islamic 
finance. ICM has a long-term objective to mobilise and 
allocate resources in an effective and efficient manner. This 
long-term objective can be achieved through real sector 
development financing. In another dimension, ICM is the 
avenue for liquidity management of the Islamic financial 
industry through Islamic money market operations. 
Liquidity management is a pivotal aspect for ICM in the 
short run because it is one of parameters for ensuring the 
long-run survival of Islamic financial institutions (‘IFIs’) 
in the financial market arena. Thus, the development of 
innovative, Shariah compliant ICM products is urgently 
needed for realising the existence of vibrant and efficient 
ICM. In this regard, sukuk, which is a term describing 
Islamic debt instruments in ICM, plays an important role 
for smoothing liquidity and resource mobilisation in ICM. 
Besides, sukuk are potential financing instruments for 
contributing to a country’s economic growth through real 
sector development initiatives. Sukuk plural; singular sak 
are defined by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (‘AAOIFI’) as “certificates 
of equal value representing undivided shares (in ownership 
of) tangible assets, usufruct, and services or (in the 
ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special 
investment activity” (AAOIFI 2008, p. 307). 
Sukuk are indeed promising as a Shariah compliant 
financing instrument. Total sukuk issuance amounts to 
US$ 236.75  billion as per June 2011 with Malaysia still 
champions the sukuk issuance1. This big number of sukuk 
issuance can be supported by the fact that western countries 
such as the United Kingdom and United States have jumped 
on the bandwagon for issuing sukuk as indicated by the 
UK’s consideration of sukuk for government financing, and 
the issuance of sukuk by General Electric and East Cameron 
Gas in the US.
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Based on Islamic Finance Information Services (‘IIFS’) 
statistic database of sukuk, sukuk issuance experienced an 
impressive growth from 2005 to 2006, increasing by 134% 
with the total sukuk issuance amounting US$ 26  million. 
Sukuk issuance peaked at US$46  million in 2007 but 
substantially declined by 64% to US$17  million in 2008. 
There are several factors that can explain the substantial 
decline of sukuk issuance, including global financial crisis, 
dry liquidity, widening credit spreads, and investor’s wait-
-and--see attitude (Damak et al., 2009). Although sukuk 
were badly hit in 2008, they are indeed a promising ICM’s 
instrument (IFIS, 2009). One reflection of this is the sukuk 
rebound throughout 2009 brought mainly by sovereign 
and quasi-sovereign sukuk issuances. These included the 
US$1.4  billion sukuk issuance of Terengganu Investment 
Authority in Malaysia, US$487.2  million retail sukuk 
issuance of government of Indonesia, plus sukuk from the 
Dubai government, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), 
and so forth (Zawya Sukuk Intelligence, 2010).
Sukuk declined by 15% in 2010, which indicates that there 
was low confidence in sukuk market. This can be explained 
that there have been 21 sukuk defaults recently in Islamic 
capital market space as reported by Khnifer (2010), with 
Nakheel sukuk and East Cameron Gas sukuk are the most 
controversial one. These sukuk defaults pose severe legal 
risks of sukuk inherent in the sukuk contract. Specifically, the 
risk emanating from sukuk contract’s enforceability whereby 
whether or not the sukuk can be enforced in order to protect 
the rights of sukuk holders in the event of sukuk defaults. 
As a matter of fact, legal conflicts are persistently occurring 
in the court due to sukuk defaults cases with the adverse 
impacts on legal rights, and even financial rights of the sukuk 
holders. Therefore, in this article, the issues surrounding 
enforceability of sukuk contract are discussed as an attempt 
to give possible legal and financial mitigations as solutions 
to the problem of sukuk’s legal challenges in Islamic capital 
market. At the end, it is expected that legal and financial 
rights of the sukuk holders can be fully protected.
Research objectives & questions
This research has four main objectives, which are as follows:
1. Appraising legal issues at stake in present sukuk 
structures,
2. As precautionary measures for Islamic finance key 
players regarding the importance of legal protection for 
sukuk structuring,
3. Presenting regulatory and financial implications for 
the ideal sukuk development in the ICM given the legal 
issues of present state of sukuk structures, and
4. As a way to obtain holistic approaches from academia 
and practitioners point of views to tackle unresolved 
legal challenges of sukuk.
In order to achieve the stated research objectives, there are 
three important questions that need to be answered in this 
research, which are as follows:
1. What is the present state of sukuk structures?
2. What are the salient legal issues that come to bear on 
sukuk structures?
3. What are the regulatory and financial implications for 
ideal future sukuk development in the ICM?
Significance and scope of research
There have not been much discussions going on to appraise 
legal aspects of sukuk with the fact that there are sukuk legal 
default cases in ICM. So far, the legal aspect of sukuk, which 
are heavily discussed in literatures and conferences, only 
pertains to Shariah compatibility of sukuk structures, but 
not taking consideration into sukuk’s legal issues. Amongst 
others, the research that discusses Shariah compatibility of 
sukuk structure are Rosly and Sanusi (1999) with critical 
evaluation of the application of bay al-inah and bay al-dayn 
contracts for sukuk issuance in Malaysia, Al-Amine (2001) 
with critics for the interest rate benchmarking and guarantee 
features in sukuk operation, and Usmani (2008) with 
critics over current sukuk mechanism on asset ownership, 
guarantee, and sukuk’s pricing benchmarks. For the recent 
research, Dusuki & Mokhtar (2010) criticise asset ownership 
in current sukuk mechanisms, and Al-Jarhi & Abozaid (2010) 
discuss Shariah issues of current sukuk structure in a paper 
presented this year to the OIC fiqh academy conference.
However, in light of sukuk legal defaults occurring in ICM, 
so far there has been only one research paper discussed by 
Salah (2010) in reference to Nakheel’s sukuk defaults. But, 
still more research paper is needed to find out solutions for 
sukuk’s legal challenges since legal aspect is one of important 
ingredients in sukuk issuance packaging that makes sukuk 
attractive to the investors. Hence, this research paper 
will contribute by scrutinising legal problems inherent in 
current sukuk structures with the expectation that there will 
be significant efforts in improving the status quo of western 
legal systems to cater the needs of sukuk operations in ICM.
The scope of this research is limited to theoretical research 
with secondary source data from relevant literatures or 
journals. Field work research to collect primary data, such 
as interviews, or questionnaires, cannot be conducted for 
this research due to time and resources constraints.
Research outline
This research study is organised in a following manner. 
In the next section, the present state of sukuk will be 
scrutinised in light of recent debates and innovation of 
current sukuk structure. Section 3 is appraisal of the legal 
issues of sukuk. After appraising legal problems of sukuk, 
chapter 4 discusses regulatory and financial implications in 
the ICM arising from those legal issues. Finally, chapter 5 
ends up this research paper with a conclusion.
2. Sukuk practises in Islamic capital market
Sukuk structures have evolved from their basic structures 
through attempts to innovate on sukuk so as to gain 
popularity in financial markets. Nevertheless, not all sukuk 
innovation is positive, as signified by the failure of sukuk 
to become a Shariah compliant financing instrument and 
alternative to conventional bonds after being tested by the 
Islamic financial industry.
Types of sukuk
Since sukuk can be structured in numerous ways, proper 
classification of sukuk is crucially important for issuers 
to determine the aim of sukuk structures, as well as the 
nature of sukuk structures. AAOIFI (2008) has classified 
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sukuk investments in its Shariah standards, which are 
ijarah certificates (leased assets), ijarah certificates 
(ownership of usufructs of existing assets, described future 
assets, specified party, and described future services), 
salam (purchasing goods to be delivered in the future) 
certificates, istisna’ (manufacturing/production of goods) 
certificates, murabaha (purchasing goods) certificates, 
musharakah certificates (participation, mudharaba, and 
investment agency sukuk), muzara’a (sharecropping) 
certificates, musaqa (irrigation) certificates, and mugharasa 
(agricultural) certificates. Ijarah and musharakah sukuk 
are predominant sukuk structures prevalent in the Islamic 
capital market. Other than the sukuk classified by AAOIFI, 
Tariq & Dar (2007) have a list of the modified types of 
sukuk, which is as follows:
i. Hybrid/pooled certificates
These are certificates based on an underlying pool of assets, 
including istisna’, murabahah receivables, and ijarah with 
the condition that at least 51 percent of the pool comprises 
ijarah assets. The return on these certificates can only be a 
pre-determined fixed return.
ii. Variable rate redeemable certificate
This type of sukuk can be called alternative sukuk due to 
its seniority to issuer’s equity, their redeeming nature and 
their relative stable rate as compared to dividend payouts. 
The return on these sukuk is benchmarked to market 
references, such as LIBOR.
iii. Fixed-rate-zero-coupon certificate
These certificates are non-tradable certificates based on an 
underlying pool of assets, primarily istisna’ or salam that 
would create debt obligations.
Sukuk versus conventional bonds
It is imperative to differentiate between the basic tenets of 
bond and sukuk operations. Bonds are financial obligations, 
in form of certificates, issued by borrowers to creditors. 
Bonds have guarantee features in which creditors guarantee 
capital repayment with capital charge to the borrowers. The 
prime objective of bonds is to gear up the issuer’s leverage 
through a loan relationship. That loan relationship implies 
a contract with the characteristic of earning money on 
money, which is the practise known as riba and prohibited 
in Islam (Adam & Thomas, 2004). Bonds are very liquid in 
nature, as they can be easily traded in secondary markets in 
case the bondholders need liquidity. Bond’s risks are highly 
concentrated on credit risk of the issuer.
In contrast, sukuk represents asset ownership passed from 
the issuer to sukuk holders in form of Shariah compliant 
contracts such as lease, partnership, or sale contract, which 
originate from trade and business activities. The return 
can be either derived from profits of real underlying assets 
attached to sukuk or from sales, lease or partnership of 
business ventures, which characterises sukuk as an asset-
backed financing instrument. It is important to note that 
sukuk are not always debt instruments, but sometimes 
equity instruments, depending on how they are structured. 
The risks of sukuk are broader than conventional fixed 
income instruments in that they involve not only credit 
risk, but also market risk, asset-quality risk, regulatory risk, 
and so forth (Zaidi, 2009).
Under current practises, sukuk are aimed at having 
structure similar to conventional bonds in spite of different 
characteristics and modus operandi between sukuk and 
conventional bonds. According to Miller et al (2007), 
sukuk ensure returns similar to conventional bonds, while 
the difference is that the return of sukuk is generated from 
the underlying real asset ownership, not interest payments 
obligation as found in conventional bonds. This is similar 
to Wilson‘s (2008) argument that replicating sukuk to be 
identical to conventional bonds has been attempted by 
financiers because the financiers’ aim is simplifying risk 
assessment for this new asset class of investments.
In the Malaysian experience, asset-backed sukuk have been 
structured in such a way that the receivables attached in the 
sukuk’s underlying assets can be traded in the market, as 
with the Time Engineering musharakah asset-backed sukuk. 
In that case, sukuk is structured to acquire the receivables 
generated by Time System Integrator (Mokhtar & Thomas, 
2009). Furthermore, the rating proxies’ treatment of sukuk 
is exactly the same as conventional bonds as shown by the 
research conducted by Siswantoro (2006). He finds that 
revenue income of the coupon payments stream is attached 
to the whole company (obligor), not the specific project 
undertaken by the company. Hence, those facts indicate 
that the current structure of sukuk show indifference 
of economic outcomes of conventional bonds and adjusts 
well to modern western capital market technique, which 
characterises asset-based sukuk.
Asset backed sukuk versus asset based sukuk
According to IFSB guidelines (2005) No. 2, sukuk are ideally 
categorised as asset-based and equity-based instruments 
whereby the former offers fair and predictable return, 
such as in the case of salam, istisna’, and ijarah whilst the 
latter the return is derived from profit-loss sharing of joint 
venture business, which offers unpredictable return, based 
on musharakah or mudharabah contracts. Since there are 
deviations in the actual implementations of sukuk from ideal 
theoretical ground of sukuk, there has been a concern to 
categorise sukuk in order to differentiate genuine and non-
genuine ones, particularly risk factors and sale execution. 
In this regard, the guidelines of IFSB 7-Capital Adequacy 
Requirement for sukuk, Securitisations, and Real Estate 
Investments (2009) distinguish three types of sukuk structures: 
Asset-Backed sukuk (‘ABS’) and two non-ABS structures, 
which are pay-through and pass-through structures.
According to these particular guidelines, ABS are 
“structures that meet the requirement for being an asset-
backed structure as assessed by a recognised external credit 
assessment institution (i.e. rating bodies)” (p.3). Based on 
this guideline, there are two factors that constitute ABS. 
Firstly, in the case of any impairment of the sukuk’s assets, 
the sukuk holders have to face the loss. Secondly, the risk 
factor of ABS is the underlying assets of sukuk. Therefore, 
sukuk holders derive the risk and return from the cash flows 
of the sukuk’s underlying asset as well as have recourse to 
the sukuk asset, not the issuer, in case of default of sukuk 
issuer. True sale execution is another dimension of ABS in 
which there is a real transfer of assets from the originators 
to sukuk holders with the effect of releasing assets from 
the issuer’s balance sheet to investors (Ahmed, 2010). 
Therefore, ABS issuance must be backed by real assets that 
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represent the sukuk’s ownership as well as risks attached 
to the assets.
In contrast, with asset-based sukuk, there is no true sale 
transaction taking place, rather one sees just transfer of 
financial rights to the asset and the income is derived from 
the financial rights to obligations attached to the debt 
(Aziz & Gintzburger, 2010, p.276). True sale transaction 
is absent since the sukuk holders have recourse to the 
originator instead of the underlying assets in the event 
of defaults. This is based on pay-through and pass-through 
as defined in IFSB-7 (2009) guidelines, in which the 
former constitutes recourse to the originator via purchase 
undertaking whilst the latter constitutes recourse to the 
issuer via guarantee. Therefore, the risk and return of 
asset-based sukuk are derived from the obligor instead of 
the sukuk’s underlying assets, so that in case of defaults, 
investors have recourse to the obligor and secured creditors 
cannot recourse the asset. The risks are measured solely 
on the issuer or obligor’s creditworthiness to pay back the 
capital. Thus, it is not surprising that investors are mainly 
focused on sovereign/corporate credit quality and less 
concerned on the actual underlying asset performance 
when they buy sovereign sukuk (Hales, 2005). In this 
regard, sukuk holders are guaranteed to get the capital 
back in the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, in asset-
based sukuk, the structures are merely fulfilling the form 
of a contract with much more complexity, which ultimately 
leads to Islamic equivalent of unsecured conventional bond 
(Howladar, 2009). Hence, sukuk holders would only be 
able to dispose of the assets to the lessee and be treated 
as unsecured creditors or ranked pari passu with other 
unsecured creditors (Haneef, 2009).
Islamic securitisation vis-à-vis asset backed sukuk
In a conventional framework, asset securitisation refers 
to “the process and the result of issuing certificates 
of ownership as a pledge against cash flow streams of 
diversified pool of assets (assets portfolio) to investors” 
(Jobst, 2007, p.14). This asset securitisation proposes an 
alternative for capital market-based refinancing mechanism 
to diversify external sources of asset funding instead of 
intermediated debt finance based with a special emphasis 
on the risk assessment of securitised assets (Jobst, 2006). 
True sale, bankruptcy remoteness, and enforceability of 
assets are essential prerequisites for asset securitisation. 
Effective risk management and capital enhancement are 
great advantages of asset securitisation, since there are 
lower costs and risks emanating from asset securitisation 
than contractual loan relationships (Shaenker & Colletta, 
1991; Dvorak, 2002). Asset securitisation is highly exposed 
towards interest rate risks, since receivables associated to 
securitised assets are valued by interest rate discounting. 
Mortgage Backed Securities (‘MBS’) is one of examples 
of asset backed security, in which a pool of receivables 
of home buyers is securitised through intermediary 
institutions, such as Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac in US, and 
Cagamas in Malaysia. The risks of asset securitisation can 
be commoditised in a way that the risks can be detached 
from the assets to trade the risks in the market through 
irresponsible derivatives instruments, such as Credit 
Default Swaps (‘CDS’) instrument. CDS transfers the risk 
of default from the fixed income security holder to the 
swap seller.
To a certain extent, conventional asset securitisation is 
in line with Islamic securitisation. Both of these types of 
securitisation have similar prerequisites, processes, and 
advantages. Nevertheless, due to Shariah restrictions, Islamic 
securitisation has distinctive features that distinguish it from 
asset securitisation. Following the spirit of Shariah, Islamic 
securitisation must be free from three prohibited practises, 
which are riba, gharar, and maysir. Thus, anything leading 
to these practises is not tolerated such as debt and financial 
assets trading (bai al-dayn), haram activities, interest bearing 
collateral, and so forth. Furthermore, Islamic securitisation 
must involve the funding or the production of real assets rather 
than financial securities, which causes irresponsible leverage 
as well as speculation, through derivatives lending (Wilson, 
2004). Jobst (2007) points out four important conditions for 
Islamic securitisation to take, which are as follows:
1. Investor’s asset ownership conferment through direct 
business participation,
2. Real purpose for securitisation through identification of 
productive securitised assets,
3. Unconditional and unsecured payment obligation (non-
guarantee promissory notes),
4. Risk-pooling spirit whereby the risks and rewards 
are shared among market participants in the Islamic 
financial market
Thus, based on those four conditions, Islamic securitisation 
has the risk-reward sharing spirit and places a paramount 
importance on the real economy through undertaking real 
project activities.
Islamic securitisation is in line with asset-backed sukuk 
structures whereby the true sale transaction is taking 
place between the sukuk holders and the sukuk issuer. 
Besides, the return of securitised assets is derived from 
real activities, and the sukuk holders can legally enforce 
the securitised assets in the event of defaults. But, under 
current practises the sukuk structures, as asset-based sukuk 
is dominant structures in the ICM, unfortunately there is no 
such an Islamic securitisation in sukuk structuring. Thus, 
this poses major legal problems in the event of sukuk’s legal 
defaults where the sukuk holders cannot recourse to the 
securitised assets.
3. Legal challenges of Sukuk development 
in Islamic capital market
Legal infrastructure of Sukuk in various 
jurisdictions
Sukuk legal development is varied across countries operating 
Islamic finance, but the status of development is a major 
determinant of the success of sukuk. From an Indonesian 
perspective, the legal basis for sukuk development is not 
sufficient, because the legal basis for Islamic financial 
development as a whole still relies on conventional banking 
laws and regulations. With regard to sukuk development, 
the existence of the asset securitisation law in Indonesia is 
not in line with Shariah dictates, wherein the draft of the 
asset securitisation law clearly states that securitisation 
can only be structured through debt (Djojosugito, 2007). 
Meanwhile, in Malaysia, which is the most active Islamic 
capital market, has robust regulatory standards as framed 
by their Securities Commission (‘SC’).
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From a British legal perspective, sukuk instruments 
apparently fall under the definition of a Collective 
Investment Scheme (‘CIS’) as pursuant to the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (FSMA 2000). If sukuk were 
treated in the same way as CIS, sukuk issuers would be 
subject to a wider range of controls, and may need to be 
authorised. Such authorisation would entail limits on 
the range of assets eligible for investments, gearing and 
marketing purposes. Hence, this would arguably put 
sukuk issuers at a disadvantage compared to issuers of 
conventional debt securities.
The legal perspective of the US, however, is very helpful for 
facilitating sukuk issuance by upholding its true value as 
project financing for real activities. Sukuk are regulated in 
such a way that sukuk are structured through U.S traditional 
private-placement.2 The Securities Act, Section  4 (2) 
exempts “transactions by an issuer not involving any public 
offering,” which indicates that the investors in the private 
placement market are not typical investors who need the 
protection of the registration provisions of the Securities 
Act, since the investors have the ability to make an informed 
decision and bear the economic risk of the specified 
investment (Khaleq & Young, 2007). This Securities Act 
is supported by Rule 144  A in which full due-diligence 
over the issuer must be conducted and receive disclosure 
on the prospectus from the US Securities Council within 
US disclosure standards and Management’s Discussion 
and Analysis, Financial Condition Results of Operation 
(‘MD&A’).
Furthermore, Regulation S and Regulation D are 
interrelated to facilitate international secured financing 
through private placement in US (Shenker & Colletta, 
1991). This can be seen in the sukuk issued by East Cameron 
Gas in the US through private placement, whereby there 
was a proper due-diligence conducted over the project – 
oil drilling –  along with risk management mechanisms for 
project’s anticipated risks. Hence, US federal securities law 
provides an impetus for sukuk development towards the 
true value, even though US federal securities law treats 
sukuk in similar fashion with conventional bonds.
Enforceability of Sukuk contracts
Dispute between Western law and Shariah
Before assessing issues surrounding the enforceability 
of sukuk, it is imperative to portray the kind of conflicts 
happening in the sphere of Islamic finance due to dual law 
system that governs transactions.
English common law and civil law each present distinctive 
problems when they collide with Shariah. The problem 
in using Shariah finance under common law jurisdiction is 
the conflict that emerges between Shariah law and common 
law; the national law/common law always prevails over 
Shariah law when there are disputes. As a consequence, 
the contract is interpreted solely based on what is written 
in the contract in respect to Shariah regulations. This can 
be seen in the case of Shamil Islamic Bank of Bahrain VS 
Pharmaceutical Company, as explained by Potter (2004). 
In that case, the defendant was not able to make payment 
for his financing to the bank, and the court judged based on 
English law instead of Islamic law. The defendants argued 
that the contract was so worded with Shariah principles 
as not to clash with English law. However, the judge ruled 
that there cannot be two separate law systems governing 
a contract, and that the national system is the valid law 
to govern the contract based on Roman conventions which 
have force in the British law system. The conflict between 
common law and Shariah leads to idiosyncrasies, such 
as that verdict which was decided based on sale contract 
law, while the substance of the contract was actually a 
conventional debt contract. Therefore, confusion emerged 
as to the legal basis of the verdict.
On the side of civil law, one sees a lack of predictability, 
transparency, and consistency. Full codification of law, 
which is needed for predictability, is not implemented 
in the countries under civil law regimes. The problems 
posed by civil law can be witnessed in the recent Nakheel 
Sukuk case, in which there was confusion over which law 
should be adopted when Nakheel declared itself in a state of 
default. Because the Nakheel offering circular was governed 
with English common law while the sukuk transactions 
took place in a civil law jurisdiction, there was a conflict 
when the investors sued Nakheel for capital repayment 
in Dubai’s civil court. The investors could sue in English 
courts as well as in the United Arab Emirates, the seven-
member federation that includes Dubai. Nevertheless, even 
if they win and the court orders seizure of the assets, the 
foreign law ownership as well as sukuk agreement cast 
doubts over whether the law is enforceable in the UAE 
(Kasolowsky & Abocar, December 2009). Consequently, the 
investors’ rights are restricted from what was promised in 
the offering circular. Therefore, this indicates that civil law 
is not yet predictable and flexible enough to be enforced in 
governing jurisdiction.
With respect to sukuk structures in jurisdictions where 
Shariah concepts are followed, this is, to a certain degree, 
more straightforward from a legal perspective, although 
the process does compose more layers since it requires 
compliance with Shariah as well as local law (Khaleq & 
Richardson, 2007). Realising that in most of sukuk issuances 
that there are cross-border transactions, there is a problem 
with which law would be enforced. This enforceability issue 
causes legal impediments due to the inability to obtain 
satisfactory legal opinions, which emanate from the sales 
of assets between the originator and investors through 
the SPV, and also due to various bankruptcy law matters 
(McMillen, 2007). Hence, there is a confusion about which 
law can be enforced and to what extent that law can be 
enforced in sukuk issuance.
True sale execution
Executing a true sale is a crucial element in sukuk operation, 
as it constitutes a real transfer of ownership from the 
originator to the sukuk holders via the SPV. Nevertheless, 
some sukuk issuances do not execute a true sale, as with 
asset-based sukuk issuance, due to the absence of property 
law and bankruptcy law under civil law regimes. This again 
was reflected in the Nakheel Sukuk case wherein leasehold 
interests were not viewed as real rights or property rights 
under the relevant laws of the UAE as applicable in the 
Emirate of Dubai (Salah, 2010, p.10). Instead, the rights 
were viewed as unregistered personal contractual rights 
binding the parties as opposed to rights to the land in 
question (Silkenet et al., 2009). Similarly, in Indonesia, 
the concept of beneficiary rights has not been recognised 
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for sovereign sukuk issuance, as state assets needed for 
government operational activities cannot be transferred 
to third parties and must be subject to the approval of 
a government body (Guritno & Oktavinanda, August, 
2008). This indicates that the civil law indeed impedes 
the undertaking of true sales that would be enforceable in 
sukuk issuance.
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy law is crucial for facilitating true sale 
transactions in which investors are protected and will 
receive payment on asset-backed securities, even in cases 
of the originator’s bankruptcy (Schwarchz, 1995, p.151). 
So far in some countries under civil law regime, especially 
Middle East region, there has not yet emerged a proper 
bankruptcy law to protect sukuk holders from bankruptcy 
on the part of the sukuk originator. Taking example of the 
bankruptcy law of UAE, bankruptcy governed in Commercial 
Companies Law, Federal Law No.8 of 1994 does not have a 
specific definition of bankruptcy. The Law only shows the 
situation where a ‘Trader’ will be regarded as a bankrupt 
in the event of insolvency, as governed in Article 645 of 
the Law. In pursuant to Article 4 of the Law a trader is 
defined as being an individual or company that carries out 
commercial activities. The Law unfortunately does not have 
specific recognition of the term that describes the situation 
where shareholders have limited liability, as in the case 
of common law jurisdiction (Gulf News Report, January 
2009). On the side of common law jurisdiction and some 
countries under civil law jurisdiction such as Indonesia and 
Netherlands, the bankruptcy law is codified in the specific 
law. Besides, the law has clearer administrative procedures 
to deal with bankruptcy entity.
Due to lack of codification of bankruptcy law under civil 
law regime in Middle East region, the transaction is not a 
true sale, but a secured disguised loan in a true sale. This 
originates from the suspicious type of financing occurring 
persistently between the originator and the trustee. Thus, 
in case of bankruptcy, the court follows the legal precedent 
that the financing is a transfer of collateral because of 
the presence of recourse to the originator (Lupica, 1998). 
Nakheel sukuk default is precisely the example of legal 
uncertainties in UAE where the sukuk holders’ rights to 
claw back the assets are not protected when Nakheel 
declared its bankruptcy. Due to that fact, this is a warning 
for asset-based sukuk issuance in which the sukuk are issued 
in reflection of a secured collateralised loan. Hence, this 
means that the enforceability of the law in the court will be 
exactly the same between sukuk and secured collateralised 
loan.
SPV
An SPV is a bankruptcy remote firm, which is independent 
from the obligor. The SPV is established based on the 
trust law in which the sukuk’s originator as the transferor 
transfers the assets to the sukuk holders as beneficiaries 
via the SPV as a trustee with a good faith. Therefore, 
trust law plays an important role in governing the SPV’s 
establishment. Trust law has been well incorporated 
into both common and civil law jurisdictions; Dubai 
and Bahrain have already incorporated trust law in their 
legal systems. This trust law recognises the equity for 
remedies and rights in which beneficiaries are provided 
with equitable treatment remedies against unfaithful acts. 
Within common law treatment, the legal rights of the 
trustee are bounded by the legal rights of beneficiaries. In 
contrast, under civil law treatment, the beneficiaries have 
no rights or control towards the assets managed by trustee 
(Hansmann & Mattei, 1998). Hence, civil law treatment 
entails a problem for sukuk issuance that originates from 
civil law jurisdiction countries. In those cases, in the event 
of default, the sukuk holders do not have recourse to the 
asset due to civil law restrictions, and therefore those sukuk 
are characterised as asset-based sukuk.
In sukuk issuance, usually the issuers do a cross-border 
securitisation in which the SPV is located outside the 
originator’s country due to the absence of specific legislation 
on certain issues (e.g. tax law, securitisation law, etc.). This 
can be seen in the Tamweel sukuk issuance in which the 
SPV was located in the Cayman Islands – far from Dubai, 
the originator’s country. However, this typical offshore SPV 
leads to a problem whereby there is no uniform law, insofar 
as the off-shore jurisdiction is very lax on specific law 
enforcement with the consequence of a fragmented legal 
governing process in order to accommodate the parties’ 
needs (Frankell, 1998). Indeed, there is a significant legal 
unpredictability governing sukuk transactions if they are 
issued through an offshore SPV. Furthermore, even if legal 
judgments are obtained in the Cayman Islands or the United 
Kingdom, there can be additional impediments arising from 
those foreign judgements’ enforceability in those foreign 
jurisdictions where there is an absence of bilateral treaties 
for reciprocal enforcement of judgments (Ryan & Elmalki, 
January, 2010). Therefore, this issue leads to weakness 
on the part of the local court or legislation as well as legal 
confusion with respect to certain laws’ enforceability in 
case the issuer defaults.
4. Regulatory and financial implications 
of Sukuk’s legal challenges
Regulatory implications
Role of rating agency
It is an inevitable fact that when investors purchase 
sukuk, they are interested in the risk related to the issuer 
instead of the underlying assets or project undertaken 
due to prevalence of asset-based sukuk. This is happening 
because the methodology used by rating agencies for sukuk 
rating is similar with conventional bond ratings, since no 
independent sukuk rating agency has yet formed. In this 
regard, since the very essence of sukuk is project financing 
backed by real assets, rating agencies should shift the 
paradigm of sukuk rating whereby the risk’s proxy is based 
on the feasibility and prudential evaluation of the assets 
instead of the originator’s risks. Furthermore, compliance 
with Shariah as well as legal uncertainties are important 
proxies to be incorporated in sukuk rating methodology, 
particularly regarding how the sukuk issuance can protect 
the investors and also resolve the legal conflicts in the event 
of bankruptcy. It is important also for rating agencies to give 
assurances to investors through information notification 
regarding the underlying asset’s quality, so that they can 
make informed decisions (Zaidi, 2009).   
Standardisation of Sukuk
Since there are legal uncertainties and conflicts arising from 
sukuk transactions as well as Shariah divergences, sukuk 
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need to be standardised and streamlined in terms of legal 
documentation and Shariah standards. AAOIFI Shariah 
standards for sukuk have been set properly, but the problem 
is that the standards are not binding among key players in 
the Islamic financial industry. Therefore, enforcement of 
the standards is critical at the moment for having Shariah 
compliant sukuk in the market. Besides, there should be 
uniformity of law for offshore jurisdiction as well as the 
methods to resolve the conflict of legal systems that applies 
to all sukuk issuance across all jurisdictions. The goal would 
be that, in a case of default, the case could be resolved 
in pursuant to a standardised legal documentation. Hence, 
there would be predictability, certainties and Shariah 
convergence through sukuk standardisation.
Financial implications
Sukuk feasibility analysis
Since one must undertake a true sale undertaking as well as 
have full ownership of the assets, usufructs, or projects in a 
sukuk transaction, it is important that sukuk are structured 
in a manner backed by an identified of portfolio of high 
quality assets, which is in line with asset securitisation, and 
prospective projects (Dusuki & Mokhtar, 2010). Hence, the 
value of the identified portfolio of assets and project must 
represent the market value of the sukuk issuance in order 
to ensure that there are genuine interests over the portfolio 
of assets or a project. In this regard, at the initial sukuk 
structuring stage, it is vital for the sukuk’s lead arrangers, 
which are Islamic investment banks in most cases of sukuk 
issuance, to exercise careful due diligence over identified 
assets through scenario analysis (both best and worst 
scenarios), as well as stress-testing analysis where the asset 
performances in different financial situations over the 
sukuk’s tenure are evaluated. In addition, an on-site visit is 
required to look over the identified portfolio of assets and 
whether or not the assets are in existence and productive 
enough to generate positive cash flows. If, after thorough 
due diligence analysis over asset and an on-site visit, the 
identified of portfolio of assets are deemed to be high 
quality and productive assets, then the sukuk issuance can 
proceed. Consequently, positive cash flows are ensured for 
the investors along with the risks arising from a portfolio of 
underlying assets.
With regard to project identification, sukuk must be 
structured in a way that sukuk structures provide linkage of 
the identified project’s risks to the sukuk holders. This can 
be seen in Tamweel Sukuk where there were risks borne by 
the sukuk holders over the property development project 
since the periodic rental payment is from a third party 
lessee. There must be a proper feasibility analysis over 
the investment project’s plan, wherein the location of the 
project is identified. A scale model of project is also needed 
for conducting feasibility analysis. Realising that there are 
different sectors of industry, such as oil and gas, property 
development, pharmaceuticals, and so forth, industry 
analysis over the investment project plan is also required to 
assess the position of the sector in comparison with other 
sectors as well as the industry’s risk assessment within 
current and projected economic conditions. If the project is 
deemed to have bright prospects in which the project would 
generate positive returns in the future, then the investment 
project should be undertaken. This project sukuk financing 
is actually a long-term investment asset class. Therefore, 
the investors are no longer interested in the issuers’ risks 
rather than the asset’s risks, with the consequence of no 
guarantee and the investors easily have recourse over the 
assets in the event of default since the investors have legal 
ownership. There must be a proper and simple disclosure of 
the risk assessment and the nature of assets and project risk 
profile to the investors at the first sukuk offering, so that 
investors can make an informed investment decision based 
on the underlying risks in the sukuk issuance.
This actually has a good implication for looking at 
alternatives for sukuk pricing, as sukuk are currently priced 
at LIBOR. Due to the fact that the sukuk holders bear the 
risks of the identified portfolio of assets and the projects, 
the periodic payment of sukuk to the sukuk holders is 
positive cash flow derived from the underlying assets in 
proportion with the number of sukuk holders. So, for sukuk 
ijarah, the cash flows are derived from rental payment of 
underlying assets leased to the third party lessee. For the 
project financing, the payment is from rental proceeds once 
the project is developed in a case of sukuk ijarah mausuf 
bi al-zimmah. Hence, the ideal pricing for a given sukuk is 
derived from the real underlying assets or projects rather 
than current interest rates, and this pricing mechanism 
is actually in line with Islamic economic objectives.
Shariah compliant financial innovations of Sukuk
Possible Shariah compliant financial innovations can be 
suggested in order to give the financial protection to the 
sukuk holders from the legal uncertainties. As suggested 
by Khnifer (2010), there are three ways for suggesting so. 
Firstly, sukuk maturity extension whereby the sukuk contract 
is extended until the issuer’s legal dispute is resolved by 
imposing legal compensations in sukuk documentation, 
which can be reflected in higher rental payments to the 
sukuk holders in the case of ijarah sukuk, and higher 
agreed profit sharing ratio in the case of musharakah sukuk. 
Secondly, sukuk refinancing in which sukuk are refinanced 
with another sukuk, which have lower financing costs, in 
order to settle the sukuk holders’ residual payments. These 
two suggestions can be done only if the sukuk position 
had a strong financial position. Lastly, convertible equity 
sukuk in which sukuk’s assets values are converted into 
the issuer’s equity value based on pre-determined formula 
in the event of defaults. These innovations are expected to 
give assurances to the sukuk holders before the purchase 
undertaking is executed, and hence their financial rights 
are fully protected from legal uncertainties.
5. Conclusion
In this discursive research paper, current sukuk practises 
and legal compatibility issues of sukuk have been extensively 
discussed in the wake of sukuk defaults occurring in Islamic 
financing space. Regulatory treatments and also practical 
Shariah compliant financing innovations have been 
suggested to mitigate future sukuk defaults.
With the current structure of sukuk, the problems still 
revolve around form over substance of the sukuk structures 
whereby asset based sukuk structures are prevalent in 
the Islamic capital market. In line with Islamic securitisation 
concepts, asset-based sukuk do not fall under Islamic 
securitisation concepts because of the absence of a true 
sale in the operation, whilst asset-backed sukuk falls under 
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Islamic securitisation due to the presence of a true sale. 
The absence of true sales in current sukuk operations poses 
legal uncertainties to all sukuk parties, especially the sukuk 
holders. Based on an analysis of the legal issues discussed 
in this research, the legal infrastructure under various 
jurisdictions is not supportive enough for sukuk operations 
taking place. Each legal system entails different problems 
in governing sukuk operations as a true Shariah compliant 
financing. Due to that reason, at the bottom line, current 
sukuk structure fails to protect the legal rights of sukuk 
holders to the securitised assets. For the way forward, 
closer engagement between key players, regulators, Shariah 
advisers, and scholars in the industry are urgently needed to 
discuss and improve the feasibility of these regulatory and 
financial implications as discussed in this research paper.
This research paper only covers salient features of legal 
issues facing sukuk development. There are still rooms 
for improvements and more detailed analysis of this 
research topic, such as detailed legal analysis of trust law 
and bankruptcy law vis-à-vis SPVs, the regulatory issues 
pertaining to law development for sukuk issuance – just 
to name a few. It is expected that more works on this 
research topic will create awareness among regulators and 
key players in the Islamic financial industry, particularly 
the lawyers who do sukuk legal documentation. This is to 
ensure that sukuk can further progress through eliminating 
legal challenges with a step-by-step approach, which 
indeed requires concerted and synergised efforts from all 
key players in the Islamic financial industry.
Notes
1. The data is retrieved from combination 2 databases: 
Islamic Finance Information Services (IIFS) and Zawya 
Sukuk Monitor.
2. Private placement refers to secured long-term financing 
provided directly by a limited number of big investors 
such as big investment banks, insurance companies, 
and mutual funds (Ross et al., 2008).
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Abstract - With the emergence of Islamic finance, legal precepts of Islam gained momentum 
through voluntary adherence by market participants. Transactions are not governed by Islamic law 
as such. Rather they are structured within the framework of freedom of contract in a way that is 
coherent with Shariah principles. In absence of an authoritative judicial institution deciding on 
the Shariah conformity of a commercial transaction, individual Shariah scholars fill this gap. They 
interpret Islamic legal principles and exercise oversight of the products and operations of the Islamic 
finance industry. In Islamic finance transactions, there is frequently a dichotomy and tension between 
Shariah principles and perceptions underlying contractual agreements and their de jure qualification 
and treatment in secular jurisdictions. This paper investigates the divergence gap between Shariah 
precepts and the contractual design of Sukuk transactions as well as transparency issues under 
the German legal regime. Sukuk is taken pars pro toto for Islamic finance products. German law is 
chosen as case example within the circle of European civil law systems. One of the problematic issues 
is ownership status of Sukuk holders in sale-and-lease-back based Sukuk. Although, asset linkage is 
a major characteristic that distinguishes Sukuk from conventional bonds, the transfer of ownership 
in some sale-based Sukuk structures is highly controversial not only from a Shariah perspective but 
also from a legal perspective. This is particularly the case when Sukuk transactions are structured 
in civil law legal systems where the common law concepts of trust and beneficial ownership are 
not recognized. The disengagement of Sukuk transactions from their underlying originating assets 
can be problematic for Sukuk holders in the event of a bankruptcy of the obligor. The asymmetrical 
risk allocation between Sukuk issuer/obligor on the one side and the investor on the other may 
not only be problematic from an inner-Islamic point of view. In some cases this situation may also 
cause legal liability issues. Besides the issue of ownership status, some other terms and conditions of 
widespread Sukuk issues appear to be problematic with respect to legal transparency requirements 
on national and EU level. This paper suggests solutions to bridge the gap.
Keywords: Sukuk, ownership issues, trust, insolvency, transparency, legal enforcement, conflict 
of laws
1. Introduction and overview of the issues
While Islamic law is applicable in most jurisdictions of 
the Arab world in the field of “statut personnel” (akhwal 
al-shakhsiyya) such as family law, it is generally not applied 
in commercial matters which are instead governed by 
codified civil law, even though many Arab constitutions 
declare Islamic Shariah to be a “main source of legislation”. 
Similarly, civil codes of Arab jurisdictions refer to Islamic 
Shariah as interpretative rule (e.g., Art. 1(2) Qatari Civil 
Code 2004; Ballantyne, 1985, pp.  245–264; Al-Muhairi, 
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1996, pp. 219–244). Islamic finance and banking is 
characterized by voluntary adherence to Islamic commercial 
principles such as the prohibition of interest (riba), gambling 
(maisir) and speculation (gharar) as well as the principle 
of profit-and-loss-participation. Despite the absence of 
an all-binding “Islamic lex mercatoria” and differences 
between the different schools of law on the admissibility 
of certain Islamic finance products, there is a high degree 
of consistency and consensus among Shariah scholars as to 
the core principles governing Islamic financial transactions. 
Moreover, standard setting organizations such as the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) have formulated principles pertaining 
to major Islamic finance transactions aiming inter alia to 
standardise rules and to avoid ambiguities. In recent legal 
disputes between parties to an Islamic finance transaction 
within a secular jurisdiction it had to be tested whether 
Islamic law is merely non-binding soft law or a set of rules 
that is also applicable and enforceable before secular state 
courts. The prevailing view in “Western” jurisprudence is 
that Shariah is “insufficiently determinate to be a governing 
law of a contract” (Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd, 1 WLR (CA 2004) (UK)).
Notwithstanding this finding, the parties to a Shariah 
compliant financial contract do have the freedom to “dress” 
their contracts in accordance with their belief. This can be 
achieved by formulating the principles of Islamic law in the 
form of contractual clauses.
This paper will consider contracts that prima facie seem 
to mirror and satisfy Shariah requirements but do not 
always stand up to further scrutiny. This problematic issue 
became apparent in some asset-based or “asset-light” 
Sukuk structures where doubts were voiced about their 
representation of ownership. These doubts do not only 
stem from Shariah law considerations (e.g., Dusuki and 
Mokthar, 2010; Haneef, 2009; Usmani 2007). With regard 
to current market practices, the validity of ownership 
transfers from the transfering obligor/orignator to the SPV 
who is the alter ego of Sukuk holders and is also contentious 
under applicable laws. This further provokes the question if 
there is a potential risk of a prospective “claw back” of the 
Sukuk assets by an insolvency practicioner in the event of 
the obligor’s insolvency or the transfer’s re-characterization 
as a loan (see also Thomas, 2009). These problematic 
issues emerge predominantly in civil law jurisdictions 
such as Germany or the UAE, which do not provide for the 
concept of trust or beneficial ownership, two of the main 
characteristics which mark the difference between common 
law legal systems and civil law jurisdictions. 
Unlike in asset-backed structures, Sukuk holders generally 
do not have any security interest over assets underyling 
an asset-based Sukuk. The contractual agreements 
are designed in a way that ownership is reduced to a 
symbolic rather than enforceable status. This is because 
the perception under Shariah has generally no legal effect 
unless it is substantiated in the contract not by mere 
reference to Shariah but by virtue of material inclusion. 
However, Shariah positions may be taken into consideration 
in examining the will of the parties. 
It must be remembered that asset-based structures were 
created due to market pressure and competition as well 
as legal constraints (Haneef, 2009, pp.108-110) such as 
the inalienability of property to foreigners in most Gulf 
jurisdictions. Asset-based Sukuk are a viable financing 
solution for corporations and banks who are unwilling to 
dispose of their physical assets by way of true sale to an 
SPV, inter alia due to risk management considerations. 
From an investor’s perspective, asset-based Sukuk is a 
Shariah compliant alternative to bonds. The Sukuk holder 
generally has no asset risk but credit risk. 
Besides the issue of ownership status of Sukuk holders, 
some other terms and conditions of widespread Sukuk 
issues appear to be problematic with respect to legal 
transparency requirements on national and EU level.
As will be discussed in this paper, Shariah issues (“lex 
internum”) can strike through to the level of applicable 
state law (“lex externum”) in various ways. Examining 
this scenario under (German and UAE) civil law, the paper 
will discuss the consequences of this divergence. It will 
then examine to what extent this “conflict of laws” can be 
resolved and the divergence gap be bridged. 
2.  The issue of transfer of ownership 
to the SPV
Basic characteristics of Ijara-Sukuk
The AAOIFI, in its Shariah Standard 17 (2), defines 
investment Sukuk as “certificates of equal value representing 
undivided shares in the ownership of tangible assets, 
usufructs and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of 
particular projects or special investment activity” (AAOIFI, 
2008). Accordingly, asset linkage is a major characteristic 
that distinguishes Sukuk from conventional bonds and is 
required from a Shariah perspective. Asset ownership is 
also a condition for the tradability of Sukuk securities on 
secondary markets because the trading of debt (bai al-dayn) 
is not permitted (e.g., Ayub, 2007, p.146-147). Sukuk are 
based on a common Shariah contract such as Murabaha, 
Salam, Istisna, Ijara, Mudaraba, Musharaka and Wakala 
(for an overview of Sukuk see Ali, 2011; Adam/Thomas, 
2004; Thomas, 2009; Sacarcelik, 2011). One of the most 
frequent types of Sukuk is the Ijara Sukuk. In a nutshell, in a 
typical Ijara-Sukuk transaction a capital seeking sovereign 
or corporate entity (obligor) incorporates a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV)—often in a tax efficient off-shore jurisdiction. 
The obligor sells and transfers (the beneficial ownership of) 
an asset or a class of assets to the SPV whose sole purpose 
is to participate in that specific Sukuk transaction. The SPV 
issues certificates (Sukuk) to the Sukuk holders (investors) 
to finance the purchase of the asset. In its capacity as trustee, 
the SPV holds the assets in trust for the Sukuk holders. The 
SPV then leases the asset back to the obligor for a period 
that corresponds with the term of the  Sukuk certificates. 
According to prevailing definitions, the Sukuk certificates 
represent pro rata ownership in the asset. Hence, Sukuk 
holders are seen as (beneficial) owners of the asset. Often 
purchase undertakings, third party guarantees, liquidity 
facilities, profit reserve accounts as well as covenants 
ensure that the cash flow to the investors is maintained 
and the principal returned at term end or at the occurence 
of a dissolution event (e.g., default on payments). Other 
important elements of the Ijara Sukuk are the initial 
purchase and sale undertakings. The obligor undertakes 
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to purchase the underlying asset back from the SPV at face 
value on the maturity date (scheduled dissolution) or in case 
of a dissolution event. At the same time, the SPV undertakes 
to sell the asset back (sale undertaking) to the issuer. It is 
important to note for the present analysis that the SPV in 
its capacity as the trustee does not have the power to retain 
or sell the assets to any third party other than the obligor. 
The sale and purchase undertakings do not constitute offer 
and acceptance but a unilateral promise (wa’d) from both 
a classical Islamic legal and German civil law perspective. 
Whereas wa’d is not binding according to the majority view 
in classical Islamic legal literature and creates only a moral 
obligation, contemporary scholars declare it to be a binding 
promise if  the promisee incurs liabilities and expenses on 
the basis of such a promise (e.g., Islamic Development 
Bank, 2000; for a discussion on the legal nature of wa’d 
and its application in Islamic financial transactions, Al-
Masri, 2002; Mokhtar, 2011; Usmani, 2008, pp. 120). 
This is for example the case in murabaha financing and 
the repurchase agreement in Ijara-Sukuk structured as a 
sale-and-lease-back transaction. Accordingly, at the end of 
the lease term, the obligor (re-)purchases the underlying 
asset (e.g., real estate) from the SPV. The redemption price 
payable by the obligor equals the nominal amount of the 
outstanding certificates and is distributed to the investors 
through the SPV. 
Ownership rights of Sukuk holders?
Common law trust and beneficial ownership
The vast majority of Sukuk issues are governed by English 
law. Legal certainty and familiarity demanded by investors 
explains the predominant use of English law. Another 
reason for this choice is that ownership rights can be split 
into legal and equitable or beneficial ownership in English 
law. This dualism of ownership is the fundament component 
in the concept of trust (Hayton, 2003) which is used both 
in conventional securitizations and Sukuk transactions. The 
obligor in a Sukuk transaction does not transfer legal title 
to the SPV but only the beneficial interest in the underyling 
assets (Thomas, 2009, pp. 95). Pursuant to a declaration 
of trust, the SPV acts as trustee and holds the (beneficial 
interest in the) assets upon trust in favor of the Sukuk holders 
who obtain (derivative) beneficial ownership. Among other 
qualities of a trust is that the assets do not form part of the 
estate of a trustee. The trustee can only act within the powers 
given to it by the trust deed or the statutes. As such it is not at 
liberty to sell on the sukuk assets or to keep the proceeds.
The  concept of beneficial ownership as used in asset-based 
Sukuk is deemed sufficient by Shariah scholars (Thomas, 
Sukuk, pp. 97) to meet the requirements of Islamic property 
law (Habachy, 1962; Wohidul Islam, 1999; Ziadeh, 1993). 
And in fact, the legal position of a beneficial owner is similar 
to that of a legal owner in many respects. For example, 
the beneficial owners can enforce their right to the asset. 
They are also entitled to transfer their beneficial interest 
to third parties. Beneficial ownership can be obtained 
through inheritance. However, the protection against the 
legal owner who tranfers the asset to a bona fide third 
person is weaker (Baur and Stürner, 2009; § 64 mn. 31). 
In contrast to the transfer of legal title in real property (sec. 
27(1), 3(a) Land Registration Act, 2002), the transfer of 
beneficial interest in real property does not require formal 
registration in English law. The concept of trust and the 
split of ownership facilitate the transfer of an asset without 
incurring tax or registration burdens. 
The main structural weakness of beneficial ownership vis-
à-vis full legal title, however, most notably comes up in the 
insolvency scenario under a legal regime (lex concursos) 
that does not recognize the concept of split ownership. 
Despite the fact that, for example, English law is chosen as 
governing law in the Sukuk documentation (e.g., offering 
circular), according to the conflict of laws doctrine of lex 
rei sitae (e.g., sec. 43 German Introductory Law to the 
Civil Code (EGBGB)), the law governing the transfer of 
title to property is dependent upon, and varies with, “the 
law where the property is situated”. Choice of law is not 
permitted in Germany for legal transactions involving 
property. The same applies most likely in UAE law which is 
far more protective when it comes to property ownership. 
This can be seen for instance in the ownership restrictions 
for Non-UAE and Non-GCC nationals in the Emirate of 
Dubai (Article 4 (1) of the Dubai Real Property Registration 
Law). 
Conclusively, it is debatable whether ownership is effectively 
transferred to the SPV when real property underlying an 
Ijara-Sukuk or similar sale-based structures is situated for 
example in Germany or the UAE. This might also have an 
effect on the validity of the English law trust structure itself 
because one of the required certainties of a trust is the trust 
property. 
Doubts about ownership transfer
In his recent criticism of some widespread asset-based 
Sukuk structures, Sheikh Taqi Usmani raised doubts about 
the transfer of ownership to Sukuk. His famous paper 
“Sukuk and Their Contemporary Application,” which was 
circulated towards the end of 2007, caused quite a stir 
and led to turmoil in the Sukuk market during the global 
financial crisis. As a result of the controversies, the AAOIFI 
issued a Shariah resolution on Sukuk in 2008 to clarify the 
situation and restore calm. Usmani’s main criticsm centered 
on the purchase undertaking in equity based Sukuk where 
the issuer undertakes to buy back the underlying assets 
from the issuer at face value and not prevailing market 
value or fair value on the expiry date of the Sukuk or in 
the event of a default. In fact, this stipulation moves 
Sukuk very close to a conventional debt security in terms 
of risk characteristics and performance. The risk is related 
to the credit worthiness of the provider of the purchase 
undertaking (obligor) and not the assets underlying the 
Sukuk. Whether recourse to the issuer or the asset (or a 
combination of both) is allowed, also affects the rating of 
a Sukuk, since rating agencies may evaluate a Sukuk either 
in terms of cash flow stability or default probability. 
In his paper, however, Usmani did not deal with the issue 
of ownership directly or to any great depth (see already: 
Usmani, 2008, p.178), saying “generally, Sukuk represent 
ownership shares in assets that bring profits or revenues, 
like leased assets, or commercial or industrial enterprises, or 
investment vehicles that may include a number of projects. 
This is the one characteristic that distinguishes Sukuk from 
conventional bonds. However, quite recently, the market has 
witnessed a number of Sukuk in which there is doubt regarding 
their representation of ownership” (Usmani, 2007). 
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As previously mentioned, the issue of ownership of assets 
underlying Sukuk becomes indeed apparent in Sukuk 
default scenarios where risk mitigating mechanisms cease 
to operate and both the distressed issuer and the obligor 
fail to fulfill their payment obligations. As a last resort, 
Sukuk holders seek recourse to the assets. 
Protecting Sukuk holders from any prospective “claw back” 
of the assets by creditors of the obligor the SPV or the 
transfer’s recharacterization as a loan requires that:
1. the SPV is insolvency remote 
2. the transfer of ownership is valid and legally binding 
(“true sale” or off-balance sheet treatment) 
Hence, in an inolvency of the obligor, it is decisive to identify 
the status of the SPV: Is it the owner of the Sukuk assets, a 
secured creditor or an unsecured creditor? This is crucial 
because according to s. 47 of the German Insolvency Code 
(Insolvenzordnung), for example, third party property does 
not belong to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Owners have 
a right to segregate their property (Aussonderungsrecht) 
and enjoy a priority status over other creditors and equity 
holders who will only receive distributions after the higher 
priority claims are satisfied. Because of the disputed and 
unclear situation, the issue of propriertary rights and of 
Sukuk holders needs further examination from a civil law 
perspective.
Legal conditions for the transfer of moveable 
and immoveable property
In Sukuk transactions, the obligor and the SPV formally 
agree to conclude a contract of sale. The initial purchase 
agreement is also mentioned in the prospectus. Pursuant 
to this agreement, the Sukuk assets are sold to the SPV 
and leased to the obligor according to a lease agreement. 
The obligor undertakes to purchase the asset back on the 
maturity date or a dissolution event. The SPV is obliged to 
sell the assets back to the obligor and it is not at liberty to 
dispose of the assets. This arrangement shows structural 
similarities to the “Sicherungsübereignung” in German 
law where ownership in a res is transferred to a creditor for 
the security of a debt that is owed to them by the owner of 
the transferred res, or by another debtor. However, while 
the “Sicherungsübereignung” which resembles chattel 
mortgage is used for security purposes and is comparable to 
a lien on property, the agreements in a Sukuk transactions 
aim to ensure Shariah compliance. 
Regardless of the purpose of the ownership transfer, the 
transfer is only valid if certain conditions are met.
In contrast to common law systems, in civil law systems, 
and particularly in the German one, there is a much greater 
differentiation between the “contract” (e.g., a contract of 
sale) (Verpflichtungsgeschäft), which creates the obligation 
to transfer, and the “conveyance” (Verfügungsgeschäft), the 
actual transfer of a proprietary right (especially ownership) 
in a res which effects the alienation of that res, i.e., the passing 
of the real right from transferor to transferee. The contract 
of sale does not effectuate the transfer of ownership ipso 
iure. Rather, the transfer of ownership in a res is a twofold 
process that requires first an agreement by the parties 
that ownership shall pass in respect of a specific res, and 
second the handing over of the res (delivery) as a factual 
act. If the res is immovable property, the conveyance must 
be approved by a notary (§ 311b German Civil Code) and 
the agreement on the transfer of ownership must be in the 
presence of a notary (§ 925 German Civil Code). Moreover, 
the transfer of ownership requires registration with the land 
registry (§ 873 German Civil Code). Similarly, in Dubai, it 
is compulsory to register real estate with the Dubai Land 
Department (Article 1277 UAE Federal Law No. 5 of 1985 
(Civil Code) and Articles 6, 7 of the Dubai Real Property 
Registration Law – Federal Law No. 7 of 2006).
Despite the use of terms such as “sale” or “ownership” in the 
transaction documents, the initial transfer of ownership is 
often not perfected in asset-based Sukuk. 
Characterisation of the transfer as a loan?
Because German law does not recognize the concept of 
trust or beneficial owner, the transfer of ownership in real 
property forming the underlying of a Sukuk and situated 
in Germany requires registration. It is expressively stated 
in the transaction documents of some Sukuk offerings that 
transfer of the ownership will not be perfected (see e.g., 
ADIB Sukuk, Offering Circular, Risk Factors, pp. 9–10). 
This provokes the question if this statement is merely of 
declaratory nature clarifying that the factual act of transfer, 
e.g., registration of real property did not take place. 
Assuming this is the will of the parties, one could argue 
that the registration of the property to perfect the transfer 
of the legal title could be made good at a later point in time, 
e.g., when investors fear the near default of the obligor. 
A counter-argument against this view could be that there 
is no convincing reason as to why the SPV representing the 
Sukuk holders should be given the right to pursue property 
registration although both parties willingly and knowingly 
did not act in conformity with their contractual sales 
agreement just until a critical stage is reached, i.e., payment 
problems of the obligor evolved. Sukuk holders who set 
themselves in contradiction to their previous conduct might 
forfeit their right to obtain ownership (venire contra factum 
proprium). However, this rigid sanction cannot be justified 
if there is a valid claim and only a relatively short of time 
elapsed after the conclusion of the contract of sale. 
Taking into consideration that the intention of the parties 
of an asset-based Sukuk is to structure an instrument that 
replicates the economic features of an unsecured bond, 
one could also take the view that the obligor at no time 
intended to fulfill its obligation to transfer the assets to the 
SPV. One has to bear in mind that asset based Sukuk were 
created due to market pressure and competition (Haneef, 
2009, pp. 108–110) as well as legal constraints such as the 
impossibility of true sales due to the inalienability of real 
property to foreigners in Gulf jurisdictions. Moreover, the 
SPV is not more than an “orphan shell company”. 
The assumption that the Sukuk holders generally are 
not quite interested in the underyling assets or structure 
of a Sukuk but rather the cash flow generated by them 
is supported by the fact that no asset due diligence or 
valuation is performed by a neutral third-party expert. 
This aspect is clearly indicated in certain prospectus: “No 
investigation or enquiry will be made and no due diligence 
will be conducted in respect of any Sukuk assets. Only limited 
representations will be obtained from IDB in respect of the 
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Sukuk assets of any series of trust certificates. In particular, 
the precise terms of the Sukuk assets or the nature of the assets 
leased or sold will not be known (including whether there 
are any restrictions on transfer or any further obligations 
required to be performed by IDB to give effect to the transfer 
of the relevant Sukuk assets). No steps will be taken to perfect 
any transfer of the relevant Sukuk Assets or otherwise give 
notice of the transfer to any lessee or obligor in respect thereof. 
Obligors and lessees may have rights of set off or counterclaim 
against IDB in respect of such Sukuk assets” (IDB Sukuk 2005 
Offering Circular, Risk Factors, pp. 69–70). Thus, in most 
cases it will also not be possible to asses whether the face 
value of the Sukuk certificates truly reflects the real market 
value of the underlying assets. Similar to the “disclaimer” 
mentioned above, one can also find the clarification in 
some prospectuses that Sukuk holders will not have interest 
in the assets from a legal perspective. This is indicated for 
example in the DP World offering circular: “Each of the 
Mudaraba Agreement, the Purchase Undertaking and the 
Sale Undertaking are governed by English law under which 
the interest under Shariah in the Mudaraba Assets of either 
the Issuer and/or the Trustee may not be recognized. Neither 
the Issuer nor the Trustee has any interest in the Mudaraba 
assets under English law” (DP World Offering Circular, Risk 
Factors, p. 22).
The lack of interest of Sukuk holders in the assets—at least 
so long they receive payments—may not be a sufficient 
evidence to negate ownership. Similarly, the (fiduciary) 
restrictions on the transferability of the assets to third 
parties by the SPV is legally permissible in German civil law 
(sec. 137 German Civil Code) and serves the interests of the 
Sukuk holders. However, the fact that payment obligations 
of the issuer rank pari passu with the claims of all its other 
unsecured and unsubordinated creditors possibly can be 
taken as an argument against ownership of Sukuk holders. 
On the basis of the statements in the sales contract or the 
prospectus stating that “no steps will be taken to perfect 
any transfer of the relevant Sukuk assets” one could argue 
that the claim of the SPV for procuration or transfer of 
the assets as promulgated in sec. 433 subsec. 1 German 
Civil Code is waived. In view of these circumstances, one 
would perhaps not go to the length of holding the transfer 
of property or the sales contract as fictitious and thus null 
and void (e.g., sec. 117 German Civil Code). If, however, 
the sales contract is “deformed” to such a degree that the 
most fundamental obligation of a sales transaction, i.e., the 
transfer of the subject matter, is excluded bilaterally on the 
basis of a (side) agreement, one will usually tend to take a 
substance over form approach and classify the transaction 
as sale and not a loan—irrespective of the designation by 
the contracting parties. The financing character of the 
described structures dominates the transactions. Thus, 
there is little room to classify the transaction as a contract 
of sale. Rather, the contract would be classified as a loan 
according to sec. 488 German Civil Code.  
In recent judgments in the UAE or Saudi Arabia, courts took 
a substance over form approach when they had to consider 
Islamic finance transactions. In a decision dated 24 March 
2010, the Dubai Court qualified an Ijara Contract as a sales 
contract taking a substance over form approach (personal 
communication). The Saudi Board of Grievances declared 
that “the circuit is concerned about the substance, not the 
title” (Khalid Bin Abdulaziz Alanzan v. Saudi American 
Bank (Samba Financial Group), 17.1.1429 A.H./26 January 
2008, Personal communication). Accordingly, taking a 
substance over form approach, the courts in the GCC could 
declare the Sukuk construction with the aforementioned 
features to be a disguised form of an interest bearing 
bond. 
Similarly, in the recent case Blom Development Bank vs. 
The Investment Dar Company ([2009] EWHC 3545 (Ch)), 
the English High Court moved away from the previous 
view taken in Shamil Bank of Bahrain vs. Beximco ([2004] 
EWCA Civ. 99) and held that TID’s legal counsel had made 
an arguable case that a Wakala agreement entered into 
between TID and Blom was not compliant with Shariah and, 
therefore, that the agreement was beyond the corporate 
powers of TID and void.
The classification of the underyling contract not as a sales 
transaction but a loan could also trigger unpredictable 
international enforceability issues (e.g., Salah, 2010). 
If, for example the Sukuk transaction is structured under 
German law but the assets are in Doha or Dubai, the local 
court could accept the German judicial assessment and 
commence with the enforcement procedure. In this case 
the court could ignore the limited recourse or insolvency 
remote structure of the Sukuk transaction, pierce through 
this veil and realise the assets of the obligor. However, 
the local court might also revisit the merits of the case 
and could make Shariah considerations fully or partially 
effective. Hence, the court could give effect to the sale 
contract and acknowledge the proprietry rights of Sukuk 
holders. It would first urge the parties to register the 
underyling real estate with the Land Department. In this 
scenario, Sukuk holders would only have recourse to the 
assets taking the risk that the asset value is not sufficient to 
cover the invested capital.
One possible way to avoid these problems would be 
to use the concept of German “custody” or “fiduciary 
agency” (Treuhand) which is very close to the Common 
Law Trust. Whereas the opinions in legal literature are 
“liberal” as to the conditions of an insolvency remote 
Treuhand, the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) 
requires an immediate transfer of the Treuhand asset 
from the Beneficiary (Treugeber, here: SPV) to the Trustee 
(Treuhänder, here: Obligor). According to this restrictive 
view, a declaration by the Obligor that it holds the assets on 
trust for the SPV is not sufficient. Furthermore, in case the 
Treuhand asset is a real estate, the Federal Court takes the 
view that the registration of a priority notice (Vormerkung, 
sec. 883 German Civil Code) is compulsory. In light of this 
judicature it is recommendable to register the real estate 
with the land registry in order to grant Sukuk holders 
recourse to the assets in case of insolvency of the Obligor 
and to avoid a “claw back” by an insolvency practitioner.    
Legal concequences of deficient transparency 
in sukuk documents
Sukuk structures, as described above, may be particularly 
problematic if they are publicly offered to retail customers. 
Despite the disclaimers and statements in the prospectuses, 
confusions on the side of average retail customers about 
the de facto characteristics of an asset based Sukuk cannot 
be entirely dispersed. Especially the terms “sale”, “lease”, 
Overcoming the divergence gap between applicable state law and Shariah principles
Sacarcelik
150 Ethics, Governance and Regulation in Islamic Finance
or “repurchase” used in Sukuk prospetuses may be 
misleading. Market participants who, without access to (or 
interest in) the legal detail, could sincerely believe there is 
asset security and that the investment/financing provided 
is collateralized (see Moody’s, 2009, p. 5). 
Poor transparency in the terms and condition  of Sukuk 
offerings can violate the transparency requirement 
promulgated in sec. 3 Bond Act (Schuldverschreibungsgesetz) 
or the unfair terms provisions, most notably sec. 307 of the 
of the German Civil Code, rendering the relevant clause 
void. Moreover, prospectus liability may arise, e.g. when the 
formulations in the prospectus are misleading. Prospectus 
liability can be triggered also in case of explicit violation 
of fundamental Shariah rules (Casper, 2011; Sacarcelik, 
2010).
3. Shifting ownership risks to the lessee
Another major concern in Ijara Sukuk is that Sukuk 
holders who are owners (i.e., lessors) from the Shariah 
point of view are responsible for major maintenance or 
insurance expenses of the subject matter of the sale and 
lease agreement. In practice, the obligor is frequently 
appointed as servicing agent for the asset. In this capacity, 
the lessee manages the maintenance on behalf of the Sukuk 
holders. The lessee usually receives a servicing fee and can 
claim reimbursement if any additional expenses incurred. 
However, the ownership responsibilities and costs are 
passed on to the lessee through charging a supplemental 
rental in the amount equal to the expenses claimed by the 
lessee. The lessee’s obligation to pay supplemental rent 
is then set off against the lessor’s (SPV/Sukuk holders) 
obligation to reimburse expenses. Passing on maintenance 
responsibilities can be agreed under German law between 
the lessor and the lessee within certain statutory limits. 
In conventional finance lease contracts, the lessee usually 
bears this responsibility. Since Sukuk holders economically 
benefit from this arrangement there is generally no legal 
objection; e.g., with respect to unfair terms rules. However, 
this risk shifting might be problematic from a Shariah 
perspective because it disburdens Sukuk holders from 
genuine ownership obligations. Moreover, German tenancy 
law sets limits to the rent increase both for residential 
and commercial real estate. Consequently, charging 
supplemental rent to absorb expensive maintenance costs 
might be barred when it exceeds a certain level.
4. Conclusion
This article has shown that Shariah considerations 
underlying Islamic finance transactions and legal 
structuring can fall appart and create a gap. This divergence 
gap can be seen, for example, when it comes to ownership 
issues in asset-based Sukuk. The compexity of the issues 
increase due to the international scope of these transactions 
involving different jurisdictions. The disengagement of 
Sukuk transactions from their underlying assets leads to a 
risk structure that is not always reflecting the stipulations 
of Shariah compliant finance. 
This paper suggests that in absence of the trust structure 
in German law or comparable civil law legal systems, a 
true sale has to be effectuated to grant Sukuk holders 
ownership rights. Formal registration is mandatory where 
the underyling asset of a Sukuk is immovable property. The 
valid transfer of the assets can eliminate the risk of a “claw 
back” of the assets or the characterization of the transfer 
as loan. Alternatively, the concept of Treuhand can be used 
to approximate the relevant Sukuk under German law to 
transactions utilizing an English law trust. 
Legal issues in Sukuk transactions structured in civil law 
jurisdictions are not limited to Ijara Sukuk. Equity-based 
Sukuk such as Mudaraba and Musharaka also show features 
that might conflict with existing legal provisions of German 
law. Moreover, the Mudaraba or Musharaka arrangement 
could qualify as civil or commercial company. However, 
complying with Shariah requirements usually does not 
cause legal frictions as long as the relevant statutory rules 
are observed. Despite challenges and some problematic 
issues reagarding current Sukuk market practices, German 
law provides a liberal and secure legal environment for 
Islamic finance transactions including Sukuk. This has 
been already proven by various Islamic funds, certificates 
and the prominent Saxony Anhalt Sukuk being the only 
“European” Sukuk to date.
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